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LIST OF PLANS.

Portrait of Author. Vol. I.

Map of Greece. Vol. II.

Vol. IV. (1) Maliac Gulf and Thermopylæ.

(2) Battle of Salamis.

(3) Battle of Platæa.

Vol. V. (1) Battle between Athenian and Peloponnesian Fleet.

(2) Battle of Amphipolis.

Vol. VI.

(1) Syracuse—operations of the siege.(2) Syracuse—when Demosthenes arrived.

Marches of the Greeks after the Battle of Kunaxa. Vol. VII.

Vol. VIII. (1) Battle of Mantineia.

(2) Plan of Syracuse at the invasion of Dion.

Vol. X. (1) Battle of Issus.

(2) African Territory of Carthage.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME X.

PART II.—HISTORICAL GREECE CONTINUED.

CHAPTER XCII.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

P	AGE	1	PAGE
During Alexander's reign, the his-		Regiments and divisions of the	
tory of Greece is nearly a blank	1	phalanx-heavy-armed infantry	11
To what extent the Asiatic pro-		Light infantry of the line-Hypas-	
jects of Alexander belonged to		pistæ, or Guards	12
Grecian history	2	Light troops generally - mostly	
Pan-hellenic pretences set up by		foreigners	13
Alexander. The real feeling of		foreigners	
the Greeks was adverse to his		lence—how regimented	ib.
success	3	The select Macedonian Body-	•••
Analogy of Alexander's relation		guards. The Royal Pages	14
to the Greeks—with that of the		Foreign auxiliaries—Grecian hop-	
Emperor Napoleon to the Con-		lites — Thessalian cavalry —	
federation of the Rhine	ib.	Pæonians—Illyrians, Thracians,	
Greece an appendage, but a valu-			16
able appendage, to Macedonia	4	&c	10
Extraordinary military endow-	-	at Pella	ib.
ments and capacity of Alex-		Macedonian aptitudes - purely	
ander	ib.		
Changes in Grecian warfare, ante-	00.	to them in lieu of national senti-	
cedent and contributory to the			17
military organization of Mace-		ment Measures of Alexander previous	
	5		
donia	J	pater left as viceroy at Pella	18
before Philip. Good and firm		March of Alexander to the Hel-	10
	7	lespont. Passage across to	
cavalry: poor infantry	•		19
Philip re-arms and re-organizes		Asia Visit of Alexander to Ilium	20
the infantry. Long Macedonian	8		20
pike or sarissa	0	Analogy of Alexander to the	21
Macedonian phalanx—how armed	0	Greek heroes	21
and arrayed	9	Review and total of the Mace-	22
It was originally destined to con-		donian army in Asia	23
tend against the Grecian		Chief Macedonian officers	20
hoplites as organized by Epa-		Greeks in Alexander's service—	24
meinondas	10	Eumenês of Kardia	24

CHAPTER XCII.—continued.

F	AGE		PAGE
Persian forces—Mentor and Mem-		Asiatics to Alexander. Sur-	
non the Rhodians	24	render of the strong fortress of	
Succession of the Persian crown		Sardis	38
-Ochus-Darius Codomannus	25	He marches from Sardis to the	
Preparations of Darius for defence	26	coast. Capture of Ephesus	39
Operations of Memnon before		He finds the first resistance at	
Alexander's arrival	27	Miletus	40
Superiority of the Persians at sea;	41	Near approach of the Persian	*0
		floor Mommon is made com	
their imprudence in letting		fleet. Memnon is made com-	21.
Alexander cross the Hellespont	.,	mander-in-chief of the Persians	ib.
unopposed	ib.	The Macedonian fleet occupies	
Persian force assembled in Phry-		the harbour of Miletus, and	
gia, under Arsites and others	28	keeps out the Persians. Alex-	
Advice of Memnon to avoid fight-		ander declines naval combat.	
ing on land, and to employ the		His debate with Parmenio	41
fleet for aggressive warfare in		Alexander besieges Miletus. Cap-	
Macedonia and Greece	ib.	ture of the city	42
Arsitês rejects Memnon's advice,		The Persian fleet retires to Hali-	
and determines to fight	29	karnassus. Alexander disbands	
	20	his own fleet	ib.
The Persians take post on the river Granikus	30	March of Alexander to Halikar-	ιο.
	90		
Alexander reaches the Granikus,		nassus. Ada queen of Karia	40
and resolves to force the passage		joins him	43
at once, in spite of the dissua-		Strong garrison and good defen-	
sion of Parmenio	ib.	sive preparation at Halikar-	
Disposition of the two armies	ib.	nassus	44
Battle of the Granikus	31	Siege of Halikarnassus. Bravery	
Cavalry battle. Personal danger of Alexander. His life is saved		of the garrison, under Ephialtes	
of Alexander. His life is saved		the Athenian	ib.
by Kleitus	33	Desperate sally of Ephialtês-at	
Complete victory of Alexander.		first successful, but repulsed-	
Complete victory of Alexander. Destruction of the Grecian in-		he himself is slain	46
fantry on the side of the Per-		Memnon is forced to abandon	***
	34	Halikarnassus, and withdraw	
Loss of the Persians—numbers of	07	the garrison by sea, retaining	
	35		
their leading meu slain		only the citadel. Alexander	477
Small loss of the Macedonians	ib.	enters Halikarnassus	47
Alexander's kindness to his		Winter campaign of Alexander	
wounded soldiers, and severe		along the southern coast of Asia	
treatment of the Grecian pri-		Minor	48
soners	36	Alexander concludes his winter	
Unskilfulness of the Persian		campaign at Gordium. Capture	
leaders. Immense impression		of Kelænæ	49
produced by Alexander's victory	37	Appendix on the length of the	
Terror and submission of the		Macedonian sarissa or pike	50
			.,,
CHAI	TTC	R XCIII.	
CIIII		10 20111.	
Communication of the communica			
SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC C	AMP.	aigns of Alexander—Battli	E OF
Tanza	Q _T	D OR Turn	
Issus—	DIEG	E OF TYRE.	
Alexander outs the Cardina		35.	
Alexander cuts the Gordian knot	53	Memnon. Capture of Mity-	
He refuses the liberation of the		lênê	54
Athenian prisoners	54	Hopes excited in Greece by the	
Progress of Memnon and the Per-		Persian fleet, but ruined by the	
sian fleet—they acquire Chios		death of Meinnon	55
and a large part of Lesbos-they		Memnon's death an irreparable	
besiege Mitvlênê. Death of		mischief to Darius	ih

CHAPTER XCIII.—continued.

	PAGE		PAG
Change in Darius' plan caused		by Alexander—capture of the	FAGI
by this event. He resolves to		mother and wife of Darius	17
take the offensive on land. His		Courteous treatment of the regal	- 1
immense land force	56	formale prigorous by Alexander	
Free speech and sound judgment	50	female prisoners by Alexander	7
of Charidamna Ha is and to		Complete dispersion of the Per-	
of Charidemus. He is put to		sian army — Darius re-crosses	
death by Darius	57	the Euphratês—escape of some	
Darius abandoned Memnon's plan,		Perso-Grecian mercenaries	7:
just at the time when he had		Prodigious effect produced by the	
the best defensive position for		victory of Issus	74
executing them with effect	58	Effects produced in Greece by the	
Darins recalls the Grecian mer-		battle of Issus. Anti-Mace-	
cenaries from the fleet	ib.	donian projects crushed	7.
Criticism of Arrian on Darius'			- 6
plan :	59	Capture of Damaskus by the Mace-	
	อย	donians, with Persian treasure	_
March of Alexander from Gor-		and prisoners	70
dium through Paphlagonia and		Capture and treatment of the	
Kappadokia	ib.	Athenian Iphikratês. Altered	
He arrives at the line of Mount		relative position of Greeks and	
Taurus—difficulties of the pass	60	Macedonians	77
Conduct of Arsames, the Persian		Alexander in Phoenicia. Aradus,	
satrap. Alexander passes Mount		Byblus, and Sidon open their	
Taurus without the least resist-		gates to him	78
ance. He enters Tarsus	61		
	01	Letter of Darius soliciting peace	
Dangerous illness of Alexander.		and the restitution of regal cap-	
His confidence in the physician		tives. Haughty reply of Alex-	
Philippus, who cures him Operations of Alexander in Kilikia	ib.	ander	ib
Operations of Alexander in Kilikia	62	Importance of the voluntary sur-	
March of Alexander out of Kili-		render of the Phœnician towns	
kia, through Issus, to Myrian-		to Alexander	79
drns	63	Alexander appears before Tyre-	
March of Darius from the interior		readiness of the Tyrians to sur-	
to the eastern side of Mount		render, yet not without a point	
Amanus. Immense numbers of		reserved—he determines to be-	
his army: great wealth and		siege the city	80
ostentation in it: the treasure		Everbitant diamonitions and con	00
	0.4	Exorbitant dispositions and con-	O1
and baggage sent to Damaskus	64	duct of Alexander	81
Position of Darius on the plain		He prepares to besiege Tyre—	
eastward of Mount Amanus.		situation of the place	82
He throws open the mountain		Chances of the Tyrians—their re-	
passes, to let Alexander come		solution not unreasonable	- 88
through, and fight a pitched		Alexander constructs a mole	
battle	ib.	across the strait between Tyre	
Impatience of Darius at the delay		and the mainland. The project	
of Alexander in Kilikia. He		is defeated	84
crosses Mount Amanus to attack		Surrender of the princes of Cyprus	٠.
		to Alexander be gote held of	
Alexander in the defiles of Kili-	*2.	to Alexander—he gets hold of	
_kia	ib.	the main Phœnician and Cyprian	
He arrives in Alexander's rear,		_fleet	85
and captures Issus	66	He appears before Tyre with a	
Return of Alexander from Myri-		numerous fleet, and blocks up	
andrus; his address to his		the place by sea	- 8€
army	ib.	Capture of Tyre by storm-	
Position of the Macedonian army		desperate resistance of the	
south of the river Pinarus	67	citizens	ib
Position of the Persian army	0,	Surviving males, 2000 in number,	-
	:1	hanged by order of Alexander.	
north of the Pinarus	ib.		Oh.
Battle of Issus	68	The remaining captives sold	87
Alarm and immediate flight of		Duration of the siege for seven	
Darius—defeat of the Persians	70	months. Sacrifice of Alexander	
Vizorous and destructive pursuit		to Heraklês	- 88

CHAPTER XCIII.—continued.

	AGE		AGE
Second letter from Darius to		His equipment and preparation—	
Alexander, who requires uncon-		better arms—numerous scythed	
ditional submission	88	chariots—elephants	103
The Macedonian fleet overpowers		Position and battle array of	
the Persian, and becomes master		Darius	ib.
of the Ægean with the islands	89	Preliminary movements of Alex-	
March of Alexander towards		ander - discussions with Par-	
Egypt—siege of Gaza	90	menio and other officers. His	
His first assaults fail—he is	-	careful reconnoitring in person	104
wounded—he erects an im-		Dispositions of Alexander for the	101
	ib.		105
mense mound round the town	20.	attack—array of the troops Battle of Arbêla	105
Gaza is taken by storm, after a	01		100
siege of two months	91	Cowardice of Darius—he sets the	
The garrison are all slain, except		example of flight—defeat of the	
the governor Batis, who be- comes prisoner, severely wounded		Persians	108
comes prisoner, severely wounded	ib.	Combat on the Persian right be-	
Wrath of Alexander against Batis,		tween Mazæus and Parmenio	110
whom he causes to be tied to a		Flight of the Persian host—ener-	
chariot, and dragged round the		getic pursuit by Alexander	112
town	92	Escape of Darius. Capture of the	
Alexander enters Egypt, and		Persian camp, and of Arbêla	ib.
occupies it without resistance	93	Loss in the battle. Completeness	
He determines on founding Alex-	•	of the victory. Entire and irre-	
andria	ib.	parable dispersion of the Per-	
His visit to the temple and oracle	٠٠.		113
of Ammon The exacts and		Sian army	113
of Ammon. The oracle pro-		Causes of the defeat—cowardice	
claims him to be the son of	0=	of Darius. Uselessness of his	
Zeus	95	immense numbers	ib.
Arrangements made by Alexander		Generalship of Alexander	114
at Memphis—Grecian prisoners		Surrender of Babylon and Susa,	
brought from the Ægean	96	the two great capitals of Persia.	
He proceeds to Phœnicia—mes-		Alexander enters Babylon. Im-	
sage from Athens. Splendid		mense treasures acquired in	
festivals. Reinforcements sent		both places	115
to Antipater	97	Alexander acts as king of Persia,	
He marches to the Euphratês—		and nominates satraps. He	
crosses it without opposition at		marches to Susa. He remodels	
Thapsakus	ib.	the divisions of his army	ib.
March across from the Euphrates	•••	Alexander marches into Persis	
to the Tigris. Alexander fords		Proper—he conquers the refrac-	
the Tigris above Nineveh, with-		tory Uxii, in the intermediate	
and magistanes	98	an combains	116
	93		116
Eclipse of the moon. Alexander		Difficult pass called the Susian	
approaches near to the army of	00	Gates, on the way to Persepolis.	
Darius in position	99	Ariobarzanês the satraprepulses	
Inaction of Darius since the de-		Alexander, who finds means to	
feat at Issus	ib.	turn the pass, and conquer it	117
Paralyzing effect upon him pro-		Alexander enters Persepolis	118
duced by the captivity of his		Mutilated Grecian captives	119
mother and wife	100	Immense wealth, and national	
Good treatment of the captive			
females by Alexander—neces-		monuments of every sort, accu-	
		monuments of every sort, accumulated in Persepolis	120
sary to keep up their value as		mulated in Persepolis	120
sary to keep up their value as	101	mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and	120
hostages	101	mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and	120
hostages Immense army collected by	101	mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to	120
hostages Immense army collected by Darius, in the plains eastward		mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the	
hostages Immense army collected by Darius, in the plains eastward of the Tigris, near Arbéla	101 <i>ib</i> .	mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the soldiers	120 ib.
hostages		mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the soldiers Alexander rests his troops and	
hostages Immense army collected by Darius, in the plains eastward of tho Tigris, near Arbêla He fixes the spot for encamping and awaiting the attack of Alex-		mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the soldiers Alexander rests his troops and employs himself in conquering	ib.
hostages		mulated in Persepolis Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the soldiers Alexander rests his troops and	

CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

*	AGE	-	2402
The first four Asiatic campaigns	AGE	Military greatness and con-	PAGE
of Alexander—their direct bear-		sideration of the family	705
ing and importance in reference		sideration of the family	135
	104	Revelation of an intended con-	
to Grecian history	124	spiracy made by Kebalinus to	
His last seven years, farther east-		Philotas for the purpose of being	
ward, had no similar bearing		communicated to Alexander.	
upon Greece	125	Philotas does not mention it to	
Darius at Ekbatana—seeks escape		Alexander. It is communicated	
towards Baktria, when he hears		to the latter through another	
of Alexander approaching	126	channel	136
Alexander enters Ekbatana-es-		Alexander is at first angry with	
tablishes there his depôt and		Philotas, but accopts his expla-	
base of operations	ib.	nation, and professes to pass	
Alexander sends home the Thes-	DU •	over the fact	ib.
salian cavalry — necessity for		Ancient grudge against Philotas	10.
him now to pursue a more de-	107	-advantage taken of the inci-	7.01
sultory warfare	127	dent to ruin him	137
Alexander pursues Darius to the		Kraterus and others are jealous	
Caspian Gates, but fails in over-		of Parmenio and Philotas.	
taking him	128	Alexander is persuaded to put	
Conspiracy formed against Darius		them both to death	ib.
by Bessus and others, who seize		Arrest of Philotas. Alexander	
his person	ib.	accuses him before the as-	
Prodigious efforts of Alexander		sembled soldiers. He is con-	
to overtake and get possession		demned	138
of Darius. He surprises the		Philotas is put to the torture, and	
Persian corps, but Bessus puts		forced to confess, both against	
	129	himself and Parmenio	140
Disappointment of Alexander	120	Parmenio is slain at Ekbatana, by	140
Disappointment of Alexander			
when he missed taking Darius	1 01	order and contrivance of Alex-	141
alive	131	ander	141
Regal funeral bestowed upon Da-	••	Mutiny of the soldiers when they	
rius. His fate and conduct	ib.	learn of the assassination of	
Repose of Alexander and his		Parmenio—appeased by the	
army at Hekatompylus in Par-		production of Alexander's order	143
thia. Commencing alteration		Fear and disgust produced by the	
in his demeanour. He becomes		killing of Parmenio and Philotas	ib.
Asiatized and despotic	132	Conquest of the Paropamisadæ,	
Gradual aggravation of these new		&c. Foundation of Alexandria	
habits, from the present mo-		ad Caucasum	144
ment	133	Alexander crosses the Hindoo	
Alexander conquers the moun-		Koosh, and conquers Baktria.	
tains immediately south of the		Bessus is made prisoner	145
Caspian. He requires the Greek		Massacre of the Branchidæ and	
Caspian. He requires the died		their families, perpetrated by	
mercenaries to surrender at dis-	47.	Alexander in Sogdiana	146
cretion	ib.	Alexander at Marakanda and on	140
Envoys from Sparta and other			148
Greek cities brought to him-	401	the Jaxartes	148
how treated	134	Foundation of Alexandria ad	
March of Alexander farther east-		Jaxartem. Limit of march	7.40
ward—his successes in Aria and		northward	149
Dranojana	135	Alexander at Zariaspa in Baktria	
Proceedings against Philotas, son		—he causes Bessus to be muti-	
of Parmenio, in Drangiana.		lated and slain	ib.

CHAPTER XCIV.—continued.

1	AGE	F	AUL
Further subjugation of Baktria and Sogdiana. Halt at Mara-		His further conquests in the Pnnjab. Sangala, the last of	
kanda	150	them	171
Banquet at Marakanda. Charac-		He reaches the Hyphasis (Sut-	
ter and position of Kleitus	151	ledge), the farthest of the rivers	
Boasts of Alexander and his flatterers—repugnance of Mace-		of the Punjab. His army refuses to march farther	172
donian officers felt, but not ex-		Alexander returns to the Hy-	
pressed	ib.	daspês	173
Scene at the banquet—vehement		He constructs a fleet, and sails	
remonstrance of Kleitus	152	down the Hydaspes and the	
Furious wrath of Alexander—he murders Kleitus	153	Indus. Dangerous wound of Alexander in attacking the	
Intense remorse of Alexander im-	100	Malli	174
mediately after the deed	155	New cities and posts to be estab-	
Active and successful operations		lished on the Indus—Alexander	
of Alexander in Sogdiana	156	reaches the ocean-effects of	~ ~-
Capture of two inexpugnable posi-		the first sight of tides	175
tions—the Sogdian rock—the rock of Choriènes. Passion of		March of Alexander by land west- ward through the desert of	
Alexander for Roxana	157	Gedrosia—sufferings and losses	
Alexander at Baktra-marriage	-0,	in the army	176
with Roxana. His demand for		Alexander and the army come back to Persis. Conduct of	
prostration or worship from all	ib.		
Public harangue of Auaxarchus		Alexander at Persepolis. Pun-	7777
during a banquet, exhorting every one to render this worship	158	ishment of the satrap Osinês He marches to Susa—junction	177
	100	with the fleet under Nearchus,	
Public reply of Kallisthenes op- posing it. Character and his-		after it had sailed round from	
tory of Kallisthenês	ib.	the mouth of the Indus	179
The reply of Kallisthenes is		Alexander at Susa as Great King.	
favourably heard by the guests		Subjects of uneasiness to him—	
—the proposition for worship is dropped	160	the satraps—the Macedonian soldiers	ib.
Coldness and disfavour of Alex-	100	Past conduct of the satraps—	ι.
ander towards Kallisthenês	161	several of them are punished by	
Honourable frankness and cour-		Alexander—alarm among them	
age of Kallisthenês	ib.	all—flight of Harpalus	ib.
Kallisthenes becomes odious to	163	Discontent of the Macedonian soldiers with the Asiatizing in-	
Alexander Conspiracy of the royal pages	103	termarriages promoted by Alex-	
against Alexander's life—it is		ander	181
divulged—they are put to tor-		Their discontent with the new	
ture, but implicate no ono else;		Asiatic soldiers levied and dis-	
they are put to death	ib.	ciplined by Alexander	182
Kallisthenes is arrested as an accomplice—antipathy manifested		Interest of Alexander in the fleet, which sails up the Tigris	
by Alexander against him, and		to Opis	183
against Aristotle also	164	Notice of partial discharge to the	
Kallisthenes is tortured and		Macedonian soldiers — they mutiny—wrath of Alexander—	
hanged	166	mutiny—wrath of Alexander—	
Alexander reduces the country between the Hindoo-Koosh and		he disbands them all	ib.
the Indus	ib.	Remorse and humiliation of the soldiers—Alexander is appeared	
Conquest of tribes on the right		-reconciliation	184
bank of the Indus—the Rock of		Partial disbanding-body of vete-	
Aornos	168	rans placed under command of	
Alexander crosses the Indus—		Kraterus to return	185
forces the passage of the Hydaspês, defeating Porus—gene-		New projects of conquests con- templated by Alexander—mea-	
rous treatment of Porus	169	sures for enlarging his fleet	ib.
TO ALD DI OND MICHIEU OF A OTHER !	200	24.00 201 011111161116 1110 11000	•0-

CHAPTER XCIV .-- continued.

Visit to Ekbatana—death of He-	AGE	Question raised by Livy, about the chances of Alexander if he	AGE
phæstion — violent sorrow of			
Alexander	186	had attacked the Romans	199
Alexander exterminates the	107	Unrivalled excellence of Alex-	000
Kossæi	187	ander, as a military man	200
Numerous embassies which met		Alexander as a ruler, apart from military affairs—not deserving	
him on the way	188	of esteem	ib.
Alexander at Babylon—his great		Alexander would have continued	
preparations for the circum-		the system of the Persian em-	
navigation and conquest of		pire, with no other improvement	
Arabia	189	except that of a strong organi-	200
Alexander on shipboard, on the		zation	202
Euphrates and in the marshes adjoining. His plans for improv-		Absence of nationality in Alex-	
ing the navigation and flow of		ander—purpose of fusing the different varieties of mankind	
the river	190	into one common type of sub-	
Large reinforcements arrive,	100	jection	203
Grecian and Asiatic. New		Mistake of supposing Alexander	
array ordered by Alexander for		to be the intentional diffuser of	
Macedonians and Persians in		Greek civilization. His ideas	
the same files and companies	191	compared with those of Aris-	004
Splendid funeral obsequies of He-		totle	204
phæstion	ib.	Number of new cities founded in Asia by Alexander	206
General feasting and intemperance in the army. Alexander		It was not Alexander, but the	200
is seized with a dangerous		Diadochi after him, who chiefly	
is seized with a dangerous fever. Details of his illness	194	hellenized Asia	207
No hope of his life. Consterna-		How far Asia was ever really	
No hope of his life. Consternation and grief in the army.		hellenized—the great fact was, that the Greek language be-	
Last interview with his soldiers.		that the Greek language be-	000
His death	195	came universally diffused	208
Effect produced on the imagina-		Greco-Asiatic cities	209
tion of contemporaries by the	196	Increase of the means of com- munication between various	
career and death of Alexander Had Alexander lived, he must	190	parts of the world	210
have achieved things greater		Interest of Alexander in science	
still	198	and literature	212
5011			
CITA	TOTE	ER XCV.	
CHA	ттт	att AOV.	
CORCLAN APPAIRS FROM THE	TAN	DING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA	то
THE CLOSE O	ביים או	IE LAMIAN WAR.	
THE CHOSE O	P 11	111 11111111111111111111111111111111111	
State of the Grecian world when		Demosthenês and Lykurgus,	
Alexander crossed the Helles-		though not in the ascendant	
pont	213	politically, are nevertheless still	
Grecian spirit might have been		public men of importance. Fin-	017
called into action if the Per-		ancial activity of Lykurgus	217
sians had played their game well	214	Position of Demosthenes—his	218
Hopes raised in Greece, first by		prudent conduct Anti-Macedonian movement from	
the Persian fleet in the Ægean,		Sparta—King Agis visits the	
next by the two great Persian armies on land	ib.	Persian admirals in the Ægean.	
Public acts and policy at Athens		His attempts both in Krête and	0-0
decided by pacific	215	in Polononnésus	219
Phokion and Demades were lead-		Agis levies an army in Pelopon-	
ing ministers at Athens—they		nesus, and makes open declara-	220
were of macedonizing politics	216	tion against Antipater	220

CHAPTER XCV.—continued.

P	AGE		PAGE
Agis, at first partially successful,		Demosthenês moves the decree	
is completely defeated by Anti-		for arrest of Harpalus, who is	
pater, and slain	221	arrested, but escapes	236
Complete submission of all Greece		Conduct of Demosthenes in regard	
to Antipater—Spartan envoys		to the treasure of Harpalus-	
sent up to Alexander in Asia	222	deficiency of the sum counted	
Untoward result of the defensive		and realized, as compared with	
efforts of Greece—want of com-		the sum announced by Harpalus	237
bination	223	Suspicions about this money—	
Position of parties at Athens		Demosthenes moves that the	
Position of parties at Athens during the struggle of Agis—		Areopagus shall investigate the	
reaction of the macedonizing		matter—the Areopagites bring	
party after his defeat	ib.	in a report against Demosthenes	
Judicial contest between Æs-		himself, with Demades and	
chinês and Demosthenês. Pre-		others, as guilty of corrupt ap-	
liminary circumstances as to the		propriation. Demosthenes is	
proposition of Ktesiphon, and		tried on this charge, condemned,	
the indictment by Æschinês	224	and goes into exile	238
Accusatory harangue of Æschinês,		Was Demosthenes guilty of such	
nominally against the proposi-		corrupt appropriation? Circum-	
tion of Ktesiphon, really against the political life of Demosthenes		stances as known in the case	239
the political life of Demosthenes	225	Demosthenes could not have re-	
Appreciation of Æschinês, on		ceived money from Harpalus,	
independent evidence, as an		since he opposed him from first	
_ accuser of Demosthenes	227	to last	240
Reply of Demosthenes—oration		Had Demosthenes the means of	
_ De Coronâ	228	embezzling after the money had	
Funeral oration of extinct Grecian		passed out of the control of	
freedom	229	Harpalus? Answer in the ne-	
Verdict of the Dikasts-triumph		gative	<i>ib</i> .
of Demosthenes—exile of Æs-		Accusatory speech of Deinarchus	
chinês	230	against Demosthenes—virulent	
Causes of the exile of Æschinês—		invective destitute of facts	242
he was the means of procuring		Change of mind respecting De-	
coronation for Demosthenes	ib.	mosthenes, in the Athenian	
Subsequent accusation against		public, in a few months	243
Demosthenes, in the affair of	001	Probable reality of the case, re-	
Harpalus	231	specting the money of Harpalus,	
Flight of Harpalus to Athens—		and the sentence of the Areo-	•7
his previous conduct and rela-	000	pagus	ib.
tions with Athens	232		
False reports conveyed to Alex-		Grecian cities, directing that	
ander, that the Athenians had		the exiles should be recalled in	045
identified themselves with Har-	000	each	245
palus	233	Purpose of the rescript—to pro-	
Circumstances attending the ar-		vide partisans for Alexander in	
rival of Harpalus at Sunium— debate in the Athenian as-		each of the cities. Discoutents in Greece	246
		Effect produced in Greece by the	240
sembly—promises held out by		3 - 4 fr - 6 A 3 3	247
Harpalus—the Athenians seem		The Athenians declare themselves	241
at first favourably disposed to- wards him	234	champions of the liberation of	
Phokion and Demosthenes both	204	Greece, in spite of Phokion's	
agree in dissuading the Athe-			:ħ.
nians from taking up Harpalus	235	The Ætolians and many other	://•
Demand by Antipater for the sur-	200	Greeks join the confederacy	
render of Harpalus—the Athe-		for liberation—activity of the	
nians refuse to comply, but		Athenian Leosthenês as general.	
they arrest Harpalus and se-		Athenian envoys sent round to	
questrate his treasure for Alex-		invite co-operation from the	
ander	ib.	various Greeks	248
		THE TOTAL OF THE TAIL OF THE T	230

CHAPTER XCV.—continued.

P	AGE	P	AGE
Assistance lent to the Athenian		Alexander at the time of his	
envoys by Demosthenês, though		death. The generals dismiss	
in exile. He is recalled to		them as too vast. Plans of	
Athens, and receives an enthu-		Leonnatus and Kleopatra	256
siastic welcome	249	Kraterus joins Antipater in Ma-	
Large Grecian confederacy against		cedonia with a powerful army.	
Antipater — nevertheless with-		Battle of Krannon in Thessaly.	
out Sparta. Beeotia strongly in		Antipater gains a victory over	
the Macedonian interest. Leos-		the Greeks, though not a com-	
thenes with the confederate		-1-4	257
army marches into Thessaly	250	Antiphilus tries to open negotia-	201
	200		
Battle in Thessaly—victory of		tions with Antipater, who re-	
Leosthenês over Antipater, who		fuses to treat, except with each	
is compelled to throw himself		city singly. Discouragement	
into Lamia, and await succours		among the Greeks. Each city	
from Asia—Leosthenes forms the	051	treats separately. Antipater	
blockade of Lamia: he is slain	251	grants favourable terms to all,	oro
Misfortune of the death of Leos-		except Athenians and Ætolians	258
thenes. Antiphilus is named		Antipater and his army in Bosotia	
in his place. Relaxed efforts of		—Athens left alone and unable	
the Grecian army	252	to resist. Demosthenes and the	
Leonnatus, with a Macedonian		other anti-Macedonian orators	
army from Asia, arrives in		take flight. Embassy of Pho-	
Thessaly. His defeat and death.		kion, Xenokratês, and others to	•7
Antipater escapes from Lamia,		Antipater Severe terms imposed upon	ib.
and takes the command	253	Severe terms imposed upon	0=0
War carried on by sea between		Athens by Antipater	259
the Macedonian and Athenian		Disfranchisement and deportation	
fleets	ib.	of the 12,000 poorest Athenian	0.00
Reluctance of the Greek contin-		citizens Hardship suffered by the deported	260
gents to remain on long-con-		Hardship suffered by the deported	
tinued service. The army in		poor of Athens — Macedonian	0.07
Thessaly is thinned by many		garrison placed in Munychia	261
returning home	254	Demosthenes, Hyperides, and	
Expected arrival of Kraterus to		others are condemned to death	
reinforce Antipater. Relations		in their absence. Antipater	
between the Macedonian officers	ib.	sends officers to track and seize	
State of the regal family, and of		the Grecian exiles. He puts	
the Macedonian generals and		Hyperidês to death	262
soldiery, after the death of Alex-		Demosthenês in sanctuary at	
ander	ib.	Kalauria-Archias with Thra-	
Philip Aridæus is proclaimed		cian soldiers comes to seize him	
king: the satrapies are distri-		—he takes poison, and expires	ib.
buted among the principal		Miserable condition of Greece—	
officers	255	life and character of Demo-	
Perdikkas the chief representa-		sthenês	263
tive of central authority, as-		Dishonourable position of Pho-	
sisted by Eumenês of Kardia	ib.	kion at Athens, under the Mace-	
List of projects entertained by		donian occupation	265
District Projects officers			

CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM.

Antipater	pnrges	and 1	emodels
the Pelo	ponnesi	an citi	ies. He
attacks	the Æt	olians,	with a
view of	deportin	ng ther	m across

to Asia. His presence becomes necessary in Asia; he concludes a pacification with the Ætolians 268

CHAPTER XCVI.—continued.

	AGE		PAGE
Intrigues with Perdikkas, and		warned, takes no precautions	
with the princesses at Pella	269	against it	281
Antigonus detects the intrigues,		Mischief to the Athenians, as well	
and reveals them to Antipater		as to Polysperchon, from Ni-	
and Kraterus	270	kanor's occupation of Peiræns;	
Unpropitious turns of fortune for		culpable negligence, and pro-	
the Greeks, in reference to the		bable collnsion, of Phokion	282
Lamian war	ib.	Arrival of Alexander (son of Poly-	
Antipater and Kraterus in Asia		sperchon): his treacherous	
—Perdikkas marches to attack		policy to the Athenians: Kas-	
Ptolemy in Egypt, but is killed		sander reaches Peiræus	283
in a mutiny of his own troops.		Intrigues of Phokion with Alex-	
Union of Antipater, Ptolemy,		ander—he tries to secure for	
Antigonus, &c. New distribu-		himself the protection of Alex-	
tion of the satrapies, made at		ander against the Athenians	284
Triparadeisus	271	Return of the deported exiles to	
War between Antigonus and Eu-		Athens—public vote passed in	
menês in Asia, Energy and		the Athenian assembly against	
ability of Eumenês. He is wor-		Phokion and his colleagues.	
sted and blocked up in Nora	273	Phokion leaves the city, is	
Sickness and death of Antipater.		protected by Alexander, and	
The Athenian orator Demadês		goes to meet Polysperchon in Phokis	
is put to death in Macedonia	274	Phokis	285
Antipater sets aside his son Kas-		Agnonides and others are sent as	
sander, and names Polysperchon		deputies to Polysperchon, to	
viceroy. Discontent and opposi-		accuse Phokion and to claim	
tion of Kassander	275	the benefit of the regal edict	ib.
Kassander sets up for himself,		Agnonidês and Phokion are heard	
gets possession of Munychia,		before Polysperchon—Phokion	
and forms alliance with Pto-		and his colleagues are de-	
lemy and Antigonus against		livered up as prisoners to the	
Polysperchon	ib.	Athenians	286
Plans of Polysperchon—alliance		Phokion is conveyed as prisoner	
with Olympias in Europe, and		to Athens, and brought for trial	
with Eumenês in Asia—en-		before the assembly. Motion	
franchisement of the Grecian		of his friends for exclusion of	
cities	276	non-qualified persons	288
Ineffectual attempts of Eumenês		Intense exasperation of the re-	
to uphold the imperial dynasty		turned exiles against Phokion—	
in Asia: his gallantry and		grounds for that feeling	ib.
ability: he is betrayed by his		Phokion is condemned to death—	
own soldiers, and slain by An-		vindictive manifestation against	
tigonus	ib.	him in the assembly, furious	
Edict issued by Polysperchon at		and unanimous	289
Pella, in the name of the im-		Death of Phokion and his four	
perial dynasty-subverting the		colleagues	290
Antipatrian oligarchies in the		Alteration of the sentiment of	
Grecian cities, restoring poli-		the Athenians towards Phokion,	
tical exiles, and granting free		not long afterwards. Honours	
constitutions to each	278	shown to his memory	291
Letters and measures of Poly-		Explanation of this alteration.	
sperchon to enforce the edict.		Kassander gets possession of	
State of Athens: exiles return-		Athens, and restores the oli-	
ing: complicated political par-		garchical or Phokionic party	292
tics; danger of Phokion	279	Life and character of Phokion	ib.
Negotiations of the Athenians		War between Polysperchon and	
with Nikanor, governor of		Kassander, in Attica and Pelo-	
Munychia for Kassander	281	ponnësus. Polysperchon is re-	
Nikanor soizes Peirans by sur-		pulsed in the siege of Megalo-	
prise. Phokion, though fore-		polis, and also defeated at sea	295

CHAPTER XCVI.—continued.

	AGE		PAGE
Increased strength of Kassander		Passiveness of the Grecian	
in Greece—he gets possession		cities	307
of Athens	296	Sudden arrival of Demetrius Poli-	
Restoration of the oligarchical		orketês in Peiræus. The Athe-	
government at Athens, though		nians declare in his favour.	
in a mitigated form, under the	-	Demetrius Phalereus retires to	
Phalerean Demetrius	297	Egypt. Capture of Munychia	800
Administration of the Phalerean		and Megara	308
Demetrius at Athens, in a mo-		Demetrius Poliorketês enters	
derate spirit. Census taken of	ib.	Athens in triumph. He pro-	
the Athenian population	20.	mises restoration of the demo-	
Kassander in Peloponnêsus—		cracy. Extravagant votes of flattery passed by the Athe-	
many cities join him—the Spar- tans surround their city with		nians towards him. Two new	
walls	299	Athenian tribes created	309
Feud in the Macedonian imperial	400	Alteration of tone and sentiment	800
family—Olympias puts to death		in Athens during the last thirty	
Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê—		years	310
she reigns in Macedonia: her		Contrast of Athens as proclaimed	010
bloody revenge against the		free by Demetrius Poliorketês,	
partisans of Antipater	300	with Atheus after the expulsion	
Kassander passes into Macedonia			311
-defeats Olympias, and be-		of Hippias Opposition made by Demochares,	
comes master of the country		nephew of Demosthenes, to	
comes master of the country Olympias is besieged in		these obsequious public flat-	
Pydna, captured, and put to		teries	312
death	301	Demetrius Phalereus condemned	
Great power of Antigonus in Asia.		in his absence. Honourable	
Confederacy of Kassander, Ly-		commemoration of the deceased	61.0
simachus, Ptolemy, and Seleu-	•,	orator Lykurgus	313
kus against him Kassander founds Kassandreia,	ib.	Restrictive law passed against the	
Rassander tounds Rassandreia,	302	philosophers — they all leave Athens. The law is repealed	
and restores Thêhes	502	next year, and the philosophers	
Measures of Antigonus against		return to Athens	ib.
Kassander—he promises free- dom to the Grecian cities—		Exploits of Demetrius Polior-	
Ptolemy promises the like.		ketês. His long siege of Rhodes.	
Great power of Kassander in		Gallant and successful resist-	
Greece	303	ance of the citizens	315
Forces of Antigonus in Greece.		His prolonged war, and ultimate	
Considerable success against		success in Greece against Kas-	
Kassander	305	sander	316
Pacification between the belli-		Return of Demetrius Poliorketês	
gerents. Grecian autonomy		to Athens—his triumphant re-	
guaranteed in name by all. Kas-		ception—memorable Ithyphallic	
sander puts to death Roxana		hymn addressed to him	317
and her child	ib.	Helpless condition of the Athe-	
Polysperchon espouses the pre-		nians — proclaimed by them-	910
tensions of Herakles son of		selves	318
Alexander, against Kassander.		Idolatry shown to Demetrius at	
He enters into compact with		Athens. He is initiated in the	
Kassander, assassinates the		Eleusinian mysteries, out of the regular season	319
young prince, and is recog-		March of Demetrius into Thessaly	
nized as ruler of Southern	306	—he passes into Asia and joins	
Greece	500	Antigonus — great battle of	
surviving relative of Alexander		Ipsus, in which the four con-	
the Great, by Antigonus	307	federates completely defeat	
Ptolemy of Egypt in Greece—		federates completely defeat Antigonus, who is slain, and	
after some successes, he con-		his Asiatic power broken up	000
cludes a truce with Kassander.		and partitioned	320

CHAPTER XCVI.—continued.

	AUD		
Restoration of the Kassandrian dominion in Greece. Lacharès makes himself despot at Athens, under Kassander. Demetrius		Macedonia, until the conquest of that country by the Romans	323
Poliorketês returns, and expels Lacharês. He garrisons Peiræus and Munychia	321	lation of the cities from each other by Antigonus	ib.
metrius acquires the crown of Macedonia	322	itself, but is essentially dependent on foreign neighbours Evidence of the political nullity	324
Antigonns Gonatas (son of Demetrius) master of Macedonia and Greece. Permanent footing of the Antigonid dynasty in		of Athens—public decree in honour of Demochares—what acts are recorded as his titles to public gratitude	325
СНАЕ	TE	R XCVII.	
SICILIAN AND ITAL	IAN	GREEKS-AGATHOKLÊS.	
Constitution established by Ti- moleon at Syracuse—afterwards		Agathoklês is constituted sole despot of Syracuse	335
exchanged for an oligarchy	327	His popular manners, military	336
Italian Greeks—pressed upon by enemies from the interior—		energy, and conquests	500
Archidamus king of Sparta slain in Italy	328	quering Sicily. The Agrigen- tines take alarm and organize a	
ise of the Molossian kingdom of Epirus, through Macedonian		defensive alliance against him They invite the Spartan Akro-	337
aid—Alexander the Molossian king, brother of Olympias	ib.	tatus to command—his bad conduct and failure	338
The Molossian Alexander crosses into Italy to assist the Taren-		Sicily the only place in which a glorious Hellenic career was	
tines. His exploits and death	329	open	ib.
Assistance sent by the Syra- cusans to Krotôn—first rise of	000	with the Agrigentines—his great	000
Agathoklês Agathoklês distinguished himself	330	power in Sicily	339
in the Syracusan expedition— he is disappointed of honours—		—the Carthaginians send an armament to Sicily against	
becomes discontented and leaves Syracuse	331	him	340
He levies a mercenary force—his	001	between Gela and Agrigentum	
exploits as general in Italy and Sicily	332	—their army reinforced from home	ib.
Change of government at Syra- cuse—Agathoklês is recalled—		Operations of Agathoklês against them—his massacre of citizens	
his exploits against the exiles— his dangerous character at		at Gela	341
home Further internal changes at Syra-	ib.	Agathoklês and the Carthaginians	ib.
cuse—recal of the exiles—Agathoklês readmitted — swears		Total defeat of Agathoklês by the Carthaginians	342
amnesty and fidelity	3 33	The Carthaginians recover a large	012
Agathoklês, in collusion with Hamilkar, arms his partisans		part of Sicily from Agathokles. His depressed condition at Sy-	0.15
at Syracuse, and perpetrates a sanguinary massacre of the		racuse He conceives the plan of attacking	343
citizens	334	the Carthaginians in Africa	ib.

CHAPTER XCVII.—continued.

1	PAGE		PAGE
His energy and sagacity in or-		Antecedent circumstances of	
ganizing this expedition. His		Kyrênê. Division of coast be-	
renewed massacre and spoliation	344	tween Kyrênê and Carthage	360
He gets out of the harbour, in		Thimbron with the Harpalian	
spite of the blockading fleet.		mercenaries is invited over to	
Eclipse of the sun. He reaches		Kyrênê by exiles. His chequered	
Africa safely	345	career, on the whole victorious,	
He burns his vessels-impressive		in Libya	361
ceremony for effecting this,		The Kyrenæans solicit aid from	
under vow to Dêmêtêr	346	the Egyptian Ptolemy, who	
Agathoklês marches into the Car-		sends Ophellas thither. Defeat	
thaginian territory—captures		and death of Thimbron. Kyrê-	
Tunês-richness and cultivation		naica annexed to the dominions	
of the country	ib.	of Ptolemy, under Ophellas as	
Consternation at Carthage-the		viceroy	363
city-force marches out against		Position and hopes of Ophellas.	
him-Hanno and Bomilkar		He accepts the invitation of	
named generals	348	Agathoklês. He collects colo-	
Inferior numbers of Agathoklês		nists from Athens and other	
-his artifices to encourage the		Grecian cities	364
soldiers	349	March of Ophellas, with his army,	
Treachery of the Carthaginian	010	and his colonists, from Kyrênê	
general Bomilkar — victory of		to the Carthaginian territory	
Agathoklês	350	-sufferings endured on the	
Conquests of Agathoklês among	000	march	365
the Carthaginian dependencies		Perfidy of Agathokles-he kills	
on the eastern coast	ib.	Ophellas-gets possession of his	
Religious terror and distress of		army-ruin and dispersion of	
the Carthaginians. Human		the colonists	366
sacrifice	351	Terrible sedition at Carthage-	
Operations of Agathoklês on the	001	Bomilkar tries to seize the	
eastern coast of Carthage—		supreme power - he is over-	
capture of Neapolis, Adrume-		thrown and slain	367
tum, Thapsus, &c	352	Further successes of Agathoklês	
Agathoklês fortifies Aspis—under-	004	in Africa-he captures Utica,	
takes operations against the		Hippo-Zarytus, and Hippagreta	368
interior country—defeats the		Agathoklês goes to Sicily, leaving	
Clariffication of the control of the	353	Archagathus to command in	
Proceedings of Hamilkar before	000	Africa. Successes of Archa-	
Spragues the city is near sur-		gathus in the interior country	370
Syracuse—the city is near sur- rendering—he is disappointed,		Redoubled efforts of the Cartha-	
	355	ginians-they gain two great	
and marches away from it Renewed attack of Hamilkar	300	victories over Archagathus	ib.
		Danger of Archagathus—he is	
upon Syracuse—he tries to sur-		blocked up by the Carthaginians	
prise Euryalus, but is totally		at Tunês	371
defeated, made prisoner, and	356	Agathoklês in Sicily. His career	
slain	200	at first prosperous. Defeat of	
The Agrigentines stand forward		the Agrigentines	ib.
as champions of Sicilian free-		Activity of Agathokles in Sicily—	
dom against Agathokles and	357	Deinokratês in great force	
the Carthaginians	991	against him	372
Mutiny in the army of Agathokles		Agrigentine army under Xeno-	
at Tunes—his great danger, and	950	dokus—opposed to the mercena-	
address in extricating himself	358	ries of Agathoklês—superiority	
Carthaginian army sent to act in		of the latter	373
the interior—attacked by Aga-		Defeat of Xenodokus by Leptinês	
thokles with some success—his		-Agathoklês passes over into	
camp is pillaged by the Numi-	950	Africa—bad state of his army	
dians	359	there—he is defeated by the	
Agathoklês invites the aid of	960	Carthaginians	ib.
Ophellas from Kyrênê	360	Out of agriffiants	

CHAPTER XCVII.—continued.

	AGE		AGE
Nocturnal panic and disorder in	05.4	Battle of Torgium - victory of	920
both camps	374	Agathoklês over Deinokratês Accommodation and compact be-	378
—he deserts his army and es-		tween Agathoklês and Deino-	
capes to Sicily	ib.	kratês	379
The deserted army kill the two		Operations of Agathokles in	
sons of Agathoklês, and then		Liparæ, Italy, and Korkyra— Kleonymus of Sparta	
capitulate with the Cartha-	075	Kleonymus of Sparta	ib.
ginians	375	Last projects of Agathoklês—	
African expedition of Agathoklês —bolduess of the first concep-		mutiny of his grandson Archa- gathus — sickness, poisoning,	
tion—imprudently pushed and		and death of Agathoklês	381
persisted in	376	Splendid genius of action and	
Proceedings of Agathoklês in		resource-nefarious dispositions	
Sicily—his barbarities at Egesta			382
and Syracuse	377	—of Agathoklês Hellenic agency in Sicily con-	
Great mercenary force under Dei-		tinues during the life of Aga- thoklês, but becomes then	
nokratês in Sicily—Agathoklês		thories, but becomes then	
solicits peace from him, and is refused—he concludes peace		subordinate to preponderant foreigners	383
with Carthage	378	foreigners	900
CHAP	TEF	R XCVIII.	
Overture Harrison Crary		Tot Court care Court	Δ
OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIL			ON
THE COAS	T OF	THE EUXINE.	
Massalia-its situation and cir-		Vloorahua ha makaa himaale	
cumstances	385	Klearchus—he makes himself despot of Herakleia—his	
Colonies planted by Massalia—	000	tyranny and cruelty	393
Colonies planted by Massalia— Antipolis, Nikæa, Rhoda, Em-		He continues despot for twelve	050
poriæ-peculiar circumstances		years—he is assassinated at a	
of Emporiæ	387	festival	395
Oligarchical government of Mas-		Satyrus becomes despot-his ag-	
salia—prudent political admini- stration	388	gravated cruelty—his military	80.0
Hellenizing influence of Massalia	900	vigour Despotism of Timotheus, just and	396
in the West—Pytheas, the navi-		mild—his energy and ability	ib.
gator and geographor	389	Despotism of Dionysius—his po-	٠٠.
Pontic Greeks—Pentapolis on the		pular and vigorous government.	
south-west coast	390	—his prudent dealing with the	
Sinôpê—its envoys present with Darius in his last days—main-		Macedonians, during the ab-	
tains its independence for some		Sence of Alexander in the East	397
time against the Pontic princes		Return of Alexander to Susa—he is solicited by the Herakleotic	
—but becomes subject to them		exiles — danger of Dionysius,	
	391	averted by the death of Alex-	
ultimately The Pontic Herakleia—oligarchi-		ander	398
cal government — the native		Prosperity and prudence of Diony.	
Mariandyni reduced to serfs			
	392	sins—he marries Amastris—his	
Political discord at Herakleia—	392	favour with Antigonus - his	
Political discord at Herakleia— banishment of Klearchus—par-		favour with Antigonus — his death	399
Political discord at Herakleia—banishment of Klearchus—partial democracy established	392 <i>ib</i> .	favour with Antigonus — his death	399
Political discord at Herakleia— banishment of Klearchus—par- tial democracy established Continued political troubles at	ib.	favour with Antigonus — his death	399
Political discord at Herakleia—banishment of Klearchus—partial democracy established	ib.	favour with Antigonus — his death	399

CHAPTER XCVIII.—continued.

P	AGE	F	AGE
Arsinoê mistress of Herakleia.		Nymphæum among the tributary	
Defeat and death of Lysima-		cities under the Athenian em-	
chus. Power of Seleukus	401	pire-how it passed under the	
Herakleia emancipated from the		Bosporanic princes	411
despots, and a popular govern-		Alliance and reciprocal good	
ment established — recal of		offices between the Bosporanic	
the exiles—bold bearing of the		princes Satyrus, Leukon, &c.,	
citizens towards Seleukus—	.,	and the Athenians. Immunities	
death of Seleukus	ib.	of trade granted to the Athe-	410
Situation and management of		nians Political condition of the Greeks	412
Herakleia as a free government		Political condition of the Greeks	
—considerable naval power	402	of Bosporus—the princes called	
Prudent administration of He-		themselves archons—their em-	
rakleia, as a free city, among		pire over barbaric tribes	413
the powerful princes of Asia		Family feuds among the Bospor-	
Minor-general condition and		anic princes — war between	
influence of the Greek cities on		Satyrus and Eumelus—death of	
the coast	ib.	Satyrus II	414
Grecian Pentapolis on the south-		Civil war between Frytanis and	
west of the Euxine—Ovid at		Eumelus—victory of Eumelus—	
	403	he kills the wives, children, and	
Olbia—in the days of Herodotus	100	friends of his brother	415
Oldia—III the days of frelodous		His reign and conquests — his	
and Ephorus—increased num-		aroody dooth	ib.
bers and multiplied inroads of	405	speedy death	
the barbaric hordes	405	Decime of the Bospotanic dy-	
Olbia in later days—decline of	400	nasty, until it passed into the	416
security and production	406	hands of Mithridates Eupator.	410
Olbia pillaged and abandoned—		Monuments left by the Spartokid	
afterwards renewed	408	princes of Bosporus—sepulchral	
Visit of Dion the Rhetor—Hel-		tumuli near Kertch (Pantika-	27.
lenic tastes and manners—		pæum)	ib.
ardent interest in Homer	ib.	Close of Greek History	418
Bosporus or Pantikapæum	409	Appendix on Issus and its neigh-	
Princes of Bosporus - relations		bourhood as connected with the	
between Athens and Bosporus	ib.	battle	420
OUT. COM WEDLES WITH THE POPULATION OF STREET			
			427
T			141



HISTORY OF GREECE.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE

CHAPTER XCII.

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

A YEAR and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first display of his energy and military skill, destined B.C. 335for achievements yet greater, and to crush the growing 334. aspirations for freedom among Greeks on the south as well as among Thracians on the north of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his preparations, so that early in the spring of 334 B.C. his army destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander's remaining life, from his crossing the Hellespont in March or April, 334 B.C., to his death During at Babylon in June, 323 B.C., eleven years and two Alexander's or three months, was passed in Asia, amidst unceasing history of Greece is military operations and ever-multiplied conquests. nearly a He never lived to revisit Macedonia, but his achieve-

ments were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so unmeasured, and his thirst for further aggrandizement still so insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list of

10-1

his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into outlying appendages of a newly-grown Oriental empire. During all these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and literally to the province of an historian of Greece. To what They were achieved by armies of which the general, extent the Asiatic the principal officers, and most part of the soldiers projects of were Macedonian. The Greeks who served with him Alexander belonged to Grecian history. were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries, they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for victory. His chief secretary, Eumenês of Kardia, was a Greek, and probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides, and still more by its connexion with previous projects, dreams, and legends long antecedent to the aggrandizement of Macedon, as well as by the character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus and of the Pheræan Jason, with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isokratês, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta; next to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandizement, the expedition against Asia thus. becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-hellenic pretence of retaliation for the longpast insults of Xerxês. I call it a pretence, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and served of the now two different purposes: first, to ennoble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose

pretences set up by Alexander. The real feeling Greeks was adverse to his success.

mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnôn or Achillês, immortalized as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult; next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favourable to his success.

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment ostentatiously re-

kindled for Alexander's purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, the Greeksespecially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader,

Analogy of Alexander's relation to with that of the Emperor Napoleon to the Confederation of the Rhine.

which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective Hellas, whereby he had been declared general and the Persian king a public enemy.1

¹ Arrian, i. 16, 10; i. 29, 9, about πέδαις, εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψεν ἐργά-the Grecian prisoners taken at the victory of the Granikus—ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν Ἦλλησιν, Ἑλληνες ὄντες, ἐναντία τῆ αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δήσας ἐν Ἑλλάδι ὑπερ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο.

Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist, except in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own Greece an purposes. Its component members are annexed as appendage, but a valuappendages, doubtless of considerable value, to the able appen-Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years before Alexdage, to Macedonia. ander's accession, Demosthenês, while instigating the

Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them 1— "The Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value; but by itself it is weak and full of embarrassments". Inverting the position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time of Alexander's accession. Had the Persians played their game with tolerable prudence and vigour, his success would have been measured by the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself and withhold it from his enemy.

Alexander's memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or Extraordinary politician, but of the general and the soldier. In this military endowments character his appearance forms a sort of historical and epoch. It is not merely in soldierlike qualities—in capacity of Alexander. the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship

Also iii. 23, 15, about the Grecian soldiers serving with the Persians and made prisoners in Hyrkania—ἀδικεῖν γὰρ μεγάλα (said Alexander) τοὺς στρατευομένους ἐναντία τῷ Ἑλλάδι παρὰ τοῦς βαρβάροις παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

Τοward the end of October, 1812, near Moscow, General Winzingerode, a German officer in the Russian service, with his aide-de-camp, a native Russian.

with his aide-de-camp, a native Russian, Narishkin, became prisoner of the French. He was brought to Napoleon. "At the sight of that German general, all the signt of that German general, all the secret resentments of Napoleon took fire. 'Who are you?' (he exclaimed). 'A man without country! When I was at war with the Austrians I found you in their ranks. Austria has become my ally, and you have entered into the Russian service. You have been one of the warmest instigators of the present war. Nevertheless, you are a native of the Confederation of the Rhine: you are my subject.

You are not an ordinary enemy: you are a rebel. I have a right to bring you to trial. Gens d'arnes, seize this man!' Then addressing the aide-decamp of Winzingerode, Napoleon said, 'As for you, Count Narishkin, I have nothing to reproach you with; you are a Russian, you are doing your duty'.' (Ségur's Account of the Campaign in Russia, book ix. ch. vi. p. 132.)

These threats against Winzingerode were not realized, because he was liberated by the Cossacks during his passage into France; but the language of Napoleon expresses just the same sentiment as that of Alexander towards the captive Greeks.

1 Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 14. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν μὲν προσθήκης μέρει ἐστί τις οὐ σμικρὰ, οἷον ὑπῆρξὲ ποθ' ὑμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέον πρὸς 'Ολυθίους . . . αὐτὴ δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀσθενὴς καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ μεστή.

and fatigue—that he stands pre-eminent; though these qualities alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with rapidity of movement even in the worst countryall on a scale of prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They carry the art of systematic and scientific warfare to a degree of efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable to keep up unimpaired.

We must recollect however that Alexander found the Macedonian military system built up by Philip, and had only to apply and enlarge it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and matured fruit antecedent of a series of successive improvements, applied by Grecian tacticians to the primitive Hellenic arrangements. During the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war had been conspicuously

Changes in Grecian warfare, and contributory to the military organization of Macedonia.

progressive, to the sad detriment of Grecian political freedom. "Everything around us (says Demosthenês, addressing the people of Athens in 342 B.C.) has been in advance for some years past nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs Formerly the Lacedæmonians as well as other Greeks did nothing more than invade each other's territory, during the four or five summer months, with their native force of citizen hoplites: in winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action, winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen, foreigners of all descriptions, and siege batteries."1

I have in several preceding chapters dwelt upon this progressive change in the character of Grecian soldiership. At Athens and

¹ Demosth. Philipp. iii. pp. 123, 124: the substance of what is said by the oracompare Olynth. ii. p. 22. I give here tor, not strictly adhering to his words.

in most other parts of Greece the burghers had become averse to hard and active military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever good pay was offered, and became immensely multiplied, to the detriment and danger of Grecian society.1 Many of these mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination with the hoplites.2 Iphikratês greatly improved and partly re-armed the peltasts, whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so effectively as to astonish his contemporaries.3 His innovation was further developed by the great military genius of Epameinondas, who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed, conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered the received principles of battle manœuvring, by concentrating an irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy's line, and keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these important improvements, realized by generals in actual practice, intelligent officers like Xenophôn embodied the results of their military experience in valuable published criticisms.4 Such were the lessons which the Macedonian Philip learnt and applied to the enslavement of those Greeks, especially of the Thebans, from whom they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thêbes,

1 Isokratês, in several of his discourses, notes the gradual increase of these mercenaries, men without regular means of subsistence or fixed residence, or civic obligations. Or. iv. (Panegyr.), s. 195; Or. v. (Philippus), s. 112—142; Or. viii. (De Pace), s. 31—56.

2 Xenoph. Magist. Equit. ix. 4. οίδα δ΄ ἐγὼ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ ἰππικὸν ἀρξάμενον εὐδοκιμεῖν, ἐπεὶ ξένους ἰππέας προσέλαβον· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι πανταχοῦ τὰ ξενικὰ ὀρῶ εὐδοκιμοῦντα.

Compare Demosth. Philippic. i. p. 46; Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 4, 14; Isokratês, Orat. vii. (Areopagit.), s. 93.

3 For an explanation of the improved arming of peltasts introduced by Iphikratês, see Chap. lxxv. of this History. Respecting these improvements, the statements both of Diodórus (xv. 44) and of Nepos are obscure. MM. Rüstow and Köchly (in their valuable work, Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, Aarau, 1852, B. ii. p. 164) have interpreted the statements in a sense to which I cannot

subscribe. They think that Iphikratês altered not only the arming of peltasts, but also that of hoplites—a supposition which I see nothing to justify.

4 Besides the many scattered remarks in the Anabasis, the Cyropædia is that of discourses are supposed in that of discourses are supposed in the anabasis, the Cyropædia.

The state the mary scattered femarks in the Anabasis, the Cyropædia is full of discussion and criticism on military phenomena. It is remarkable to what an extent Xenophôn had present to his mind all the exigences of war, and the different ways of meeting them. See as an example, Cyropæd. vi. 2; ii. i.

The work on sieges, by Æneas (Poliorketica), is certainly anterior to the military improvements of Philip of Macedon—probably about the beginning of his reign. See the preface to it by Rüstow and Köchly, p. 8, in their edition of Die Griechischen Kriegsschriftsteller, Leipz. 1853. In this work allusion is made to several others, now lost, by the same author—Παρασκευαστική βίβλος, Χτρατοπεδευτική, &c.

he had probably conversed with Epameinondas, and must certainly have become familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive, not merely from ambition of conquest, but even from the necessities of defence, to turn them to account; and he brought to the task military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements, he introduced important novelties, bequeathing to his successors the Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son, lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome, near two centuries afterwards.

The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip, appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed and well-mounted cavalry, formed military condition from the substantial proprietors of the country, and before in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian Penestæ): these latter were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended sheep and cattle, or tilled the

Macedonian Philip. Good and cavalry: poor infantry.

earth, among the spacious mountains and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast, and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen hoplites better armed; but foot service was not in honour among the natives, and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly more than a rabble. At the period of Philip's accession they were armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and Illyrian neighbours, before whom they were constantly compelled to flee for refuge up to the mountains.1

¹ See the striking speech addressed by Alexander to the discontented Macedonian soldiers, a few months before his death, at Opis or Susa (Arrian, vii. 9).

νιί. 9).

Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν cula ex purpurâ sordent, auru γιας πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὁρη πρόβατα σατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυριοῖς τε καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θραξὶ, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῦν ἀντὶ τῶν δυφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας τοῖς προσχώροις τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς μὴ χωρίων ἔτι ὀχυρότητι ἄλλος ὅμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολύς.

πιστεύοντας μαλλον ή τη οἰκεία άρετή

Compare the description given by Thucydidês, iv. 124, of the army of Brasidas and Perdikkas, where the Macedonian foot are described as

Their condition was that of poor herdsmen, half-naked or covered only with hides, and eating from wooden platters; not much different from that of the population of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by Perdikkas the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife of the native prince baked bread with her own hands. On the other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war, and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty years afterwards.2 These horsenen, like the Thessalians, charged in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offence, not javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat.

Thus defective was the military organization which Philip found. Under his auspices it was cast altogether Philip rearms and The poor and hardy Landwehr of Macedonia, anew. re-organizes constantly on the defensive against predatory neighinfantry. bours, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and Long Macedonian proved not intractable to the innovations of a warlike pike or They were placed under constant training sarissa. prince. in the regular rank and file of heavy infantry; they were moreover brought to adopt a new description of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also comparatively useless to the soldier when fighting single-handed, and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the name in the army of Philip, was the sarissa—the Macedonian pike or lance. sarissa was used both by the infantry of his phalanx, and by particular regiments of his cavalry; in both cases it was long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two. The regiments of cavalry called Sarissophori or Lancers were a sort of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the heavier cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried the xyston or short pike. The sarissa of this cavalry may have been fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This dimension is so prodigious and so

¹ Herodot. viii. 137. ² Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 40-42.

unwieldy that we should hardly believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of an historian like Polybius.

The extraordinary reach of the sarissa or pike constituted the

prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian Macedonian phalanx. The phalangites were drawn up in files phalanx generally of sixteen deep, each called a Lochus, with armed and an interval of three feet between each two soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the lochage, a man of superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest. Now the sarissa, when in horizontal position, was held with both hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet was so weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence the sarissa of the man standing second in the file projected twelve feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; those of the fourth and fifth ranks respectively six feet and three feet. There was thus represented a quintuple series of pikes by each file to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain and press

The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was further provided with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggings, and a kausia or broadbrimmed hat—the head-covering common in the Macedonian army. But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defence as well as of offence. They were destined to contend against the charge of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike

onward the front, did not carry the sarissa in a horizontal position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so as to break the force of any darts or arrows which might be shot over-

head from the rear ranks of the enemy.1

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ Respecting the length of the pike of the Macedonian phalanx, see Appendix to this Chapter.

and heavy shield; especially against the most formidable manifes-

originally destined to contend against the Grecian hoplites as organized by Epameinondas.

tation of that force, the deep Theban column organized by Epameinondas. This was what Philip had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry of Greece, bearing down everything before it by thrust of pike and propulsion of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the long two-handed

pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of protended pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle of Chæroneia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of pikes double the length of their own. We must look at Philip's phalanx with reference to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman organization, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted it mainly to stand the shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode of attack. Now Polybius informs us that the phalanx was never once beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The inconveniences of Philip's array, and of the long pikes, arose from the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by Grecian hoplites.1

The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the Pezetæri² or

¹ The impression of admiration, and even terror, with which the Roman general Paulus Æmilius was seized on first seeing the Macedonian phalanx in battle array at Pydna, has been recorded by Polybius (Polybius, Fragm. xxix. 6, 11; Livy, xliv. 49).

2 Harpokration and Photius, v. Réζεταίρων καλουμένων τὰς Τάξεις, and ii. 23, 2, ἀc. Since we know from Demosthenês that the pezetæri date from the time of Philip, it is probable that the passage of Anaximenês (as cited by

Foot Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native infantry, as distinguished from special Regiments corps d'armée. The largest division of it which we sions of the find mentioned under Alexander, and which appears phalanxheavyunder the command of a general of division, is called a Taxis. How many of these Taxeis there were in infantry. all, we do not know; the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial allotments of the country: Orestæ, Lynkestæ, Elimiotæ, Tymphæi, &c. The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the Lochus of sixteen men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of 16.384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions, that which stands out as most fundamental and constant is the Syntagma, which coutained sixteen Lochi. Forming thus a square of sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it four supernumeraries—an ensign, a rear-man, a herald, and an attendant or orderly.2 Two of these Syntagmas composed a body of 512 men, called a Pentakosiarchy, which in Philip's time is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a separate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when he reorganized his army at Susa, so as to form regiments of 1024 men, each under his Chiliarch, and each comprising four Syntagmas. All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force when at home appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip. On actual foreign service, no numerical precision could be observed: a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the files of the phalangites,

The term, originally applied only to a select few, was by degrees extended to the corps generally.

1 Arrian, i. 14, 3; iii. 16, 19; Diodôr. xvii. 57. Compare the note of Schmieder on the above passage of Arrian; also Droysen, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen, pp. 95, 96, and the elaborate note of Mützell on Curtius, v. 2, 3, p.

The passage of Arrian (his descrip-

tion of Alexander's army arrayed at the Granikus) is confused, and seems erroneous in some words of the text; yet it may be held to justify the supposition of six taxeis of pezetæri in Alexander's phalanx on that day. There seem also to be six taxeis at Arbêla (iii. 11, 16).

2 Arrian, Tactic. c. 10; Ælian, Tactic. c. 9.

3 Curtius, y. 2. 3.

3 Curtius, v. 2, 3.

appears to have been regarded as important and characteristic,1 perhaps essential to impart a feeling of confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the Thebans. But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one

among many, in the varied military organization introduced by Philip. It was neither intended, nor infautry of the linefit, to act alone, being clumsy in changing front to Hypasprotect itself either in flank or rear, and unable to pistæ, or Guards. adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of infantry organized by Philip called the Hypaspists -shield-bearers or Guards,2 originally few in number, and employed for personal defence of the prince, but afterwards enlarged into several distinct corps d'armée. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry of the line; 3 they were hoplites, keeping regular array and intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for diversities of circumstance and position than the phalanx. They seem to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks; and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa. occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry of the phalanx properly so called, and the peltasts and light troops generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier we have no distinct information), at least three in number, and probably more.4 We find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements: first his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next the hypaspists come to follow it up; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and for rapid night marches.⁵ What was the total number of them we do not know.⁶

¹ This is to be seen in the arrangements made by Alexander a short time before his death when he incorporated Macedonian and Persian mcorporated Macedonian and Persian soldiers in the same lochus: the normal depth of sixteen was retained, all the front rank or privileged men being Macedonians. The Macedonians were much hurt at seeing their native regimental array shared with Asiatics (Arrian, vii. 11, 5, vii. 23, 4—8).

The proper meaning of ὑπασπισταί,

as guards or personal attendants on the prince, appears in Arrian, i. 5, 3; vii. 8, 6.

Neoptolemus, as ἀρχιυπασπιστής to Alexander, carried the shield and lance of the latter on formal occasions (Plutarch, Eumenês, 1).

3 Arrian, ii. 4, 3, 4; ii. 20, 5.

4 Arrian, iv. 30, 11; v. 23, 11.

5 Arrian, ii. 20, 5; ii. 23, 6; iii.

⁶ Droysen and Schmieder give the

Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian army, as employed by Philip and Alexander, Light included a numerous assemblage of desultory or troops irregular troops, partly native Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Pæonians, &c. They were of foreigners. different descriptions—peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best of them appear to have been the Agrianes, a Pæonian tribe expert in the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement by Alexander, on the flanks and in front of his heavy infantry, or intermingled with his cavalry,—as well as for pursuit after the enemy was defeated.

Lastly, the cavalry in Alexander's army was also admirable at least equal, and seemingly even superior in efficiency, to his best infantry. I have already mentioned that cavalry was the choice native force of -its excellence Macedonia, long before the reign of Philip, by whom —how it had been extended and improved.2 The heavy

Macedo-

regimented. cavalry, wholly or chiefly composed of native Macedonians, was known by the denomination of the Companions. There was besides a new and lighter variety of cavalry, apparently introduced by Philip, and called the Sarissophori, or Lancers, used like Cossacks for advanced posts or scouring the country. The sarissa which they carried was probably much shorter than that of the phalanx: but it was long, if compared with the xyston or thrusting-pike used by the heavy cavalry for the shock of close combat. Arrian, in describing the army of Alexander at Arbêla, enumerates eight distinct squadrons of this heavy cavalry, or cavalry of the Companions; but the total number included in the Macedonian army at Alexander's accession is not known. Among the squadrons, several at least (if not all) were named after particular towns or districts of the country-Bottiæa,

number of hypaspists in Alexander's army at Issus as 6000. That this opinion rests on no sufficient evidence has been shown by Mützell (ad Curtium, v. 2, 3, p. 399). But that the number of hypaspists left by Philip at his death was 6000 seems not improbable.

1 See Arrian, v. 14, 1; v. 16, 4; Curtius, vi. 9, 22. "Equitatui, optimæ exercitûs parti," &c.

2 We are told that Philip, after his

expedition against the Scythians about three years before his death, exacted and sent into Macedonia 20,000 chosen and sent into Macedonia 20,000 chosen mares, in order to improve the breed of Macedonian horses. The regal haras were in the neighbourhood of Pella (Justin, ix. 2; Strabo, xvi. p. 752, in which passage of Strabo the details apply to the haras of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia, not to that of Philip at Pella). Amphipolis, Apollonia, Anthemus, &c.; there was one, or more, distinguished as the Royal Squadron—the Agêma, or leading body of cavalry—at the head of which Alexander generally charged, himself among the foremost of the actual combatants.2

The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he remodelled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B.C.) at Susa, so as to subdivide the squadron into two Lochi, and to establish the Lochus for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been of infantry.3 His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or Lochus, while they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.

Among the Hypaspists or Guards, also, we find an Agêma, or chosen cohort, which was called upon oftener than the The select rest to begin the fight. A still more select corps were Macedonian Bodythe Body-Guards, a small company of tried and con-Guards. fidential men, individually known to Alexander, The Royal Pages. always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants as commanders for special service. These Body-Guards appear to have been chosen persons promoted out of the Royal Youths or Pages, an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military organization as well as into dependence on his own person. The Royal Youths, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained perpetual guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the hours of

¹ Arrian, i. 2, 8, 9 (where we also find mentioned τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἰππέας) i. 12, 12; ii. 9, 6; iii. 11, 12.

About the iππεις σαρισσοφόροι see i.

About the trimes duple occupies state 13, 1.

It is possible that there may have been sixteen squadrons of heavy cavalry, and eight squadrons of the Sarissophori—each squadron from 180 to 250 men—as Rüstow and Köchly conceive (p. 243). But there is no sufficient evidence to prove it; nor

can I think it safe to assume, as they do, that Alexander carried over with him to Asia just half of the Macedonian

him to Asia just half of the Macedonian entire force.

² Arrian, iii. 11, 11; iii. 13, 1; iii. 18, 8. In the first of these passages we have ίλαι βασιλικαί in the plural (iii. 11, 12). It seems too that the different ίλαι alternated with each other in the foremost position, or ἡγεμονία for particular days (Arrian, i. 14 0) 14, 9). 3 Arrian, iii. 16, 19.

daily and nightly watch: they received his horse from the grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews, and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well as that of never being flogged except by his special order. The precise number of the company we do not know; but it must have been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought out from Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander, and to be added to the company at Babylon.2 At the same time the mortality among them was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon himself.3 The training in this corps was a preparation first for becoming Body-Guards of Alexander,—next, for appointment to the great and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first stage of advancement to most of the Diadochi. or great officers of Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of his conquests.

It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and

1 Arrian, iv. 13, 1. ἐκ Φιλίππου ἢν ήδη καθεστηκός, τῶν ἐν τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παίδας, ὅσοι ἐς ἢλικίαν ἐμειρακίσαντο, καταλέγεσθαι ἐς θεραπείαν τοῦ βασιλέως. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν τοῦ σώματος διακονείσθαι βασιλεῦ, καὶ κοιμώμενον φυλάσσειν, τούτοις ἐπετέτραπτο καὶ ὁπότε ἐξελαύνοι βασιλεῦς, τοὺς ἵπτους παρὰ τῶν ἱπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι προσῆγον, καὶ ἀνέβαλον οὖτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θῆρα φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινωνοὶ ἢσαν, ἄτς. ησαν, &c.

Curtius, viii. 6, 1. "Mos erat principibus Macedonum adultos liberos regibus tradere, ad munia haud multum servilibus ministeriis abhorrentia. Excubabant servatis noctium vicibus Excubabant servatis noctium vicibus proximi foribus ejus ædis, in qua rex acquiescebat. Per hos pellices introducebantur, alio aditu quam quem armati obsidebant. Ildem acceptos ab agasonibus equos, quum rex ascensurus esset, admovebant; comitabanturque et venantem, et in preliis, omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium exculti. Præcipuus honor habebatur, quod licebat sedentibus vesci cum rege. Castigandi eos

verberibus nullius potestas præter ipsum erat. Hæc cohors velut seminarium ducum præfectorumque apud Macedonas fuit; hinc habuere posteri reges, quorum stirpibus post multas ætates Romaniopes ademerunt." Compare Curtius v. 6, 42; and Ælian, V. H. xiv. 49.

This information is interesting on

This information is interesting as an illustration of Macedonian manners an illustration of Macedonian manners and customs, which are very little known to us. In the last hours of the Macedonian monarchy, after the defeat at Pydna (168 B.C.), the pueri regii followed the defeated king Perseus to the sanctuary at Samothrace, and never quitted him until the moment when he surrendered himself to the Romans (Livy, xlv. 5).

As an illustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to these

As an inustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to these young Macedonians of rank, see the case of Dekamnichus, handed over by king Archelaus to Euripidês, to be flogged (Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 13).

2 Curtius, v. 6, 42; Diodôr. xvii. 65.

3 We read this about the youthful Philippus by the of Lysingchus Cur

Philippus, brother of Lysimachus (Curtius, viii. 2, 36).

Foreign auxiliaries --Grecian hoplites-Thessalian cavalry-Pæonians---Illyrians-Thracians,

diversified by Philip, including at his death-(1) the phalanx, Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa; (2) the Hypaspists, or lighter-armed corps of foot guards; (3) the companions, or heavy cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent or substantial Macedonians; (4) the lighter cavalry, lancers, or Sarissophori. With these were joined

foreign auxiliaries of great value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized shield and onehanded pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, &c., whom he had subdued around him, he levied contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts, bowmen, darters, &c., all excellent in their way, and eminently serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by organizing what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as well as for battles—a stock of projectile and battering machines, superior to anything at that time extant. We find this artillery used by Alexander in the very first year of his reign in his campaign against the Illyrians. Even in his most distant Indian marches, he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new engines for the occasion. no part of his military equipment more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander are among his most memorable exploits.

To all this large, multifarious, and systematized array of actual force are to be added the civil establishments, the Magazines, war-office, and depôt, depôts, magazines of arms, provision for remounts. drill officers and adjutants, &c., indispensable for mainat Pella. taining it in constant training and efficiency. At the time of Philip's accession, Pella was an unimportant place; 2 at his death it was not only strong as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but also the permanent centre, war-office, and training quarters of the greatest military force then known.

¹ Arrian, i. 6, 17.

² Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 247.

The military registers as well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there until the fall of the monarchy. Philip had employed his life in organizing this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of 500 talents. But his son Alexander found the instrument ready-made, with excellent officers and trained veterans for the front ranks of his phalanx.2

This scientific organization of military force, on a large scale, and with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to co-operate for one end, is the great fact of aptitudes-Macedonian history. Nothing of the same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians, like Epirots and Ætolians, had no other to them in aptitude or marking quality except those of soldier-national ship. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest no

purely militarymilitary pride stood sentiment.

definite political institutions and little sentiment of national brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the first to organize this military union into a system permanently and efficaciously operative, achieving by means of it conquests such as to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms, which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality. Such pride was still further exalted The Maceby the really superhuman career of Alexander. donian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous, and disciplined citizenship, with highly gifted intelligence.

During the winter of 335-334 B.C., after the destruction of Thêbes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian army, with the auxiliary contingents destined for this

1 Livy, xlii. 51; xliv. 46; also the comparison in Strabo, xvi. p. 752, between the military establishments of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia in Syria, and those of Philip at Pella in Macedonia.

2 Justin, xi. 6. About the debt of trusted.

enterprise, were brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest and ablest officers of Philip, was ap-B.C. 334. pointed to act as viceroy of Macedonia during the king's Measures of absence. A military force, stated at 12,000 infantry Alexander previous to his deparand 1500 cavalry, was left with him to keep down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian ture for Asia. fleet, and to repress discontents at home. Such dis-Antipater left as contents were likely to be instigated by leading vicerov at Macedonians or pretenders to the throne, especially as

Alexander had no direct heir; and we are told that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own lineage.2 Alexander overruled these representations, yet he did not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of Philip's last wife Kleopatra.3 Of the dependent tribes around, the most energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions, the tranquillity of Macedonia was entrusted to the prudence and fidelity of Antipater, which were still further ensured by the fact that three of his sons accompanied the king's army and person.4 Though unpopular in his deportment,5

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 17.

² Diodôr. xvii. 16.

³ Justin, xi. 5. "Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum omnes novercæ suæ cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatie legum program excelsiorem. cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatis locum provehens imperiis præfecerat, interfecit. Sed nec suis, qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit; ne qua materia seditionis procul se agente in Macedonia remaneret." Compare also xii. 6, where the Pausanias mentioned as having been put to death by Alexander is not the assassin of Philip. Pausanias was a coumon Macedonian name (see Diodor. xvi. 93).

I see no reason for distructive the

xvi. 93).

I see no reason for distrusting the general fact here asserted by Justin. We know from Arrian (who mentioned the fact incidentally in his work τὰ μετὰ 'Αλέξωνδρον, though he says nothing about it in his account of the expedition of Alexander—see Photius, Cod. 92, p. 220) that Alexander put to death, in the early period of his reign, his first cousin and brother-in-law

Amyntas. Much less would he scruple to kill the friends or relatives of Kleopatra. Neither Alexander nor Antipater would account such proceeding anything else than a reasonable measure of prudential policy. By the Macedonian common law, when a man was found guilty of treason, all his relatives were condemned to die along with him (Curtius vi 11, 20)

with him (Curtius, vi. 11, 20.
Plutarch (De Fortuna Alex. Magn.
p. 342) has a general allusion to these p. 342) has a general allusion to these precautionary executions ordered by Alexander. Fortune (he says) imposed upon Alexander δεινην πρὸς ἀνδρας ὁμοφύλους καὶ συγγενεῖς διὰ φόνου καὶ σιδηρου καὶ πυρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀμύνης, ἀτερπέστατον τέλος ἔχουσαν.

4 Kassander commanded a corps of Thracians and Pæonians: Iollas and Philippus were attached to the king's person (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Justin, xii. 14; Diodôr. xvii. 17).

5 Justin, xvi. 1, 14. "Antipatrum—amariorem semper ministrum regni, quam ipsos reges, fuisse," &c.

quam ipsos reges, fuisse," &c.

Antipater discharged the duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability; notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he sent many complaints to Alexander when in Asia, while she on her side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence, Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest respect, trying however to restrain her from meddling with political affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigences and violence.1

The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed the Strymôn; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus and to the towns of Abdêra and Maroneia; then through Thrace across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; lastly, through the Thracian Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet, consisting of 160 triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides,2 made up in large propor-

B.C. 334. April.

March of Alexander to the Hellespont. Passage across to Asia.

tions from contingents furnished by Athens and Grecian cities.3 The passage of the whole army—infantry, cavalry, and machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos in Asia-was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating from the army at Sestos, went down to Elæus at the southern extremity of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hektor; having been the first Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 25—39; Arrian, vii. 12, 12. He was wont to say that his

mother exacted from him a heavy house rent for his domicile of ten months.

Kleopatra also (sister of Alexander and daughter of Olympias) exercised considerable influence in the government of the Section 1988. ment. Dionysius, despot of the Pontic

Herakleia, maintained himself against opposition in his government, during Alexander's life, mainly by paying assiduous court to her (Memnon, Heracl. c. 4, ap. Photium, Cod. 224).

² Arrian, i. 11, 9.

³ The Athenians furnished twenty ships of war, Diodôr. xvii. 22.

He then sailed across in the admiral's trireme, steering with his own hand, to the landing-place near Ilium called the Harbour of the Acheans. At mid-channel of the Alexander to Ilium. strait he sacrificed a bull, with libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids. Himself too in full armour, he was the first (like Protesilaus) to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy like Hektor to meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilium was placed, he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athênê, and deposited in her temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused to be carried by guards along with him in his subsequent battles. Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of Zeus Herkeios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors, Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam's yet unappeased wrath, and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and monumental column of Achillês, father of Neoptolemus, he not only placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked up to it, exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achillês, who had been blessed during life with a faithful friend and after death with a great poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing, Alexander erected permaneut altars in honour of Zeus, Athênê, and Hêraklês, both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted and on that of Asia where it had landed.1

ture of the numerous legendary and religious associations connected with religious associations connected with the plain of Troy and with the tomb of Protesilaus at Eleus, and of the many rites and ceremonies performed there even in his time (Philostrat. Heroica, xix. 14, 15, p. 742, ed. Olearius —δρόμοις δ' ἐρβυθμισμένοις συνηλάλαζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν ᾿Αχιλλέα, ἄc., and the pages preceding and following).

Dikæarchus (Fragm. 19, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 603) had treated in a special work about the sacrifices

¹ Arrian, i. 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 15; Justin, xi. 5. The ceremony of running up to the column of Achillês still subsisted in the time of Plutarch still subsisted in the time of Plutarch— ἀλειψάμενος λίπα καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐταίρων συναναδραμῶν γυμνὸς, ισπερεθος ἐστιν, &c. The words here seem to imply that this monumental column was placed on an eminence, and that it was used as a goal for runners to run up to in matches at the festivals. Philostratus, five centuries after Alexander, conveys a vivid pic-

The proceedings of Alexander on the ever-memorable site of Ilium are interesting, as they reveal one side of his Analogy of imposing character—the vein of legendary sympathy Alexauder and religious sentiment wherein alone consisted his Greek analogy with the Greeks. The young Macedonian prince had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation which characterized the free Greeks of the city community. But he was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks.¹ his warlike ancestors in legend, Achillês and Neoptolemus, and others of that Æakid race, unparalleled in the attributes of force —a man of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous. often vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and hatred, but devoured especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity, appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his superiority of force over others—"Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis "-taking pride not simply in victorious generalship and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles, Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far As a general he surpassed his age in provident higher order. and even long-sighted combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military precaution. Thus much he borrowed, though with many improvements of his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the character and dispositions which he took with him to Asia had the features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those of Agesilaus or Epameinondas.

offered to Athênê at Ilium (Περὶ τῆς εν Ἰλίφ θυσίας) by Alexander, and by many others before him; by Xerxês (Herodot. vii. 43), who offered up 1000 oxen; by Mindarus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 4, άc.). In describing the proceedings of Alexander at Ilium, Dikæarchus appears to have dwelt much on the warm sympathy which that prince exhibited for the affection between Achillês and Patroklus; which sympathy Dikæarchus illustrated by characterizing Alexander as φιλόπαις έκμανως, and by recounting his public admiration for the eunuch Bagôas:

compare Curtius, x. i. 25, about Bagôas.

1 Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. ii. p. 334.

βριθὺς ὁπλιτοπάλας, δαΐος ἀντιπάλοις—αύτον, έκων τέχνην προγονικὴν ἀπ' Αίακιδων, άc.

Αλκην μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν 'Ολύμπιος Αἰακίδητις, Νοῦν δ' 'Αμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ' ἔπορ' 'Ατρείδησιν.

(Hesiod. Fragment. 223, ed. Marktscheffel.)

Like Achillês, Alexander was distinguished for swiftness of foot (Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. i. p. 331).

The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after Review and its crossing, presented a total of 30,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry, thus distributed :-

total of the Macedonian armyin Asia.

4,500

Infantry,						
Macedonian phalanx and	l hypas	pists				12,000
Allies	•					7,000
Mercenaries .	•	•	•	•	•	5,000
Under the command of I	Parmen	io .				24,000
Odrysians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians						5,000
Agriânes and archers .	•	•	•	•	•	1,000
Total	al Infar	ıtry				30,000
CAVALRY.						
Macedonian heavy—under Philotas, son of Parmenio						1,500
Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas						1,500
Miscellaneons Grecian —under Erigyius						600
Thracian and Pæonian (light)—under Kassander .						900

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander's first invading army. There were, however, other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 Besides these troops, also, there must have been an cavalry.1 effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the

Total Cavalry .

1 Diodôr. xvii. 17. Plutarch (Alexand. 15) says that the highest numbers and. 15) says that the highest numbers which he had read of were 43,000 infantry with 5000 cavalry; the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, τετρακισχιλίους in place of πεντακισχιλίους to be well founded, as it probably is: compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M.

Alex. M. 1. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and Aristobulus stated the number of infantry to be 30,000; but Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus as only 4000. Nevertheless Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and Aristobulus

whenever they agree-states the number of infantry as "not much more than 30,000: the cavalry as more than 5000" 30,000: the cavalry as more than 5000 ° (Ex. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaximenês alleged 43,000 infantry with 5500 cavalry. Kallisthenês (ap. Polybium, xii. 19) stated 40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 32,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. My statement in the text follows Diodôrus, who stands distinguished by

recounting not merely the total, but the component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus; as to cavalry, his statement is a mean between

the two.

military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers,1 was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his auxiliaries or complete the outfit of his army without incurring a debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by his father Philip.² Though Plutarch ³ wonders at the smallness of the force with which Alexander contemplated the execution of such great projects, yet the fact is that in infantry he was far above any force which the Persians had to oppose him; 4 not to speak of comparative discipline and organization, surpassing even that of the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander's army were native Macedonians. His intimate Chief personal friend Hephæstion, as well as his body- Macedonian guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives of Pella: Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper Macedonia called Orestis; 5 Antipater with his son Kassander, Kleitus son of Drôpidês, Parmenio with his two sons Philôtas and Nikanor, Seleukus, Kœnus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus,6 Meleager, Peukestês, &c.—all these seem to have been native Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war under Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater especially had occupied a high rank.

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 15.

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 15.

² Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts into the mouth of Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.

Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200 talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).

³ Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, v. 6.

Justin, xi. 6.

⁴ Arrian, i. 13, 4.

⁵ Arrian, vi. 28, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, xv. 3—4. Porphyry (Fragm. ap. Syncellum, Frag. Histor. Grac. vol. iii. pp. 695—698) speaks of Lysimachus as a Thessalian from Kranon; but this must be a mistake: compare Justin, xv. 3.

⁶ Neoptolemus belonged, like Alexander himself, to the Æakid gens (Arrian, ii. 27, 9).

Of the many Greeks in Alexander's service, we hear of few in important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, Greeks in was among his familiar companions, but the ablest Alexander's serviceand most distinguished of all was Eumenês, a native Eumenês of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. of Kardia. combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip, and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued by Alexander in the post of chief-secretary during the whole of that king's life.1 He conducted most of Alexander's correspondence, and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the name of the Royal Ephemerides. But though his special duties were thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in the field. Occasionally entrusted with high military command, he received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In spite of these great qualities, or perhaps in consequence of them, he was the object of marked jealousy and dislike 2 on the part of the Macedonians, from Hephæstion the friend and Neoptolemus the chief armour-bearer of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenês as an unwarlike penman. The contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down on Greeks is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of Alexander, as well as a new feature in history, retorting the ancient Hellenic sentiment, in which Demosthenês, a few years before, had indulged towards the Macedonians.3

Though Alexander had been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army was already assembled under the Persian sa-Persian traps within a few days' march of Abydos. Since the forces-Mentor and reconquest of Egypt and Phœnicia, about eight or nine Memnonthe Rhodians. years before by the Persian king Ochus, the power of

¹ Plutarch, Eumenês, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumen. c. 1.
² Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum.

<sup>2, 3, 8, 10.

3</sup> Demosth. Philip. iii. p. 119, repecting Philip—οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἑλληνος οντος, οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ελλησιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν

καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁλέθρου Μακεδόνος, ὅθεν οὐδὶ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἢν πρότερον πρίασθαι.
Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers (called Argyraspides) against their distinguished chief Eumenês, calling him Χεῥρονησίτης ὅλεθρος (Plutarch, Eumenês, 18).

that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece. The Persian successes in Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries, under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general Mentor, who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the eunuch Bagôas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only ample presents but also the appointment of military commander on the Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard. He procured the recal of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with Philip.2 He further subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast, among them the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the strong post of Atarneus.3 These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B.C. He and his brother Memnon after him upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace; 4 that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip's intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court, and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.5

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the of the Peryear 338 B.C. he died, poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, sian crown _Ochus_ who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king's Darius Cosons, killing all the rest. After two years, however,

domannus.

Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses and put him to death also,

1 See, in reference to these incidents,

of Hermeias.—Compare also Isokratês,

of Hermeias.—Compare also Isokratês, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167.

2 Diodôr. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from Ochus to Philip.

3 Diodôr. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of Atarneus, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodôr. xiii. 65. It had been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of Hermeias.—Compare also Isokratês, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167.

4 Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle of Issus, apud Arrian. ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of Perinthus) are here alluded to.

5 Demosthenês, Philippic iv. pp. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi apud Demosthen. p. 160.

together with all his children, thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxês Mnemon), who had acquired glory in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy's army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to poison Darius also, but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself. In spite of such murders and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards reproached to Darius, the authority of Darius seems to have been recognized, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B.C. 336, when Philip was organizing the projected invasion of Persia, tions of and when the first Macedonian division under Par-Darius for menio and Attalus was already making war in Asia, defence. Darius prepared measures of defence at home, and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.3 assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful Alexan-Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander's reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Beotia satisfied Darius that the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for defence. The Phænician fleet was ordered to be equipped; the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon on the sea-board was furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under his separate command.5

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events during the nineteen months between Alexander's accession and his landing in Asia (August, 336 B.C., to March or April, 334

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; ³ Diodôr. xvii. 7. Curtius, x. 5, 22. ⁴ Arrian, ii. 14, 11. ⁵ Diodôr. xvii. 7.

B.C.). We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own territory (the before region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of

Alexander's

arrival. Adramyttium1) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around.2 The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but was compelled by Memnon to raisc the siege of Pitanê, while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhæteium.3

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, Superiority and Memnon both active and successful even against of the the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of sea-their the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal imprudence in letting imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand Hellespont army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B.C. They

Persians at Alexander unopposed.

possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phonician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander's designs, preparations, and even intended time of march must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

At the time of Alexander's landing, a powerful Persian force

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν — which doubtless means this region, conquered by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.

 ² Diodôr. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.
 ³ Diodôr. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near Magnêsia, between Parmenio and Memnon (Polystreen) ænus, v. 34, 4).

was already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsitês the Phrygian satrap, sup-Persian ported by several other leading Persians-Spithridatês force assembled (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakês, Atizyês, Mithin Phrygia, under ridatês, Rheomithrês, Niphatês, Petinês, &c. Forty Arsitês and and others. of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valour. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians, Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, &c. 1 In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number,2 composed, however, in large proportion of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodôrus as 10,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodôrus the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth, that of cavalry probably below it.

Memnon, who was present with his own sons and with his own

Advice of Memnon, to avoid fighting on land, and to employ the fleet for aggressive warfare in Macedonia and Greece.

division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander, he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves, in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force im-

practicable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbours.3

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12,

^{14;} i. 16, 5.

2 Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.

3 Compare the policy recommended by Mcmnon, as set forth in Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodôrus (xvii. 18).

The superiority of Diodôrus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly be the the defensive and the offensive. both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon's policy, which, when

taken together, form a scheme of operations no less effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the offensive policy, and mentious only the defensive—the retreat and destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly have been reckoned upon for success in starving out Alexander, and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian

Had his plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions—perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander's military superiority, and conscious at the same time to fight. of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonourable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was further strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders. deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsitês, in whose territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burnt.1 Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus-"of not being able to procure a dinner in his own country".2 The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalized by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,3

generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon's ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of the irresistible Persian

I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodôrus, because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very

valuable historian; he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric, which contrasts favourably both with Diodôrus and with Curtius; but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.

¹ Arrian, i. 12, 18.

2 Xenophôn, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.

3 Strabo, xii. p. 602. The rivers
Skamander, Æsepus, and Granikus
all rise from the same height, called
Kotylus. This comes from Demetrius, a native of Skêpsis.

and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. The It is of no great depth: near the point where the Persians take post on Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in the river Granikus. many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy's attack. Persians, marching forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city, situated between Priapus and Parium.1

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position,

Alexander reaches the Granikus, and resolves to force the passage at once, in spite of the dissuasion of Parmenio.

from Arisbê (where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus, receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From

Hermôtus (the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched towards the Granikus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

In Alexander's array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of Disposition of the two which it consisted, were commanded (reckoning from armies. right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus, Amyntas son of Andromenês, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus.² Immediately

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 18, 19. οἰ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπώρειαν κατειλημμένοι, &c., "prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit".

Justin, xi. 6: compare Strabo, xiii. pp. 587, 588.

² Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations

are proposed. The words έστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσου τῆς ξυμπάσης τάξεως seem to prove that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager, and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three others (Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ

on the right of the phalanx were the hypaspistæ, or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio-then the light horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniate squadron of Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokrates, all under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly, the full body of Companioncavalry, the bownen and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.1 The left flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct divisions of cavalry or lighter troops: first, by the Thracians, under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus son of Menelaus-lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas, whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the command of the right. giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank-for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithrês—the Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsitês and Spithridatês—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenês with their divisions.2 The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

In this array both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence.3 There being no firing Battle of the or smoke, as with modern armies, all the details on Granikus. each side were clearly visible to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendour of his armour and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanour of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own left, which

Aλεξάνδρου appear wrongly inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the τάξεις, once again in counting from the left.

1 Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with thirteen squadrons (ἴλαι) of cavalry. Whether

this total includes all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cav-alry, we cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).

they reinforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead (the squadron of Apollonia, of which Sokratês was captain commanded on this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippus), supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ. He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry.² Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others down at the water's edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body

¹ Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same cavalry as those who are called (in i. 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας, under Amyntas son of Arrhibens.

Dreus.

2 Arrian, i. 14, 10. αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον κέρας . . . ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξην ἀεὶ παρατείνων την τάξιν ή παρείλκε τὸ ρεῦμα, ἴνα δη μη ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστὸν, τῆ ψάλαγγι προσμίξη αὐτοῖς.

Apparently this passage λοξην ἀεὶ παρατείνων την τάξιν, η παρείλκε τὸ ῥεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which follows, describing the purpose to be accomplished.

I cannot think that the words imply a movement en échelon, as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, p. 271), nor a crossing of the river against the stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of others.

which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervour on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander, with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility. Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope to recede to the level ground above.

Here again, as at the water's edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horse-battle. guards who generally aided him in mounting his horse -and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else; upon which

Cavalry Personal danger of Alexander. His life is saved by. Kleitus.

the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against Mithridatês (son-in-law of

¹ Arrian, i. 15, 5. καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν achievements of Alexander, he had (Alexander himself) ξυνειστήκει μάχη said little even about the right half of καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτφ ἄλλαι ἐπ' ἄλλαις the army and nothing at all about the τῶν τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ left half of it under Parmenio. We αλεπῶς ἤδη. These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete Arrian's description of the battle had before been. Dwelling almost exclusively upon the personal presence and the most part with little or no resistance.

Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridatês and laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhæsakês, who struck him a blow on the head with his scimitar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakês through the body with his pike.1 Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridatês, was actually close behind Alexander with hand and scimitar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment Kleitus, son of Dropidês—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridatês and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander's life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridatês, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armour, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigour and success; 2 and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander's cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardour of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his Complete victory of victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Alexander. Destruction Greeks, had remained without movement or orders of the Grelooking on the cavalry battle which had just disascian infantry on the trously terminated. To them Alexander immediately side of the turned his attention.3 He brought up his phalanx and Persians. hypaspistæ to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him.

¹ Arrian, i. 15, 6—12; Diodôr. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16. These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

² Diodôr. xvii. 21.

³ Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.

infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.1

In this complete and signal defeat the loss of the Persian cavalry was not very serious in mere number, for only 1000 of them were slain. But the slaughter of the Persians leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with number of their leadextreme bravery in the personal conflict against ing men Alexander, was terrible. There were slain not only

Loss of the

Mithridatês, Rhœsakês, Spithridatês, whose names have been already mentioned, but also Pharnakês, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanês satrap of Kappadokia, Atizvês, Niphatês, Petines, and others, all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsitês, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon's advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand from anguish and humiliation.2 The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian's account, was a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field or could be afterwards re-assembled in Asia Minor.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas of the Macewere slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander.3 It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.4 If

² Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6. ³ Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

¹ Arrian, i. 16, 4: Diodôr. xvii. 21.
Diodôrus says that on the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with 2000 cavalry, and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.

2 Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.
3 Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

4 Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p. 273) state that in modern battles the ordinary proportion of wounded to killed is from 8: 1 to 10: 1.

this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add further the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only 2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity: moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valour, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not easy, therefore, to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.1

Alexander's kindness to his wounded soldiers, and severe treatment of the Grecian prisoners.

After the victory Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the twenty-five Companions slain he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead

bodies were honourably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners were put in chains and transported to Macedonia, there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil to be dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis. with this inscription—"Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedemonians (present these offerings), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia".2 Though the vote

Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus (apud Plutarch. l. c.) said that there were slain among the companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν 'Λλέξανδρον) thirty-four persons, of

whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian's statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry slain.

² Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.

to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own selfaggrandizing impulse under the name of a supposed Pan-hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against His conquests were the extinction of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsitês and the other satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was, Unskilfulmoreover, so unskilfully fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service. was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was fought only by the Persian cavalry; 1 the infantry was left to be surrounded and destroyed afterwards.

ness of the Persian leaders. Immense impression produced by Alex-ander's victory.

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees who perished, realizing almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxês, and the Chorus, in the Persæ of Æschylus,2 after the battle of Salamis; next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achillês, not only rushed foremost into the mêlée, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of contemporaries.

Several of the neighbouring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and were permitted to occupy their lands under the

 ¹ Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an iππομαχία (i. 17, 10, and elsewhere).
 This battle was fought in the Attic
 month Thargelion: probably the beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).
 Æschylus, Pers. 950 εεqq.

same tribute as they had paid before. The inhabitants of the

Terror and submission of the Asiatics to Alexander. Surrender of the strong fortress of Sardis. neighbouring Grecian city of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered and obtained their pardon—Alexander admitting the plea that they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio to attack Daskylium, the stronghold and chief residence of the satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison and surrendered,

doubtless with a considerable treasure therein. satrany of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander's power, and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf, levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before. He himself then marched with his main force in a southerly direction towards Sardis, the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis-situated on a lofty and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long blockade,2 which would have allowed time for the arrival of the fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrines. The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure were delivered up to him without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there was not in Asia any Persian governor of courage and fidelity such as had been displayed by Maskamês and Bogês after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece.3 Alexander treated Mithrines with courtesv and honour, granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally, with the usc of their own Lydian laws. The betraval of Sardis by Mithrinês was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious strength—congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on

Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

² About the almost impregnable fortifications and position of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15—18; Herod. i. 84. It held out for nearly two years against

Antiochus III. (B.C. 216), and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.

3 Herodot, vii. 106, 107.

the spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated. He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikas, collector of tribute. The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute. From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespon-

tine Phrygia, and Alexander, son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas to the command from Sardis to the coast. of the Thessalian cavalry, to attack Atarneus and the Capture of district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Milêtus, the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior, the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Milêtus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbour, and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator in the agora.² Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who, however, was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to

¹ Arrian, i. 17, 5—9; Diodôr. xvii. told who Heropythus was, or under what circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander's invasion.

² Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus, which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no information; nor are we

death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander, who displayed an honourable and prudent moderation.¹

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in com-He finds the munication with his fleet, under the command of first resist-Nikanor, and received propositions of surrender from ance at the two neighbouring inland cities, Magnêsia and To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companioncavalry; while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian supremacy-to place the government in the hands of the citizens, and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself-after taking part in a solemn festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle array—marched southward towards Milêtus; his fleet, under Nikanor, proceeding thither by sea.2 He expected probably to enter Milêtus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,3 four hundred sail of Phonician and Cyprian ships of war, with well-trained seamen, was approaching.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have pre-

Near approach of the Persian fleet. Memnon is made commander-in-chief of the Persians.

vented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Milêtus; ⁴ and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to

accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle.

¹ Arrian, i. 17, 10—13. ² Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

 ³ Arrian, i. 18, 10—13.
 4 Diodôr. xvii. 22.

Whether the towns in Memnon's principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests, however, were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince; but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was, however, probably on board.

It came too late to aid in the defence of Milêtus. before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Lade, which commanded the harbour of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Milêtus evacuated, and took it without Persians.

resistance. He was making preparations to besiege Alexander resistance. He was making preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 4000 naval comtroops across to the island of Lade, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded Parmenio.

Three days The Macedonian fleet occupies the harbour of Milêtus, and keeps declines bat. His debate with

from Milêtus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighbouring promontory of Mykalê. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard, and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land, and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would overcome the Persian fleet by means of land operations.2 This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole;

illustrating as it does not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Milêtus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought to him by a Alexander Milesian citizen named Glaukippus—that the city besieges Milêtus. should be neutral, and open to him as well as to the Capture of the city. His fleet, under Nikanor, occupied the Persians. harbour, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water's edge: while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield. Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbour, and there prepared to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of capitulation, and received them into his own service.1 To the surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city, while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighbouring promontory
The Persian of Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the capture of Milêtus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus. At the same time, Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his own fleet, which, while costing more than he

¹ Arrian, i. 19; Diodôr, xvii. 22.

could then afford, was nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated that, by concentrating all his efforts on land operations, especially against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.1

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of Milêtus-including the Ionic and Æolic cities and March of the principality of Memnon—had either accepted Alexander to Halikarwillingly the dominion of Alexander, or had been nassus. reduced by his detachments. Accordingly, he now of Karia,

joins him. directed his march southward of Milêtus, towards Karia, and especially towards Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family, who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions, adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many years earlier. under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of Idrieus, his widow Ada was expelled from Halikarnassus and other parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still retained some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobatês, warmly espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of resistance against the invader.2

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian fleet had repaired thither from Milêtus; Memnon,

Arrian, i. 20, 1—4; Diod. xvii. 22. At the same time, the statement of Diodôrus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24), that Alexander sent his battering-engines from Milètus to Halikarnassus by sea.

2 Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodôr. from Milètus to Halikarnassus by sea. ² Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodôr. xvii. This would only have exposed them to ² Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

We shall see that Alexander reorganized his entire fleet during the ensu-

now invested by Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was there in person. Strong garrison, and good dewas not only Orontobatês with many other Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, comfensive preparation manded by Ephialtês, a brave Athenian exile. The at Ĥalikarcity, strong both by nature and by art, with a surnassus. rounding ditch forty-five feet broad and twenty-two feet deep, 1 had been still further strengthened under the prolonged superintendence of Memnon; 2 lastly, there were two citadels, a fortified harbour with its entrance fronting the south, abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines. The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which Alexander had vet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea at once, as at Milêtus, he could make his approaches only from the land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the Persian ships with their numerous crews.

His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or north-

Siege of Halikarnassus. Bravery of the garrison, under Ephialtês he Athepian. east of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls. After a few days thus spent without much avail he passed with a large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land on which Halikarnassus and Myndus (the

latter farther westward) were situated. While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus he at the same time attempted a night attack on Myndus, but was obliged to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from missiles by movable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled up the wide and deep ditch round the town so as to open a level road for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition was successfully prosecuted; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from the garrison, repulsed, though not without loss and difficulty, by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines had overthrown two towers of the city-wall,

together with two intermediate breadths of wall, and a third tower was beginning to totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of brick to cover the open space and a wooden tower of the great height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles.1 It appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third tower before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers from the division of Perdikkas.2 These men, elate with wine, rushed up single-handed to attack the Mylasean gate and slew the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a general combat took place a short distance from the wall. In the end the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back into the city. Such was the confusion that the city might then have been assaulted and taken had measures been prepared for it beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless, before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed their halfmoon within, against which accordingly, on the next day, Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position, however, being as it were within the circle of the citywall, the Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them. Moreover, at night a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even the main woodwork of one of them, was burnt. It was not without difficulty that Philôtas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard, preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.3 Though his troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of defeat: nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which was granted by Memnon in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtês.4

¹ Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8; Diodikkas, though Diodôrus says that it dôr. xvii. 25, 26.

2 Both Arrian (i. 21, 5) and Diodôrus (xvii. 25) mention this proceeding of the two soldiers of Per-dikkas, though Diodôrus says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.

3 Arrian, i. 21, 7—12.

4 Diodôr. xvii. 25.

After a few days of interval for burying his dead and repairing

Desperate sally of Ephialtês— at first successful, but repulsed— he himself is slain.

the engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon under his own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtês especially resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the only chance of preservation consisted

in destroying the besieging engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head of a last desperate sally.1 He took immediately near him 2000 chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtês with his division marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torchbearers tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for personal strength than for valour, he occupied the front rank, and was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers, charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled. They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip's campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the most conspicuous,

The fact here mentioned by Diodôrus, that Ephialtês drove back the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard, is one of much interest, which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias; the part of his work in which it ought to have been narrated is lost. On this, as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverses, obstructions, and losses of Alexander's career. His authorities probably did so before him.

¹ The last desperate struggle of the besieged is what stands described in i. 23 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27, of Diodôrus; though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does not name Ephialtês at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who probably dwelt only on Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other hand, Diodôrus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great part, Grecian authors, in whose view eminent Athenian exiles, like Ephialtês and Charidêmus, counted for much more.

upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades,1 cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtês, foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage. During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally, over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the king's body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers, perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party were at length repulsed and driven into the city.2 The loss of the besieged was severe in trying to get again within the walls under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.

By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobatês, satis- Memnon is fied that no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores, and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis, partly to the neighbouring islet called Arkonnesus, partly to the island of Kôs.3 Though

forced to abandon Halikarnassus, and withdraw the garrison by sea, retaining only the citadel. Alexander enters Halikarnassus.

thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept good garrisons, well provisioned, in the two citadels belonging to it. The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander when he entered the town, and put to death all those whom he found with fire-He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the brands. houses should be spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned the whole of Karia to Ada as a principality, doubtless under condition of tribute. As the citadels still

¹ Diodôr. xvi. 27: Curtius, v. 1; ἀνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ συνανιίί. 2. . . οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτατοι θροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν τησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη 'νενικηκέναι ἀπολελυμένοι τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππω . . . τοἷς γενικηκόναι ἀνγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρώς xvii. 27.

ώνείδισαν την άνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ συνα-

occupied by the enemy were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3000 men to guard it.

Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage waggons, to Sardis.

The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern B.C. 334— Lykia, Pamphyna, and Lykia, Pamphyna, Six 1333. Winter. coast of Asia Minor is mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea, so as to Winter campaign of leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In Alexander along the southern spite of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander's arms, that all the Lykian townscoast of Asia Minor. Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow.2 One alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation.3 On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city. Phaselis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort erected and garrisoned against them by the neighbouring Pisidian mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektês.4

After this brief halt at Phasêlis, Alexander directed his course to Pergê, in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent most of his army, was so difficult as to require some levelling by Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still, called Klimax, under the mountains by the brink of the sea. When the wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the spot, the wind had blown strong from the south, but as he came near, the special providence of the gods (so he and his friends conceived it) brought on

Arrian, i. 23, 11; Diodôr. xvii. 7;
 Strabo, xiv. p. 657.
 Arrian, i. 24, 6-9.
 Diodôr. xvii. 28.
 Arrian, i. 24, 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 17.

a change to the north, so that the sea receded and left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to their waists.1 From Pergê he marched on to Sidê, receiving on his way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but deprecated the entrance of a garrison, which they were allowed to buy off by promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having left a garrison at Sidê, he advanced onward to a strong place called Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault, which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained them to submission, and then marched back to Pergê; from whence he directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,2 through the difficult mountains and almost indomitable population of Pisidia.

After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce several towns or strong posts, Alexander pro- Alexander ceeded northward into Phrygia, passing by the salt concludes his winter lake called Askanius to the steep and impregnable campaign at Gordium. fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000 Karians and Capture of Kelænæ. 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress, unless such relief should arise before the sixtieth day.3 Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ, and left there Antigonus (afterwards the most powerful among his successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio was directed to meet him, and where his wintercampaign was concluded.4

Plutarch's words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that Alexander did

Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὖκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, ἀc. Strabo, xiv. p. 666; Curtius, v. 3, 22.

not boast so much of this special favour from the gods as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.

² Arrian, i. 27, 1—8. ³ Curtius, iii. 1, 8. ⁴ Arrian, i. 29, 1—5.

APPENDIX.

ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE.

The statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried by the phalangite are taken from Polybius, whose description is on all points both clear and consistent with itself. "The sarissa (he says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory, and fourteen cubits, as adapted to actual practice"— τ ò δὲ τ ῶν σαρισσῶν μέγεθός ἐστι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἐκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δεκατεσσάρων. τούτων δὲ τοὺς τέσσαρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ ταῖν χεροῖν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατόπιν σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).

The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in theory and that in practice may probably be understood to mean, that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they employed against an enemy.

Of the later Tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2) state its length at sixteen cubits; Ælean (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius or some other authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though none state the case so clearly as he does.

Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238), authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen feet in length—not sixteen cubits. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.

First, they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual

service was sixteen cubits long. Computing the weight of such a weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as only fourteen cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us read cubits where we ought to have read feet—it will follow that the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be fourteen feet, not sixteen feet. Now this length is not sufficient to justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.

Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied by a Macedonian soldier, and yet that in the fight he had two Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes opposed to him (xviii. 13). But there is here no contradiction at all; for Polybius expressly says that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn up in order, required when fighting an expansion of the ranks and an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and on each side of him $(\chi \acute{a}\lambda a\sigma \mu a \kappa a) \delta i \acute{a}\sigma \tau a\sigma i \lambda \lambda \acute{n}\lambda \omega \nu \ \acute{e}\chi \epsilon \iota \nu \delta \epsilon \acute{n}\sigma \epsilon \iota \tau o is \ \acute{a}\nu \delta \rho as \ \acute{e}\lambda \acute{a}\chi \iota \sigma \tau o \nu \tau \rho \epsilon \hat{i}s \pi \acute{o}\delta as \kappa a\tau \ \acute{e}\pi \iota \sigma \tau \acute{a}\tau \eta \nu \kappa a \iota \pi a\rho a\sigma \tau \acute{a}\tau \eta \nu)$ in order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to attack the phalanx occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and had ten pikes to deal with.

Further, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of cubits, really meant feet, because (cap. 12) he speaks of three feet as the interval between each rank in the file, and these three feet are clearly made equal to two cubits. His computation will not come right,

if in place of eubits you substitute feet.

We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it, that the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of Paulus Æmilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on the subject.

It might indeed be imagined that the statement of Polybius, though true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.

Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable

except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions. But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite is always spoken of. So Livy, xxxi. 39: "Erant pleraque silvestria circa, incommoda phalangi maximè Macedonum; quæ, nisi ubi prælongis hastis velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo opus est) nullius admodum usus est". Compare also Livy, xliv. 40, 41, where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we find: "Si carptim aggrediendo, circumagere immobilem longitudine et gravitate hastam cogas, confusâ strue implicatur"; also xxxiii. 8, 9.

Xenophôn tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried a pike fifteen cubits long, together with a short sword: he does not mention a shield, but they were greaves and helmets (Anab. iv. 7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynceki defended their citadel "with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry them" (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the assailants with a thrusting pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three feet in length (ξυστὸν ναύμαχον ἐν παλάμησιν—δυωκαιεικοσίπηχυ, Iliad, xv. 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in length—intended to be hurled (Iliad, vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading is not settled, whether ἔγχος ἔχὶ ἑνδεκάπηχυ, or ἔγχος ἔχεν δεκάπηχυ.

The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or four first ranks composed of the strongest and bravest men in the regimentcither officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay. The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at arms: they were irresistible in front. unless an enemy could find incans to break in among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their great confidence was in the length of the pike-Macchiavelli says of them (Ritratti dell' Alemagna. Opere, t. iv. p. 159; and Dell'Arte della Guerra, pp. 232-236): "Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non è possibile entrare tra loro, nè accostarseli. quanto è la picca lunga. Sono ottime genti in campagna, a far giornata: ma per espugnare terre non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo: ed universalmente, dove non possano tenere l'ordine loro della milizia non vagliano."

CHAPTER XCIII.

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER —BATTLE OF ISSUS—SIEGE OF TYRE.

It was about February or March, 333 B.C., when Alexander reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time, giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gor-

B.C. 333.

Alexander cuts the Gordian

dian knot. There was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure, said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and his son Midas, the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as such by the gods and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of fibres from the bark of the cornel tree) attaching the yoke of this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to untie. An oracle had pronounced that to the person who should untie it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the knot and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the cord in two. By every onc this was accepted as a solution of the problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia, a belief which the gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during the ensuing night.1

¹ Arrian, ii. 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18; Justin, xi. 7.

At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating the liberation of the Athenian prisoners He refuses taken at the Granikus, who were now at work chained the liberation of the in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this praver Athenian until a more convenient season. prisoners. Aware that the Greeks were held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians, he did not think it prudent to relax his hold

Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, B.C. 333.

Progress of Memnon and the Persian fleet-they acquire Chios and a large part of Lesbos they be-siege Mitylênê. Death of Memnon. Capture of Mitylênê.

upon their conduct.1

excluded from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Ægean (during the first half of 333 B.C.), with the purpose of carrying war into Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a large Phœnician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries, together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradatês. Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos, where four out of the five cities, either from

fear or preference, declared in his favour, while Mitylênê, the greatest of the five, already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him. Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died of sickness, but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by Alexander should be dismissed; that the column recording alliance with him should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus, as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at He not only extorted contributions, but introduced a once.

garrison under Lykomêdês, and established a returned exile named Diogenês as despot.1 Such breach of faith was illcalculated to assist the further extension of Persian influence in Greece.

Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander's army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly important as promising future progress. Several of the Cyclades islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet was expected in Eubea, and the

Hopes excited in Greece by the Persian fleet, but ruined by the death of Memnon.

Spartans began to count upon aid for an anti-Macedonian movement.2 But all these hopes were destroyed by the unexpected decease of Memnon.

It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, Memnon's which rendered his death a fatal blow to the interests death an irreparable of Darius. The Persians had with them other Greek to Darius. officers, brave and able, probably some not unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of operations, and upheld against court calumnies. Though Alexander had now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means, if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom he opposed than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of Memnon, lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full leisure to reorganize the Macedonian fleet,3 and to employ the undivided land force for further inland conquest.4

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by

vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander) 1 Arrian, ii. 1, 4—9.
2 Diodôr. xvii. 29.
3 Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. "Nondum enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur."
4 Diodôr. xvi. 31.

Change in He resolves to take the offensive on land. His immense

land force.

the change of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian king resolved to renounce the defensive Darius's plan caused by this event. schemes of Memnon, and to take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops, already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially arrived and were still coming in.1 Their numbers became greater and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host, the total of which

is given by some as 600,000 men, by others as 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language, filled the mind of Darius with confidence, especially as there were among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. Persian courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana, Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive, but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had come in, Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians, Kardakes, &c., all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia, are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxês in the plain of Doriskus, by paling off a space capable of containing exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in succession.2 Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him, had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the real conditions of military preponderance, accustomed only to the gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength, the king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a god on earth, certain to trample down all before; just as most Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxês,3 and by stronger

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 30, 31. Diodôrus represents the Persian king as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops after he heard the death of Memnon, which cannot be true. The letters must have been sent out before.

Herodotus into the mouth of Xerxês is natural and instructive. On the other hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the troops after he heard the death of Memnon, which cannot be true. The letters must have been sent out before.

2 Curtius, iii. 2.
3 Herodot, vii. 56, and the colloquy between Xerxês and Demaratus, vii. Yen. Hellen, vii. 1, 38, and Cyropæd. viii. 8, 20.

reason Xerxês respecting himself, a century and a half before him. Because all this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling, given in Curtius and Diodôrus, is often mistrusted as baseless rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgment.

But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near Darius was the Athe- and sound nian exile Charidêmus; who, having incurred the implacable enunity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens after the Macedonian capture of Thêbes, death by and had fled together with Ephialtes to the Persians.

Free speech Darius.

Darius, elate with the apparent omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion of Charidêmus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxês), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerable wrath. cated as they all were with the spectacle of their immense muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidêmus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still further exasperated by the clamours of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidêmus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late (exclaimed

the Athenian) the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you."1

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and

Darius abandoned Memnon's plans, just at the time when he had the best defensive positions for executing them with effect.

glory, Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment his land-army became the really important and aggressive force, with which he himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the plans of Memnon-the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. For

at the time of the battle of the Granikus, when Memnon's counsel was originally given, the defensive part of it was not easy to act upon, since the Persians had no very strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly desire—advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia—a line of defence (as will presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, and after that the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity for executing the defensive part of Memnon's scheme could not present itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to Darius the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of recalls the Grecian Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnamercenaries bazus (made provisionally by the dying Mennon) as from the fleet. admiral, he at the same time despatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the

¹ Curtius, iii. 2, 10—20 : Diodôr, xvii, 30,

fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army. Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian drama-because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except secondary points in the case. for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favour of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain, as was afterwards proved at Arbêla. The real imprudence—the neglect of the Memnonian warning-consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.

The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put in relief the really important and determining

points.

While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thessalian cavalry and 150 Eleians.2 As soon as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphalagonians, who submitted themselves to his discretion, only en-

B.C. 333. Summer.

March of Alexander from Gordium through Paphlagonia and Kappa

¹ Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1. ² Arrian, i. 29, 6.

treating that he would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving therein Sabiktas as satrap.1

B.C. 333. He arrives at the line of Mount Taurnsdifficulties of the pass.

Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus, at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pyle, or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication between Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great chain. The long road

ascending and descending was generally narrow, winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present, the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier. Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army.² Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother Artaxerxês; and Xenophôn,3 who then went through it, pronounces it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact, that he prepared a fleet in case he found the pass occupied, to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and great indeed was his astonishment to discover that the habitual recklessness of Per-

Pintarch, Alex. 18.

² Respecting this pass, see Chap.
lxix. of the present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one the easternmost, descending upon Adana in Kilikia; the other, the westernmost, upon Tarsus.

In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha, the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass unsign on the control of the two passes.

defended, so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but defended them easternmost pass of the Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadalvène et Barrault, p. 243).

Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.

3 Xenoph. Anabas. i. 2, 21 : Diodôr.

Lbrim

sian management had left the defile unguarded. The narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men abreast. was shut in by precipitous rocks on each side.1 Here, if anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.

Yet Arsamês, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia, having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass Alexander fled without striking a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable than mountain robbers. Alexander thus became master of this least resistalmost insuperable barrier without the loss of a man.2 On the ensuing day he marched his whole army over Tarsus.

B.C. 333. Conduct of

Arsamês, the Persian satrap. Taurus without the ance. He enters

it into Kilikia, and arriving in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by Arsamês.3

At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt-much longer than he Either from excessive fatigue, or from intended. bathing while hot in the chilly water of the river B.C. 333. Kydnus, he was seized with a violent fever, which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his illness of life was despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune filled the army, none of dence in the the physicians would venture to administer remedies, from fear of being held responsible for what threatened who cures him. to be a fatal result.4 One alone among them, an

Summer.

Dangerous Alexander. His confiphysician Philippus,

Akarnanian named Philippus, long known and trusted by

¹ Curtius, iii. 4, 11.

² Curtius, iii. 4, 11. "Contemplatus locorum situm (Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem suam," &c.

See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathoklės (son of Lysimachus) holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkėtės.

³ Arrian, ii. 4, 3—8; Curtius, iii. 4. Curtius ascribes to Arsamės the intention of executing what had been recomirantes.

tion of executing what had been recom-

mended by Memnon before the battle of the Granikus, to desolate the country in order to check Alexander's advance. But this can hardly be the right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian's account seems more reason-

4 When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him to be crucified (Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Arrian, vii. 14).

Alexander, engaged to cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received a confidential letter from Parmenio. entreating him to beware of Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading the letter he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark, at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus, indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and even to bring him to death's door: but after a certain interval its healing effects became The fever was subdued, and Alexander was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army. A reasonable time sufficed to restore him to his former health and vigour.

It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio, at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Operations of Alexan-Thracians in his army, for the purpose of clearing the der in forward route and of securing the pass called the Kilikia. Gates of Kilikia and Syria.² This narrow road, bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The Gates, about six days' march beyond Tarsus,3 were found guarded, but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time, Alexander himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as

1 This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians —Arrian, ii. 4; Diodôr, xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexand. 19; Curtius, iii. 5; Justin, xi. 8.

It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of Alexander. by superhuman successes continued for four years, to contrast the generous confidence which he here displayed towards Philippus, with his cruel pre-judgment and torture of Philôtas four

years afterwards.

² Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodôr. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.

³ Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to Issus, and one day more from Issus to the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—Xenoph. Anab. i. 4, 1; Chap. lxix. of this His-

well as the Kilikian mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next to Mallus: the general body of cavalry, under Philôtas, being sent by a more direct route across the Alëian plain. Mallus, sacred to the prophet Amphilochus as patron-hero, was said to be a colony from Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilochus, exempted Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the citizens.1

It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication respecting Darius and the main Persian army, which was said to be encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus, about two days' march from the mountain pass now called Beylan. That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first over Taurus, and next

B.C. 333. March of Alexander Kilikia, through Issus, to Myriandrus.

through the difficult point of ground above specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a spacious plain. with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favourable to the enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly, Alexander. well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick and wounded under a moderate guard, then through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. At the second day's march from those Gates, he reached the seaport Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phœnicia.2

Here, lraving been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm, he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of Issus.

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscel-

March of Darius from the interior to the eastern side of Mount Amanus. Immense numbers of his army: great wealth and ostentation in it: the treasure and baggage is sent to Damascus.

laneous host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance for the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous; of gold and silver alone, we are told that there was enough to furnish load for 600 mules and 300 camels. A temporary bridge being thrown over the Euphratês, five days were required to enable the whole army to cross.2 Much of the treasure and baggage, however, was not

allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus, but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to

B.C. 333.

Position of Darius on the plain eastward of Mount Amanus. He throws open the mountain passes, to let Alexander come through, and fight a pitched battle.

bring on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated on crushing altogether. Accordingly he had given no orders (as we have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in like manner through the remaining strong passes-first the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea-next the pass, now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there

to be trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unre-Impatience mitting, seemed suspended. We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians, with abundant exaggerations; and when Alexander, immediately after

of Darius at the delay of Alexander in Kilikia. He crosses Mount Amanus to attack Alexander in the defiles of Kilikia.

recovery, instead of marching forward towards them.

¹ Curtius, iii. 3, 24.

² Curtius, iii. 7, 1.

turned away from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia. this again was construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so.1 At any rate, Darius, after a certain interval. contracted the persuasion, and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers that the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to resist his attack. Under this impression, Darius resolved upon an advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymôdês, indeed, and other intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that, too, speedily. They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius, but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous.2 Even some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia.3 To cross, by any pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus with a numerous army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were, both of them, narrow and easily defensible.4 Darius followed the northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of the enemy.

¹ Curtius, iii. 7, 8.

2 From Æschinês (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that Demosthenês and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens received letters at this moment written in high spirits, intimating that Alexander was "caught and pinned up" in Kilikia. Demosthenês (if we may believe Æschinês) went about showing these letters and boasting of the good news which was at hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also re-

ports the confident anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sam-ballat at Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.

³ Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodôr. xvii. 32.

⁴ Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xv. 4. See the instructive commentary of Mützell ad Curtium, iii. 3, pp. 103, 104. I have given, in an Appendix to this volume, a plan of the ground near Issus, together with some explanatory comments.

Thus, at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward to cross Mount Amanus by the southern Hearrivesin Alexander's pass, and attack Darius in the plain, Darius was rear, and captures coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass to Tasus. drive them before him back into Macedonia.1 Reaching Issus, seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or amputation of hands and arms.2 He then marched forward along the same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by Alexander, and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.

The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he Return of that he refused to believe the news until it had been Alexander from Myconfirmed by some officers whom he sent northward riandrus: along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley, and to his address to his army. whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favourable auspices under which a battle would now take place.3 His address was hailed with acclamation by his hearers. who demanded only to be led against the enemy.4

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen miles.⁵ By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before. Again master of that important

¹ Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly; but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one another in the night, &c.
2 Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14.
I have mentioned, a few pages back, that about a fortnight before Alexander had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli and Anchialus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this time by a distance not less than eight days of ordinary march. If, during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issns, he would have been just between them, and would have cut

them off one from the other. It was Alexander's good luck that so grave an embarrassment did not occur.

embarrassment did not occur.

3 Arrian, ii. 7, 8.

4 Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodôrus, xvii. 33.

5 Kallisthenês called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb. xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.

Polybius criticises severely the descriptiou given by Kallisthenês of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the words of Kallisthenês himself, we are hardly in a condition to appreciate the goodness of the criticism, which in some points is certainly overstrained.

position, he rested there the last portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was of the so confined as to admit only a narrow column of Macedonian march, with the cavalry following the infantry; of the river Pinarus. presently it widened, enabling Alexander to enlarge

army south

his front by bringing up successively the divisions of the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. On the extreme right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next (reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx, under Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command; himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on the right and the sea on the left is said to have been not more than fourteen stadia, or somewhat more than one English mile and a half.1 From fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians, he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians, were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianes and the principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on the left flank to Parmenio.2

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw across the river a force the Persian army north of 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, to insure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the Pinarus. river.3 He composed his phalanx, or main line of battle, of 90,000 hoplites: 30,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Kardakes) on each side of these Greeks. These men-not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude 4—filled the breadth between

¹ Kallisthenês ap. Polybium, xii. 17.

² Arrian, ii. 8, 4—13.
3 Cp. Kallisth. ap. Polyb. xii. 17, and Arrian, ii. 8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies as

these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little facility in moving. Kallisthenês did not notice them, as far as we can collect from Polybius.

⁴ Arrian, ii. 8, 9. τοσούτους γάρ ἐπὶ

the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left he placed a body of 20,000 men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host he could find no room to act; accordingly, they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites, yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the right bank of the Pinarus the 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry was sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them to act, so that they were forced to cross to the right wing, where, accordingly, the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself, in his chariot, was in the centre of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river, or rivulet, Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments.1

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarrissophori, as well as the light infantry, Pæonians and archers,

φάλαγγος άπλης έδέχετο το χωρίον, ενα έτάσσοντο.

The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of \$600 percentage. men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces, and therefore 80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of Rüstow and Köchly (p. 280) about the Macedonian line). Assuming a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the breadth of the stadium, and therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that civen by Kellisthouse. which is that given by Kallisthenês. But there must have been intervals left, greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments, which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.

Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles. The four-teen stadia of Kallisthenes are equi-valent to nearly one English mile and

valent to nearly one English mile and three-quarters.

Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march orarray—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. il. p. 498; Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124.

Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthene's appears to have reckoned the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000, and the cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii. 18). (Polyb. xii. 18).

to the front of his right. The Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these 20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily, that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them. He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front equal to that of his enemies.¹

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon the Kardakes or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakes scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives.2 He kept to his chariot as long as the ground permitted,

¹ Arrian, ii. 9. Kallisthenės ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to the battle—are noticed also by Curtius, iii. 9. 11.

iii. 9, 11.

² Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄρματος, σὺν τοίς πρώτοις έφευ-

γε, &c.

This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the highly-wrought details given by Diodôrus (xvii. 34) and Curtius (iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the

chariot of Darius and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot, in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to be on the point of overturning it. Char's even went so far as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh (Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a slight wound in the thigh.

In respect to this point, as to so

but quitted it on reaching some rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape: in such terror that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order.

Alarm and immediate flight of Darius defeat of the Persians.

This great battle—we might rather say, that which ought to have been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of Darius,-within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these mis-

fortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division, Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front-rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemies' left, brought back his victorious troops from the

have copied the same authority.

Kallisthenės (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22), and was, in fact, realized, since the first successful charge of the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How did Alexander know in what part of the

many others, Diodôrus and Curtius army Darius was?—we may reply that have copied the same authority. the chariot and person of Darius would

pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward.1

Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavyarmed Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to cross the Pinarus 2 and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed. They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakes on the right flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line we hear nothing, nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these Kardakes came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the general flight of the Persians. as soon as Darius was known to have left the field.3

The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of Vigorous the fugitives were prodigious. Amidst so small a and breadth of practicable ground, narrowed sometimes destructive into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses, Alexandertheir vast numbers found no room, and trod one the mother another down. As many perished in this way as by and wife of Darius. the sword of the conquerors; insomuch that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a

Ainsworth's Essay on the Chican and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geograph. Society, 1838, p. 194.] These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way over very difficult ground.

2 Arrian, ii. 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11,

1 This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears to me probable, though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates, Journal of the Geograph. Society, 1838, p. 194.] These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way over difficult ground. 22).
3 Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.

ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass over it.¹ The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour. The camp of Darius was taken, together with his mother, his wife, his sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield, and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain moreover were several eminent Persian grandees—Arsamês, Rheomithrês, and Atizyês, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakês, satrap of Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a sword.²

The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were treated by Alexander's order with the utmost Courteous ' treatment consideration and respect. When Alexander returned of the regal at night from the pursuit, he found the Persian regal female prisoners by Alexan. tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment of it he heard the tears and wailings of He was informed that the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learned that the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest for the empire of Asia.3 Besides this anecdote, which depends on good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted about his kind behaviour to these princesses; and Alexander himself, shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it, which he thought it necessary to contradict in a

¹ Arrian, ii. 11, 11; Kallisthenês ap. Polyb. xii. 20.

² Arrian, ii. 11; Diodôr. xvii. 36. Curtius (iii. 11, 27) says that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and fifty horse, killed; with

⁵⁰⁴ men wounded. Justin states, 130 foot and 150 horse (xi. 9).

³ Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare Diodôr. xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.

letter. It is certain (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.1

How this vast host of figitives got out of the narrow limits of Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it, we cannot make out. It is sian armyprobable that many, and Darius himself among the crosses the number, made their escape across the mountain by Euphratesvarious subordinate roads and by-paths; which, some Persothough unfit for a regular army with baggage, would mercebe found a welcome resource by scattered companies. naries.

Complete dispersion of the Per-Grecian

Darius managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphratês. The only remnant of force still in a position of defence after the battle consisted of 8000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymôdês. These men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis, on the coast of Phænicia, where they found the same vessels in which they had themselves been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.2 With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or reform, nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and silver, but also in captives for the slavemerchant. On the morrow of the battle Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or complimented all who had distinguished themselves.3

¹ Plutarch, Alex. 22. εγώ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι έωρακὼς ἄν εὐρεθείην τὴν Δαρείου γυναίκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.

² Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodôr, xvii. 48. Curtius says that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains (Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19). 3 Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12,

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than Prodigious that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force effect pro-duced by destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for the victory of Issus. recovery were paralyzed by the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, reappearing in different places for operations of detail, but we shall find no further resistance to Alexander during almost two years, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. where an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad towards the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called, together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show—a contempt not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter upon which most remark is usually made was that of fighting the battle not in an open plain but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish; 1 nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run away but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing

^{27;} Diodôr. xvii. 40. The "Aræ Alexandri, in radicibus Amani," are mentioned by Cicero (ad Famil. xv. 4).

When commanding in Kilikia, he compare the speech of Achæmenês, encamped there with his army four vii. 236.

his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.1 But it was not merely as a general that Darius acted in such a manner as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skilful, his personal cowardice in quitting the field and thinking only of his own safety would have sufficed to nullify the effect.2 Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbêla, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

Happy was it for Memnon that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes and the ruin consequent B.C. 333. upon it! The fleet in the Ægean, which had been Autumu. transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though Effects weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom in Greece Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a by the battle of serious defeat which the Persian Orontobatês had Issus. Antireceived from the Macedonians in Karia,3 was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-

Macedonian projects crushed.

Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his 100 triremes he was visited by the Lacedæmonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnêsus as large a force as he could spare to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios as the result of this news, Pharnabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnêsus and to content himself with directing some operations in Krête, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among the

ii. 6, 7.

2 Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger was asked by some of the Grecian officers, whether he thought that his brother

Artaxerxês (who had as yet made no resistance) would fight. "To be sure he will (was the reply); if he is the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the crown without fighting!" Personal cowardice in a king of Persia at the head of his army seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i. 7, 9).

3 Arrian, ii. 5, 8.

¹ Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτη ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς ἀμφ' ᾿Αλέξανδρον τῆ γνώμη δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression borrowed from Thncydidês, iv. 34). Compare Arrian,

islands and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradatês to Halikarnassus.¹ It appears, however, that he afterwards went to conduct the operations in Krête, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the Persians.² On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian synod, assembled at Corinth during the period of the Isthmian festival, manifested their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath of gold.³

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through

B.C. 333. Winter.

Capture of Damascus by the Macedonians, with Persian treasure and prisoners. Kœle-Syria to the Phœnician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way to attack Damascus, whither Darius before the battle had sent most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the treason or cowardice of the governor,

who made a feint of trying to convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the hands of the enemy. There was captured a large treasure, with a prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury, belonging to the court and the grandees. Moreover, the prisoners made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor of Darius, the daughter of Darius's brother Oxathrês, the wives of Artabazus and of Pharnabazus, the three daughters of Mentor, and Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian, and Athenian, who had fied to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to

¹ Arrian, ii. 13, 4—8. ² Diodôr. xvii. 48.

³ Dioddr. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.

after the battle of Issus.

4 Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13.
The words of Arrian (ii. 15, 1)—ἀπίσω

κομίσαντα èς Δαμασκόν—confirm the statement of Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the town, but in the hands of fugitives who

were conveying it away from the town.

5 A fragment of the letter from
Parmenio to Alexander is preserved,
giving a detailed list of the articles of
booty (Athenæus, xiii. p. 607).

Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble name and parentage, Iphikratês, son of the great Athenian officer of that name. The captive Iphikratês not only received his liberty, but was induced by courteous and honourable treatment to remain with Alexander. He died, however, shortly afterwards from sickness, and his ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his family at Athens.

I have already stated in a former chapter 2 that the elder Iphikratês had been adopted by Alexander's grandfather into the regal family of Macedonia as the saviour of their throne. Probably this was the circumstance which determined the superior favour shown to the son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the military genius of the father. The difference of position, between Iphikrates and Macethe father and Iphikratês the son, is one among the

Capture and treatment of the Athenian Iphikratês. Altered relative position of Greeks donians.

painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism. father, a distinguished officer, moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family; the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his own security and the freedom of Greece.

Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to Phœnicia. The first Phœnician town which he approached was Marathus, on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with that islet and some other neighbouring towns, the domain of the Aradian prince Gerostratus. That

¹ Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13—16. There is some discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.

² See above in this History, Chaps.

lxxvii. lxxix.; and Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 263, c. 13. Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada, princess of Karia, as her son (Arrian, i. 23,

prince was himself now serving with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean; but his son Strato. B.C. 333— 332. Winter. acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him Alexander in Phœnicia. at once Aradus with the neighbouring towns included Aradus, in its domain. The example of Strato was followed, Byblus, and Sidon open first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician their gates to him. city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the queen and parent of all Phoenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent envoys to meet him and invite his approach.1 Their sentiments were unfavourable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody and perfidious proceeding which (about eighteen years before) had marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.2 Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as well as that of Aradus) were at this moment sailing in the Ægean with the Persian admiral Autophradatês, and formed a large proportion of his entire fleet.3

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to

Letter of
Darius
soliciting
peace and
the restitution of
the regal
captives.
Haughty
reply of
Alexander.

his onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius, asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children, and tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another. Darius further attempted to show that the Macedonian Philip had begun the wrong against Persia, that Alexander had continued it, and that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply, Alexander

wrote a letter wherein he set forth his own case against Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxês. He then alleged various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having instigated the assassination of Philip as well as the hostilities of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. "Now," continued he, "by the grace of the gods I have been victorious, first over your satraps, next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me, and you shall receive back your mother

Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.
 Diodôr. xvi. 45.

³ Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6—16.

and wife, and anything else which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you; otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be."1

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with himself, even on the part of other kings-everything short of submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries on each side was mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis²) which of the two should be master of Asia.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed Impor almost beyond doubt by the rapid and unopposed of the successes of Alexander among most of the Phænician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly of the upon the sentiments of these Phœnicians. The towns to greater part of the Persian fleet in the Ægean was

Importance voluntary surrender Phœnician Alexander.

composed of Phœnician triremes, partly from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the Phœnician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be recalled, thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining arrow. But if the Phonician towns held out resolutely against him, one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied, that even Alexander's energy and ability might hardly

¹ Arrian, ii. 14; Curtius, iv. 1, 10; money and large cessions of territory Diodôr. xvii. 39. I give the substance in exchange for the restitution of the of this correspondence from Arrian. captives. Arrian says nothing of the Both Curtius and Diodôrus represent barius as offering great sums of ² Arrian, ii. 12, 9.

have proved sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and efforts. It was, therefore, a signal good fortune to Alexander when the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still greater city of Sidon. The Phoenicians, taking them generally, had no positive tie to the Persians: neither had they much confederate attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians there was even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause above-mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander's march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbours if he resolved to hold out, and still less disposition to hold out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the irresistible force of Alexander, not less than the impotence of Persia. One after another, all these important Phœnician seaports, except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian, was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus of the reigning family, yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.1

Alexander appears before Tyre —readiness of the Tyrians to surrender, yet not without a point reserved—he determines to besiege the city.

With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre, the most powerful among the Phænician cities, though apparently less ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together with a golden wreath of honour; announcing

formally that the Tyrians were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.2 In reply, he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents, and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished to enter Tyre and offer

¹ Curtius, iv. 1, 20—25; Justin, xi. bable.
10. Diodôrus (xvii. 47) tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon; which is highly impro- δρος. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.

sacrifice to Hêraklês. The Phænician god Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Hêraklês, and was thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle. The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all other points, they would obey Alexander's orders.2 They added that his wish to sacrifice to Hêraklês might be accomplished without entering their city, since there was in Palætyrus (on the mainland over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than their own.3 Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took note only of the point refused, Alexander dismissed the envoys with angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.4

Those who (like Diodôrus) treat such refusal on the part of the Tyrians as foolish wilfulness, 5 have not fully considered Exorbitant how much the demand included. When Alexander dispositions made a solemn sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus, he conduct of Alexander. marched to her temple with his whole force armed and in battle array.6 We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at Tyre to Hêraklês-his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was force-would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as in fact it was, after the town had been taken.7 The Tyrians were thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military force, which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as permanent garrison of an almost

¹ Curtius (ut supra) adds these motives; Arrian inserts nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius represents what is likely to have been the real fact and the real feeling of Alexander.

It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out his narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton. ² Arrian, ii. 16, 11.

3 Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians is not noticed by Arrian.

4 Arrian, ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσεις πρὸς ὁργὴν ὁπίσω ἀπέπεμψεν, &c. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. "Non tenuit iram, cujus alioqui potens non erat," &c.

5 Diodôrus, xvii. 40. οἱ δὲ Τύριο βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως τῷ Ἡρακλεὶ τῷ Τυρίῳ θῦσαι, προπεπέστερον διεκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.

6 Arrian, i. 18, 4.

7 Arrian, ii. 24, 10.

impregnable position. They had not endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure it from a new master. It was in fact, hazarding their all; submitting at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without necessity of besieging the town. The great value of the Phœnician cities consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and gave to them the command of the sea.1 Had Alexander required that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia, nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between the two belligerents, as if the contest was still undecided.2 Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands, prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy, and intelligent communities of the ancient world.

Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the mainland,3 the channel between the two being He prepares shallow towards the land, but reaching a depth of to besiege Tyreeighteen feet in the part adjoining the city. The situation islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls, of the place. the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland, reached a height of not less than 150 feet, with

though they declined compliance with one extreme demand.

Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of Jerusalem by

made limself master of Jerusalem by entering the town on the Sabbath under pretence of offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).

3 Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of Alexander's time.

¹ This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his addresses to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre (Arrian, ii. 17, 3—8).

2 Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtins says (iv. 2, 2): "Tyros facilius societatem Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam imperium". This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the imperium of Alexander,

corresponding solidity and base. Besides these external fortifications, there was a brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms, machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against the formidable arm of the Tyrians Alexander and against Alexander as he then stood; resolution they might have held out successfully, for he had as not unreasonable. yet no fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The question turned upon the Phænician and Cyprian ships, which were for the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian admiral. Alexander-master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all the Phœnician cities except Tyre - calculated that the seamen belonging to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate, to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This could hardly have failed to happen, if he had treated the Tyrians with decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradatês in the Ægean, when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other Phœnician cities—next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his ships for the defence of his own city; the Sidonian and Aradian ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradatês without Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did), had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander, as the interests of Persia dictated, the Cypriot ships might not improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly, the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phœnician brethren, if ready to serve Alexander against Persia,

Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8. against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was
 Azemilchus was with Autophrada- in Tyre when it was captured (Arrian, tês when Alexander declared hostility ii. 24, 8).

would be nowise hearty as his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies, though ultimately they all turned out in favour of Alexander, were in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid resolution of the Tyrians; who were further encouraged by promises of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet, the

Alexander constructs a mole across the strait between Tyre and the mainland. The project is defeated.

Sidonian and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the half mile of channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into his service labouring hands by thousands from the neighbourhood; he had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with

ardour and perseverance under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome, even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede it, and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as to be exposed to their obstruction as well as to damage from winds and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work in spite of all the protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in front of their advancing mole and discharged projectiles from engines provided for the purpose. At length by unremitting efforts the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel to the city-wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At the same time the full naval force of the city. ships and little boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all

¹ Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodôr. xvii. 40, 41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending

of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover, it is not conformable to Alexander's temperament, after what had passed between him and the Tyrians.

parts of the mole. So successful was this attack that all the Macedonian engines were burnt,—the outer woodwork which kept the mole together was torn up in many places, -and a large part of the structure came to pieces.1

Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines but

also to begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth and strength, for the purpose of the of carrying more towers abreast in front and for better princes of Cyprus to defence against lateral attacks. But it had now Alexander defence against lateral attacks. But it had now become plain to him that while the Tyrians were masters of the sea no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town. Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus, therefore, to reconstruct the mole and

Surrender —he gets hold of the main Phœnician and Cyprian

build new engines, he himself repaired to Sidon for the purpose of assembling as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in requisition the ships of the Phœnician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders; while not long afterwards the princes of Cyprus came thither also, tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.² He was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part, and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near the ships at Milêtus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been fulfilled; since by successful operations on land he had conquered and brought into his power a superior fleet.3

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and training with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put

¹ Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodôr. xvii. 22;

considering that they had acted under

compulsion.

3 Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon and other Phoenician towns had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander apud Joseph., Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).

Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.

2 Arrian, ii. 20, 1—4: Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander's point of view, when we find him telling us that the monarch forgave the Phenicians and Cyprians for their adherence and past service in the Persian fleet,

himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of eleven

He appears before Tyre with a numerous fleet, and blocks up the place by sea.

days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and hazard. On returning to Sidon he found Kleander arrived with a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard

his fleet in the harbour of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within, struck with surprise and consternation, having not before known that their fellow-Phœnicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander, having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight, immediately caused their two harbours to be blocked up and watched; that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians-that on the south, towards Egypt, by the Phænicians.2

Capture of Tyre by stormdesperate

resistance

of the citi-

From this time forward the doom of Tyre was certain. Tyrians could no longer offer obstruction to the mole. which was completed across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted upon it to batter the walls; movable towers were rolled up to take them by assault; attack was also made from sea-

Yet though reduced altogether to the defensive the Tyrians still displayed obstinate bravery and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon, that none of Alexander's engines could make any breach in it; but on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large breach having been made in this south wall, he assaulted it with two ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time he caused the town to be menaced all round at every approachable point for the purpose of distracting the attention of the Himself and his two ships having been rowed close defenders. up to the breach in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck, upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective storming parties. Admêtus got upon the

¹ Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.

² Arrian, ii. 20, 9-16.

wall, but was there slain; Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the same time his ships also forced their way into the two harbours, so that Tyre came on all sides into his power.1

Though the walls were now lost and resistance had become desperate, the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded the streets and concentrated their strength, especially at a defensible post called the Agenorion or chapel of Agenor. Here the battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter in the temple of Hêraklês were spared by Alexander from respect to the sanctuary; among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both sexes. The Sidonians also. displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.2 greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in their hands, while 2000 of them who survived, either from disabling wounds or from the hanged by fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the seashore by order of Alexander.3 The females, the children, and the slaves were sold to the slavemerchant. The number sold is said to have been

Surviving males, 2000 in number, order of Alexander. The remaining captives sold.

about 30,000, a total rather small, as we must assume slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously sent away to Carthage.

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated his much-desired sacrifice to Hêraklês. His whole force, land and naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more costly hecatomb had never been offcred to that god, when we consider that it had been purchased by all the

¹ Arrian, ii. 23, 24: Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodôr. xvii. 46.

² Curtius, iv. 4, 15.
3 This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by Diodôrus (xv.

^{46).} It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see no ground for disbelieving

toils of an unnecessary siege, and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his former worshippers. B.C. 332. What the loss of the Macedonians had been we can-July-Aug. not say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian Duration of the siege at 400,1 which must be greatly beneath the truth; for for seven months. the courage and skill of the besieged had prolonged Sacrifice of the siege to the prodigious period of seven months, Alexander to Hêraklês. though Alexander had left no means untried to

accomplish it sooner.2

Second letter from Darius to Alexander, who requires unconditional submission.

Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents, with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphratês, as ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should become his son-in-law as well as his ally. "If I were Alexander," said Parmenio, "I should accept such

terms, instead of plunging into further peril." "So would I," replied Alexander, "if I were Parmenio; but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer." His answer to Darius was to this effect: "I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter, I shall marry her, whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me if you wish to obtain from me any act of friendship."3 Alexander might spare the submissive and the prostrate, but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phonicia, and Palestine, and having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before

¹ Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodôrus, xvii.

^{46.}The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by the fact that in spite of this total destruction Tyre again rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).

3 Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5.

The answer is more insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian than in the point of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54), and represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after Alexander's return from Egypt.

he undertook any further expedition into the interior of the Persian empire, to make himself master of all the coast- The Macelands which kept open the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his rear against any the Persian, serious hostility. His great fear was of Grecian master of soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold; and Egypt was the last remaining possession of islands.

donian fleet overpowers and becomes the Ægean with the

the Persians which gave them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were, indeed, now prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet in the Ægean, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the Macedonian admirals, Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160 sail.2 During the summer of 332 B.C., while Alexander was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the important acquisitions-Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos-which had been made by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos invited them and insured their success; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonides and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force: twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Methymna, arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the capture, was entrapped into the harbour and made prisoner. There remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Charês, with a garrison of 2000 men, who, however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.3

These successes were in full progress when Alexander himself directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between

Arrian, ii. 17, 4.
 Curtius, iv. 5, 14.

³ Curtius, iv. 5, 14-22; Arrian, iii. 2,

have triumphed.1

one and two miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall; but March of its main defence was derived from the deep sand imme-Alexander towards diately around it, as well as from the mud and quick-Egyptsand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, siege of Gaza. the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover, his judgment was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult the enterprise,

the greater was the charm for him, and the greater would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen to

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall, for the purpose of bringing up his battering-His first assaults engines. This external mound was completed, and fail-he is woundedthe engines had begun to batter the wall, when a he erects well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the an immense mound assailants and destroyed the engines. The timely aid round the of Alexander himself with his hypaspists protected town. their retreat; but he himself, after escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by a dart discharged from a catapult, as the prophet Aristander had predicted; giving assurance at the same time that Gaza would fall into his hands.2 During the treatment of his wound, he ordered the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea, and caused his mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work, the description of which we read with astonishment, was

¹ Arrian, ii. 26, 5. οὶ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο, ἄπορον είναι βία ελείν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος ἀλλ' ᾿Αλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἰρετέον είναι, ὅσῳ ἀπορώτερον · ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ τοῦ πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐλεῖν αἰσχρὸν είναί οἰ, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἑλληνας καὶ

Δαρεῖον.
About the fidelity and obstinate defensive courage shown more than once by the inhabitants of Gaza, see

Polybius, xvi. 40.

Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12—18; Plutarch, Alexander,

250 feet high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad; the loose sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must have been brought up from a distance. undertaking was at length completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have been considerable; though doubtless thousands of labourers would be pressed in from the circumiacent country.2

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the walls were breached in several places, taken by storm after though the defenders were unremitting in their efforts a siege of to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted two months. three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still further breaching of the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt The entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions manifested hardly less ardour, and the town was at length taken. Its gallant defenders resisted with unabated spirit to the last; and all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince or governor himself, the eunuch Batis, who, Thegarrison are all slain, having manifested the greatest energy and valour, except the was taken severely wounded, yet still alive. In this governor Batis, who condition he was brought by Leonnatus and Philôtas becomes into the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him prisoner, looks of vengeance and fury. The Macedonian prince wounded. had undertaken the siege mainly in order to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and labour, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded, that the palm of honour belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to

the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that he had himself incurred great personal risk, received a severe wound, besides his narrow escape from the dagger of the pretended Arabian deserter. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was, moreover, still further exasperated by the appearance of Batis-an eunuch, a black man, tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish, and doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible circumstances, repulsive to eves familiar with Grecian gymnastics, contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch. After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single captive, upon whom, therefore, he resolved to inflict a punishment as novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and

Wrath of Alexander against he causes to be tied to a dragged round the town.

brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of this brave man, yet surviving, was Batis, whom tied with cords to the tail of a chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst chariot, and the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army. Herein Alexander, emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor Achillês, copied the ignominious treatment described in the Iliad as inflicted on

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament. stands out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining

the dead body of Hektor.2

¹ Curtius, iv. 6, 25—30; Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. pp. 123—125, with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnêsia. Diodôrus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza în two sentences, but gives no details of any kind.

Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of Curtius, while he himthe statement of Curtius, while he him-

self recognizes how emulous Alexander was of the proceedings of Achillês (vii.

The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus as an example of bad rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of Hegesias as a writer does not diminish his credibility as a witness.

² Arrian, vii. 14, 7.

measures were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from the neighbourhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town for the Macedonians.¹

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine months,2 were the hardest fighting that Alexan- B.C. 332. der had ever encountered, or in fact ever did encounter. Autumn. throughout his life. After such toils, the march to Alexander enters Egypt, which he now commenced (October, 332 B.C.), enters Egypt, and was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakês the occupies it without satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a resistance. disaffected native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching conqueror. Seven days' march brought Alexander and his army from Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled there to welcome him.3 He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by land. The satrap Mazakês surrendered himself, with all the treasure in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian god Apis; to which he added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most distinguished artists.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed He deterwesterly along the shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the lake Mareôtis. Reckon-Alexandria. ing Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population, as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new city of

¹ Arrian, ii. 27, 11. About the circumstances and siege of Gaza, see the work of Stark, Gaza und die Philistäische Küste, p. 242. Leip. 1852.

² Diodôr. xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq.
xi. 4.
³ Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius, iv. 7, 1, 2;
Diodôr. xvii. 49.

his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city. Perceiving soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian.² It was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The site of the place between the sea and the Lake Mareôtis was found airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce. The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good harbours for ships coming by sea. on a coast harbourless elsewhere; while the Lake Mareôtis, communicating by various canals with the river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the interior.3 As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by the intendant Kleomenês, transporting to them in mass the population of the neighbouring town of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides.4

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes. It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future. He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen beyond mediocrity.5

¹ Curtius, iv. 8, 1—4; Plutarch, Alexandria less favourably than Strabo: see St. Croix, Examen des Hist. d'Alex-

Alexand. 26.

2 Arriau, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8,

2—6; Diodôr. xvii. 52.

3 Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors, however, speak of the salubrity of i. 11) says about Egypt under the

The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or

five months' stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march His visit to through the sandy desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. the temple and oracle This is chiefly memorable as it marks his increasing of Ammon. The oracle self-adoration and inflation above the limits of humanproclaims him to be ity. His achievements during the last three years had so transcended the expectations of every one, himself Zeus. included—the gods had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralyzed or put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career. He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors Perseus and Hêraklês, to find a worthy prototype.² Conceiving himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days, through a sandy desertalways fatiguing, sometimes perilous-was distinguished by manifest evidences of the favour of the gods. Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water. When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenes, companions and contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the details.3 The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being the son of the god, and further assured him that his career would be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honours to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After pro-

Romans—"Provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione et lascivià discordem et mobilem, insciam legum, ignaram magistratuum," &c. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon. xvii. p.

<sup>797.

1</sup> Diodôr, xvii. 51, τεκμήρια δ' έσεσθαι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταὶς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων (answer of the priest of Ammon to Alexander).

 ² Arrian, iii. 3, 2.
 3 Arrian, iii. 3, 12. καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῖόν τι ξυνεπέλαβεν αὐτῷ, ἔχω ἰσχυρίσα σ θ αι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς ταύτη ἔχει· τὸ δ' ἀτρεκὲς τοῦ λόγου ἀφείλοντο οὶ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.
 Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12—15; Diodôr. xvii. 49—51; Plutarch, Alex. 27; Kallisthenes ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.

fuse sacrifices and presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith that he really was the son of the Zeus Ammon: which faith was further confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Milêtus.¹ Though he did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus, he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon. Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander, for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom he was enlarging his empire.² But it seems rather to have been a genuine faith—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways, but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To Parmenio, to Philôtas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the insolence of the king, in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above the level of humanity. appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious and will be found reappearing hereafter.3

The last month of Alexander's stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis. While nominating various officers for the B.C. 331. permanent administration of the country, he also re-January. ceived a visit of Hegelochus his admiral, who brought Arrangeas prisoners Aristonikus of Methymna and other ments made by despots of the various Grecian cities. Alexander at Memphis ordered them to be handed over to their respective -Grecian prisoners cities, to be dealt with as the citizens pleased; all brought except the Chian Apollonidês, who was sent to Elefrom the Ægean. phantinê in the south of Egypt for detention. In

most of the cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred that, when delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.

¹ Kallisthenês, Fragm. xvi. ap. Alex. Magn. Histor. Scriptor. ed. Geier. p. 257: Strabo. xvii. p. 814.

² Plut. Alexand. 28. Arrian hints at the same explanation (vii. 29, 6).

³ Curtius, iv. 10, 3—"Fastidio esse patriam, abdicari Philippum patrem, cœlum vanis cogitationibus petere". Arrian, iii. 26, 1; Curt. vi. 9, 18; vi. 11, 23. ⁴ Curtius, iv. 8, 11.

Pharnabazus also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape from his guards when the fleet touched at Kôs.1

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and Thracians, Alexander marched into Phœnicia. It was there that he regulated the affairs of Phoenicia. Syria, and Greece, prior to his intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the Macedonian prefect Andromachus.2 addition to all the business transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Hêraklês, and offered splendid sacrifices to other gods. festivals with tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens, with the best actors and

February-March.

proceeds to Phœnicia message from Athens. Splendid festivals. Reinforcements sent to Antipater.

chorists contending for the prize. The princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honour to the son of Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorêgus, getting up at his own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among the ten tribes at Athens.3

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.4 He had already sent forward a June-July. detachment to Thapsakus, the usual ford of the Euphratês, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but only to hinder them from being carried completely

B.C. 331. He marches to the Euphratês -crosses it without opposition

Thapsakus. over to the left bank. After eleven days of march from Phœnicia, Alexander and his whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay, and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed, and Alexander crossed forthwith.5

⁴ Arrian, iii. 6, 12. 5 Arrian, iii. 7, 1-6; Curtius, iv. 9, 12-" Undecimis castris pervenit ad 1 Arrian, iii. 2, 8, 9. ² Curtius, iv. 8, 10. ³ Plutarch, Alexand. 29; Arrian, Euphraten". l. c. 10 - 7

Once over the Euphratês, Alexander had the option of marching down the left bank of that river to Babylon, the across from chief city of the Persian empire, and the natural place the Ento find Darius.1 But this march (as we know from phratês to the Tigris. Xenophôn, who made it with the Ten Thousand Alexander Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and fords the Tigris through a desert country where no provisions were to above Nineveh, be got. Moreover, Mazæus in retreating had taken a without north-easterly direction towards the upper part of the resistance. Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march, first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the current, and the slippery footing.2 A resolute and vigilant enemy might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies left undone than in what they actually did.3

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown regions on which they were entering. Alexander,

¹ So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, iii. 17, 3–10)—προχωρησάντων ξύν τῆ δυνάμει ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρεῖον τόν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον ποιησόμεθα, &c.
This is the explanation of Arrian's remark (iii. 7, 6) where he assigus the reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphratês at Thapsakus, did not take the straight road towards Babylon. Cyrus the younger marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxês. Susa, Ekbatana, and

while offering solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from Egyptian Sept. 20. astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favoured the Greeks, and Selênê the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended victory to the Macedonians approaches -and victory, too (so Aristander promised), before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the Darius in soldiers, Alexander marched for four days in a south-

Eclipse of the moon. near to the position.

easterly direction through the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that Darius with his main host was not far off.1

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What Darius had been doing during this B.C. 331. long interval, and especially during the first half of it. September. we are unable to say. We hear only of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the defeat at especial view of recovering his captive family.

Inaction of since the

Nothing else does he appear to have done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza, the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten months. disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost,2 and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by others, to throw open the country to Alexander.3 Having incurred so deplorable a loss, as well in

¹ Arrian, iii. 7, 12; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, 'arbitraretur" (Amyntas). iv. 10, 11—18. 3 Arrian, iii. 1, 3. $\tau \dot{\eta} \nu \tau \epsilon \dot{\epsilon} \nu$ Ίσσφ 2 Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27— $\mu \dot{\alpha} \chi \eta \nu$ όπως συνέβη πεπυσμένος (the 30—"cum in illo statu rerum id satrap of Egypt) καὶ Δαρείον ὅτι αἰσχρῷ quemque, quod occupasset, habiturum φυγῷ ἐφυγε, &c.

reputation as in territory, Darius had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigour.

But he was paralyzed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and several of his children had fallen into the hands Paralyzing of the conqueror. Among the countless advantages effect upon him 'growing out of the victory of Issus, this acquisition produced was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition by the captivity of of one who had given hostages for good behaviour to his mother and wife. The Persian kings were often in the his enemy. habit of exacting from satraps or generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon, as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet.1 Bound by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphratês, he

for defending what yet remained. The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages, honourable as it was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their value as a subject of political negotiation.² It was essential

hoped to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to take measures east of the Euphratês

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 23. Compare Xeno-phôn, Anabasis, i. 4, 9; Herodot. vii.

2 The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for refusing to visit Statira, the wife of Darius, is

ders made to him by those who sought to gain his favour (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female captives, Barsine, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon, daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of to visit Statira, the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even to absurdity.

In regard to women, Alexander was of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of by temperament cold, the opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development was so tardy that there was even a surmise of some physical disability (Hieronymus ap. Alex. 21). In adopting the widow of Athenæ. x. p. 435). As to the most beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the numerous ten-

that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank, if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphratês, and even through the waters of the Tigris. To them this -necessary must have proved a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out that she died

Good treatment of the captive females by Alexander -necessary their value as hostages.

shortly after crossing the Tigris; 1 to him also it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have been better guarded, and might have been treated with still greater ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with any prize short of the entire Persian Immense empire, Darius summoned all his forces to defend collected by what he still retained. He brought together a host Darius, in the plains said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated at Issus.² Contingents arrived from the the Tigris farthest extremities of the vast Persian territory, from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of the Tigris, about

legendaryancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with Andromache, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by any reader of Euripidês. Alexander had by Barsinê a son called Hêraklês.

Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition—so overcharged with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always performed himself—and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily effort—that he had little leisure left for indulgence; such leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to

wine-parties, with the society and conversation of his officers.

1 Curtius, iv. 10, 19—"Itineris continui labore animique ægritudine fatigata," &c.

fatigata," &c.

Curtius and Justin mention a third
embassy sent by Darius (immediately
after having heard of the death and
honourable obsequies of Statira) to
Alexander, asking for peace. The
other authors allude only to two
tentatives of this kind; and the third
recember was a ways belocked. seems by no means probable.

² Arrian, iii. 7, 7.

the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between that riverand the Gordvene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from the north, east, and south. Arbêla—a considerable town about twenty miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and Bagdad—was fixed on as the musterplace or headquarters, where the chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near which the troops were first assembled and exercised.1

He fixes the spot for encamping and awaiting the attack of Alexanderin a level plain near Gaugamela.

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was the neighbourhood of Gaugamela near the river Bumôdus, about thirty miles west of Arbêla, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul, a spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of cavalry and the

rush of scythed chariots: moreover, the Persian officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of the slopes as they thought inconvenient.2 There seemed everything in the ground to favour the operation both of the vast total and the special forces of Darius; who fancied that his defeat at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia, and that on open and level ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. the undefended passage of the Tigris.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of 1,000,000 of infantry,3 40,000 cavalry, 200 scythed cha-

<sup>9, 9.

2</sup> Arrian, iii. 8, 12. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνώμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ἐκ πολλοῦ οὶ Πέρσαι τοῦς τε ἄρμασιν ἐπελαύνειν εὐπετῆ πεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῆ ἵππφ ὶππάσιμα,

³ This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set forth (ἐλέγετο), probably the best information which Ptolemy and Aristobulus could procure

¹ Diodôrus, xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9.
2 Arrian, iii. 8, 12. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα τοῦ ἀς ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ἐκ Justin (κi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse, and 209 scythed chariots. Δύμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ἐκ Justin (κi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a milliou of men. Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as that which sobably the best information which tolemy and Aristobulus could procure

riots, and fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time in a field of battle. But besides the His equipment and numbers, Darius had provided for his troops more preparation effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong swords -better and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian numerous cavalry wielded so admirably in close combat, together scythed chariots with shields for the infantry and breastplates for the elephants. horsemen.1 He counted much also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point, together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.2

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius B.C. 331. moved from Arbêla, where his baggage and treasure September. were left -crossed by bridges the river Lykus or Great Position and battle Zab, an operation which occupied five days-and array of Darius. marched to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under command of Barsaentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians, horse and foot alternating,—the Susians, under Oxathrês,—and the Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both east and west of the Euphratês, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under Atropates; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all cavalry, under Phrataphernes; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ. Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the army near and around him -the Persian select Horse-guards, called the king's kinsmen-the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as colonists in the interior of the empire-the contingent of Mardi, good archers -and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom Darius placed his greatest confidence.

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 2. of Mützell upon this passage of Cur2 Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodôr. xvii. 53. tius, the mode in which these chariots
Notwithstanding the instructive note were armed is not clear on all points.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it stood deep masses of Babylonians-inhabitants of Sittakê down to the Persian Gulf-Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry-Scythians and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots-Armenians and Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty chariots in front of the centre.1

B.C. 331. September.

Preliminary movements of Alexander -discussions with Parmenio and other officers. His careful reconnoittring in person.

Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army, and four days' march since his crossing the Tigris, when he first learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade, and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack them at daybreak.

But his progress was so retarded, that day broke, and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and commence the attack forthwith.2 Though most of them pronounced for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy's position, which they now saw for the first time, ought to

¹ The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii, 11), is taken from aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down in the official scheme of the battle drawn up by the Persian officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius. Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete, even as to names; while it says nothing about numbers or depth or extent of front. Several depth or extent of front. Several

names of various contingents stated to have been present in the field are not placed in the official return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian soguani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the Kossæans, by Diodôrus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ, Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius (iv. 12).

2 Arrian iii. 9.5—7 ² Arrian, iii. 9, 5-7.

be carefully reconnoitred. Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp, to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward from the preceding day's encampment.1 He himself spent the day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio, with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies were notoriously unmanageable by night,2 and since their camp had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaringwith an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of many others-that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory; that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in open daylight.3 Having then addressed to his officers a few brief encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed them to their evening meal and repose.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of 40,000 foot and 7000 horse, in two lines.⁴ The first Dispositions or main line was composed, on the right, of the eight of Alexander squadrons of Companion-cavalry, each with its for the attackseparate captain, but all under the command of array of the Philôtas son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from right to left) came the Agema or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ, -then the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor-then the phalanx properly so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of Kænus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon,

¹ Arrian, iii. 9, 2–8. It is not expressly mentioned by Arrian that the baggage, &c., was brought forward from the first camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander's baggage, which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first camp would require. This coincides also with Curtins, iv. 13, 35. The words $\xi \gamma \nu \omega$ $\delta \pi \partial \lambda \epsilon (\pi \epsilon \nu)$ (Arr, iii. 9, 2) indicate the contemplation of a

Simmias, and Kraterus, respectively. Next on the left of the phalanx, were arranged the allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians under Philippus—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the left to Parmenio.

Behind this main line was placed a second or body of reserve, intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose, Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the Pæonians, under Aretês and Aristo—half the Agriânes, under Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brison—and the mercenaries of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly, the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and the baggage.²

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where Battle of iron spikes had been planted to damage the Macedo-Arbéla. He himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards, Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his chariots in front. To check any farther movement in this

Arrian, iii. 11; Diodôr. xvii. 57; 30—32; Diodôr. xvii. 57.
 Curtius, iv. 13, 26—30.
 Arrian, iii. 12, 2—6; Curtius, iv. 13, 3, 17.
 3 Curtius, iv. 13, 36; Polyænus, iv. 13, 3, 17.

direction, the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian left were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under Menidas, and the action thus began.1

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and Scythians in the left portion of Darius's line. The action was here for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who at length, however, by a more compact order against enemies whose fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of their place in the

line, and thus making a partial opening in it.2

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them, calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. horses were terrified, checked, or wounded by the Macedonian archers and darters in front, who even found means to seize the reins, pull down the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius's front, intended to bear down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line were let through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few only inflicted wounds or damage.3

¹ Arrian, iii. 13, 1—5.

² Arrian, iii. 13, 9.

³ About the chariots, Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15, 14; Diodor. xvii.

of Curtius—"Ipse (Darius) ante se falcatos currus habebat, quos signo dato universos in hostem effudit" (iv.

14, 3).
The scythed chariots of Artaxerxês, Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were launched on Darius's left, immediately opposite to Alexander. But it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as implied in the words The Scythed chariots of Artaxerxes, the battle of Kunaxa, did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10—20). At the battle of Magnėsia, gained by the Romans (B.C. 190) over the Syrian the Romans (B.C. 190) over the Syrian the same signal—which we may understand as implied in the words Reb. Syriac. 33).

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main force laid open as advancing behind them, Cowardice of Darius-Alexander gave orders to the troops of his main line, he sets the who had hitherto been perfectly silent, to raise the example of ment—defeat of the war-shout and charge at a quick pace; at the same time directing Aretês with the Pæonians to repel the Persians. assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed, at the head of all the Companion cavalry, into that partial opening in it which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians. Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight towards the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest hand-combat, and thrusting with their short pikes at the faces of the Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by this mode of fighting-accustomed as they were to rely on the use of missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack.2 They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time, the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For a short interval the combat here was close and obstinate; and it might have been much prolonged, since the best troops of Darius's army—Greeks; Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, &c. were here posted, had the king's courage been equal to that of his soldiers. But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger, in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxês at Kunaxa, to aim the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person, since he well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated it with still more signal success at Arbêla. Darius, who had been long in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formid-

¹ See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander to his soldiers, previous to the battle, about the necessity of absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout $\delta = 0$ similar direction from Phormio to the Athenians.

2 Arrian, iii. 15, 4. οὖτε ἀκοντισμῷ τω, οὖτε ἀξελιγμοῖς τῶν ἵππων, ἥπερ ἰππωμαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Per-(Arrian, iii. 9, 14): compare Thucyd. ii.

² Arrian, iii. 15, 4. ούτε ἀκοντισμῶ ἔτι, ούτε ἐξελιγμοῖς τῶν ἵππων, ἤπερ ἐπ-πομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Per-sian cavalry when driven to despair.

able enemy on the neighbouring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came to close quarters with his troops. pressing towards and menacing the conspicuous chariot on which he stood. The sight and hearing of this terrific mêlée, combined with the prestige already attaching to Alexander's name, completely overthrew the courage and self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round, and himself set the example of flight.2

From this moment the battle, though it had lasted so short a time, was irreparably lost. The king's flight, followed, of course, immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him. spread dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those immediately around him, were, under these circumstances, the first to give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry, and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front, were obstructed by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same time, Aretês with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the right flank, so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised by the dense

1 Arrian, iii. 14, 2. ἢγε δρόμω τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῶῶς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον—Diodôr. χτὶ. 60. Αlexander μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἰππέων ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἤλαυνε τὸν Δαρεῖον.

2 Arrian, iii. 14, 3. καὶ χρόνον μέν των ὁλίγον ἐν χεροῖν ἢ μάχη ἐγωτοι. ῶς δὲ οἴ τε ἰππεῖς οἰ ἀμφ' Αλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς 'Αλέξανδρος εὐρώστως ἐνέκειντο, ὡθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι, καὶ τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν Περσῶν κόπτοντες, ἢ τε φάλαγξ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ, πυκη καὶ ταῖς σαρίσσαις πεφρικυῖα, ἐμβέρληκεν ἤδη αὐτοῖς, καὶ π ἀντα ὁ μοῦ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῷ ὅντι Δαρείῳ ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφεινγεν. At Issus, Arrian states that "Darius fled along with the first" (ii. 11, 6); at Arbêla here, he states that "Darius was the first to turn and flee"—an expression yet stronger and more distinct. Curtius and Diodôrus, who seem here as elsewhere to follow generally the same authorities, give details re-

specting the conduct of Darius which are not to be reconciled with Arrian, and which are decidedly less credible than Arrian's narrative. The fact that the two kings were here (as at Issus) near, and probably visible to each other, has served as a basis for much embroidery. The statement that Darius, standing on his chariot, hurled his spear against the advancing Macedonians, and that Alexander also hurled his spear at Darius, but missing him nians, and that Alexander also hurled his spear at Darius, but missing him killed the charioteer, is picturesque and Homeric, but has no air of reality. Curtius and Diodôrus tell us that this fall of the charioteer was mistaken for the fall of the king, and struck the Persian army with consternation, causing them forthwith to take flight, and thus ultimately forcing Darius to flee also (Diodôr. xvii. 60; Curt. iv. 15, 26—32). But this is noway probable, since the real fight then going on was close, and with hand-weapons.

3 Arrian, iii. 14, 4. multitude is said to have been so thick that nothing could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full speed.1 It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre, the scene on his left under Parmenio was Combat on different. Mazæus, who commanded the Persian the Persian right right, after launching his scythed chariots (which between Mazzeus and may possibly have done more damage than those Parmenio. launched on the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them), followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of cavalry to attack them on their left flank.2 Here the battle was obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed that he sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops and brought them back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to follow the advanced movement of Alexander.3 Hence there arose a gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian cavalry darted, galloping through

<sup>Diodôr. xvii. 60; Curtius, iv. 15, 32, 33. The cloud of dust and the noise of the whips are specified both by Diodôrus and Curtius.
Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodôrus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii. 14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazeus, though he alludes to the effects produced by it.</sup>

 $^{^3}$ Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks di- 14, 6), α rectly here only of the $\tau \alpha \xi \iota_5$ under the command of Simmias; but it is plain manner.

that what he says must be understood of the $\tau \dot{\alpha} \dot{\xi}_{15}$ commanded by Kraterus also. Of the six $\tau \dot{\alpha} \dot{\xi}_{e15}$ or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus stood at the extreme left, that of Simmias (who commanded on this day the $\tau \dot{\alpha} \dot{\xi}_{15}$ of Amyntas son of Andromenės) next to it (iii. 11, 16). If, therefore, the $\tau \dot{\alpha} \dot{\xi}_{15}$ of Simmias was kept back from pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian left (iii. 14, 6), à fortiori the $\tau \dot{\alpha} \dot{\xi}_{15}$ of Kraterus must have been kept back in like manner.

the midst of the Macedonian line to get into the rear and attack the baggage.1 At first this movement was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis, whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander.2 But while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian line, who, though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus slain; the rest got off as they could.3

Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to the paralyzing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigour in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse. on the other hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favour, pressed their enemies with redoubled energy, and at length drove them to flight; so that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces, before the succours from Alexander reached him.4

In conducting those succours, on his way back from the pursuit, Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through

¹ Arrian, iii. 14, 7.

² Curtius, iv. 15, 9—11; Diodôr. xvii.
59. Curtius and Diodôrus represent the brigade of cavalry who plundered the camp and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazæus from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that they got through the break accidentally left in the phalanx, and traversed the Macedonian lines.

³ Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as having been driven off by Aretês and a detachment sent expressly by Alexander himself.

Diodôrus describes it as if it had not been defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazæus after plun-dering the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of

⁴ Diodôr, xvii. 60. ὁ Παρμενίων . . . 4 Diodor. XVII. 60. ο Παρμενίων ... μόλις ἐτρέψατο τοὺς βαρβάρους, μάλιστα καταπλαγέντας τῆ κατὰ τὸν Δαρείον φυγῆ. Curtius, iv. 16, 4—7. "Interim ad Mazæum fama superati regis pervenerat Itaque quanquam validior erat, tamen fortuna partium territus, perculsis lau-guidius instabat." Arrian, iv.14, 11; iv.

his Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides, contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kænus, and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though leaving many of their number on the field.1

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only

out of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his Persian host pursuit of the flying Persians, in which Parmenio now - energetic pursuit by Alexander. took part.2 The host of Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten. On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken, especially at the passage of the river Lykus; where he was obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such cavalry as could follow him, to Arbêla, in hopes of capturing the person of Darius. In this he was disappointed. Escape of Darius in though he reached Arbêla the next day. Darius had person. merely passed through it, leaving an undefended Capture of the Persian town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure camp, and of Arbêla. and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied without resistance the Persian camp near

the field of battle, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the

elephants.4

¹ Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius also alludes to this combat, but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16, 19—25).

2 Arrian, iii. 15, 9.

3 Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12—18) gives aggravated details about the sufferings of the fugitives in passing

the river Lykus, which are probably founded on fact. But he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had got as far as this river in his first pursuit, from which he was called back to assist Parmenio.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1,

To state anything like positive numbers of slain or prisoners is impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians Loss in the were slain, and many more taken prisoners. Diodôrus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius at 40,000. Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not irreparable more than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodôrus states the slain at 500, besides a great number of army.

battle. Completeness of the victory. Entire and

wounded.1 The estimate of Arrian is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other; but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed at the battle of Arbêla. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever succeeded: we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments. The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes, and could never be again mustered in mass.

The defeat of Arbêla was in fact the death-blow of the Persian

empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of the defeat, here as at Issus, the most prominent and indisputable was the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient immense not merely in the virtues of a general, but even in

Causes of the defeatcowardice of Darius. Uselessness of his numbers.

those of a private soldier, and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person, nothing short of ruin could ensue. those brave Persians whom he dragged into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to believe that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were mere spectators who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect. The flank movement against Alexander's right, instead of being made by some unemployed division, was so carried into

¹ Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27; Diodôr. xvii. 61.

effect, as to distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of space—the condition wanting at Issus—the attacks of the Persians on Alexander's flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all, Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by the scythed chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander, they appear the most signal example Generalrecorded in antiquity of military genius and sagacious ship of Alexander. He had really as great an available combination. force as his enemies, because every company in his army was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against definite and reasonable contingencies. All his successes, and this most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon's command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast real power of resistance in detail-keeping back his treasures to become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly held out to perish unassisted, and committing the whole fate of the empire, on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which Alexander most desired.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon and Susa. To Babylon Alexander marched in person, to Susa he sent Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon the satrap Mazæus met him with the keys of the city; Bagophanês, collector of the revenue, decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldæan priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness as Babylon to Alexander.¹ The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great, sufficient to furnish a large donative to the

¹ Arrian, iii, 16, 5-11; Diodôr. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1, 17-20.

troops-600 drachms per man to the Macedonian cayalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry, 200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign infantry. But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents 2 (=about £11,500,000 sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible if we did not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in golden Darics,3 the untouched accumulations of several preceding kings,

Oct.-Nov. Surrender of Babylon and Susa. the two great capitals of Persia. Alexander

enters Babylon. Immense treasures acquired in both places.

who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency. A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able Grecian officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance, would have preserved both his life

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the population and the Chaldean priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus, as well as by directing that the temple of that god and the other Alexander temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxês should be rebuilt.4 Treating the Persian and non nates saempire now as an established conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with him two Greeks as assistants and guarantees— Apollodôrus of Amphipolis, as commander of the

B.C. 331. November. December.

acts as king of Persia. and nomitraps. He marches to Susa. He remodels the divisions of

military force, Asklepiodôrus as collector of the revenue. rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrinês, who had surrendered at his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of Armenia. To that of Syria and Phœnicia he appointed Menês, who took with him 3000 talents to be remitted to Antipater for

¹ Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodôr. xvii. 64.
2 Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16, 12).

I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents, the

value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to three.

³ Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodôr. xvii. 66. 4 Arrian, iii. 16, 6—9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.

levying new troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnêsus.1 The march of Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days, an easy route through a country abundantly supplied. Susa he was joined by Amyntas, son of Andromenês, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000 men, Macedonians, Greeks, and There were both cavalry and infantry, and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian youths of noble family soliciting admission into Alexander's corps of pages.2 The incorporation of these new-comers into the army afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the larger.3

After some delay at Susa, and after confirming the Persian

B.C. 331-330. Winter.

Alexander marches into Persis proper-he conquers the refractory Uxii in the intermediate mountains.

Abulitês, who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, vet not without two Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force, the other governor of the citadel, Alexander crossed the river Eulæus or Pasitigris and directed his march to the south-east towards Persis proper, the ancient heart or primitive seat from whence the original Persian conquerors had issued.4 Between Susa and Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii, rude but warlike shepherds to whom the great king himself had always

been obliged to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded the like tribute from Alexander, who replied

¹ Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodôr. xvii. 64. Curtius and Diodôrus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the discrepancy here is not very important.

² Curtius, v. 1, 42; compare Diodôr. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii. 16, 18.

³ Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodôr. xvii. 65. Respecting this reorganization, begun now at Susa and carried further during the next year at Ekbatana, see Rüstow and Köchly, Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 seq.

One among the changes now made was that the divisions of cavalry, which, having hitherto coincided with various local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered accordingly,

donia, had been officered accordingly, were redistributed and mingled to-

gether (Curtius, v. 2, 6).

4 Arrian, iii. 17, 1. ἄρας δὲ ἐκ Σούσων, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Πασιτίγρην ποταμὸν, ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίων γῆν.

The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers, the Choaspes (now Kherkha) on the west, the Eulæus or Pasitigris, now Karun, on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The Eulæus appears to have water. The Euleus appears to have been called Pasitigris in the lower part of its course—Pliny, H. N. xxxi. 21. "Parthorum reges ex Choaspe et Euleo tantum bibunt."

Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two rivers and the site of the Persiau Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book iii. West-Asien, pp. 291—

by inviting them to meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army, but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii that they were forced to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or expel them, but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis, permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their poverty allowed.1

But bad as the Uxian pass had been there remained another

still worse, called the Susian or Persian Gates,2 in the mountains which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis Proper. Ariobarzanês, satrap of the Susia the province, held this pass; a narrow defile walled the way to across, with mountain positions on both sides, from Ariobarwhence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of march Alexander reached who finds on the fifth day the Susian Gates, which, inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing pass and conquer it. In spite of all the courage of his soldiers, morning.

Difficult pass called the Susian Persepolis. zanês the satrap repulses Alexander, means to turn the

however, he sustained loss without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult pass could be turned, but there was a long circuitous march of many days whereby it might be evaded and another entrance found into the plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable was a

1 Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius, v. 3, 5—12; Diodôr. xvii. 67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by Alexander in this march was that described by Kinneir, through Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of the territory for military opera-

Ancient Persia shows how little can be made out.

Alexander in this march was that described by Kinneir, through Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of the territory for military operation.

No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient geography of these regions. Mr. Long's Map of ² See the instructive notes of Mützell

humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. further inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years attending sheep as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a track known only to himself whereby he might come on the flank of Ariobarzanês. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp with orders to attack the pass in front when he should hear the trumpet give signal, Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light detachment under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount incredible hardship and difficulty, the more so as it was mid-winter and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements that he surprised all the Persian outposts and came upon Ariobarzanês altogether unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also, the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the gates, and were for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among the rocks and precipices, the satrap himself being one of a few that escaped.1

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest of fortresses,2 yet after this unexpected con-Alexander quest of a pass hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few enters Persepolis. had courage to think of holding it against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanês, hastening thither from the conquered pass, still strove to organize a defence, and at least to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already preparing to pillage. But Tiridatês, commander of the garrison. fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly, Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole. Ariobarzanês, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ, the two peculiar capitals of the Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of Cyrus the Great, both fell into the hands of the conqueror.3

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was

Arrian, iii. 18, 1—14; Curtius, v. 4, 10—20; Diodôr. xvii. 68.
 Diodôr. xvii. 68.
 Diodôr. xvii. 69.

powerfully moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs, arms, eyes, ears, or some other January, bodily members. Mutilation was a punishment Mutilated commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental gover- Grecian nors, even by such as were not accounted cruel.

captives.

Thus Xenophôn, in eulogizing the rigid justice of Cyrus the vounger, remarks that in the public roads of his satrapy men were often seen who had been deprived of their arms or legs or otherwise mutilated by penal authority. Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old and had lived for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian kings, but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle, offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to remain altogether in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an ample donation of money, clothing, and cattle.2

¹ Xenoph. Anabas. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always prevailed among Orientals. "The most atrocious part of the Mahomedan system of punishment is that which regards theft and robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or the foot, is the prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence" (Mill, History of British India, book iii. ch. 5, p. 447). "Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the British camp-followers that fell into his hands" (Elphinstone, Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380, ch. xi.).

(Elphinstone, Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380, ch. xi.).

A recent traveller notices the many mutilated persons, female as well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde (Burton, Scenes in Scinde, vol. ii. p. 281).

² Diodôr. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it

is certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention 800. Diodórus calls them—*Ελληνες ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων ἀνάστατοι γεγονότες, ὁκτακόσιοι μὲν σχεδὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅντες, ταῖς δ΄ ηλικίαις οἱ πλείστοι μὲν γεγηρακότες, ἡκρωτηριασμένοι δὲ πάντες, &c. Some ἀνάρπαστοι πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ σοφίαν are noticed in Xenoph. Men. iv. 2, 33: compare Herodot. iii. 93; iv. 204. I have already mentioned the mutilation of the Macedonian invalids taken at Issus by Darius.

at Issus by Darius.

Probably these Greek captives were mingled with a number of other captives, Asiatics and others, who had been treated in the same manner. mutilated persons, female as well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde (Burton, Scenes in Scinde, vol. ii. p. 281).

2 Diodôr. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; would calculate on obtaining sympathy of these mutilated captives; but I see no reason to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it seen treated in the same manner. Noue but the Greek captives would be and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy of the same manner. Noue but the Greek captives would be and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy of the same manner. Noue but the Greek captives would be and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy of the same manner. Noue but the Greek captives would be and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy of the same manner. Noue but the Greek captives would be and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy of the same manner. Noue but the Greek captives would be and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy of the same manner. Noue but the Greek captives would be and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy of the same manner. The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to

Immense wealth and national monuments of every sort accumulated in Persepolis.

excite not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity, as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of Greece against the Persians, to punish the

wrongs done by Xerxês a century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who, under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus to the Ægean. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the purposes of the Great King's empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbatana, were more central and convenient residences, but Persepolis was still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased, and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.1

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Perse-

Alexander carries away the regal treasures, and then gives up Persepolis to be plundcred and burnt by the soldiers.

polis as the most hostile of all Asiatic cities,—the home of those impious invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and that the Asiatics would

used. The two persons among them, Athenian. named by Curtius as spokesmen in the interview with Alexander, are Eukteoview with Alexander, are Eukteoview, and Theætêtus, an v. 6, 2, 3.

construe it as evidence of an intention to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in the country.1 appropriating the regal treasure—to the alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver $(=£27,600,000 \text{ sterling})^2$ Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules, with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed out of Persis Proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and Ekbatana. Six thousand talents more, found in Pasargadæ, were

1 Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodôr. xvii. 70; Cnrtius, v. 6, 1; Strabo, xv. p. 731.

2 This amount is given both by Diodôrus (xvii. 71) and by Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see, however, from Strabo that there were different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures deserve no coufidence upon any evidence short of an official return. At the same time, we ought to expect avidence short of an official return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum, considering the long series of years that had been spent in amassing it. Alexander's own letters (Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000 camels.

To explain the fact of a large accumulated treasure in the Persian capitals, it must be remarked that what we are accustomed to consider as what we are accustomed to consider as expenses of government were not defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary tribute. The king's numerous servants and attendants received no pay in money but in kind. numerous servants and attendants received no pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192, and iii. 91; and a good passage of Heeren, setting forth the small public disbursements out of the regal treasure, in his account of the internal constitution of the ancient Persian Empire (Ideen tiber die Politik und den Verkehr der Völker der alten Welt, part i. Abth. 1, pp. 511—519).

Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (Voyage en Arménie et en Perse, Paris, 1821, p. 272, ch. 30)—"Si les sommes que l'on verse dans le trésor du Shah ne sont pas exorbi-

tantes, comparativement à l'étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles n'en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables qui n'en absorbent pas la moitié. Le reste est converti en lingots, en pierreries, et en divers objets d'une grande valeur et d'un transport facile en cas d'événement : a moi deit suffire que par la consideit suffi et d'un transport facule en cas d'evene-ment: ce qui doit suffire pour empêcher qu'onne trouve exagérés les rapports que tous les voyageurs ont faits de la mag-nificence de la cour de Perse. Les Per-ses sont assez clairvoyans pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui portent Futteh Ali Shah à thésauriser."

Shah a thesauriser. When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mahomed, and entered Delhi in 1739, the imperial treasure and effects which fell into his hands is said to have amounted to £32,000,000 sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants (Mill, History of British India, vol. ii. B. iii. ch. 4, p. 403). Runjeet Sing left at his death (1839) a treasure of £8,000,000 sterling, with jewels and other effects to several millions more (The Punjaub, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16, London, 1845).

London, 1845).

Mr. Mill remarks, in another place, that "in Hindostan, gold, silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to production" (vol. i. p.

254, B. ii. ch. 5). Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the gold and silver brought to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state into earthen vessels; when it cooled the earthen vessel was withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion of it was cut off when occasion required for disbursements. This practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was habitually accumulated, and not expended. expended.

added to the spoil.1 The persons and property of the inhabitants were abandoned to the licence of the soldiers, who obtained an immense booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing, furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male inhabitants were slain,2 the females dragged into servitude; except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious articles, not without occasional bloodshed.3 As soon as their ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters, seen by Plutarch, Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.4

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis.

1 Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount, which I transcribe from Curtius, v. 6, 10.

2 Diodôr. xvii. 70. οὶ Μακεδόνες ἐπήεσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρας πάντας φονεύοντες, τὰς δὲ κτήσεις διαρπάζοντες, &c.
Curtius, v. 6, 6.

3 Diodôr xvii. 70. 71: Curtius v. 6.

sepoils, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with his own hand, may perhaps be so far true, that he main features of the massacre and plunder in Persepolis permitted to the soldiers by Alexander. Arrian does not mention it: he mentions only the deliberate resolution of Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would also naturally dictate the general liceuce to plunder and massacre. Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or lovo to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the licence to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any antecedent sentiment of vengeance. sentiment of vengeance.

The story (told by Diodôrus, Curtius, aud Plutarch, Alex. 38) that Alex-The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38) that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first instigated by the courtezan Thais to set fire to the palace of Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with his own hand, may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on the authority of Arrian.

4 Plutarch, Alexand. 37. φόνον μὲν οῦν ἐνταῦθα πόλυν τῶν ἀλισκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε· γράφει γὰρ αὐτὸς, ὡς νομίζων αὐτῷ το ῦτο λυσιτελεῖν ἐκέλευεν ἀποσφάττεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· νομίσματος δὲ εὐρεῖν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκκομοσθῆναί φησι μυρίοις ὁρικοῖς ζεύγεν,

son with the treasure found at Susa.

But he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division, traversed the interior of Persis Proper; conquering or receiving into submission the various towns and villages. The greatest resistance which he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity troops, and of the season and the rugged destitution of a frozen himself in country. Neither physical difficulties, however, nor conquering the rest of human enemies could arrest the march of Alexander. He returned from his expedition complete master of Persis, and in the spring quitted that province with his whole army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of 3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridatês, who surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.2

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable pursuer.3 He calculated that once across these mountains, Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

B.C. 330. Winter-Spring.

Alexander rests his employs Persis.

² Curtius, v. 6, 11. ³ Arrian, iii. 16, 1—4. 1 Diodôr. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12-20.

CHAPTER XCIV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

FROM this time forward to the close of Alexander's life—a period B.C. 330. of about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again.

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these volumes - the first portion of Alexander's Asiatic The first campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the four Asiatic conquest of Persis, a period of four years, March, 334 campaigns of Alex-B.C., to March, 330 B.C.), though not of direct bearing, andertheir direct is vet of material importance. Having in his first bearing and year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, importance in reference to Grecian he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renohistory. vated under his imperial sceptre. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, destined, a century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing.1 Towards the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings—who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing

¹ Compare the language addressed dotus puts into the mouth of Xerxês, by Alexander to his weary soldiers, when announcing his intended on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arcian, v. 26), with that which Herovii. 8).

and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis-and that ruler, too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of his age, to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

But though the first four years of Alexander's Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the Western half of the His last Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities, his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The upon stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartes, Indus,

seven years, farther eastward. had no similar bearing

Greece. and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious armies over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance. To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the battles of Issus and Arbêla.

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbêla to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest-Persis Proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ekbatana, the chief city of Media, clinging to the

Sir John Malcolm observes: "There can hardly be said to be any roads in Persia; nor are they much required, for the use of wheel-carriages has not yet been introduced into that kingdom. Nothing can be more rugged and difficult than the paths which have been cut over the mountains by which it is bounded and intersected "(ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 525)

vol. ii. p. 525).

In this respect, indeed, as in others, the modern state of Persia must be inferior to the ancient: wit-

¹ I see no reason for doubting that the Ekbatana here meant is the modern Hamadan. See a valuable Appendix added by Dr. Thirlwall to the sixth volume of his History of Greece, in which this question is argued against Mr. Williams.

B.C. 330.

Darius at

seeks

escape

towards Baktria,

when hé hears of

approach-

hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals

and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiation, and might leave him May-June. unmolested in the more barren East. As soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, Ekbatanahe sent forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian Sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure Alexander in the city (7000 talents = £1,610,000 in amount),

and passed through the Caspian Gates into the territory of Parthyênê. His only chance was to escape to Baktria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.1

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander

Alexander enters Ekbatanaestablishes there his depôt and base of operation.

entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis we cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been further prolonged, partly by necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Parætakeni,2 partly by rumours exaggerating the Persian force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to

advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana-the last capital stronghold of the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana his principal depôt: depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents =£41,400,000 sterling.³ Parmenio was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in

ness the description given by Herodotus of the road between Sardis and Susa.

1 Arrian, iii. 19, 2—9; iii. 20, 3.
2 Arrian, iii. 19, 5.
3 Arrian iii. 19, 14; Diodôr, xvii. 80.
3 Arrian announces the treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents; Curtius gives the uncoined gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure of both places was transported to Ekbatana.

Media; of which territory Oxodatês, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.1

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000

Grecian mercenaries,2 who had marched from Kilikia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home.3 He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure. The operations which he

B.C. 330. June—July.

Alexander sends home the Thessacavalry— necessity for him now to pursue a more desultory warfare.

was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented to execute; moreover, he was called upon to act less with large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore for the first time established a regular Taxis, or division, of horse-bowmen.4

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media, by which Gates 5 was under-

¹ Arrian, iii. 20, 4.
2 Curtius, v. 23, 12.
3 Arrian, iii. 19, 10: compare v. 27, 7.
4 Arrian, iii. 24, 1. ήδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἰππακοντισταὶ ἦσαν τάξις.
See the remarks of Rüstow and Köchly upon the change made by Alexander in his military organization about this period, as soon as he found that there was no further chance of a large collected Persian force, able to meet him in the field (Geschichte des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 252 seq.). The change which they point out was real,

but I think they exaggerate it in

degree.
5 The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those described Gates appear to be those described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari, or Serdara Khan, on the southernmost of the two roads which lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence farther east-ward towards Mesched and Herat. See the note of Mutzell in his edition of Curtius v 35, 2, p. 439; also Morier. of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier,

stood a mountain-pass or rather a road of many hours' march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward Alexander along the southern side of the great range of Taurus

pursues Darius to the Caspian Gates, but fails in overtaking him.

towards Parthia. He marched with his Companioncavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the bowmen, the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it could, to Rhage, about fifty miles north

of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven days by exertions so severe that many men as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed he learned that Darius had already passed through the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhage, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed A day's march on the other side of them he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanês and Antibêlus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.1

The conspirators by whom this had been done were Bessus, satrap of Baktria; Barsaentês, satrap of Drangiana B.C. 330. and Arachosia; and Nabarzanês, general of the July. regal guards. The small force of Darius having Conspiracy been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who formed against remained were the contingents of the still uncon-Darius by Bessus and quered territories, Baktria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, others, who seize his under the orders of their respective satraps. person. Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus

with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace satraps.

Second Journey through Persia, p. 363; Fraser's Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan, p. 291.

The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus, extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive

and populous; while the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and warlike tribes — Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, &c. The mountain range, now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very high peak of Demavend.

The road from Ekbatana to Baktria, along which both the flight of Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz. Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most difficult portion.

1 Arrian, iii. 20, 21.

with Alexander by surrendering Darius should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Baktria and Sogdiana they resolved to organize an energetic resistance under their own joint command for the defence of those eastern provinces, the most warlike population of the empire.1 Under the desperate circumstances of the case this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara, in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold, placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian troops, and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could, Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding. quitted the army in disgust and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapyri bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.²

On hearing this intelligence Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the Prodigious person of Darius. At the head of his Companion- efforts of cavalry, his light horse, and a body of infantry picked to overtake out for their strength and activity, he put himself in session of the control of the con instant march, with nothing but arms and two days' Darius. He provisions for each man, leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short puts Darius to death. midday repose (it was now the month of July),

surprises the Persian corps,

1 Masistės, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen Amestris, was going to Baktria to organize a revolt: see Herodot. ix. 113, about the importance of that satrapy.

2 Arrian, iii. 21—23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the golden chain (Curtius, v. 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use of some golden chains round neck and arms.

brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp, which his informant Bagistanês had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding Yet learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them unless he could find some shorter road. informed that there was another shorter but leading through a Setting out by this road late in the day with waterless desert. his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms and having no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden appearance of their indefatigable conqueror that they dispersed and fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment Bessus and Barsaentês urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse, and accompany them in their flight. refused to comply. They were determined, however, that he should not fall alive into the hands of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the eastern provinces; they were, moreover, incensed by his refusal, and had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him mortally wounded and then pursued their flight. His chariot, not distinguished by any visible mark nor known even to the Persian soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers. At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring, and is said to have received his last words; wherein he expressed thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself, was about to pass to so generous a

Rarus apud Medos regum cruor; unaque cuncto (Claudian. in Eutrop. ii. p. 473.)
Court conspiracies and assassinatorudelibus æque unknown either among the Achæmenidæ or the Arsakidæ.

^{1 &}quot;Rarus apud Medos regum cruor;

conqueror. It is at least certain that he never lived to see Alexander himself.1

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for the express purpose of taking pointment of Alexan-Darius alive. It would have been a gratification to der when he missed his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless taking captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword Darius alive. of his enemy, and spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all further resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither with their hands free to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy as large a force as they could against the Macedonian conqueror, who was obliged to follow them if he wished to complete the subjugation of the empire. We can understand, therefore,

that Alexander was deeply mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march, and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter find him manifesting

Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried, with full pomp and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the and conmagnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendour to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an

Regal · funeral bestowed upon Darius. His fate

¹ This account of the remarkable This account of the remarkable incidents immediately preceding the death of Darius is taken mainly from Arrian (iii. 21), and seems one of the most authentic chapters of his work. He is very sparing in telling what passed in the Persian camp; he mentions, indeed, only the communications made by the Persian deserters to Alexander. e is very sparing in telling what ssed in the Persian camp; he mens, indeed, only the communications ade by the Persian deserters to Alexder.

Curtius (v. 27—34) gives the narra-

against the satrap Bessus.

tive far more vaguely and loosely than Arrian, but with ample details of what was going on in the Persian camp. We should have been glad to know from whom these details were bor-

impartial review will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was his own blindness; his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens whom he had himself exposed to captivity; lastly, what is still less pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends and countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.1

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the

в.с. 330. July.

Repose of Alexander and his army at Hekatompylus, in Parthia. Commencing alteration in his demeanour. He becomes Asiatized and despotic.

purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant supplies from the neighbouring region, the soldiers here received a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of Darius.2 In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet and in wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure allowed, were

now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions, by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most im-

¹ Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius, dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him ἀνδρὶ τὰ μὲν πολέμια, εἶπερ τινὶ ἄλλω, μαλθακῷ καὶ οὐ φρενήρει, &c.

2 Curtius, vi. 5, 10; vi. 6, 15; Diodôr. xvii. 74. Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads joined (Polyb. x. 28). It was situated on one of the roads running eastward site unknown.

from the Caspian Gates, on the southern from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with certainty: Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 465, 467), with others, conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, vol. ii. p. 549) places it farther eastward, near Jai-Jerm. Mr. Long notes it on his map as cite and the again.

portance in Alexander's conduct was, that he now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress. of a Persian king.

To many of Alexander's soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated, and the war finished, by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardour of all. His first march was across one of the passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania, the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernês, together with Nabarzanês, Artabazus, and

aggravation of these new habits, from the present moment.

B.C. 330. September.

Alexander conquers the mountains immediately south of the Caspian. He requires the Greek mercenaries to surrender at discre-

other eminent Persians, surrendered themselves to him and were favourably received. The Greek mercenarics, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic synodrequired them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched to conduct them to him in safety.2 The Macedonian Andronikus was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi-a name seemingly borne by several distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern slope of the range of Mount Elburz, a few miles from the Caspian Sea (Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their retreats, overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great slaughter, and

poses a long speech for Alexander (vi. 7, 9).

Arrian, iii. 23, 15. ¹ This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexand. 47). Curtius com-

reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace.1

From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction, he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was from Sparta and other Greck cities der themselves, as well as by various Grecian envoys brought to from Sparta, Chalkêdôn, and Sinôpê, who had accomhim—how treated. panied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkêdôn and Sinôpê to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition of Philip as leader of Greece, and those whose enlistment had been of later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the same pay as they had hitherto received.² Such was the untoward conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia-a system whereby the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an enemy as Alexander.3

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward his united army through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, came to him near the border, to a town named Susia, submitted, and was allowed to retain his satrapy; while

slew himself in despair, disdaining to surrender.

¹ Arrian, iii. 22, 4. In reference to the mountain tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different localities—on the parts of Mount Taurus south of the Caspian, in Armenia, on Mount Zagros, and in Persis Proper (see Strabo, xi. pp. 508—523: Herodot. i. 125), we may note that the Nomadic tribes, who constitute a considerable fraction of the population of the modern Persian empire are at this day found Persian empire, are at this day found under the same name in spots widely distant: see Jaubert, Voyage en Arménie et en Perse, p. 254.

2 Arrian, iii. 24, 8. Curtius, vi. 5, 9. An Athenian officer named Demokratês

³ See a curious passage on this subject at the end of the Cyropædia of Xenophôn.

Xenophôn.

4 Arrian, iii. 25, 3—8. Droysen and Dr. Thirlwall identify Susia with the town now called Tûs or Toos, a few miles north-west of Mesched. Professor Wilson (Ariana Antiqua, p. 177) thinks that this is too much to the west, and too far from Herat; he conceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the mountains west of Herat ceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the mountains west of Herat. Mr. Prinsep (Notes on the historical results deducible from discoveries in Afghanistan, p. 14) places it at Sub-zawar, south of Herat, and within the region of fertility. This seems to lie in the line of Alex-

Alexander, merely skirting the northern border of Aria, marched

in a direction nearly east towards Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered, after three or four days, that Satibarzanes was in league with Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the chief city of Aria.1 His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that the

B.C. 330. September.

March of Alexander farther eastwardhis successes in Aria and Drangiana.

Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanês was obliged to escape. A few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seiestan), where he found no resistance: the satrap Barsaentês having sought safety among some of the Indians.2

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father B.C. 330. Parmenio the second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern satrapies, had Philotas, been left in the important post of commanding the great depôt and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three the family.

October.

Proceedings son of Parmenio, in Drangiana. Military greatness and consideration of

sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before; 3 the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank

ander's march more than the other two places indicated; Subzawar is too far to the south. Alexander appears to have first directed his march from Parthia to Baktria (in the line from Asterabad to Balkh through Margiana), merely touching the borders of Aria in his route.

1 Artakoana, as well as the subsequent city of Alexandria in Ariis, are both supposed by Wilson to coincide with the locality of Herat (Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, pp. 152—177).

There are two routes from Herat to

Asterabad, at the south-east corner of Asterabad, at the south-east corner of the Caspian—one by Schahrood, which is 533 English miles; the other by Mesched, which is 688 English miles (Wilson, p. 149).

² Arrian, iii. 25; Curtius, vi. 24, 36. The territory of the Drangi or Zarangi southward from Aria, coincides generally with the modern Seiestan, adjoining the lake pow called Zareh, which

ing the lake now called Zareh, which receives the waters of the river Hil-

3 Arrian, iii. 25, 6; Curtius, iv. 8, 7; vi. 6, 19.

of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

Revelation of an intended conspiracy made by Kebalinus to Philotas, for the purpose of being communicated to Alexander. Philotas does not mention it to Alexander. It is communicated to the latter through another channel.

A revelation came to Philotas from Kebalinus, brother of a vouth named Nikomachus, that a soldier named Dimnus of Chalastra, had made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person, under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander, inviting him to become an accomplice.1 Nikomachus, at first struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a few names, all of which he presently communicated to his brother Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected to do this for two days, upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of connivance, and caused the revelation

to be made to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any declaration.²

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, everything rested on the

Alexander is at first angry with Philotas, but accepts his explanation, and professes to pass over the fact.

testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had heard. Philotas replied that the source from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice, that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as Nikomachus, recount-

ing the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander received or affected to receive the explanation, gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his usual familiarity.3

the officer sent to arrest him, and was

¹ Curtius, vi. 7, 2. "Dimnus, modicæ apud regem auctoritatis et gratiæ, exoleti, cui Nicomacho erat nomen, amore flagrabat, obsequio uni sibi dediti corporis vinctus." Plutarch, Alex. 49; Diodor. xvii. 79.

² Curt. vi. 7, 29; Plutarch, Alex. 49. The latter says that Dimnus resisted

killed by him in the combat.

3 Curtius, vi. 7, 33. "Philotas respondit, Cebalinum quidem scorti sermonem ad se detulisse, sed ipsum tam levi auctori nihil credidisse—veritum, ne jurgium inter amatorem et exoletum non sine risu aliorum detulisset."

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms on the pretended divine paternity, coupled with boasts that he and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of Asia.

Ancient grudge against Philotasadvantage taken of to ruin him.

had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These and the incident other self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexan-

der, had been divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached, a beautiful Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigonê, who, having first been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral Autophradatês, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonê, respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander, and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report them from time to time to himself.1

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming confidence, had for at least and others eighteen months, ever since his conquest of Egypt and are jealous of Parmenio perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the Alexander suborned and secret communication of a treacherous mistress.2 Some of the generals around Alexander, especially Kraterus, the first suborner of Antigonê,

Kraterus Philotas. is persuaded to put them both to death.

fomented these suspicions from jealousy of the great ascendency of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanour, so as to have made many enemies among the soldiers.3 But whatever may have been his defects on this head, defects which he shared with the other Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and pre-

ανεπιτηδείους προϊέμενος.

Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus recognized these previous communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).

3 Plutarch, Alexand. 40—48; Curting vi 11 3.

tius, vi. 11, 3.

sents, his fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval, and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus and the other enemies of Philotas worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancour. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death of Philotas, and on the death of Parmenio besides.2

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a Arrest of Philotas. separate and distant command, required management. Alexander accuses him Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the before the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation assembled soldiers. from the army, according to an ancient Macedonian He is condemned. custom in regard to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised. He not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual.3 In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed, put in chains, and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends, Philotas and Parmenio, through the intended

¹ Phylarchus, Fragment. 41, ed. Didot., ap. Athenaeum, xii. p. 539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Enmenês enriched himself much; though beine et neriched himself much; though beine et rex non cenare modo, sed etiam philotas ad ultimas sibi epulas, et rex non cenare modo, sed etiam native Macedonian generals (Plntarch,

agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning, but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.¹

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself-revelations of his own personal danger and reproaches Amyntas and even Kœnus, the against treacherous friends. brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused.2 They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him and ardent sympathy with the king's danger. Philotas was heard in his defence, which, though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was, indeed, sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly and overwhelmed with disadvantages, while a degree of courage absolutely heroic would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough well-founded) was noway connected with the charge of treason against the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly and wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the parricide in pieces.3

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his

¹ Arrian, iii. 26, 2. λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰσαχθήναι ἐς Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ κατηγορήσαι αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς ᾿Αλέξαν-δρον, &c. Curtius, vi. 9, 13; Diodôr. xvii. 80.

² Curtius, vi. 9, 30. eret ³ Curtius, vi. 11, 8. "Tum vero bat.

universa concio accensa est, et à corporis custodibus initium factum, clamantibus, discerpendum esse parricidam manibus eorum. Id quidem Philotas, qui graviora supplicia metueret, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat."

enemies.

Philotas is put to the torture and forced to confess both against himself and Parmenio.

Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him but against his father Parmenio, whom there was as yet nothing to implicate.

Accordingly during the ensuing night Philotas was put to the torture. Hephæstion, Kraterus, and Kœnus—the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas 1—themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself, too, was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles.2 All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted,3 cruel in the extreme and long continued, wrung from him at last a confession implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death, and at the same time all those whose names had been indicated by Nikomachus were slain also, apparently by being stoned without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.4

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential

¹ Curtius, vi. 9, 30; vi. 11, 11.
2 Plutarch, Alexand. 49.
3 Curtius, vi. 11, 15. "Per ultimos deinde cruciatus, utpote et damnatus et inimicis in gratiam regis torquentibus, laceratur. Ac primo quidem, quanquam hinc iguis, illinc verbera,

jam non ad quæstionem, sed ad pænam, ingerebantur, non vocem modo, sed etiam gemitus habuit in potestate; sed flagellorum ictus nudis ossibus incussos ferre non poterat," &c.

4 Curtius, vi. 11, 20.

of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depôt at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his Parmenio is presence one of the Companions named Polydamas, a Ekbatana. particular friend, comrade, or aide-de-camp, of Par-by order menio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment trivance of that his life hung by a thread, so that Polydamas Alexander. entered the king's presence in extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ekbatana ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and, therefore, as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands addressed to Parmenio, one from Alexander himself conveying ostensibly military communications and orders, the other signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas and purporting to be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these Polydamas received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenio at Ekbatana, proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded, too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of Khorasan and arrived at Ekbatana on the eleventh day, a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse. Entering the camp by night without the knowledge of Parmenio, he delivered his despatch to Kleander, with whom he concerted measures. the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio while walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander's order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in

¹ Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodôr. xvii. 80; Curtius, vii. 2, 11—18.

perusal he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell by the remaining officers, the last even after life had departed.¹

1 Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus, except as to one material point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodórus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin (xii. 5) also state the facts

in the same manner.

Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian, appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in a conspiracy against Alexander's life. But when we analyse what they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be have said, their opinion will not be found entitled to much weight. In the first place they state (Arr. iii. 26, 1) that the conspiracy of Philotas had been before made known to Alexander while he was in Egypt, but that he did not then believe it. Now, eighteen months had elapsed since the stay in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he Philotas was in a mood in which he might be supposed likely to conspire is one proposition, that he actually did conspire is another; Arrian and his authorities run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us that "the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers and convicted Philo-tas with the rest by other indicia not obscure, but chiefly by this—that Philotas confessed to have heard of a Philotas confessed to have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence "—καὶ τοὺς μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἐργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλώτας πεπύσθαι μὲν—συνέφη, &c. What these other indivia were we are not told. θαι μεν-συνέφη, ας. What these other indicia were we are not told; but we may see how slender was their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation, when we recollect that Nikomachus was the only informant (Arrian loosely talks of μηνυτάς, as if there were more), proves absolutely nothing as to the

complicity of Philotas, though it may prove something as to his indiscretion. Even on this minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been little room for remark.

The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius is that he states "Philotas with the rest to have been shot to death by the Macedonians," thus seemingly contradicting, at least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured. Now, Plutarch, Diodôrus, and Justin all concur with Curtius in affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter I prefer their united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to believe in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander himself, without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs. They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced (κατηγορήσαι ἰσχυρῶς) Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover, let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion to be one of the confidential body guards (σωματοφύλακες) out of this very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian iii) 27, 11)

bouy guaras (σωματοφυλακες) out of this very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27, 11).

How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one whom Alexander hated may be seen by what they say afterwards about the philosopher Kallisthenės. Both of them affirmed that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander, deposed against Kallisthenės as having instigated them to the deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55), that the pages denied the privity of any one else, maintaining the project to have been altogether their own. To their great honour, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme tortures, though they knew that a deposition against Kallisthenės was desired from them.

My belief is that Diodôrus, Plutarch.

The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden Mutiny of wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of the soldiers avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the learn the other murderers should be delivered to them. But assassination of Kleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander's written orders, to by the prowhich the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs of Alexander's reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, order.

yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio's body. Even this was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king's displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.1

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting Fear and than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent disgust in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancour worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services.² When we see the greatest magnitude of past services.² When we see the greatest

officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio, we feel how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalized. It is not surprising to read that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenio the favour and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions.³ Hence Alexander, opening and examin-

Curtius, and Justin are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no evidence at all against Parmenio; for the only evidence

ing the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army. Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the command of one, and Kleitus to that of the other.2

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing

B.C. 330-329.

Conquest of the Paropamisadæ, &c. Foundation of Alexandria ad Caucasum.

Drangiana, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seiestan, Afghanistan, and the western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on the north, Kandahar or Kelar on the south, and Furrah in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation.3 Near the southern termination of one of the passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east of

the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists.4 Towards the close of winter he crossed over

Justin, xii. 5.

² Arrian, iii. 27, 8.

³ Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson's Ariana Antiqua, pp. 173—178. "By perambulator the distance from Herat to Kantara and the comparison of th lator the distance from Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309 miles; total, 680 miles (English)." The principal city in Drangiana (Seiestan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers is Prophthasia; existing seemingly before Alexander's arrival. See the fragments of his mensores, ap. Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 135; Pliny, H. N. vi. 21. The quantity of remains of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).

(p. 154).

4 Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodôr. xvii. 83. Alexandria in Arachosia is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is mentioned as having been founded by Alexandria of them in Arrian or Curtius or ander, either in Arrian or Curtius or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi called

¹ Curtius, vii. 2, 36: Diodôr. xvii. 80; their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii. p. 593). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in ³ Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geoaphy, compare Wilson's Ariana Ancould have found time to establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghram, twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul on the south side of the between Kabul on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderab on the north side. The prodigious number of coins and relies, Greek as well as Mahometan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghram, supply better evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality. See Masson's Narrative of Journeys in Afghanistan, &c., vol. iii. ch. 7, p. 148 seq. 148 seqq.

In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from south to north, Alexander probably

the mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh-a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains he found himself in Baktria.

The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king, could muster no more than a small force, with which Alexander he laid waste the country, and then retired across the Grosses the Hindooriver Oxus into Sogdiana, destroying all the boats. Koosh, and Alexander overran Baktria with scarcely any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos

Bessus is made surrendering to him on the first demonstration of prisoner. attack. Having named Artabazus satrap of Baktria, and placed Archelaus with a garrison in Aornos, he marched northward towards the river Oxus, the boundary between Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather. The Oxus, six furlongs in breadth, deep and rapid, was the most formidable river that the Macedonians had vet seen.2 Alexander transported his army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favourable opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenês and others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus, were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader.3 They sent a proposition to this effect; upon which

marched by the pass of Bamian, which seems the only one among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p.

See Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p.
195.

1 Arrian, iii. 29, 3; Curtius, vii. 5, 1.
2 Arrian, iii. 29, 4; Strabo, xi. p.
509. Evidently Ptolemy and Aristobulus were much more awe-struck with
the Oxus than with either the Tigris
or the Euphratês. Arrian (iv. 6, 13)
takes his standard of comparison, in
regard to rivers, from the river Peneius
in Thessalv.

in Thessaly.

3 Curtius, vii. 5, 19. The exactness of Quintus Curtius, in describing the general features of Baktria and Sogdiana, is attested in the strongest

language by modern travellers. See Burnes's Travels into Bokhara, vol. ii. ch. 8, p. 211, 2nd edit.; also Morier, Second Journey in Persia, p. 282.

But in the geographical details of the country we are at fault. We have not sufficient data to identify more than one or two of the localities mentioned, in the narrative of Alexander's proceedings, either by Curtius or Arrian. That Marakanda is the modern Samarkand—the river Polytimetus, the modern Kohik—and Baktra or Zariaspa the modern Balkh—appears certain; but the attempts made by commentators to assign the site of other places are not such as to carry conviction.

In fact, these countries, at the pre-

In fact, these countries, at the pre-

Ptolemy with a light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus on what pretence he had first arrested, and afterwards slain, his king and benefactor Darius. Bessus replied that he had not done this single-handed; others were concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra¹ -where we shall again hear of him.

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, in-Massacre of habited by the Branchidæ, descendants of those the Bran-chidæ and Branchidæ near Milêtus on the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle of their families, per-Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up petrated by Alexander the treasures of that temple to the Persian king in Sog-Xerxês, 150 years before. This surrender had diana. brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion of Xerxês was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the interior of Asia. He assigned to them lands in the distant region of Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual and partially dishellenized, yet still attached to their traditions and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would determine for

sent moment, are known only super-ficially as to their general scenery; for purposes of measurement and geography they are almost unknown, as may be seen by any one who reads the Introduction to Erskine's translation of the Memoirs of Sultan Baber.

1 Arrian, iii. 30, 5—10. These details are peculiarly authentic, as coming from Ptolemy, the person chiefly con-

Aristobulus agreed in the description of the guise in which Bessus was exhibited, but stated that he was brought up in this way by Spitamenės and Dataphernės. Curtius (vii. 24, 36) follows this version. Diodôrus also gives an account very like it, mentioning nothing about Ptolemy (xvii. 32)

himself. Having first occupied the city in person with a select detachment, he posted his army all round the walls, and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the entire population-men, women, and children. They were slain without arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be levelled and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site might remain, nor anything except solitude and sterility.1 Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before. Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of the god.2 The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxês; so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging upon the contemporary Branchidæ the acts of their ancestors—yet more guilty than Xerxês, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest

1 Curtius, vii. 23; Plutarch de Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 557 B; Strabo, xi. p. 518; compare also xiv. p. 634, and xvii. p. 814. This last-mentioned passage of Strabo helps us to understand the peculiarly strong pious fervour with which Alexander regarded the temple and oracle of Branchidæ. At the time when Alexander went up to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt, for the purpose of affiliating himself to Zeus Ammon, there came to him envoys from Milêtus announcing that the oracle at Branchidæ, which had been silent ever since the time of Xerxês, had just begun again to give prophecy, and had certified the fact that Alexander was the son of Zeus, besides many other encouraging predictions.

The massacre of the Branchidæ by Alexander was described by Diodôrus, but was contained in that portion of the seventeenth book which is lost; there is a great lacuna in the MSS. after cap. 83. The fact is distinctly indicated in the table of contents prefixed to book xvii.

Arrian makes no mention of these

fixed to book xvii.

Arrian makes no mention of these descendants of the Branchidæ in Sog-

diana nor of the destruction of the town and its inhabitants by Alexander. Perhaps neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus said anything about it. Their silence is not at all difficult to explain, nor does it, in my judgment, impeach the credibility of the narrative. They do not feel under obligation to give publicity to the worst acts of their hero.

2 The Delphian oracle pronounced, in explaining the subjugation and ruin of Krœsus king of Lydia, that he had thereby explated the sin of his ancestor in the fifth generation before (Herodot. i. 91: compare vi. 86). Immediately before the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians called upon the Athenians to expel the descendants of those who had taken part in the Kilonian sacrilege 180 years before; they addressed this injunction with a view to procure the banishment of Periklés, yet still τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες (Thucyd. i. 125—127).

The idea that the sins of fathers were visited upon their descendants, even to the third and fourth generation, had great currency in the ancient world.

scale, offered to the gods by the religious impulses of Alexander, and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3000 Grecian prisoners on the field of Himera, where his grandfather Hamilkar had been slain seventy years before.1

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Mara-

Alexander at Marakanda and on the Jaxartes. Foundation of Alexandria Jaxartes. Limit of Alexander's progress northward.

kanda (Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana-next to the river Jaxartes, which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia and Europe.2 In his march he left garrisons in various towns,3 but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of his foragers, took refuge afterwards in a steep and rugged mountain, conceived to be unassailable. Thither, however,

Alexander pursued them, at the head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first repulsed, he succeeded in scaling and capturing the place. Of its defenders, thirty thousand in number, three-fourths were either put to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a shot from one of them through his leg.4 But here, as elsewhere, we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander subdued were men little suited for close combat hand to hand,—fighting only with missiles.

Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a new city to bear his name; intended partly as a protection against incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river, partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which he intended to do as soon as he could

¹ Diodôr. xiii. 62. See Ch. IXXXI. of this History.

2 Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Meteorologica of Aristotle (i. 13, 15—18) we read that the rivers Baktrus, Choaspes, and Araxes flowed from the lofty mountain Parnasus (Paropamisus?) in Asia; and that the Araxes bifurcated, one branch forming the Tanais, which fell into the Palus Meotis. For this fact he refers to the γης περίοδοι current in his time. It

¹ Diodor. xiii. 62. See Ch. lxxxi. of seems plain that by the Araxes Aristotle History.
2 Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Merorologica of Aristotle (i. 13, 15—18) panions, in identifying the Jaxartes with the Tanais, only followed the geopes, and Araxes flowed from the graphical descriptions and ideas current with the control of the property of the control of the cont graphical descriptions and ideas cur-rent in their time. Humboldt remarks several cases in which the Greek geogra-phers were fond of supposing bifurcation of rivers (Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 291). 3 Arrian, iv. 1, 5. 4 Arrian, iii. 30, 17.

find opportunity. He was however called off for the time by the news of a widespread revolt among the newly-B.C. 329. conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Baktria. Summer. He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigour Foundaand celerity, distributing his troops so as to capture tion of Alexandria five townships in two days, and Kyropolis or Kyra, the ad Jaxartem. Limit largest of the neighbouring Sogdian towns (founded of march northward. by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterwards. He put all the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the Jaxartes, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable sacrifices and festivities to the gods. He planted in it some Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer settlers from the natives around.2 An army of Scythian Nomads, showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and the army suffered much from thirst: while the little water to be found was so bad that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhœa which endangered his life.3 This chase, of a few miles on the right bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand), marked the utmost limit of Alexander's progress northward.

Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted, was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenês and the Scythians: a rare misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region4 near the river Polytimêtus (the Kohik), and putting to the sword the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and with

в.с. 329-328. Winter.

Alexander at Zariaspa in Baktria —he causes Bessus to bemutilated and slain.

¹ Arrian, iv. 1, 3.
2 Arrian, iv. 3, 17; Curtius, vii. 6, 25.
3 Arrian, iv. 5, 6; Curtius, vii. 9.
4 Arrian, iv. 6, 11; Curtius, vii. 9,
22. The river, called by the Macedonians Polytimétus (Strabo, xi. p.
518), now bears the name of Kohik or Zurufshan. It rises in the mountains

east of Samarkand, flowing westward on the north of that city and of Bokhara. It does not reach so far as the Oxus; during the full time of the year, it falls into a lake called Karakul; during the dry months, it is lost in the sands, as Arrian states (Burnes's Travels, vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 299, 2nd ed.).

Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various reinforcements of Greek troops. Bessus, who had been here retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amidst a public assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his treason to Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent him in this condition to Ekbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes and Persians.² Mutilation was a practice altogether Oriental and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is towards his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed treason against the king's person, which it was the policy as well as the feeling of Alexander to surround with a circle of deity.3 For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them. Mithrines, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of that almost impregnable fortress immediately after the battle of the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favour and promotion.4

The rude but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces of sandy desert, by the B.C. 328. Summer. neighbourhood of the Scythian Nomads, and by the Further presence of Spitamenês as a leader. Alexander, subjugation of Baktria distributing his army into five divisions, traversed and the country and put down all resistance, while he also

Sogdiana. Halt at took measures for establishing several military posts, Marakanda. or new towns, in convenient places.⁵ After some time

1 Arrian, iv. 7, 1; Curtius, vii. 10,

bus more, munimentum ad præsens, in posterum ultionem" (Tacitus, Hist. i.

44). 4 Arrian, i. 17, 3; iii. 16, 8. Curtius,

4 Arrian, i. 17, 3; iii. 16, 8. Curtius, iii. 12, 6; v. 1, 44.
5 Curtius (vii. 10, 15) mentions six cities (oppida) founded by Alexander in these regions; apparently somewhere north of the Oxus, but the sites cannot be made out. Justin (xii. 5) alludes to twelve foundations in Bak

<sup>12.

&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Arrian, iv. 7, 5.

³ After describing the scene at the formulation of the form Aome, when the Emperor Carlas was deposed and assassinated in the forum, Tacitus observes—"Plures quam centum et viginti libellos prrenila exposcentium, ob aliquam notabilem illà die operam, Vitellius posteà invenit, omnesque conquiri et interfici jussit. non honore Galba, sed tradito principi- tria and Sogdiana.

the whole army was reunited at the chief place of Sogdiana— Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.1

During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already related that Kleitus had B.C. 328. saved his life at the battle of the Granikus, by cutting Banquet at off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridates when Character already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since and position the death of Philotas, the important function of

general of the Companion-cavalry had been divided between Hephæstion and Kleitus. Moreover the family of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his sister, Lanikê, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic battles. therefore there were any man who stood high in the service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it was Kleitus.

In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian habit, had been abundantly drunk, and Boasts of when Alexander, Kleitus, and most of the other Alexander and his guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts or flatterers flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king's repugnance of Macepast achievements.2 They exalted him above all the donian most venerated legendary heroes; they proclaimed but not that his superhuman deeds proved his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like Hêraklês,

officers, felt expressed.

which nothing but envy could withhold from him even during his life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took

1 Arrian, iv. 16, 4; Curtius, vii. 10, 1. "Sogdiana regio magnà ex parte deserta est; octingenta ferè stadia in latitudinem vastæ solitudines tenent."

Respecting the same country (Sogdiana and Baktria), Mr. Erskine observes (Introduction to the Memoirs of Sultan Baber, p. xliii.):—

"The face of the country is extremely broken, and divided by lofty hills; even the plains are diversified by great varieties of soil—some extensive districts along the Kohik river, nearly the whole of Ferghana (along the Jaxartes), the greater part of Kwarizm, along the branches of the Oxus, with large portions of Balkh, Badakshan,

Kesh, and Hissar, being of uncommon fertility; while the greater part of the rest is a barren waste, and in some places a sandy desert. Indeed, the whole country north of the Oxus has a decided tendency to degenerate into desert, and many of its most fruitful spaces are nearly surrounded by barren sands; so that the population of all these districts still, as in the time of Baber, consists of the fixed inhabitants of the cities and fertile lands, and of the unsettled and roving wanderers of the desert, who dwell in tents of felt, and live on the produce of their flocks." Kesh, and Hissar, being of uncommon flocks.' ² Arrian, iv. 8, 7.

credit for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers such an insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among them all none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing insolence of Alexander-his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants, who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian hands and Persian rods. The pride of a Macedonian general in the stupendous successes of the last five years was effaced by his mortification, when he saw that they tended only to merge his countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxês or Ochus. But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers, they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

Scene at the banquet -vehement remonstrance of Kleitus.

At the banquet of Marakanda, this long-suppressed repugnance found an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated. but for that very reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made Alexander more boastful, and his flatterers fulsome to excess, overpowered altogether the reserve of Kleitus. He re-

buked the impiety of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip, whose achievements he loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior, to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his hands;2 whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had found

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 51. Nothing τας πρὶν ἐπιδείν Μηδικαῖς ῥάβδοις ξαινοcan be more touching than the words
put by Plutarch into the mouth of τνα τῷ βασιλεί προσέλθωμεν.

Kleitus—ἀλλ' οὐδὲ νῦν χαίρομεν, 'Αλέξανδρε, τοιαῦτα τέλη τῶν πόνων κομιζόμενοι, μακαρίζομεν δὲ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκόπολὺ μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ ἔργα, &C.

Macedonia prostrate and disorganized, and had to create for himself both soldiers and a military system. The great instruments of Alexander's victories had been Philip's old soldiers, whom he now despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander, who now for the first time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand towards Alexander, he exclaimed: "Recollect that you owe your life to me; this hand preserved you at the Granikus. Listen to the outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves." All these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under whose reproof he was now smarting. At length wrath and intoxication together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus; but the dagger had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the body guards and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas, and others, clung round him, held his arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall, which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus was not in a humour to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered to his

will, exclaimed that his officers held him in chains as Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king. Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength and continued efforts presently set him free. He then snatched a pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him through on the spot, exclaiming, "Go now to Philip and Parmenio".1

¹ Arrian, iv. 8; Curtius, viii. 1.; Plutarch, Alexand. 50, 51; Justin. xii. 6. The description given by Diodôrus was contained in the lost part of his seventeenth book; the table of contents, prefixed thereunto, notes the incident briefly.

All the anthors describe in the same

All the anthors describe in the same general way the commencement, progress, and result of this impressive scene in the banqueting hall of Marakanda; but they differ materially in the details. In giving what seems to me the most probable account, I have borrowed partly from all, yet following mostly the account given by Arrian from Ptolemy, himself present. For Arrian's narrative down to sect. 14 of c. 8 (before the words 'Αριστόβουλος δέ) may fairly be presumed to be derived from Ptolemy.

Both Plutarch and Curtius describe

Both Plutarch and Curtius describe the scene in a manner more dishonourable to Alexander than Arrian; and at the same time (in my judgment) less at the same time (in my judgment) less probable. Plutarch says that the brawl took its rise from a poet named Pierion singing a song which turned into derision those Macedonians who had been recently defeated in Sogdiana; that Alexander and those around him greatly applauded this satire; that Kleitus protested against such an insult to soldiers who, though unfortunate, had behaved with unimpeachable bravery; that Alexander then turned upon Kleitus, saying that he was seeking an excuse for limself by he was seeking an excuse for himself by extenuating cowardice in others; that Kleitus retorted by reminding him of the preservation of his life at the Granikus. Alexander is thus made to provoke the quarrel by aspersing the courage of Kleitus, which I think no way probable; nor would be be likely to creatures. Some of the town.

to encourage a song of that tenor.
Curtius agrees with Arrian in ascribing the origin of the mischief to the extravagant boasts of Alexander and his flatterers, and to their depreciation

of Philip. He then tells us that Kleitus, on hearing their unseemly talk, turned round and whispered to his neighbour some lines out of the Androneighbour some lines out of the Andro-machê of Euripidês (which lines also Plutarch ascribes to him, though at a later moment); that Alexander, not hearing the words, asked what had been said, but no one would tell him; at length Kleitus himself repeated the continent in language of his own been said, but no one would tell him, at length Kleitus himself repeated the sentiment in language of his own. This would suit a literary Greek; but an old Macedonian officer half-intoxicated, when animated by a vehement sentiment, would hardly express it by whispering a Greek poetical quotation to his neighbour. He would either hold his tongue, or speak what he felt broadly and directly. Nevertheless, Curtius has stated two points very material to the case, which do not appear in Arrian. 1. It was Alexander himself, not his flatterers, who vilipended Philip; at least the flatterers only did so after him, and following his example. The topic would be dangerous for them to originate, and might easily be carried too far. 2. Among all the topics touched upon by Kleitus, none was so intolerable as the open expression of sympathy, friendship, and was so intolerate as the open expression of sympathy, friendship, and regret for Parmenio. This stuug Alexander in the sorest point of his conscience; he must have known that there were many present who sympa-thized with it; and it was probably the main cause which worked him up to freuzy. Moreover, we may be pretty sure that Kleitus, while expattating upon Philip, would not forget Philip's general in chief, and his own old friend Parmenio.

I cannot believe the statement of

Aristobulus, that Kleitus was forced by his friends out of the hall, and afterwards returned to it of his own accord, to defy Alexander once more. It seems plain from Arrian that Ptolemy said no such thing. The murderous impulse of Alexander was

No sooner was the deed perpetrated than the feelings of Alexander underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding corpse on the floor— morse of the marks of stupefaction and horror evident in all Alexander, the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse diately after instantaneously satiated-plunged him at once into

immethe deed.

the opposite extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the hall and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the names of Kleitus and Lanikê, with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such services with a foul murder.1 His friends at length prevailed on him to take food and return to activity. All joined in trying to restore his selfsatisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own order.2 The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the god Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but withheld.3 Lastly, the Greek sophist or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdêra, revived Alexander's spirits by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to pre-

1 Arrian, iv. 9, 4; Curtius, viii. 2, 2.
2 Curtius, viii. 2, 12. "Quoque minus cædis puderet, jure interfectum Clitum Macedones decernunt; sepultura quoque prohibituri, ni rex humari incitat."

In explanation of this monstrous verdict of the soldiers, we must recollect that the safety of the whole army (now at Samarkand, almost beyond the boundary of inhabited regions, έξω τῆς οἰκουμένης) was felt to depend on the life of Alexander. Compare Justin,

gratified on the spot, and without delay, as soon as he got clear from the gentle restraint of his surrounding friends.

1 Arrian, iv. 9, 4; Curtius, viii. 2, 2.
2 Curtius, viii. 2, 12. "Quoque minus cædis puderet, jure interfectum favourite locality of that god (Plutarch,

Alex. 13).

Alex. 13).

The maddening delusion brought upon men by the wrath of Dionysus is awfully depicted in the Bacchæ of Euripidês. Under the influence of that delusion, Agavê, mother of Pentheus, tears her son in pieces and bears away his head in triumph, not knowing what is in her hands. Compare also Euripid. Hippolyt. 440—1412.

scribe what was right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from without.¹ Kallisthenês the philosopher was also summoned, along with Anaxarchus, to the king's presence, for the same purpose of offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute necessity for action, Alexander's remorse at length yielded. Like the other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable trace on his character, nor any effects justifying the unbounded admiration of Arrian, who has little but blame to bestow on the murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the mental suffering of the murderer.

After ten days ² Alexander again put his army in motion to B.C. 328.

Active and successful operations of Alexander in Sogdiana.

Active and successful operations of Alexander with the Sogdians and some Scythian allies raised much hostility of detail, which it cost another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue and hardships in his marches through

the mountainous parts of this wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions, strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these fastnesses held by a native chief named Sisymithrês seemed almost unattackable, and was, indeed, taken rather by intimidation than by actual force.³ The Scythians, after a partial success over a small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten and overawed that they slew Spitamenês and sent his head to the conqueror as a propitiatory offering.⁴

After a short rest at Nautaka during the extreme winter, Alexander resumed operations by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled with an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be inexpugnable, and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the energy and abilities of Alexander, had not

Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 52.
 Curtius, viii. 2, 13—" decem diebus ad confirmandum pudorem apud Maracanda consunptis," &c.

³ Curtius, viii. 2, 20—30.
4 Arrian, iv. 17, 11. Curtius (viii.
3) gives a different narrative of the death of Spitamenês.

the occupants altogether neglected their guard and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives taken by Alexander on this rock were the wife and family of the Baktrian chief Oxyartês, one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her his wife.1 He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighbouring territory, Parætakênê, where there was another inexpugnable site called the Rock of Choriênes, which he was also fortunate enough to reduce.2

B.C. 328— 327. Winter, spring.

Capture of two inexpugnable positionsthe Sogdian Rock—the Rock of Choriênes. Passion of Alexander for Roxana.

From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Kraterus with a division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætakênê, he himself remained at Baktra preparing for his expedition across the Hindoo-Koosh to the con-

quest of India. As a security for the tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied 30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.3

It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with the captive Roxana. Amidst the repose and festivities B.C. 327. connected with that event the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be satisfied without obtaining prostration or worship from Greeks and Macedonians as well as from Persians, a public and unanimous recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks and Macedonians had

Spring.

Alexander at Baktramarriage with Rox. ana. His demand for prostration or worship from all.

already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless, to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on such a subject, but a manœuvre was concerted with his privity by the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

¹ Arrian, iv. 18, 19. these localities, or to fol 2 Arrian, iv. 21. Our geographical knowledge does not enable us to verify 3 Curtius, viii. 5, 1; A

these localities, or to follow Alexander 3 Curtius, viii. 5, 1; Arrian, iv. 22, 2.

During a banquet at Baktra the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing the assembly in a prepared harangue, Public harangue of extolled Alexander's exploits as greatly surpassing Anaxarchus those of Dionysus and Hêraklês. He proclaimed that during a Alexander had already done more than enough to banquet exhorting establish a title to divine honours from the Maceevery one to render this donians, who (he said) would assuredly worship worship. Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to

worship him during his life forthwith.1

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced by others favourable to the plan, who proceeded to set the example of immediate compliance and were themselves the first to tender worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at the speech. But though disgusted they said nothing. To reply to a speech doubtless well-turned and flowing required some powers of oratory; moreover it was well known that whoever dared to reply stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banqueting hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The repugnance which many felt but none ventured to express at length found an organ in Kallisthenës of Olynthus.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenês had accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned towards the composition of history, and to

the history of recent times.² Alexander, full of ardour for conquest, was at the same time anxious that his achievements should

² Kallisthenes had composed three 6-9.

historical works—1. Hellenica, from the year 387—337 B.C. 2. History of the Sacred War, from 357—346 B.C. 3. $\tau \grave{\alpha} \kappa \alpha \tau' \Lambda \lambda \acute{\epsilon} \xi \alpha \nu \delta \rho \nu$. His style is said by Cicero to have been rhetorical; but the Alexandrine critics included him in their Canon of Historians. See Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. pp. 6—9.

I Arrian, iv. 10, 7—9. Curtius (viii. 5, 9—13) represents the speech proposing divine honours to have been delivered, not by Anaxarchus, but by another lettered Greek, a Sicilian named Kleôn. The tenor of the speech is substantially the same as given by both authors.

be commemorated by poets and men of letters; there were seasons also when he enjoyed their conversation. On both these grounds he invited several of them to accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but Kallisthenes obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like favour for Stageira.2 Kallisthenês had composed a narrative (not preserved) of Alexander's exploits, which certainly reached to the battle of Arbêla. and may perhaps have gone down further. The few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme admiration not merely of the bravery and ability but also of the transcendent and unbroken good fortune of Alexander, marking him out as the chosen favourite of the gods. This feeling was perfectly natural under the grandeur of the events. In so far as we can judge from one or two specimens, Kallisthenes was full of complimentary tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander himself had undergone a material change during the six years between his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for the actual manifestations of worship as towards a god.

To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious consequence; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these Greeks-Anaxarchus, Kleôn, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the pitch required. Kallisthenes could not do so. He was a man of sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful. Aristotle said of him that he was a

¹ See the observation ascribed to the invitation of Alexander (Pluhim, expressing envy towards Achillês tarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, for having been immortalized by Homer (Arrian, i. 12, 2).

2 It is said that Ephorus, Xenokratês, and Menedemus all declined invited.

great and powerful speaker, but that he had no judgment; according to other reports, he was a vain and arrogant man, who boasted that Alexander's reputation and immortality were dependent on the composition and tone of his history. Of personal vanity—a common quality among literary Greeks— Kallisthenês probably had his full share. But there is no ground for believing that his character had altered. Whatever his vanity may have been, it had given no offence to Alexander during the earlier years; nor would it have given offence now, had not Alexander himself become a different man.

On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the

The reply of Kallisthenês is guests-the proposition for worship is dropped.

banquet, Kallisthenês had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephæstion afterwards favourably heardhythe alleged that he had promised to comply.² But his actual conduct affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise; for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship, but

also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like himself. He contended that the distinction between gods and men was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong. Alexander had amply earned—as a man, a general, and a king-the highest honours compatible with humanity: but to exalt him into a god would be both an injury to

¹ Arrian, iv. 10, 2; Plutarch, Alex. 53, 54. It is remarkable that Timeus denounced Kallisthenes as having in his historical work flattered Alexander nis instorical work nattered Alexander to excess (Polybius, xii, 12). Kallisthenês seems to have recognized various special interpositions of the gods, to aid Alexander's successes—see Fragments 25 and 26 of the Fragmenta Callisthenis in the edition of Didot.

In reading the censure which Arrian In reading the censure which Arrian passes on the arrogant pretensions of Kallisthenes, we ought at the same time to read the pretensions raised by Arrian on his own hehalf as an historian (i. 12, 7—9)—καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐχ ἀπαξιῶ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν πρώτων ἐν τῆ ψωνῆ τῆ Ἑλλάδι, εἴπερ καὶ ᾿λλέξαν-δρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ଝc. I douht much whether Kallisthenes pitched his self-estimation so high. In this chapter Arrian recounts that

Alexander envied Achillês for having heen fortunate enough to obtain such a poet as Homer for pauegyrist, and Arrian laments that Alexander had not Arrian laments that Alexander had not as yet found an historian equal to his deserts. This, in point of fact, is a reassertion of the same truth which Kallisthenes stands condemned for asserting—that the fame even of the greatest warrior depends upon his commentators. The boastfulness of a poet is at least pardonable when he exclaims, like Theokritus, Idyll. xvi. 73—

*Εσσεται ούτος ἀνὴρ, δς έμεῦ κεχρήσετ'

ἀοιδοῦ, 'Péξας ἢ 'Αχιλεὺς ὅσσον μέγας, ἢ βαρὺς Aias

Έν πεδίω Σιμόεντος, ὅθι Φρυγὸς ἡρίον Τλου.

² Plutarch, Alex. 55.

him and an offence to the gods. Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to Alexander's society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive and wholesome counsel.

Kallisthenês here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt. The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the Macedonians present, especially the older officers, that Alexander thought it prudent to forbid all further discussion upon this delicate subject. Presently the Persians present. according to Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the pledge, approached the king, made his prostration, and then received a salute. Alexander sent the pledge to Kallisthenes, who, after drinking like the rest, approached him, for the purpose of receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which he declined to admit Kallisthenes to a salute. The latter retired, observing, "Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the salute goes".2

Kallisthenês was imprudent, and even blameable, in making this last observation, which, without any necessity or advantage, aggravated the offence already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent still, if we look and courage of Kallisthenês. Publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering divine honours to that prince, and in thus creating the main offence, which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an order given by Alexander—for no order had been given—but about accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander, by a shabby preconcerted manœuvre, affected to leave to the free decision of the assembly,

¹ Arrian, iv. 11. ἐπὶ σοφία τε καὶ 2 Arrian, iv. 12, 7. φιλήματι ἕλαττον παιδεύσει ἀλλεξάνδρφ συνόντα. ἔχων ἄπειμι. 10—11

in full confidence that no one would be found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could do himself nothing but honour by entering public protest against it; more especially since this was done (as we may see by the report in Arrian) in terms noway insulting, but full of respectful admiration towards Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone; 1 for the Macedonian officers would feel indifference, if not contempt, towards a rhetor like Kallisthenes, while towards Alexander they had the greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenês.² Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and strongly blames the motion of Anaxarchus: nevertheless such is his anxiety to find some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames Kallisthenês for unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in offering opposition. He might have said with some truth that Kallisthenês would have done well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without offence) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment, and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as Kallisthenes was, in the hall at Baktra when the proposition of Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent, his protest against it was both seasonable and dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

¹ Arrian, iv. 12, 1. ἀνιᾶσαι μὲν μεγα- aspirations were followed by the Neλωστὶ ᾿Αλέξανδρον, Μακεδόσι δὲ πρὸς mesis of the gods. In the dying speech θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν.

Curtius, viii. 5, 20. "Æquis auribus Callisthenes velut vindex publicæ libertatis audiebatur. Expresserat non assensionem modo, sed etiam vocem, seniorum præcipue, quibus gravis erat inveterati moris externa

mutatio."

2 There was no sentiment more deeply rooted in the free Grecian mind, prior to Alexander's conquests, than the repugnance to arrogant aspirations on the part of the fortunate man, swelling himself above the limits of humanity, and the belief that such

aspirations were followed by the Nemesis of the gods. In the dying speech which Xenophôn puts into the mouth of Cyrus the Great, we find—"Ye gods, I thank you much that I have been sensible of your care for me, and that I have never in my successes raised my thoughts above the measure of man" (Cyropæd. viii. 7, 3). Among the most striking illustrations of this sentiment is the story of Solôn and Cræsus (Herodot. i. 32—34).

I shall recount in the next chapter examples of monstrous flattery on the part of the Athenians, proving how this sentiment expired with their freedom.

Kallisthenês knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to recognize it in the altered demeanour of Alexander towards him. He was, from that day, a marked man thenês becomes in two senses: first, to Alexander himself, as well as odious to to the rival sophists and all promoters of the intended Alexander. deification,—for hatred, and for getting up some accusatory pretence such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the more freespirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander's increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had protested against the motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was doubtless much extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they were sure to be reported to Alexander. The

pretext for his ruin was not long wanting. Among those who admired and sought the conversation of

Kallisthenês was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages, —the band, selected from noble Macedonian families. who did duty about the person of the king. It had happened that this young man, one of Alexander's companions in the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king, darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged before all the other pages, and deprived him of his horse. Thus humiliated and outraged—for an act

Conspiracy of the royal pages against Alexander's life—it is divulgedthey are put to torture, but implicate no one else: they are put

not merely innocent, but the omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely bent on revenge.2 He enlisted in the project his intimate friend Sostratus, with several others among the pages; and it was agreed among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without any divulgation of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow one of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the scheme to his friend Chariklês, with the names of those concerned.

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 54. He refers attendant on Kallisthenês. to Hermippus, who mentions what was told to Aristotle by Streebus, the reader 7. ² Arrian, iv. 13; Curtius, viii.

Eurylochus, brother to Chariklês, apprised by him of what he had heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to Alexander. By Alexander's order, the persons indicated were arrested and put to the torture; 1 under which they confessed that they had themselves conspired to kill him. but named no other accomplices, and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this denial they persisted. though extreme suffering was applied to extort the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious; denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander as having become insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to death forthwith by the soldiers.2

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian

Kallisthenês is arrested as an accomplice-antipathy manifested by Alexander against him, and against Aristotle also.

families, for whose condemnation accordingly Alexander had thought it necessary to invoke-what he was sure of obtaining against any one—the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against Kallisthenês-not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such formality was required.3 As yet, there was not a shadow of proof to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known

to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude, declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by pronouncing it. Their confessions—all extorted by suffering, unless confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any was taken—were hardly of the least value. even against themselves; but against Kallisthenês they had no bearing whatever; nay, they tended indirectly, not to convict,

¹ Arrian, iv. 13, 13.
² Arrian, iv. 14, 4. Curtius expands this scene into great detail; composing a long speech for Hermolaus, and another for Aloxander (viii. 6, 7, 8).

He says that the soldiers who executed these press technical them.

cuted these pages tortured them first, in order to manifest zeal for Alexander

⁽viii, 8, 20).

3 "Quem, si Macedo esset (Callisthenem), tecum introduxissem, dignissimum te discipulo magistrum; nunc Olynthio non idem juris est" (Curtius, viii. 8, 19—speech of Alexander before the soldiers, addressing Hermolaus especially).

but to absolve him. In his case, therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and conversations. He was alleged 1 to have addressed dangerous and inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium, instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as grounds of action against one whom he hated.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander's mind disclosed by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by Plutarch. Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterwards, Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in another letter addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these expressions—"The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him out here, and those who harbour in their cities conspirators against me".2 The sophist Kallisthenês had been sent out by Aristotle, who is here designated; and probably the Athenians after him. Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenes: hatred towards that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenes not only cherished, in

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 55; Arrian, αντικρυς έν γε τούτοις αποκαλυπτόμενος

common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshipping a mortal.

Kallisthenês was first put to the torture and then hanged.1 His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of thenes is sympathy and indignation among the philosophers of tortured and hanged. antiquity.2

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions; his marches, to the unconquered natives whom B.C. 327. he chose to treat as enemies. On the return of Summer. Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his march Alexander reduces the from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain country between the range Paropamisus or Caucasus (Hindoo Koosh); Hindooleaving however at Baktra Amyntas with a large Koosh and the Indus. force of 10,000 foot and 3500 horse, to keep these intractable territories in subjugation.3 His march over the mountains occupied ten days; he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria in the Paropamisadæ. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river), he was joined by Taxilês, a powerful Indian prince, who brought as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under Hephæstion and Perdikkas, towards the territory called Peukelaôtis (apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kabool river with the Indus), and conducting the remainder himself in an easterly direction, over the mountainous regions between the Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephæstion was ordered,

¹ Arrian, iv. 15, 5. Curtius also says —"Callisthenês quoque tortus interiit,

—"Callisthenes quoque tortus interift, initi consilii in caput regis innoxius, sed haudquaquam anlæ et assentantium accommodatus ingenio" (viii. 8, 21). Compare Plutarch, Alex. 55.

This is the statement of Ptolemy, who was himself concerned in the transactions, and was the officer through whom the conspiracy of the pages had been revealed. His partiality might permit him to omit or soften what was discreditable to Alexander, but he may be fully trusted when he records an act of cruelty. Aristobulus and others affirmed that Aristobulus and others affirmed that Kallisthenes was put in chains and carried about in this condition for

some time; after which he died of disease and a wretched state of body. But the witnesses here are persons whose means of information we do not

whose means of information we do not know to be so good as those of Ptolemy; besides that the statement is intrinsically less probable.

² See the language of Seneca, Nat. Quæst. vi. 23; Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine, p. 65; Theophrast. ap. Ciceron. Tusc. Disp. iii. 10. Curtius says that this treatment of Kallisthenês was followed by a late repentance on the part of Alexander (viii. 8, 23). On this point there is no other evidence, nor can I think the statement probable.

³ Arrian, iv. 22, 4.

3 Arrian, iv. 22, 4.

after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes, prince of Peukelaôtis, was taken and slain in the city where he had shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephæstion a siege of thirty days.1

Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction of the Aspasii, the Guræi, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying mountainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns mentioned-Arigeon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dyrta, &c., except perhaps the remarkable rock of Aornos,2 near the Indus-

1 Arrian, iv. 22, 8—12.
2 Respecting the rock called Aornos, a valuable and elaborate article, entitled "Gradus ad Aornon," has been published by Major Abbot in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. iv. 1854. This article gives much information, collected mainly by inquiries on the spot, and accompanied by a map, about the very little known country west of the Indus, between the Kabool river on the south and the Hindoo-Koosh on the north.

Hindoo-Koosh on the north. Major Abbot attempts to follow the march and operations of Alexander, from Alexandria ad Caucasum to the rock of Aornos (p. 311 seq.). He shows highly probable reason for believing that the Aornos described by Amiron is highly probable reason for believing that the Aornos described by Arrian is the Mount Mahabnun, near the right bank of the Indus (lat. 34° 20'), about sixty miles above its confluence with the Kabool river. "The whole account of Arrian of the rock Aornos is a faithful picture of the Mahabuun. It was the most remarkable feature of the country. It was the refuge of all the neighbouring tribes. It was covered with forest. It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and nure with forest. It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and pure springs of water everywhere abounded. It was 4125 feet above the plain and fourteen miles in circuit. The summit was a plain where cavalry could act. It would be difficult to offer a more faithful description of the Mahabunn. The side on which Alexander scaled the main summit had certainly the character of a rock. But the whole description of Arrian indicates a table mountain" (p. 341). The Mahabunn "is a mountain table, scarped on the east by tremendous precipices, from which descends one large spur down upon the Indus between Sitana and

Umb" (p. 340).
To this similarity in so many local features is to be added the remarkable coincidence of name, between the town Embolina, where Arrian states that Alexander established his camp for Alexander established his camp for the purpose of attacking Aornos, and the modern names Umb and Balimah (between the Mahabunn and the Indus), "the one in the river valley, the other on the mountain immediately above it" (p. 344). Mount Mahabunn is the natural refuge for the people of the neighbourhood from a conqueror, and was among the places taken by Nadir Shah (p. 338).

A strong case of identity is thus made out between this mountain and the Aornos described by Arrian. But

made out between this mountain and the Aornos described by Arrian. But undoubtedly it does not coincide with the Aornos described by Curtius, who compares Aornos to a Meta (the conical goal of the stadium), and says that the Indus washed its base—that at the first assault several Macedonian caldiars more builds. the first assault several Macedonian soldiers were hurled down into the river. This close juxtaposition of the Indus has been the principal feature looked for by travellers who have sought for Aornos; but no place has yet been found answering the conditions required. We have here to make our election between Arrian and Curtius. Now there is a general presumption in Arrian's favour, in the description of military operations, where he makes a positive statement; but in this case the presumption is peculiarly strong, because Ptolemy was in the most conspicuous and difficult command for the capture of Aornos, and was therefore likely to be particular in the description of a scene where he had reaped much glory. can be more exactly identified. These tribes were generally brave, and seconded by towns of strong position as в.с. 327 well as by a rugged country, in many parts utterly without roads. But their defence was conducted Conquest of tribes on the right with little union, no military skill, and miserable weapons; so that they were noway qualified to oppose bank of the Indus-the the excellent combination and rapid movements of rock of Alexander, together with the confident attack and very Aornos.

superior arms, offensive as well as defensive, of his soldiers. All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked, overpowered, and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the mountains, were pursued and either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes, all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having been assailed in vain by Hêraklês; and indeed he himself had deemed it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the stream to the point where Hephæstion and Perdikkas were preparing the bridge.²

Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amidst all the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days, to refresh the soldiers before he crossed the Indus, in the early spring of 326 B.C.3 It is presumed, probably enough, that he

¹ Arrian, iv. 30, 13. ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ ἐ κόδοποιεῖτο πρόσω ἰοῦσα, ἄπορα ἄλλως ἱ οῦτα τὰ ταὐτη χωρία, ἀc.

The countries here traversed by Alexander include parts of Kafiristan, Swart, Bajore, Chitral, the neighbourhood of the Kameh, and other affluents of the river Kabool before it falls into he Indus near Attock. Most of this is Terra Incognita even at present; especially Kafiristan, a territory inhabited by a population said to be rude and barbarous, but which has never been conquered, nor indeed ever visited by strangers. It is remarkable, that among the inhabitants of Kafiristan, as well as among those of Badak-

shan, on the other or northern side of the Hindoo-Koosh, there exist tradi-tions respecting Alexander, together with a sort of belief that they themselves are descended from his soldiers. See Ritter's Erdkunde, part vii. book iii. p. 200 seq.; Burnes's Travels, vol. iii. ch. 4, p. 186, 2nd ed.; Wilson's Ariana Antiqua, p. 194

seq.

2 Arrian, iv. 30, 16; v. 7, 2.

3 The halt of thirty days is mentioned by Diodôrus, xvii. 86. For the proof that these operations took place in winter, see the valuable citation from Aristobulus given in Strabo (xv. p.

crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He first marched to Taxila, where the Prince Taxiles at once submitted, and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian soldiers. His alliance and information were found extremely valuable. The whole crosses the neighbouring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippus as satrap, with a garrison and depôt at passage of the Hydas-Taxila. He experienced no resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute the treatment passage—a brave man, with a formidable force, better

B.C. 326. Spring.

Alexander Indus-forces the pes, defeat-ing Porus generous

armed than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants, which animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By a series of admirable military combinations, Alexander eluded the vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite of their elephants, which were skilfully managed, the Indians could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry, rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last. Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing with thirst, he was only preserved by the special directions of Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing.1 Addressing him first, he asked what Porus wished to be done for him. "That you should treat me as a king," was the reply of Porus. Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved towards Porus with the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions.

1 Arrian, v. 19, 1. 'Αλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς προσάγοντα ἐπύθετο, προσιππεύσας πρὸ τῆς τάξεως σὺν ὁλίγοις τῶν ἐταίρων ἀπαντῷ τῷ Πώρω, καὶ ἐπιστήσας τὸν ἱπον, τό τε μέγεθος ἐθαύμαζεν ὑπὲρ πέντε πήχεις μάλιστα ξυμβαίνον, καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεδουλωμένος τῷ γνώμη ἐφαίνετο, ἀς.

We see here how Alexander was struck with the stature and personal beauty of Porus, and how much these visual impressions contributed to de-

He found in Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of Alexander's life; if we take together the splendour and difficulty of the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered opponent.1

Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the gods and festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes, where he also gave directions for the foundation of two cities—Nikæa, on the eastern bank, and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of his favourite horse, who died here of age and fatigue.² Leaving Kraterus to lay out and erect these new establishments

¹ These operations are described in Arrian, v. 9; v. 19 (we may remark that Ptolemy and Aristobulus, though both present, differed on many points, v. 14); Curtius, viii. 13, 14; Diodor. xvii. 87, 88. According to Plutarch (Alex. 60), Alexander dwelt much upon the battle in his own letters letters.

There are two principal points, Jelum and Julalpoor, where high roads from the Indus now cross the Hydaspes. Each of these points has been assigned by different writers as the probable scene of the crossing the river by Alexander. Of the two, Jelum (rather higher up the river than Julalpoor) seems the more probable. Burnes points out that near Jelum the river is divided into five or six channels with islands (Travels, vol. ii. ch. 2, p. 50, 2nd ed.). Captain Abbot (in the Journal of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Dec., 1848) has given an interesting memoir on the features and course of the Hydaspes a little above Jelum, comparing them with the particulars stated by Arrian, and showing highly plausible reasons in support of this hypothesis, that the crossing took place near Jelum. near Jelum.

Diodôrus mentions a halt of thirty days after the victory (xvii. 89), which seems not probable. Both he and Curtius allude to numerous serpents,

Curtius allude to numerous serpents, by which the army was annoyed between the Akesinês and the Hydraotês (Curtius, ix. 1, 11).

2 Arrian states (v. 19, 5) that the victory over Porus was gained in the month Munychion of the archon Hegemon at Athens—that is, about the end of April, 326 B.C. This date is not to be reconciled with another passage (v. 9, 6), where he says that the summer solstice had already passed, and that

all the rivers of the Punjab were full of water turbid and violent. This all the rivers of the Punjab were full of water, turbid and violent. This swelling of the rivers begins about June; they do not attain their full height until August. Moreover, the description of the battle, as given both by Arrian and by Curtius, implies that it took place after the rainy season had begun (Arrian, v. 9, 7; v. 12, 5. Curtius viii 14 4)

tius, viii. 14, 4).

Some critics have proposed to read Metageitnion (July—August) as the month, instead of Munychion—an alteration approved by Mr. Clinton and received into the text by Schmieder. But if this alteration be admitted, the name of the Athenian archon must be altered also; for Metageitnion of the archon Hegemon would be eightmonths earlier (July—August, 327 B.C.); and at this date Alexander had not as yet crossed the Indus, as the passage of Aristobulus (ap. Strab. xv. p. 691) plainly shows, and as Droysen and Mützell remark. Alexander did not cross the Indus before the spring of 326 B.C. If, in place of the archon Hegemon, we substitute the next following archon Chremes (and it is remarkable that Diodòrus assigns the battle to this later archonship, xvii. 87), this would be July—August, 326 B.C., which would be a more admissible date for the battle than the preceding month of Munychion. At the same time, the substitution of Metageitnion is mere conjecture, and seems to leave name of the Athenian archon must be is mere conjecture, and seems to leave hardly time enough for the subsequent events. As far as an opinion can be formed, it would seem that the battle was fought about the end of June or beginning of July, 326 B.C., after the rainy season had commenced, towards the close of the archonship of Hege-mon and the beginning of that of Chremes.

as well as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an easterly direction towards the river B.C. 326. Akesinês (Chenab). His recent victory had spread April-May. terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful Indian tribe, His further conquests with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages, in the submitted and were placed under the dominion of Punjab. Sangala, Porus, while embassies of submission were also the last of received from two considerable princes—Abisarês, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his namesake. The passage of the great river Akesinês, now full and impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he proceeded onward in the same direction across the Punjab-finding no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydraotês or Ravee, which, though not less broad and full than the Akesinês, was comparatively tranquil so as to be crossed with facility.2 Here some free Indian tribes, Kathæans and others, had the courage to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of waggons. These being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which they now began to despair of defending and resolved to evacuate by night, but the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters and frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day he took the town by storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than 100 killed and 1200 wounded. Two neighbouring towns, in alliance with Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified

Indians.3

Alexander's march in that territory cannot be expected to remain, especially in ground near rivers.

2 Arrian, v. 20.

3 Arrian, v. 23, 24; Curtius, ix. 1

Alexander pursued but could not overtake them,

except 500 sick or weakly persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of Sangala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then present with a contingent of 5000

¹ Arrian, v. 20; Diodôr. xvii. 95. Lieut. Wood (Journey to the Source of the Oxus, pp. 11—39) remarks that the large rivers of the Punjab change their course so often and so considerably, that monuments and indications of

B.C. 326. Summer.

He reaches the Hyphasis (Sutledge), the farthest of the Punjab. His army refuses to march farther.

Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander's conquests. Presently his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of the rivers in the Punjab, seemingly at a point below its confluence with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was informed that there lay a desert of eleven days' march extending to a still greater river called the Ganges, beyond which dwelt the Gandaridæ, the most powerful, warlike, and populous of all the Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their elephants. The prospect of a difficult march

and of an enemy esteemed invincible only instigated his ardour. He gave orders for the crossing. But here for the first time his army, officers as well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness, murmuring aloud at these endless toils and marches they knew not whither. They had already overpassed the limits where Dionysus and Hêraklês were said to have stopped; they were travelling into regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had no enjoyment; 2 the hardships of a perpetual onward march, often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses; moreover, their advance from the Hydaspes had been accomplished in the wet season under rains more violent and continued than they had ever before experienced.3 Informed of the reigning discontent, Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavouring to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had hitherto found not inadequate to his own.4 But he entirely

¹ Curtius, ix. 2, 3; Diodôr. xvii. 93;

Plutarch, Alex. 62.

2 Curtius, ix. 3, 11 (speech of Kænus).

"Quoto cuique lorica est? Quis equum habet? Jube quæri, quam multos servi ipsorum persecuti sint, quid cuique supersit ex præda. Omnium victores, omnium inopes sumus.")

³ Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. pp. 691 -697. ὕεσθαι συνεχῶς. Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodôr. xvii. 93. χειμῶνες ἄγριοι κατερράγησαν ἐψ΄ ἡμέρας ἐβδομήκοντα, καὶ βρονταὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ κεραυνοὶ κατέσκη πτον, &c.
In the speech which Arrian (v. 25,

²⁶⁾ puts into the mouth of Alexander the most curious point is the geographical views which he promulgates. "We have not much farther now to march have not much farther now to march (he was standing on the western bank of the Sutledge) to the river Ganges, and the great Eastern Sea which surrounds the whole earth. The Hyrkanian (Caspian) Sea joins on to this great sea on one side, the Persian Gulf on the other; after we have subdued all those nations which lie before us eastward towards the Great Sea, and northward towards the Hyrkanian Sea, we shall then sail by water first to the we shall then sail by water first to the

failed. No one, indeed, dared openly to contradict him. Konus alone hazarded some words of timid dissuasion: the rest manifested a passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those who desired might return, with the shame of having deserted their king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a suspense of two days, passed in solitary and silent mortification, he still apparently persisted in his determination and offered the sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the gods and gave orders for return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army.1

To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress he erected twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimensions on the western bank of the Hyphasis, offering sacrifices of thanks to the gods with the usual festitie Hydaspes. vities and matches of agility and force. Then, having

committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the government of Porus, he marched back, repassed the Hydraotês and Akesines, and returned to the Hydaspes near the point where he had first crossed it. The two new cities, Bukephalia and Nikæa, which he had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much from the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis, and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage.2 The heavy rains continued throughout most of his return march to the Hydaspes.3

On coming back to this river Alexander received a large reinforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe, together with 25,000 new panoplies and a considerable stock of

Persian Gulf, next round Libya to the pillars of Hêraklês; from thence we shall march back all through Libya, and add it to all Asia as parts of our empire." (I here abridge rather than translate.)

translate.)
It is remarkable that while Alexander made so prodigious an error in narrowing the eastern limits of Asia, the Ptolemaic geography, recognized in the time of Columbus, made an error not less in the opposite direction, stretching it too far to the east. It was upon the faith of this last mistake that Columbus projected his voyage of circumnavigation from

Western Europe, expecting to come to the eastern coast of Asia from the west after no great length of

voyage.

1 Arrian, v. 28, 7. The fact that Alexander, under all this insuperable repugnance of his soldiers, still offered the sacrifice preliminary to crossing is curious as an illustration of his charac-ter, and was specially attested by Pto-

lemy.

² Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodôr. xvii. 95.

³ Aristobulus, ap. Strab. xv. p. 691—
until the rising of Arkturus. Diodôrus
says 70 days (xvii. 93), which seems
more probable.

B.C. 326. Antumn.

He constructs a fleet and sails down the Hydaspes and the Indus. Dangerous wound of Alexander in attacking the Malli.

medicines. Had these reinforcements reached him on the Hyphasis it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to accompany him in his farther advance to the Ganges and the regions beyond. now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxiles, in collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydaspes and thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November, a fleet of nearly 2000 boats or vessels of various sizes having been prepared, he began his voyage.2 Kraterus marched with one division of the army along the right bank of the Hydaspes, Hephæstion on the leftbank with

the remainder, including 200 elephants; Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of which was Alexander He pursued his voyage slowly down the river to the himself. confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesines, with the Hydraotês, and with the Hyphasis, all pouring in one united stream into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with Altogether this voyage occupied nine the Indian Ocean. months,3 from November, 326 B.C., to August, 325 B.C. But it was a voyage full of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander perpetually disembarked to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were the Malli and Oxydrakæ, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend their liberty but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually at variance and could not now accomplish any hearty co-operation against the common invader.4 Alexander first assailed the Malli with his usual celerity and vigour, beat them with slaughter in the field, and took several of their towns.⁵ There remained only their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already

Diodôr. xvii. 95; Curtius, ix. 3, 21.
 The voyage was commenced a few days before the setting of the Pleiades

⁽Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692).

For the number of the ships, see Ptolemy ap. Arrian. vi. 2, 8.

On seeing crocodiles in the Indus, Alexander was at first led to suppose that it was the same river as the Nile, and that he had discovered the higher course of the Nile, from whence it flowed into Egypt. This is curious, as

an illustration of the geographical knowledge of the time (Arrian, vi. 1, 3).

³ Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692. Aristobulus said that the downward voyage occupied ten months; this seems longer than the exact reality. Moreover, Aristobulus said that they had no rain during all the voyage down, through all the summer months; Near-

chus stated the contrary (Strabo, 7.c.).

4 Curtius, ix. 4, 15; Diodôr. xvii. 98.

5 Arrian, vi. 7, 8.

driven out and forced to retire to the citadel. Thither they were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander himself being among the foremost with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted upon a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestês and one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel and made head for some time nearly alone against all within. received, however, a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was on the point of fainting when his soldiers burst in, rescued him, and took the place. Every person within-man, woman, and child—was slain.2

The wound of Alexander was so severe that he was at first reported to be dead, to the great consternation and distress of the army. However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself and to receive and posts their ardent congratulations in the camp established to be established on at the point of junction between the Hydraotês (Ravee) the Indusand Akesinês (Chenab). His voyage down the river, reaches the though delayed by the care of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted with the same active operations by his land force on both sides to subjugate all

B.C. 325.

New cities Alexander oceaneffect of the first sight of tides.

the Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction of the river Akesinês (Punjnud) with the Indus, Alexander directed the foundation of a new city with adequate docks and conveniences for shipbuilding, whereby he expected to command the internal navigation.4 Having no further occasion now for so large a land force, he sent a large portion of it, under Kraterus, westward (seemingly through the pass now called Bolan) into Karmania.⁵ He established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the Delta of the Indus divided, and

¹ This last stronghold of the Malli is supposed by Mr. Cunningham and others to have been the modern city of Multan. The river Ravee or Hydraotês is said to have formerly run past the city of Multan into the Chenab or Akesinês.

² Arrian, vi. 9, 10, 11. He notices

the great discrepancy in the various accounts given of this achievement and dangerous wound of Alexander. Compare Diodôr. xvii. 98, 99; Curtius, ix. 4, 5; Plutarch, Alex. 63.

3 Arrian, xi. 13.

4 Arrian, xi. 15, 5.

5 Arrian, xi. 17, 6; Strabo, xv. p. 721.

he then sailed with a portion of his fleet down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the Indian Ocean. of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much astonishment and alarm.1

The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus from the mouth of the Indus round by the в.с. 325. Persian Gulf to that of the Tigris, a memorable nautical March of enterprise in Grecian antiquity. Alexander him-Alexander self (about the month of August) began his march by by land westward through the land westward through the territories of the Arabitæ desert of and the Oritæ, and afterwards through the deserts of Gedrôsia-Gedrôsia. Pura, the principal town of the Gedrosians, sufferings

in the Oritæ.2 army.

and losses

Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy, underwent the most severe and deplorable sufferings, their march being through a sandy and trackless desert with short supplies of food and still shorter supplies of water under a burning sun. The loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle, from thirst, fatigue, and disease, was prodigious, and it required all the unconquerable energy of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number.3 At Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his late command, was put to death or imprisoned; several of his comrades were executed. To recompense the soldiers for

was sixty days' march from the boundary of the

¹ Arrian, xi. 18, 19; Curtius, ix. 9. He reached Pattala towards the middle

He reached Pattala towards the middle or end of July, περὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν (Strabo, xv. p. 692).

The site of Pattala has been usually looked for near the modern Tatta. But Dr. Kennedy, in his recent Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Kabool (ch. v. p. 104), shows some reasons for thinking that it must have been considerably higher up the river than Tatta, somewhere near Sehwan. "The Delta commencing about 130 miles above the sea higher up the river than Tatta, somewhere near Sehwan. "The Delta commencing about 130 miles above the sea, its northern apex would be somewhere to the Oxus, p. 12.

2 Arrian, vi. 24, 2; Strabo, xv. p. 723.

3 Arrian, vi. 25, 26; Curtius, ix. 10; Plutarch, Alex. 66.

midway between Hyderabad Sehwan; where local traditions still speak of ancient cities destroyed, and of greater changes having occurred than in any other part of the course of the Indus.

The constant changes in the course of the Indus, however (compare p. 73 of his work), noticed by all observers, render every attempt at such identification conjectural-see Wood's Journey

their recent distress in Gedrôsia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken bacchanalian procession through Karmania. himself and all his friends taking part in the revelry, an imitation of the jovial festivity and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the conquest of India.1

During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing his admiral Nearchus,2 who had brought the B.C. 325fleet round from the mouth of the Indus to the Winter. harbour called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far from the Alexander entrance of the Persian Gulf-a voyage of much hardand the army come back to ship and distress, along the barren coasts of the Oritæ, the Gedrosians, and the Ichthyophagi.3 Nearchus, Persis. Conduct of highly commended and honoured, was presently sent Alexander back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth of the lis. Punish-Euphratês; while Hephæstion also was directed to ment of the satrap conduct the larger portion of the army, with the ele-Orsines. phants and heavy baggage, by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persis. This road, though circuitous, was the most convenient, as it was now the winter season; 4 but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadæ and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged. He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian

1 Curtius, ix. 10; Diodôr. xvii. 106; Plutarch, Alex. 67. Arrian (vi. 28) found this festal progress mentioned in some authorities, but not in others. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus mentioned it. Accordingly Arrian refuses to believe it. There may have been exaggeration or falsities as to the details of the march; but as a general fact, I see no sufficient ground for disbelieving it. A season of excessive licence to the soldiers, after their extreme suffering in Gedrôsia, was by no means unnatural to grant. Moreover, it corresponds to the general conception of the returning march of Dionysus in antiquity, while the imitation of that god was quite in conformity with Alexander's turn of sentiment.

I have already remarked that the silence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus is

too strongly insisted on, both by Arrian and by others, as a reason for dis-believing affirmations respecting Alexander.

Arrian and Curtius (x. 1) differ in their statements about the treatment their statements about the treatment of Kleander. According to Arrian he was put to death; according to Curtius he was spared from death, and simply put in prison, in consequence of the important service which he had rendered by killing Parmenio with his own hand—while 600 of his accomplices

own nand—while 600 of ms accomplices and agents were put to death.

² Nearchus had begun his voyage about the end of September, or beginning of October (Arrian, Indic. 21; Strabo, xv. p. 721).

³ Arrian, vi. 28, 7; Arrian, Indica,

⁴ Arrian, vi. 28, 12-29

guardians of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain. Orsinês, satrap of Persis, was however accused of connivance in the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation: according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested both good faith and devotion to Alexander; 2 in spite of which he became a victim of the hostility of the favourite eunuch Bagôas, who both poisoned the king's mind with calumnies of his own, and suborned other accusers with false testimony. Whatever may be the truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsinês to be hanged,3 naming as satrap Peukestês, whose favour was now high, partly as comrade and preserver of the king in his imminent danger at the citadel of the Malli, partly from his having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and language more completely than any other Macedonian.

It was about February, in 324 B.C., 4 that Alexander marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who, having completed his circumnavigation from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphratês, had sailed back with the fleet from the latter river and come up the Pasitigris.⁵ It is probable

for Nearchus was seemingly present at

¹ Plutarch, Alex. 69; Arrian, vi. 29, 17; Strabo, xv. p. 730.

² Arrian, v. 30, 2; Curtius, x. 1, 23—38. "Hic fuit exitus nobilissimi Per-2 Arrian, v. 30, 2; Curfius, x. 1, 22—38. "Hic fuit exitus nobilissimi Persarum, nec insontis modo, sed eximiæ quoque benignitatis iu regem." The great favour which the beautiful eunuch Bagôas (though Arrian does not mention him) enjoyed with Alexander, and the exalted position which he occupied, are attested by good contemporary evidence, especially the philosopher Dikæarchus—see Athenæ. xiii. p. 603; Dikæarch. Fragm. 19, ap. Hist. Græc. Fragm. Didot. vol. ii. p. 241. Compare the Fragments of Eumenês and Diodotus (Ælian, V. H. iii. 23) in Didot, Fragm. Scriptor. Hist. Alex. Magni, p. 121; Plutarch de Adul. et Amic. Discrim. p. 65.

3 Arrian, vi. 30; Curtius, x. 1, 22—30.

4 Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. B.C. 325, also Append. p. 232) places the arrival of Alexander in Susiana, on his return march, in the month of

his return march, in the month of February, B.C. 325,—a year too early, in my opinion. I have before remarked on the views of Mr. Clinton respecting the date of Alexander's victory over

Porus on the Hydaspes, where (following Schmieder's coujecture) he alters the name of the month as it stands in the text of Arrian, and supposes that battle to have occurred in August, B.C. the text of Arrian, and supposes that battle to have occurred in August, B.C. 327, instead of April, B.C. 326. Mr. Clinton antedates by one year all the proceedings of Alexander subsequent to his quitting Baktria for the last time in the summer of B.C. 327. Dr. Vincent's remark—that "the supposition of two winters occurring after Alexander's return to Susa is not borne out by the historians" (see Clinton, p. 232), is a perfectly just one; and Mitford has not replied to it in a satisfactory manner. In my judgment, there was only an interval of sixteen months (not an interval of sixteen months (not an interval of twenty-eight months, as Mr. Cliuton supposes) between the return of Alexander to Susa and his death at Babylon (Feb., 324 B.C., to June, 323 B.C.).

5 Arrian, vii. 5, 9; Arrian, Indica, c. 42. The voluntary death of Kalanus the Indian Gymnosophist must have taken place at Susa (where Diodôrus places it, xvii. 107), and not in Persis; for Nearchus was seemingly present at

that the division of Hephæstion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the whole army was there for the first time

brought together after the separation in Karmania.

In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it pleased him to go in quest of a new one; nor indeed could any new one be found, except at a prodigious He had emerged from the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital city from whence the great Achæmenid kings had been accustomed to govern the Western as well as the Eastern portions of their vast empire. To their post and to their irritable love of servility, Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such as none of them except the first founder Cyrus had manifested, and a splendid military genius such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to his suc-

B.C. 324. Early spring.

He marches to Susajunction with the fleet under Nearchus, after it had sailed round from the mouth of the Indus.

B.C. 324. Spring and sûmmer.

Alexander at Susa as Great King. Subjects of uneasiness to him-the satraps— the Macedonian soldiers.

In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of uneasiness were the satraps and the Macedonian Past consoldiers. During the long interval (more than five duct of the years) which had elapsed since he marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that he would never return—an anticipation noway unreasonable, since his own impulse towards forward march was so insatiate, that he was only con-Harpalus.

satrapsseveral of them are punished by Alexander -alarm among them allflight of

strained to return by the resolute opposition of his own soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his calamitous march through Gedrôsia, had given rise to reports of his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra in Macedonia. Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood accused of having pillaged rich temples and committed acts of violence towards individuals. Apart from all criminality, real or

the memorable scene of the funeral with Alexander in Persis. pile (Arrian, vii. 3, 9), and he was not 1 Plutarch, Alex. 68.

alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay bodies of mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the event of Alexander's decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in, to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the accused with indiscriminate rigour, and resenting especially the suspicion that they had calculated upon his death.1 Among those executed were Abulitês, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathrês: the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself with a sarissa,2 the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands an outburst of exasperated He also despatched peremptory orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary troops without delay.3 This measure produced considerable effect on the condition of Greece, about which I shall speak in a subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also more presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure and a small body of soldiers.4 Serious alarm was felt among all the

The satyric drama called 'Αγήν, represented before Alexander at a period subsequent to the flight of Harpalus, cannot have been represented (as Athenaeus states it to have been) on the banks of the Hydaspes, because Harpa-

lus did not make his escape until he was frightened by the approach of Alexander returning from India. At the Hydaspes, Alexander was still on his outward progress; very far off, and without any idea of returning. It appears to methat the words of Atheneus respecting this drawn is the street of pears to me that the words of Athenæns respecting this drama—ἐδίδαξε Διονυσίων ὀπον ἐπὶ τοῦ 'Υδάσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ (xiii. p. 595)—involve a mistake or misreading, and that it ought to stand ἐπὶ τοῦ X ο άσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ. I may remark that the words Medus Hydaspes in Virgil, Georg. iv. 211, probably involve the same confusion. The bably involve the same confusion. The Choaspes was the river near Susa; and this drama was performed before Alexander at Susa during the Dionysia of the year 324 B.C., after Harpalus had fled. The Dionysia were in the month Elaphebolion; now Alexander did not fight Porus ou the Hydaspes until the succeeding month, Munychion, at the earliest, and probably later. And even if we suppose (which is not probable) that he reached the Hydaspes in Elaphebolion, he would have no leisure to celebrate dramas and a

¹ Arrian, vii. 4, 2-5; Diodôr. xvii. 108; Curtius, x. 1, 7. "Coeperat esse præceps ad repræsentanda supplicia, item ad deteriora credenda" (Curtius, x. 1, 39).

2 Plutarch, Alex. 68.
3 Diodôr. xvii. 106-111.
4 Among the accusations which

³ Diodôr. xvii. 106—111.

4 Among the accusations which reached Alexander against this satrap, we are surprised to find a letter addressed to him (ἐν τῆ πρὸς Αλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῆ) by the Greek historian Theopompus, who set forth with indignation the extravagant gifts and honours heaped by Harpalus upon his two successive mistresses, Pythionikê and Glykera, celebrated Hetæræ from Athens. These proceedings Theopompus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap. Athenæ, xiii. pempus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap. Atheue, xiii. pp. 586—595; Fragment. 277, 278, ed. Didot.).

satraps and officers, innocent as well as guilty. That the most guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of Kleomenês in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though his iniquities were no secret.1

Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian costume with the and ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national intermar-Asiatic marriage at Susa. He had already married riages the captive Roxana in Baktria; he next took two by Alexadditional wives—Statira, danohter of Darius and ander.

Discontents of the Macedonian soldiers Asiatizing

Parysatis, daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly, to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them.² He made presents besides to all those Macedonians who gave in their names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities³ accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to favourites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers generally towards these Asiatizing marriages,4 Alexander issued proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet The soldiers suspected the few came to enter their names. proclamation as a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punish-

Dionysiac festival, while the army of Porus was waiting for him on the opposite bank. Moreover, it is no way probable that, on the remote Hydaspes, he had any actors or chorus, or means of celebrating dramas at all.

1 Arrian, vii. 18, 2; vii. 23, 9—13.

2 Arrian, vii. 4, 6—9. By these two marriages, Alexander thus engrafted himself upon the two lines of antecedent Persian kings. Ochus was of the

ment—a remarkable evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired, and how completely the sentiment entertained towards him was that of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their mistrust, and openly complained of it: at the same time proclaiming that paymasters and tables should be planted openly in the camp, and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to 10,000 talents-according to Arrian, to not less than 20,000 talents, or £4,600,000 sterling.1

Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted в.с. 323. Spring. soldiers could have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to come forward with ficti-Their discontent tious debts. A new mortification moreover was in with the new Asiatic store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from soldiers the various satrapies—even from those most distant, levied and disciplined by Alex-ander. Sogdiana, Baktria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, &c. contingents of young and fresh native troops, amount-

ing in total to 30,000 men, all armed and drilled in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India, Alexander saw that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary to disband the old soldiers, and to organize an army at once more fresh and more submissive. He accordingly despatched orders to the satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous native youths; and the fruit of these orders was now seen.2 Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with great satisfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians, both officers and soldiers, into the Companion-cavalry, the most honourable service in the army; making the important change of arming them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of Alexander for military

¹ Arrian, vii. 5; Plutarch, Alexand. taken some time to get together and 70; Curtius, x. 2, 9; Diodor. xvii. discipline these young troops; Alexander must therefore have sent the orders

² Diodôr, xvii. 108, It must have from India.

organization was so consummate, that he saw himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans-a change evident enough to them as well as to him.1

The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage

had excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on board his fleet in the Pasitigris (the Karun, the river on the east side of Susa), he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed up the Tithe coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris, and then

Alexander in the fleet, which sails gris to Opis.

sailed up the latter river as far as Opis. Hephæstion meanwhile. commanding the army, marched by land in concert with his voyage and came back to Opis, where Alexander disembarked.2

Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies to enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans. Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending home those who the Macewere unfit for service either from age or wounds but were unfit for service, either from age or wounds, but of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to mutiny place them in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Alexander Macedonian substitutes. On hearing this intimation, bands them all the long-standing discontent of the soldiers at once all.

Notice of partial diers-they

broke out. They felt themselves set aside, as worn out and useless,-and set aside, not to make room for younger men of their own country, but in favour of those Asiatics into whose arms their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he should dismiss them all-advising him by way of taunt to make his future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so incensed Alexander, that he leaped down from the elevated platform on which he had stood to speak. rushed with a few of his guards among the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be put to death. multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great exploits of, Philip, and of his own still greater: he affirmed that all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of the

common labours, hardships, wounds, and perils. Reproaching them as base descriters from a king who had gained for them all these unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to all—commanding them forthwith to depart.1

After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that exorbitant self-exaltation which formed the leading Remorse feature in his character-Alexander hurried away into the palace, where he remained shut up for two humiliation of the days without admitting any one except his immediate soldiers-Alexander attendants. His guards departed along with him, is appeased -reconleaving the discontented soldiers stupefied and ciliation. motionless. Receiving no further orders, nor any of

the accustomed military indications,2 they were left in the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to resolve for themselves. and at the same time altogether dependent upon Alexander, whom they had offended. On the third day, they learnt that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them with the chief military commands, distributing the newly-arrived Epigoni into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did not exist. At this news the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and remorse. They rushed to the gates of the palace, threw down their arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander's pardon. Presently he came out, and was himself moved to tears by secing their prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation, he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a multitudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians The Grccian prophets, the Persian Magi, and all the guests present united in prayer and

¹ Arrian, vii. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex.
71; Curtius, x. 2; Justin, xii. 11.
2 See the description given by Tacitus (Hist. ii. 29) of the bringing round of the Vitellian army, which had mutinied against the general Fabius Valens:—"Tum Alphenus Varus, prefectus castrorum, deflagrante paulatim seditione, addit consilium—vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubæ sono, quo miles ad belli munia cietur. Igitur torpore cuncti, circumspectare inter se attoniti, et id ipsum, quod neno regeret, paventes; silentio, quod nemo regeret, paventes; silentio,

patientià, postremo precibus et lacrymis patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis, Valeus processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor; versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque, circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt."

Compare also the narrative in Xenophon (Anab. i. 3) of the embarrassment of the Ten Thousand Greeks at Tarsus, when they at first refused to obey Kle-archus and march against the Great

libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire between the two nations.1

This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life, carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus. giving to each full pay until the time of arrival in

Partial disbandingbody of veterans placed inder command of Kraterus to return.

Macedonia, with a donation of one talent besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should come out to Asia with a reinforcement of troops.2 Pursuant to this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return, and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander's remaining life.

Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing each city to recall its exiled citizens— I shall speak in a future chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organizing a land force half jects of con-Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval force also, which was indeed an indispensable condition towards his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both

B.C. 324. Summer.

templated by Alexandermeasures for enlarg-ing his

nautical exploration and aggrandizement from the Persian Gulf round the Arabian coast. He despatched orders to the Phænician ports, directing that a numerous fleet should be built, and that the ships should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thansakus on the Euphratês, whence they would sail down to Babylon. At that place, he directed the construction of other ships from the numerous cypress trees around—as well as the formation of an enormous harbour in the river at Babylon,

¹ Arrian, vii. 11.
2 Arrian, vii. 12, 1—7: Justin, xii. 12. dared, the Oriental transformation Kraterus was especially popular with of Alexander (Plutarch, Eumenês, the Macedonian soldiers, because he 6).

adequate to the accommodation of 1000 ships of war. Mikkalus, a Greek of Klazomenæ, was sent to Phœnicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring, for which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition against Arabia.1

In the meantime, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana,

the ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. B.C. 324. He conducted his army by leisurely marches, review-Visit to ing by the way the ancient regal parks of the cele-Ekbatana -death of brated breed called Nisæan horses—now greatly Hephæsreduced in number.2 On the march, a violent altertion-violent sorrow cation occurred between his personal favourite, of Alexander. Hephæstion, and his secretary, Eumenês, the most able, dexterous, and long-sighted man in his service. Eumenês, as a Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephæstion: Alexander now took pains to reconcile the two, experiencing no difficulty with Eumenes, but much with Hephæstion.3 During his stay at Ekbatana, he celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and musical exhibitions, which were further enlivened, according to the Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amidst these proceedings, Hephæstion was seized with a fever, The vigour of his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the theatre; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found Hephæstion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded, manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of

¹ Arrian, vii. 19. He also sent an officer named Herakleidês to the shores of the Caspian Sea with orders to construct ships and make a survey of that sea (vii. 16).

² Arrian, vii. 13, 2; Diodôr. xvii. 110.

How leisurely the march was may be seen in Diodôrus.

The direction of Alexander's march from Susa to Ekbatana, along a frequented and good road which Diodôrus

in another place calls a royal road (xix. in another place calls a royal road (xix. 19), is traced by Ritter, deriving his information chiefly from the recent researches of Sir Henry Rawlinson. The larger portion of the way lay along the western side of the chain of Mount Zagros, and on the right bank of the river Kerkha (Ritter, Erdkunde, part ix. b. 3, p. 329, West-Asia).

3 Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eugenbarg.

his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achillês mourning for Patroklus, he cast himself on the ground near the dead body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused all care, and even food, for two days; he cut his hair close, and commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities, but interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighbouring cities should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias, who had prescribed for Hephæstion; he ordered that a vast funeral pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000 talents (£2,300,000), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to worship Hephæstion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once to show a sort of worship towards the deceased, by devoting to him themselves and their arms: of which Eumenes set the example, conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.1

Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendour B.C. 324of festivals and ostentation of life. His temper be- 323. Winter. came so much more irascible and furious, that no one Alexander approached him without fear, and he was propitiated exterminates the by the most extravagant flatterics.2 At length he Kossæi. roused himself and found his true consolation in gratifying the primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting.3

dot. ix. 24): compare also Plutarch, Pelopidas, 33, and Euripid. Alkestis,

¹ Arrian, vii. 14; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodôr. xvii. 110. It will not do to follow the canon of evidence tacitly assumed by Arrian, who thinks himself authorized to discredit all the details of Alexander's conduct on this occasion, which transgress the limits of a dignified though vehement sorrow.

When Masistius was slain, in the Persian army commanded by Mardonius in Bœotia, the manes of the horses were cut as token of mourning (Hero-

<sup>442.

&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See the curious extracts from Ephippus the Chalkidian, seemingly a contemporary, if not an eye-witness (ap. Athenæ. xii. pp. 537, 538)—εὐφημία δὲ καὶ σιγὴ κατεῖχε πάντας ὑπὸ δέους τοὺς παρόντας · ἀφόρητος γὰρ ἦν (Alexander) καὶ φονικός · ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι μελαγχο. λικός, &c.
3 I translate here, literally, Plu-

Between Media and Persis dwelt the tribes called Kossæi, amidst a region of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory, they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population was slain, -which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of Hephæstion.1

B.C. 323. Winterspring. March of Alexander to Babylon. Numerous embassies which met. him on the way.

Not long afterwards, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon, but in slow marches, further retarded by various foreign embassies which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came from the most distant regions. There were some from the various tribes of Libya: from Carthagefrom Sicily and Sardinia-from the Illyrians and Thracians — from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and

Tuscans, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as yet a people of moderate power.² But there were other names yet more surprising: Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube— Iberians and Gauls from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and compliments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the Grecian exiles.³ It was remarked

tarch's expression—τοῦ δὲ πένθους παρηγορία τῷ πολέμῳ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνη ης έσιο ν ἀνθρώ πων ἐξήλθε, καὶ τὸ Κοσσαίων ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο, πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφατων εκαλείτο (Plutarch, Alexand. 72: compare Polyænus, iv. 3, 31).

¹ Arrian, vii. 15; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diod. xvii. 111. This general slaughter, however, can only be true of portions of the Kossæan name; for Kossæans occur in after years (Diodôr. xix. 19).

² Pliny, H. N. iii. 9. The story in Strabo, v. p. 232, can hardly apply to Alexander the Great. Livy (ix. 18) conceives that the Romans knew no-

thing of Alexander even by report, but this appears to me not credible.

On the whole, though the point is doubtful, I incline to believe the assertion of a Roman embassy to Alexauder. Nevertheless, there were various false statements which afterwards became current about it, one of which may be seen in Memnon's history of the Pontic Herakleia ap. Photium, Cod. 224; Orelli Fragment. Memnon. p. 36. Kleitarchus (contemporary of Alexander), whom Pliny quotes, can have had no motive to insert falsely the name of Romans, which in his time was nowise important. tion of a Roman embassy to Alexander. important.

Arrian, vii. 15; Justin, xii. 13;

that these Grecian legates approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god.1 The proofs which Alexander received, even from distant tribes with names and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety for his favour. were such as had never been shown to any historical person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.

In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of these the most Spring. remarkable was the warning of the Chaldean priests, who apprised him soon after he crossed the Tigris that it would be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey, but his scruples were overruled either by arguments from the Greek sophist Anaxarchus or by the shame of shutting himself out

Alexander at Babylon -his great prepara-tions for the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia.

from the most memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come up from the mouth of the river, and also the ships directed to be built in Phœnicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus, together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard.2 The ships of cypress-wood and the large docks which he had ordered to be constructed at Babylon were likewise in full progress. He lost no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition into Arabia and the Persian Gulf by his land force and naval force co-operating. From various naval officers who had been sent to survey the Persian Gulf and now made their reports he learnt that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated that coast, to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia, and thus to reach the Red Sea, was an enterprise perilous at least if not im-

Diodôr, xvii. 113. The story mentioned by Justin in another place (xxi. 6) is probably referable to this last season of Alexander's career. A Carthaginian named Hamilkar Rhodanus was sent by his city to Alexander; really as an emissary to acquaint himself with the king's real designs, which occasioned 112.

to the Carthaginians serious alarm, but under colour of being an exile tendering his services. Justin says that Parmenio introduced Hamilkar; which

must, I think, be an error.

Arrian, vii. 19, 1; vii. 23, 3.

Arrian, vii. 19, 5—12; Diodôr. xvii.

practicable.1 But to achieve that which other men thought impracticable was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the cities of Phoenicia 2

Amidst preparations for this expedition, and while the imв.с. 323.

April, May. Alexander on shipboard on the Euphratês and in the marshes adjoining. His plans for improving the navigation and flow of the river.

mense funeral pile destined for Hephæstion was being built. Alexander sailed down the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles below Babylon, a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full so as to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well, he projected the construction of a new one somewhat farther down. He then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes together

with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the kausia on his head and the regal diadem above it,3 he passed some time among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct, and even commence, the foundation of a new city in what seemed to him a convenient spot.4

On returning to Babylon Alexander found large reinforcements arrived there, partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas from Lydia and Karia, partly 20,000 Persians under Peukestês the satrap. He caused these Persians to be incorporated in the files of the Macedonian phalanx. According to the standing custom, each of these files was sixteen deep, and each soldier was

Even in the time of Arrian, in the

¹ Arrian, vii. 20, 15; Arrian, Indica, second century after the Christian æra, 43. To undertake this circumnavigated, Arabia had never been circumnavigated, tion, Alexander had despatched a ship-from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea master of Soli in Cyprus, named Hiero, who, becoming alarmed at the distance to which he was advancing, and at the apparently interminable stretch of Arabia towards the south, returned without accomplishing the object.

at least so far as his knowledge extended.

² Arrian, vii. 19, 11. ³ Arrian, vii. 22, 2, 3; Strabo, xvi. p. 741.

⁴ Arrian, vii. 21, 11. πόλιν εξωκοδόμησέ τε καί ετείχισε.

armed with the long pike or sarissa wielded by two hands, the lochage, or front-rank man, being always an officer B.C. 323 receiving double pay, of great strength and attested valour, and those second and third in the file, as Large reinwell as the rearmost man of all, being likewise strong and good men, receiving larger pay than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained the New array first three ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the same depth of file, but he substituted twelve Persians in place of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank man, so that the file was composed first of the lochage and

June.

forcements arrive, Grecian and Asiatic. ordered by Alexander for Macedonians and Persians in the same files and companies.

two other chosen Macedonians each armed with the sarissa; then of twelve Persians armed in their own manner with bow or javelin: lastly, of a Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the rear.1 In this Macedonico-Persian file the front would have only three projecting pikes instead of five, which the ordinary Macedonian phalanx presented; but then, in compensation, the Persian soldiers would be able to hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy over the heads of their three front-rank men. The supervening death of Alexander prevented the actual execution of this reform, interesting as being his last project for amalgamating Persians and Macedonians into one military force.

Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in review his fleet, which was now fully equipped. The Splendid funeral oborder was actually given for departing so soon as the obsequies of Hephæstion should be celebrated. This was sequies of Hephæsthe last act which remained for him to fulfil. The tion. splendid funeral pile stood ready, two hundred feet high, occupying a square area, of which the side was nearly one furlong, loaded with costly decorations from the zeal, real and simulated, of the Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was exhausted in long discussions with the king himself to produce at all cost an exhibition of magnificence singular and stopendous. The outlay (probably with addition of the festivals

Arrian, vii. 23, 5. Even when performing the purely military operations of passing these soldiers in review, inspecting their exercise, and determining their array, Alexander sat upon the evidences of his altered manners.

immediately following) is stated at 12,000 talents, or £2,760,000 sterling. Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honour he might properly and piously show to his departed friend.2 The answer was now brought back intimating that Hephæstion was to be worshipped as a Hero, the secondary form of worship, not on a level with that paid to the gods. Delighted with this divine testimony to Hephæstion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted and the obsequies celebrated in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the oracle.3 He further directed that magnificent chapels or sacred edifices should be erected for the worship and honour of Hephæstion at Alexandria in Egypt, at Pella in Macedonia, and probably in other cities also.4

Respecting the honours intended for Hephæstion at Alexandria. he addressed to Kleomenes the satrap of Egypt a despatch which becomes in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomenês was among the worst of the satraps, having committed multiplied public crimes, of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal despatch enjoined him to erect in commemoration of Hephæstion a chapel on the terra firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret in the islet of Pharos; and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of Hephæstion. Alexander concluded thus:—"If coming I find the Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephæstion completed in the best manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future, whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad

phæstiou's honour—as we see by Arrian, vii. 23, 10. And Diodôrus must be sup-posed to allude to these intended sacred buildings, though he has inadvertently spoken of the funeral pile. Kraterus, who was under orders to return to Macedonia, was to have built one at

Pella.

The Olynthian Ephippus had composed a book, περὶ τῆς Ἡφαιστίωνος καὶ ᾿Αλεξάνδρον ταφῆς, of which there appear four or five citations in Atheneus. He dwelt especially on the luxurious habits of Alexander, and on his unmeasured potations, common to him with other Macedonians.

¹ Diodôrus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, the splendid edifices and chapels in He-

¹ Diodôrus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, Alex. 72.

2 Arrian, vii. 23, 8.

3 Diodôr. xvii. 114, 115: compare Arrian, vii. 14, 16; Plutarch, Alex. 75.

4 Arrian, vii. 23, 10—13; Diod. xviii.

4. Diodôrus speaks indeed, in this passage, of the πυρά or funeral pile in honour of Hephæstion as if it were among the vast expenses included in the memoranda left by Alexander (after his decease) of prospective schemes. the menoranda left by Alexander (arter-his decease) of prospective schemes. But the funeral pile had already been erected at Babylon, as Diodôrus him-self had informed us. What Alexander left unexecuted at his decease, but intended to execute if he had lived, was.

treatment from me".1 This despatch strikingly illustrates how much the wrongdoings of satraps were secondary considerations in his view, compared with splendid manifestations towards the gods, and personal attachment towards friends.

The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephæstion—not merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigour as himself—laid his mind open to gloomy forebodings from numerous omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers. Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of Olympias by the support of Hephæstion,2 fell more and more into discredit; whilst his son Kassander, who had recently come into Asia with a Macedonian reinforcement, underwent from Alexander during irascible moment's much insulting violence. In spite of the dissuasive warning of the Chaldean priests,3 Alexander had been persuaded to distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon, though not without hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.4

1 Arrian vii. 23, 9—14. καὶ Κλεομένει ἀνδρὶ κακῷ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικήσαντι ἐν Αιγύπτῳ, ἐπιστέλλει ἐπιστολήν. . . ἢν γὰρ καταλάβω ἐγὼ (ἔλεγε τὰ γράμματα) τὰ ἰερὰ τὰ ἐν Αιγύπτῳ καλῶς κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα τὰ Ἡφαιστίωνος, εἶτε τι πρότερον ἡμάρτηκας ἀφήσω σε τούτων, καὶ τολοιπὸν, ὁπήλικον ἀν ἀμάρτης, οὐδὲν πείση ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἀχαρι. In the oration of Demosthenês against Dionysodorus (p. 1285). Kleomenês In the oration of Demosthenës against Dionysodorus (p. 1285), Kleomenës appears as enriching himself by the monopoly of corn exported from Egypt: compare Pseudo-Aristot. Œconom. c. 33. Kleomenës was afterwards put to death by the first Ptolemy, who became king of Egypt (Pausanias, i. 6, 3).

2 Plutarch, Alex. 74; Diodor. xvii.

The uneasiness here caused by these prophecies and omens in the mind of the most fearless man of his age is worthy of notice as a psychological fact, and is perfectly attested by the authority of Aristobulus and Nearchus. It appears that Anaxarchus and other Greeian philosophers encouraged him by their reasonings to despise all prophecy, but especially that of the Chaldean priests, who (they alleged) wished to keep Alexander out of Babylon in order that they might continue to possess the large revenues of the temple of Belus, which they had wrongfully appropriated; Alexander being disposed to rebuild that ruined temple, and to re-establish the suspended sacrifices to which its revenues had been The uneasiness here caused by these and to re-establish the suspended sacrifices to which its revenues had been originally devoted (Arrian, vii. 17; Diodôr. xvii. 112). Not many days afterwards, Alexander greatly repented of having given way to these dangerous reasoners, who by their sophistical cavils set aside the power and the warnings of destiny (Diodôr. xvii. 116) 116).

10 - 13

² Phitarch, Alex. 74; Blodor. xvii. 114.

³ Arrian, vii. 16, 9; vii. 17, 6. Plutarch, Alex. 73. Diodôr. xvii. 112.

⁴ Arrian, vii. 22, 1. αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἐξ ε λ ἐγ ξ α ς δὴ τῶν Χαλδαίων μαντείαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πεπουθὼς εἴη ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἄχαρι (ἀλλὶ ἔφθη γὰρ ἐλάσας ἔξω Βαβυλῶνος πρίν τι παθεῖν) ἀνέπλει αὖθις κατὰ ἔλη θ α ρἱρῶν, &C

The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most

B.C. 323. June.

General feasting and intemperance in the army. Alexander is seized with a dangerous fever. Details of his illness.

prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander presided in person at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality like the rest. Already full of wine, he was persuaded by his friend Medius to sup with him, and to pass the whole night in yet further drinking, with the boisterous indulgence called by the Greeks Kômus or Revelry. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day, he in the evening again supped with Medius, and

spent a second night in the like unmeasured indulgence.1 It appears that he already had the seeds of a fever upon him, which was so fatally aggravated by this intemperance that he was too ill to return to his palace. He took the bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning, he was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch to celebrate sacrifice (which was his daily habit), he was obliged to lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals to his presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedition, and ordering that the land force should begin its march on the fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard, would sail on the fifth day. In the evening he was carried on a couch across the Euphratês into a garden on the other side, where he bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so that in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform the sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing at dice with Medius; in the evening he bathed, sacrificed again, and ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased fever. The next two days passed in the same manner, the fever becoming worse and worse; nevertheless Alexander still summoned Nearchus to his bedside, discussed with him many points about

attested only the general fact of his large potations and the long sleep which followed them: see Athenæus, x. p. 434.

To drink to intoxication at a funeral was required as a token of respectful sympathy towards the deceased: see the last words of the Indian Kalauus before he assended the funeral pile—Plutarch, Alexander, 69.

¹ Arrian, vii. 24, 25. Diodôrus states (xvii. 117) that Alexander, on this convivial night, swallowed the contents of a large goblet called the cup of Hêraklês, and felt very ill after it—a statement repeated by various other writers of antiquity, and which I see no reason for discrediting, though some modern critics treat it with contempt. The Royal Ephemerides, or Court Journal,

his maritime projects, and repeated his order that the fleet should be ready by the third day. On the ensuing morning the fever was violent; Alexander reposed all day in a bathing-house in the garden, yet still calling in the generals to direct the filling up of vacancies among the officers, and ordering that the armament should be ready to move. Throughout the two next days, his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the second of the two, Alexander could with difficulty support the being lifted out of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however, he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition. On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across from the garden-house to the palace, giving orders that the generals and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside: but though he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable of utterance. One of his last words spoken is said to have been, on being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom. "To the strongest"; one of his last acts was to take the signet ring from his finger and hand it to Perdikkas.1

For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either amendment or repose. Meanwhile the news of his malady had spread through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of the soldiers, eager to see him once more, forced their way into the palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside, with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy: Alexander knew them, and

No hope of his life. Consternation and grief in the army. Last interview with the soldiers. His death.

made show of friendly recognition as well as he could, but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the god in a dream whether they ought to bring Alexander into it as a suppliant to experience the divine healing power. The god informed them in their dream that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple, that it would be better for him to be left where he was. In th afternoon he expired—June, 323 B.c.—after a life of thirty-two

¹ These last two facts are mentioned found no place in the Court Journal. by Arrian (vii. 26, 5) and Diodôrus (xvii. Curtius (x. 5, 4) gives them with some 117), and Justin (xii. 15), but they enlargement.

years and eight months, and a reign of twelve years and eight months.1

The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the plenitude of health, vigour, and aspirations, was B.C. 323. an event impressive as well as important in the high-Effect est possible degree to his contemporaries far and near. produced When the first report of it was brought to Athens, the on the imagination orator Demadês exclaimed-"It cannot be true: if of contemporaries by Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world the career Alexander were dead, standard world and death of would have smelt of his carcass".2 This coarse but Alexander. emphatic comparison illustrates the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate this far-shooting Apollo-by every man among the nations who had sent these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then

1 The details respecting the last illness of Alexander are peculiarly authentic, being extracted both by Arrian and by Plutarch from the Ephemerides

and by Plutarch from the Ephemerides Regiæ, or short Court Journal, which was habitually kept by his secretary Eumenes, and another Greek named Diodôrus (Athenæ, x. p. 434): see Arrian, vii. 25, 26; Plutarch, Alex. 76.

It is surprising that throughout all the course of this malady no mention is made of any physician as having been consulted. No advice was asked, if we except the application to the temple of Serapis during the last day of Alexwe except the application to the temple of Serapis during the last day of Alexander's life. A few months before, Alexander had hanged or crucified the physician who attended Hephæstion in his last illness. Hence it seems probable that he either despised or mistrusted medical advice, and would not permit any to be involved. His views permit any to be invoked. His views must have been much altered since his dangerous fever at Tarsus, and the successful treatment of it by the Akarnanian physician Philippus.

Though the fever (see some remarks from Littré attached to Didot's Fragm. from Littre attached to Didot's Fragm. Script. Alex. Magn. p. 124) which caused Alexander's death is here a plain fact satisfactorily made out, yet a different story was circulated some time afterwards, and gained partial credit (Plutarch, De Invidia, p. 538), that he had been poisoned. The poison was said to have been provided by

Aristotle, sent lover to Asia by Anti-pater through his son Kassander, and administered by Iollas (another son of pater through his son Kassander, and administered by Iollas (another son of Antipater), Alexander's cupbearer (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Curtius, x. 10, 17; Diodor. xvii. 118; Justin, xii. 13). It is quite natural that fever and intemperance (which latter, moreover, was frequent with Alexander) should not be regarded as causes sufficiently marked and impressive to explain a decease at once so unexpected and so momentous. There seems ground for supposing, however, that the report was intentionally fomented, if not originally broached, by the party-enemies of Antipater and Kassander, especially by the rancorous Olympias. The violent enmity afterwards displayed by Kassander against Olympias and all the family of Alexander helped to encourage the report. In the life of Hyperides in Plutarch (Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849), it is stated that he proposed at Athens public honours to Iollas for having given the poison to Alexander. If there is any truth in this, it might be a stratagem for casting discredit on Antipater of Iollas), against whom stratagem for casting discredit on Anti-pater (father of Iollas), against whom the Athenians entered into the Lamian war, immediately after the death of

Alexander.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Demetrius Phaler. De Elocution, s. 300. οὐ τέθνηκεν ᾿Αλέξανδρος, ὧ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι—ὧζε γὰρ ἄν ἡ οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ.

known—to affect either his actual condition or his probable future.1 The first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two years preceding the battle of Chæroneia, from an embarrassed secondary state into the first of all known powers. had excited the astonishment of contemporaries and admiration for Philip's organizing genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as the King of Persia was called by excellence) was, and had long been, the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of the Caspian Gates, escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only to perish by those of the satrap All antecedent historical parallels—the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Crossus, the expulsion and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive examples of the mutability of human condition—sank into trifles compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus. The orator Æschinês expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly before the death of Darius)—"What is there among the list of strange and unexpected events that has not occurred in our time? Our lives have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king-who dug through Athos and bridged the Hellespont,-who demanded earth and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself in public epistles master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is not he now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others, but for the safety of his own person?"2

Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, fainted away with joy when he heard of Alexander's death, and erected a statue of Εὐθυμία or Comfort (Memn. Heracl. Fragm. ap. Photium,
 Cod. 224, c. 4).
 Æschinés adv. Ktesiph. p. 524, c. 48.
 τοιγάρτοι τί τῶν ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτων ἐψ̂ ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν! οὐ γὰρ βίον γ' ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβιώκαμεν,

Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander's career even in the middle of 330 B.C., more than seven years before his death. During the following seven years, his additional achievements had carried astonishment yet further. He had mastered, in defiance of fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent, many were doubtless disposed to take him for a god on earth, as Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxês, when they beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.1

Alexander lived, he must have achieved things greater still.

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years less than the age for a consul at Rome; 2 two years younger than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began his foreign conquests.3 His extra-

ordinary bodily powers were unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and, what was still more important, his appetite for further conquest was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest cost of toil or danger as complete, as it had been when he first crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world as then known; 4 and if his life had been prolonged, he would probably

ἀλλ' εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς ἐσομένοις μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἔφυμεν. οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν ᾿Αθων διορύξας καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ τῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἦληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἐτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας: σῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν ἸΑθων διορυξας καὶ Τύχης—Fragment. Histor. Græcor. vol. τὸν Ἑλλήσπουτον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἑλληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἡλίου ἀνιόντος ακάντων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ ἐτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας;

Compare the striking fragmont, of admirer Arrian, vii. 1, 6.

a like tenor, out of the lost work of the Phalerean Demetrius— Περὶ τῆς Tύχης-Fragment. Histor. Græcor. vol.

have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue. The patriotic feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain1

that Alexander, had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Samnites, would have failed and perished raised by Livy, about the chances conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the of Alexcourage and discipline of the Roman infantry to have he had been equal to the best infantry of Alexander's army, the the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as Romans.

ander, if attacked

compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring to one common purpose-nor the same unbounded influence over their minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great; though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and Lucanianscombining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective arms both for defence and for close combat.2

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to form the only military defect which can be fairly

¹ Livy, ix. 17—19. A discussion of Alexander's chances against the Romans—extremely interesting and beautiful, though the case appears to me very partially set forth. I agree with Niebuhr in dissenting from Livy's result; and with Plutarch in considering it as one of the boons of Fortune to the Romans, that Alexander did not live long enough to attack them (Plutarch De Fortunà Romanor. p. 326).

Livy, however, had great reason for complaining of those Greek authors (he calls them "levissimi ex Græcis"), who

imputed to him—we trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken beforehand, vigilant precaution Unrivalled in guarding against possible reverse, and abundant excellence resource in adapting himself to new contingencies. of Alexander, as a military Amidst constant success, these precautionary comman. binations were never discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence of scientific military organization on a large scale, and of its overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior, and as organizer and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Arês, but also the intelligent. methodized, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in Athênê. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and slaughtered.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a general, some authors give him credit for grand Alexander and beneficent views on the subject of imperial governas a ruler, apart from ment, and for intentions highly favourable to the military affairs, not deserving improvement of mankind. I see no ground for of esteem. adopting this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have been Alexander's future, we see nothing in prospect except years of ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition of universal dominion, conceived not metaphorically but literally, and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect geographical knowledge of the time, was the master-passion of his soul. At the moment of his death he was commencing fresh aggression in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent; while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and Europe, as far as the Pillars of Hêraklês, were con-

signed in the orders and memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus.1 Italy, Gaul, and Spain would have been successively attacked and conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Baktria by the Chorasmian prince Pharasmanês, but postponed then until a more convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would have marched from the Danube northward round the Euxine and Palus Mæotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus.2 There remained, moreover, the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which his soldiers had refused to enter upon, but which he certainly would have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring more.3 "You are a man like all of us, Alexander (said the naked Indian to him), except that you abandon your home like a meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions, enduring hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others."4 Now, how an empire thus boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has ever yet realized, could have been administered with any superior advantages to subjects, it would be difficult to show. The mere task of acquiring and maintaining, of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers in authority as well as in subordination, of suppressing resistances ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march,5 would occupy the whole life of a world conqueror, without leaving any leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we give him credit for such purposes in theory.

But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander's acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up the traditions of the Persian empire, a tribute-levying and army-

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 4.

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 4.
2 Arrian, iv. 15, 11.
3 Arrian, vii. 19, 12. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἄπληστος ἢν τοῦ κτᾶσθαί τι ἀεὶ 'Αλέξανδρος. Compare vii. 1, 3—7; vii. 15, 6, and the speech made by Alexander to his soldiers on the banks of the Hyphasis when he was trying to persuade them to march forward, v. 26 way which removed that Arrian seq. We must remember that Arrian

had before him the work of Ptolemy, who would give, in all probability, the substance of this memorable speech from his own hearing.

4 Arrian, vii. 1, 8. σὺ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὧν, παραπλήσιος τοῖς ἄλλοις, πλήν γε δὴ, ὅτι πολυπράγμων καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας τοσαύτην γῆν ἐπεξέρχη, πράγματα ἔχων τε καὶ παρέχων ἄλλοις.

5 Arrian, vii. 4, 4, 5.

Alexander would have continued the system of the Persian empire, with no other improvement except that of a strong or-

ganization.

levying system, under Macedonians in large proportion as his instruments, yet partly also under the very same Persians who had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to reappoint Persian grandees (putting their armed force, however, under the command of a Macedonian officer), and to continue native princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him as tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the Persian

kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required.1 In like manner Alexander's Asiatic empire would thus have been composed of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing money and soldiers; in other respects, left to the discretion of local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but no systematic examination or control.² Upon this, the condition of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one special improvement: the military organization of the empire, feeble under the Achæmenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by his genius and by the able officers formed in his school, both for foreign aggression and for home control.3

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice has sometimes been counted to him as a virtue, it only made room, in my opinion, for prejudices still worse. substitute for it was an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordi-

² See the punishment of Sisamnes by

Kambysês (Herodot. v. 25).

¹ Herodot. iii. 15. Alexander offered to Phokion (Plutarch, Phok. 18) his choice between four Asiatic cities, of which (that is, of any one of them) he was to enjoy the revenues; just as Artaxerxês Longimanus had acted towards Themistoklês in recompense for his treason. Phokion refused the offer.

The rhetor Aristeidês, in his Encoo the rheter Aristeides, in his Encommum on Rome, has some good remarks on the character and ascendency of Alexander, exercised by will and personal authority, as contrasted with the systematic and legal working of the Roman empire (Orat. xvi. pp. 332—360, vol. i. ed. Dindert). vol. i. ed. Dindorf).

nary success into the belief in divine parentage, which, while

setting him above the idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive all mankind as nationality subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by der—pur-himself. To this universal empire the Persian king pose of fusing the made the nearest approach, according to the opinions different then prevalent. Accordingly Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full due. He became more Persian than either

Absence of in Alexanvarieties of mankind into one common type of subjection.

Macedonian or Greek. While himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites. At the time of Alexander's death, there was comprised in his written orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation of inhabitants both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying intermarriages and intercourse.2 Such reciprocal translation of peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have been accomplished without coercive authority.3 It is rash to speculate upon unexecuted purposes; but as far as we can judge, such compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favourable to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius Alexander was Hellenic to the full; in respect of disposition and purpose no one could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental vio-

καταστήση.
3 See the effect produced upon the Ionians by the false statement of Histiæus (Herodot. vi. 3) with Wesseling's note, and the eagerness of the Pæonians to return (Herod. v. 98; also Justin, viii. 5).

Antipater afterwards intended to transport the Ætolians in mass from their own country into Asia, if he had succeeded in conquering them (Diodôr. xviii. 25). Compare Pausanias (i. 9, 8—10) about the forcible measures used by Lysimachus, in transporting new inhabitants at Ephesus and Lysima-

¹ Xenoph. Cyropæd. vii. 6, 21; Anabas. i. 7, 6; Herodot. vii. 8, 13: compare Arrian, v. 26, 4—10.

2 Diodôr. κνίii. 4. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πόλεων συνοικισμοὺς καὶ σωμάτων μεταγωγὰς ἐκ τῆς 'Ασίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, καὶ κατὰ τοὑναντίον ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν 'Ασίαν, ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας ἡπείρους ταῖς ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειώσεσιν εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συγγενικὴν φιλίαν καταστάση.

lence of impulse, unmeasured self-will, and exaction of reverence above the limits of humanity have been already Mistake of supposing Alexander recounted. To describe him as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle, and bent to be the intentional on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for diffuser of Greek civithe improvement of mankind,2 is, in my judgment, lization. an estimate of his character contrary to the evi-His ideas compared dence. Alexander is indeed said to have invited with those of Aristotle. suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of colonizing, but his temper altered so much after a few years of Asiatic conquest that he came not only to lose all deference for Aristotle's advice but even to hate him bitterly,3 Moreover, though the philosopher's full suggestions have not been preserved, yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave to the Greeks as a leader or president, or limited chief, and to the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master; 4 a distinction substantially coinciding with that pointed out by Burke in his speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles of government proper to be followed by England in the Ameri-

can colonies and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity upon which the

1 Livy, ix. 18. "Referre in tanto rege piget superbam mutationem vestis, et desideratas humi jacentium adulationes, etiam victis Macedonibus graves, nedum victoribus: et fœda supplicia, et inter vinum et epulas cædes annicorum, et vanitatem ementiendæ stirpis. Quid si vini amor in dies fleret acrior? quid si trux et præfervida ira? (nec quidquam dubium inter scriptores refero) nullane hæc damna imperatoriis virtutibus ducinus?"

The appeal here made by Livy to the full attestation of these points in Alexander's character deserves notice. He had doubtless more authorities before him than we possess.

² Among other eulogists of Alexander, it is sufficient to name Droysen, in his two works, both of great historical research, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen, and Geschichte des Hellenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenismus other Staaten-Systemes (Hamburg, 1843). See especially the last and most recont work, p. 27 seqq., p. 651 seqq., and

elsewhere passim.

3 Plutarch, Alex. 55—74.

4 Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 329. 'Αλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγφ τὸ ἔργον παρέσχεν· οὐ γὰρ, ὡς 'Αριστοτέλης συνερούλευεν αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλησιν ηγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενον . αλλὰ κοινὸς ἤκειν θεόθεν ἀρμοστὴς καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὅλων νομίζων, οὖς τῷ λόγφ μὴ συτῆγε, τοῖς ὅπλοις βιαζόμενος, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνενέγκων τὰ πανταχόθεν, ἀτ.

Straho (or Eratosthenês, see Strabo, i. p. 66) and Plutarch understand the

Strabo (or Eratosthenês, see Strabo, i. p. 66) and Plutarch understand the expression of Aristotle erroneously, as if that philosopher had meant to recommend harsh and cruel treatment of the non-Hellenes, and kind treatment only towards Greeks. That Aristotle could have meant no such thing is evident from the whole tenor of his treatise on Politics. The distinction really intended is between a greater and a less measure of extra-popular authority, not between kind and unkind purposes in the exercise of authority. Compare Tacitus, Annal. xii. 11—the advice of the Emperor Claudius to the Parthian prince Meherdatês.

5 Aristot. Politic. i. 1, 5; vii. 6, 1.

march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded to the same level. Now Alexander recognized no such distinction as that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike, not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently found the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favour of the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenizing Asia, he was tending to Asiatize Macedonia and Hellas. His temper and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the Greeksquite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-coloured than even the army of Xerxês, it is quite possible that he might have turned his power towards the improvement of the rudest portions. We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkanians, Arachosians, and Sogdians. But Macedonians as well as Greeks would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic aggregate.

Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities in Asia.² So large a number of them is neither verifiable

See the memorable comparison drawn by Aristotle (Polit. vii. 6) between the Europeans and Asiatics generally. He pronounces the former to be courageous and energetic, but wanting in intelligence or powers of political combination; the latter to be intelligent and clever in contrivance, but destitute of courage. Neither of them have more than a "one-legged aptitude" (φύσιν μονόκωλον); the Greek alone possesses both the courage and the intelligence nnited. The Asiatics are condemned to perpetual subjection; the Greeks might govern the world, could they but combine in one political society.

Isokratês ad Philippum, Or. v. p. 85, s. 18. έστι δε το μεν πείθειν προς τους

*Ελληνας σύμφερον, τὸ δὲ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους χρήσιμον.

1 Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 328. The stay of Alexander in these countries was, however, so short that even with the best will he could not have enforced the suppression of any invotants entering.

have enforced the suppression of any inveterate customs.

² Plutarch, Fortun. Al. M. p. 328. Plutarch mentions, a few lines afterwards, Seleukia, in Mesopotamia, as if he thought that it was among the cities established by Alexander himself. This shows that he has not been exact in distinguishing foundations made by Alexander from those originated by Seleukus and other Diadochi.

The elaborate article of Droysen (in

The elaborate article of Droysen (in the appendix to his Geschichte des nor probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts or borrow from the list of foundations really estab-Number of lished by his successors. Except Alexandria, in new cities founded in Egypt, none of the cities founded by Alexander Asia by himself can be shown to have attained any great Alexander. Nearly all were planted among the remote, wardevelopment. like, and turbulent peoples eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really fortified posts to hold the country in subjection; Alexander lodged in them detachments from his army, but none of these detachments can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to weaken his army while active military operations were still going on, and while farther advance was in contemplation. More of these settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks whom he established there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away in mutiny immediately on the news of his death.1 Some Greek soldiers in Alexander's army on the Jaxartês or the Hydaspes. sick and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled among the colonists of a new city, on one of these unknown rivers, to the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty.2 But it is certain that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to

Hellenismus, pp. 588—651) ascribes to Alexander the largest plans of colonization in Asia, and enumerates a great number of cities alleged to have been founded by him. But in regard to the majority of these foundations, the evidence upon which Droysen grounds his belief that Alexander was the foundar appears to me altographer. his belief that Alexander was the founder appears to me altogether slender and unsatisfactory. If Alexander founded so many cities as Droysen imagines how does it happen that Arrian mentions only so comparatively small a number? The argument, derived from Arrian's silence, for rejecting what is affirmed by other ancients respecting Alexander, is indeed employed by modern authors (and by Droysen himself among them) far oftenor than I think warrantable. But if there be any one proceeding of if there be any one proceeding of Alexander more than another in respect of which the silence of Arrian ought to make us suspicious, it is the foundation of a new colony; a solemn act, requir-ing delay and multiplied regulations,

intended for perpetuity, and redounding to the honour of the founder. I do ing to the honour of the founder. I do not believe in any colonies founded by Alexander beyond those comparatively few which Arrian mentions, except such as rest upon some other express and good testimony. Whoever will read through Droysen's list will see that most of the names in it will not stand this test. The short life and rapid movements of Alexander are of themselves the strongest presumption against his having founded so large a number of colonies. number of colonies.

1 Diodôr. xvii. 99; xviii. 7. Curtius, ix. 7, 1. Curtius observes (vii. 10, 15) respecting Alexander's colonies in Sogdiana that they were founded "velut freni domitarum gentium; nunc originis suæ oblita serviunt, quibus im-

peraverunt".

² See the plain-spoken outburst of the Thurian Antileon, one of the soldiers in Xenophon's Ten Thousand Greeks, when the army reached Trapezus (Xenoph. Anabas. v. 1. 2).

settle at distances such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The absorbing appetite of Alexander was conquest to the east, west, south, and north; the cities which he planted were established for the most part as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious acquisitions. The purpose of colonization was altogether subordinate, and that of hellenizing Asia, so far as we can see, was not even contemplated, much less realized.

This process of hellenizing Asia—in so far as Asia was ever hellenized—which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in reality the work of the Diadochi who came Alexander, after him, though his conquests doubtless opened the door and established the military ascendency which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the lenized aspirations, and the interests of these Diadochi-

It was not but the Diadochi after him, who chiefly hel-

Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, &c.—were materially different from those of Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found new cities immortalizing their family names. These foundations were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks, where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria, Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known to Greeks and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants, not out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals as the Jaxartês and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new Hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding Alexander, probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the condition of the Greek cities became more and more calamitous, besides the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became predominant, if not in numbers at least in importance, throughout most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular the Macedonian military organization, discipline, and administration were maintained systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the battle of Magnêsia, fought by the Seleukid king Antiochus the Great against the Romans in 190 B.C., the Macedonian phalanx, constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its completeness just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia itself.1

How far Asia was ever really hellenizedthe great fact was that the Greek language became universally diffused.

When it is said, however, that Asia became hellenized under Alexander's successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their epoch of autonomy 2 -never passed over into Asia; neither the highest qualities of the Greek mind, nor even the entire character of ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under the over-ruling compres-

sion of Alexander, nor even under the less irresistible pressure of his successors. Its living force, productive genius, self-organizing power, and active spirit of political communion were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the Greco-Asiatic kings was not Hellenic (as it has been sometimes called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been before. follows their history until the period of Roman dominion will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family. Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference, as compared with their Persian predecessors, consisted in their retaining the military traditions and organization of Philip and Alexander an elaborate scheme of discipline and manœuvring, which could not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the Achæmenid kings, who had no military school or training what-

¹ Appian, Syriac. 32. ² This is the sense in which I have always used the word *Hellenism* throughout the present work.

With Droysen the word Hellenismus -Das Hellenistische Staatensystem—is applied to the state of things which followed upon Alexander's death; to the aggregate of kingdoms into which Alexander's conquests became distri-

buted, having for their point of similarity the common uso of Greek speech, a certain proportion of Greeks both as inhabitants and as officers, and a partial streak of Hellenic culture.

This sense of the word (if admissible to the content of the

ever. Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became the instrument of a foreign prince; the details of government were managed, to a great degree, by Greek officials, and always in the Greek language.

Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of the many new cities founded in Asia by the Greco-Asia-Seleukidæ and the other contemporary kings. Each tic cities. of these cities had a considerable infusion of Greek and Macedonian citizens among the native Orientals located here, often brought by compulsion from neighbouring villages. In what numerical ratio these two elements of the civic population stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians were the leading and active portion, who exercised the greatest assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. these cities the Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek was the language of public business and dealing; each formed a centre of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighbourhood; all together they were the main Hellenic, or quasi-Hellenic, element in Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic villages where native manners, and probably native speech, still continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or Alexandria, or Seleukeia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thêbes, nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially orientalized. Their feelings, judgments, and habits of action ceased to be Hellenic. Polybius, when he visited Alexandria, looked with surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they were superior to the non-Hellenic population, whom he considered worthless.1 Greek social habits, festivals, and legends

¹ Strabo, xii. p. 797. ὁ γοῦν Πολύ- The Museum of Alexandria (with its βιος, γεγονὼς ἐν τῷ πόλει (Alexandria), library) must be carefully distinguished βδελύττεται τὴν ταύτη κατάστασιν, &c. from the city and he people. It was an 10—14

passed with the Hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and political consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language, and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication throughout Western Asia. But after all the hellenized Asiatic was not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophokles, by Thucydides, by Sokratês.

Increase of the means of communication between various world.

Thus much is necessary in order to understand the bearing of Alexander's conquests, not only upon the Hellenic population, but upon Hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the parts of the Greeks as individuals abroad, and produced—perhaps the best of all their effects—a great increase of inter-

communication, multiplication of roads, extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road (established by Darius son of Hystaspes, and described as well as admired by Herodotus) for the three months' journey between Sardis and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa and Ekbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was contemplating when surprised by death, one was the construction of a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars of Hêraklês. He had intended to found a new

artificial institution which took its rise altogether from the personal taste and munificence of the earlier Ptolemies, especially the second. It was one of the noblest and most useful institutions recorded in history, and forms the most honourable monument of what Droysen calls the hellenistic period, between the death of Alexander and the extension of the Roman empire into Asia.

this museum though situated at Alexandria had no peculiar connexion with the city or its population; it was a college of literary Fellows (if we may employ a modern word) congregated out of various Grecian towns. Eratostophis Kellimakus Avistonharas thenês, Kallimachus, Aristophanês, Aristarchus, were not natives of ¹ Diodôr. xviii. 4. Pausanias (ii. 1,

maritime city on the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphratês, and to incur much outlay for regulating the flow of water in its lower course. The river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings. Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the Eastern Ocean, and intended to make it his point of departure for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we must remark that this same voyage (from the mouth of the Indus round Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders of Darius son of Hystaspes;2 yet, though recorded by Herodotus, forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries. This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main feature in Alexander's career which presents itself as promising real consequences beneficial to humanity.

We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension

5) observes that Alexander wished to cut through Mount Mimas (in Asia Minor), but that this was the only one among all his undertakings which did not succeed. "So difficult is it (he goes on) to put force upon the divine arrangements," τὰ θεῖα βιάσασθαι. He wished to cut through the isthmus between Teôs and Klazomenæ so as to avoid the navigation round the cliffs of Mimas (σκόπελον νιφόεντα Μίμαντος— Aristophan. Nub. 274) between Chios and Erythræ. Probably this was among the projects suggested to Alexander in the last year of his life. We have no other information about it.

1 Arrian, v. 26, 2.
2 Herodot. iv. 44: compare iii. 102.
That Arrian had not present to his

of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of 800 talents in money, placing under his directions several Interest of thousand men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological Alexander in science researches.1 These exaggerations are probably the and literature. work of those enemies of the philosopher who decried him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court; but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem towards him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries. intellectual turn of Alexander was towards literature, poetry, and history. He was fond of the Iliad especially, as well as of the Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various tragedies of Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês, with the dithyrambic poems of Telestês and the histories of Phlistus.2

¹ Pliny, H. N. viii. 17; Athe-Historiæ De Animalibus, p. xxxix. næus, ix. p. 398. See Schneider's seq. preface to his edition of Aristotle's ² Plutarch, Alexand. 8.

CHAPTER XCV.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

Even in 334 B.C., when Alexander first entered upon his Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, State of the had been robbed of all their free agency, and existed Grecian only as appendages of the kingdom of Macedonia. World when Alexander Several of them were occupied by Macedonian garri-crossed the Hellespont. sons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon such armed force for support. There existed among them no common idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except such as it suited Alexander's purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian sentiment - once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the recollection of which Demosthenês was wont to appeal, in animating the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are "in the hands of the king". A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city-"the streets and fountains which we are whitening," to use a phrase of Demosthenês2—the good manage-

¹ Aristot. Physic. iv. 3, p. 210, a. 21. καὶ ὅλως ἐντῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ. ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ Ἑλλήνων, ²Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36.

ment of the Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the first years of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns, Grecian spirit might it might at any moment have become animated with have been an active spirit of self-emancipation, if he had expericalled into action, if enced reverses, or if the Persians had administered the Persians had played their own affairs with skill and vigour. their game already stated that, during the first two years of the well. war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say the Phonician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia—as Alexander himself was well aware.

Hopes raised in Greece, first by the Persian fleet in the Ægean, next by the two great Persian armies on land.

During the winter of 334—333 B.C., Mennon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean, and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in Eubœa and Peloponnêsus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius's abandonment of the Memnonian plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian land force. Even down to the

eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenês2 and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half (from November, 333 B.C., to March or April, 331 B.C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralyzed by the captivity of his family that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defence, without the least attempt to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B.C., the prospects again appeared to improve.

¹ Arrian, ii. 1.

² Æschinês cont. Ktesiph. 552.

A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks' march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October, 331 B.C.) came the catastrophe at Arbêla; after which no demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbêla. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thêbes had been destroyed and demolished as a city, and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison. Moreover, besides that garrison, the Bœotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, &c., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thêbes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands. In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction and policy at Athens of Thêbes and the enslavement of the Thebans. decidedly Ephialtês and Charidêmus, the military citizens at Pacific. Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtês perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidêmus suffered a

¹ Vita Demosthenês ap. Westermann, βαις μετὰ τὸ κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους, Scriptt. Biograph. p. 301. φρουρὰν &c. καταστήσαντος ᾿Αλεξάνδρου ἐν ταῖς Θή-

2 Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained at Athens, such as Demosthenês and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demosthenês or Lykurgus who now guided the general policy of Athens. For the twelve years Phokion and Demabetween the destruction of Thêbes and the death of dês were Alexander, Phokion and Demadês were her ministers leading ministers at for foreign affairs—two men of totally opposite Athens characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in they were of macedolooking to the favour of Alexander and Antipater as nizing politics. the principal end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian fleet during Alexander's first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him further as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians generally.2 There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip's power was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to Demadês, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end, declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by Antipater, but even by Alexander.3

It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonizing policy was now decidedly in the ascendant—accepted, even by dissentients, as the only course admissible under the circumstances,

^{1 &}quot;Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes Demosthenes, De Corona, p. 331), Æschines and men of his stamp are in full ascendency and affluence—I am impotent: there is no place at Athens

for free citizens and counsellors, but only for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling potentate."

² Arrian, i. 29, 8. ³ Plutarch, Phokion, 30.

and confirmed the more by each successive victory of Alexander -yet statesmen, like Lykurgus and Demosthenês, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment, still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of though not course restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic theless still intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not ance. Financial merely the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue, rendering strict

thenês and in the ascendant politically, are neverpublic men of importactivity of Lykurgus.

periodical account, vet with a financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since Periklês. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city,-multiplied the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples,—enlarged, or constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval, -- and maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian people. The main cause of his first hold upon the public mind was his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the parallel of Phokion.

As to Demosthenês, he did not hold any such commanding public appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel during the past. The proof of this is to be found

1 See the remarkable decree in honour of Lykurgus, passed by the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death, in the archonship of Anaxikratès, B.C. 307 (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree, constituting four-lifths of the whole, goes over the public conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.

It seems that the twelve years of financial administration exercised by Lykurgus are to be taken probably either from 342—330 B.C., or four years later, from 338—326 B.C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two. Droysen and Meier prefer the

in one very significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon's motion for crowning Demosthenes, was instituted Position of by Æschinês, and official entry made of it before Demosthenês—his prudent the death of Philip - which event occurred in August, 336 B.C. Yet Æschinês did not venture to conduct. bring it on for trial until August, 330 B.C., after Antipater had subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even at that advantageous moment, when the macedonizers seemed in full triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive that though Phokion and Demadês were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable, yet the preponderant sentiment of the people went with Demosthenes and Lykurgus. In fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war Antipater thought it requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or deporting two-thirds of the citizens.1 It seems however that the anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to Alexander, between 334 and 330 B.C. Ktesiphon accepted a mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death of her husband, Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenês stands accused of having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in Phænicia, during the spring of 331 B.C. This assertion of Æschinês, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general prudence of Demosthenês as to his known and formidable enemy.2

It was not from Athens but from Sparta that anti-Macedonian

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

² Æschinês (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration, p. 550) charges Demosthenês with having sent letters to Alexander, soliciting pardon and favour. He states that a young man named Ariston, a friend of Demosthenês, was much about the person of Alexander and that the person of Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent. He cites as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called Paralus, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B.C. (compare Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperides also seems to have advanced the like allegation against Demosthenes—see Har-

pokratiôn, v. 'Αριστίων.

The oration of Hyperides in defence of Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington), delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, gives general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion to the existing Macedonian ascendency. Euxenippus had been accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperides strenuously denies it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at school (says Hyperides) know the names of the corrupt orators or flatterers who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among them (pp. 11, 12). The oration of Hyperides in defence

movements now took rise. In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thêbes at Chæroneia against Anti-Macedonian Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned. Their movement king Archidamus, who had been active conjointly from Sparta -King Agis with Athens in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the visits the Phokians against Philip and the Thebans, had after-Persian admirals in the wards withdrawn himself from Central Greece to assist Ægean. His attempts the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a battle both in against the Messapians.1 He was succeeded by his son Krête and in Pelopon-Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince was nominated Leader of the Greeks, and even persisted in the same denial on Alexander's nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the inscription that they were dedicated "by Alexander and the Greeks, excepting the Lacedæmonians".2 Agis took the lead in trying to procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards the close of summer, 333 B.C., a little before the battle of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men and money for intended action in Peloponnêsus.³ At that moment they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known, they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes, which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself master of Krête, feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. Krête, he appears to have had considerable temporary success, and even in Peloponnêsus he organized some demonstrations which Alexander sent Amphoterus with a large naval force to

repress in the spring of 331 B.C.4 At that time Phœnicia, Egypt,

¹ Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodôr. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.

² Arriau, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan.

vii. 10, 1.

³ Arrian, ii. 13, 4. 4 Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodôr. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It is to this war in Krête, between Agis and the Mace-

and all the naval mastery of the Ægean had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably Amphoterus recovered Krête, but he had no land force to attack Agis in Peloponnêsus.

In October, 331 B.C., Darius was beaten at Arbêla and became a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Per-

B.C. 330. Spring.

Agis levies an army in Peloponnesus, and makes open declaration against Antipater. a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander's force, it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement during the spring of 330 B.C. must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale of opera-

tions in Peloponnêsus, and prevailed on a considerable body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed war with Macedonia, and therefore incurred little additional risk; moveover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters to cast back upon Greece small bands of soldiers who had hitherto found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta, so that Agis found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable

donian party and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words contained, Politica, ii. 7, 8) as having exposed the weakness of the Kretan institutions—see Schneider's note on the passage. At least we do not know of any other events suitable to the words

or any other events stitude to the words.

Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian treasures at Susa (about December, 331 B.C.) sent a large reunittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for carrying on the war against the Lacedemonians (Arrian, iii. 16, 17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnésus had begun in the spring of 331 B.C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his aggressive movements in Peloponnésus did not assume formidable proportions until the spring of 330 B.C. At the date of the speech of Æschinés against Ktesiphon (August, 330 B.C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedemonian prisoners were only about to be sent to Alexander to learn

their fate (Æsch. adv. Ktes. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated before the battle of Arbèla. Moreover, there were Lacedemonian envoys present with Darius until a few days before his death (July, 330 B.C.), who afterwards fell into the hands of Alexander (Arrian, iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the victory of Antipater to have taken place about June, 330 B.C., and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got together about three months before (March, 330 B.C.).

Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4, p. 234) discusses the chronology of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory. He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander (Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time between the battle of Arbêla and the final defeat of Agis.

to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy in Macedonia.1 An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable distance from Greece, while Alexander, victorious as he was, being in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.2 Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage to march out of Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against Macedonian dominion. while Darius still retained all the eastern half of his empire. and while support from him in men and money might yet be anticipated.3

Respecting this war, we know very few details. flush of success appeared to attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans (except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis), and some other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as

At first, a B.C. 330.

Agis, at first partially successful, is completely

defeated by Antipater and slain.

previously, was the stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself at Athens in favour of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion and Demadês, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution.4 Even Demosthenes himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging, could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against Alexander-though he seems to have indulged in the expression of general anti-Mace-

¹ Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plusard A. Philosoph, Paintle General Production of Plusard A. Philosoph, Paintle General Production of Plusard A. Philosoph, Paintle General Production of Plusard Production of Plusard Production of Plusard Production of Plusard Pl tarch, Agesilaus, 15.

² Æschinês adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553.

Demosth. s. 35.

4 Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præ-

cept. p. 818.

donian sympathies, and to have complained of the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad policy.1 Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached Peloponnêsus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially, fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated. Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who, though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost 3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained either at Issus or at Arbêla—a plain proof, that Agis and his companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage worthy of the best days of Sparta.

Complete submission of all Greece to Antipater -Spartan envoys sent up to Alexander in Asia.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed that all submitted to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those among their leading men who had advised the war.² But he would not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians without special

reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.3 We are told that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at Baktra; 4 what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

¹ This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenes, from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.

It is, however, difficult to believe, what Æschines insinuates, that Demosthenes boasted of having himself got up the Lacedemonian movement, and wit that he made no proposition. and yet that he made no proposition or suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenes can hardly have lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things

took a favourable turn.

Deinarchus (ut suprà) also accuses Demosthenês of having remained inactive at this critical moment.

² Curtius, vi. 1, 15—20; Diodôr. xvii. 63—73. After the defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing from ἀτιμία those who had escaped from the hattle—as had been done after Leuktra (Diodôr. xix.

<sup>70).

&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 524.

⁴ Curtius, vii. 4, 32.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander's accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate themselves from Macedonian dominion: this enterprise of Agis was the second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility Greece of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; want or combinaboth ended miserably, riveting the chains of Greece

Untoward result of the defensive efforts of

more powerfully than ever. Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal. The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as against the gigantic power of Alexander, and would perhaps never have been undertaken. had not Agis himself been already compromised in hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability (so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopyle; whose renown stands higher, only because the banner which he upheld ultimately triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part with Agis, were now left, without Thêbes and Sparta, as the two great military powers of Greece; which will appear presently, when we come to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet during this anti-Macedonian movement in B.C. 330. Peloponnêsus, a powerful sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle was parties at going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, during the the Athenians might probably have declared in his struggle of favour; and although no independent position could reaction of the have been permanently maintained against so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet, considering

Position of Athens Agismacedonizing party after his

that he was thoroughly occupied and far in the defeat. interior of Asia, Greece might have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable. In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the macedonizing statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents, and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies of Demosthenês to offer a favourable opportunity for ruining and dishonouring him.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial

Judicial contest between Æschinês and Demosthenês. tion of Ktesiphon, and the in-Æschinês.

contest between the two great Athenian orators—the memorable accusation of Æschinês against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown to Demosthenes, and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenês, on Preliminary behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in stances as to autumn or winter of 337—336 B.C. that Ktesiphon the proposi- had proposed this vote of public honour in favour of Demosthenês, and had obtained the (probouleuma) dictment by preliminary acquiescence of the Senate; it was in the same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that

Æschinês attacked the proposition under the Graphê Paranomôn, as illegal, unconstitutional, mischievous, and founded on false allegations.1 More than six years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation; yet Æschinês had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the same honour upon Demosthenês,2 and had been indicted under the Graphê Para-

¹ Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in the oration of Demosthene's De Corona, there appears one (p. 266) purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another (p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschine's. I have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all the documents annexed to this oration; all of them hear the name of wrong archons. them bear the name of wrong archons, them bear the name of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding Chaps. Ixxxix., xc.

We know from the statement of Eschines himself that the motion of

Ktesiphon was made after the appoint-Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenês to be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city, and that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon Cherondas (June, 337 B.C.—see Eschinês adv. Ktesiph. pp. 421—426). We also know that the accusation of Eschinês against Ktesiphon was pre-

ferred before the assassination of Philip, which took place in August, 336 B.C. (Æschin. ib. pp. 612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with the probouleuma which preceded it) must have occurred some time during the autumn or winter of time during the autumn or winter of 337—336 B.C.; that the accusation of Eschines must have been handed in shortly after it; and that this accusation cannot have been handed in tion cannot have been handed in at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month Elaphebolion of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to the appointment of Demosthenès. Moreover, whoever compares the so-called motion of Ktesiphon as it stands inserted in Demosth. De Corona, p. 266, with the words in which Eschinès himself (adv. Ktesiph. p. 631—öθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποιήσω, see also p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it cannot be genuine. it cannot be genuine.

Demosthenês De Coronâ, pp. 253,
 302, 303, 310. He says (pp. 267—313) that

nomôn; but with such signal ill-success, that their accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts. and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited Æschines; and although in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon's motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under the Graphe Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of Demosthenês; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand publicly dishonoured both as citizen and as politician. Unless this latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschinês gained nothing by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenes might have forced Æschinês to the alternative of either dropping his indictment or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge, which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold enough to send; especially after the capture of Thêbes in 335 B.C., when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenes with several other citizens.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenes enjoying the inchoate honour of a complimentary vote from the Senate, Æschinês intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to trial under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of

Accusatory harangue of Æschinês, nominally against the proposition of Ktesiphon, really against the political life of Demosthenês.

he had been crowned often (πολλάκις) successes against Philip at Byzantium by the Athenians and other Greek citizens. The crown which he received on the motion of Aristonikus (after the vit. X. Oratt. p. 848.

10 - 15

anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities also.1 Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry his resentment still further, Æschinês could now urge that Athens was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of Demosthenês,2 and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and bitter harangue, Æschinês first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held by Demosthenes at the moment when it was proposed; next he enters at large into the whole life and character of Demosthenes, to prove him unworthy of such an honour, even if there had been no formal grounds of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenc's into four periods; the first ending at the peace of 346 B.C. between Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out of the next ensuing war in 341—340 B.C.—the third, ending with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time following.3 Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the conduct of Demosthenes as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly, and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still, he expressly charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander, at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and intrepid opposition to them.4

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been driven from her independent and even presidential position into the degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time when Demosthenês first began political life, was a fact but too indisputable. Æschinês even makes this a part of his case, arraigning the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenês as the cause of so melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him

¹ Demosthenês De Coronâ, p. 294.
2 Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 645.
διαβέβληται δ' ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἐκτῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιρο ὑς· δόξετε δ' ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ὁ μο γνώ μο νες εἶναι τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τ ἡν κοινὴν εἰρήνην, ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this the last sentence of the oration of Demosthenês in reply,

where he puts up a prayer to the gods — ἡμῖν δὲτοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

The mention by, Æschinês (immediately before) of the Pythian games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of this judicial trial— August, 330 B.C.

 ³ Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.
 4 Æs. adv. Ktes. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.

as candidate for public compliment on no better plea than a series of public calamities.¹ Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenês prior to the battle of Chæroneia, Æschinês proceeds to the more recent past, and contends that Demosthenês cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all highly favourable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the earliest was, when Alexander first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis in Peloponnêsus.² On none of these occasions did Demosthenês call for any public action against Macedonia—a proof (according to Æschinês) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

I have more than once remarked that, considering the bitter enmity between the two orators, it is rarely safe to Appreciatrust the unsupported allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the last mentioned charges on indepenadvanced by Æschinês, there is enough of known fact, dence, as an and we have independent evidence, such as is not accuser of Demostheoften before us, to appreciate him as an accuser of nes. Demosthenes. The victorious career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschinês, presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian patriot to involve his country in warfare against so formidable an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against Demosthenes, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenês does not notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground, that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired, by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and the barbaric world-in which Athens has been engulfed along with others-and from which even those faithless

 ¹ Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526,
 2 Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. pp. 551—553,
 553.

and trimming Greeks, who helped to aggrandize Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor indeed so well.¹

I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to Reply of those encomiums which have been pronounced upon Demosthenêsit with one voice, both in ancient and in modern oration De times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian Coronâ. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world, against a dangerous aggressor from without. efforts were directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in my preceding chapters. Demosthenes here passes them in review, replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B.C. (or the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is remarkable that, though professing to enter upon a defence of his whole public life, he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed that portion of it which is perhaps the most honourable to him—the early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs when, though a politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip's aggrandizement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic precautions against it, in spite of apathy and murmurs from older politicians as well as from the general Beginning with the peace of 346 B.C., Demosthenes vindicates his own share in that event against the charges of Æschinês, whom he denounces as the cause of all the mischiefa controversy which I have already tried to elucidate in a former chapter. Passing next to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenês is not satisfied with simple vindication. He reasserts this policy as matter of pride and honour, in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and takes to himself only

^{. 1} Demosthen. De Coronâ, pp. 311— μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου παντὸς, ὡς 316. Είναι τοῦς καὶ τῶν κοιν $\hat{\eta}$ 2 Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 227. πεπολιτευμένων, &c.

the credit of having been forward to proclaim and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been adverse: yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake; Demosthenês swears it by the combatants of Marathôn, Platæa, and To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece is an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without strenuous resistance on the part of Athens would have been calamity aggravated by dishonour.

Conceived in this sublime train, the reply of Demosthenes to his rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration Funeral of extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years oration of before, the orator had been appointed by his countryfreedom.

men to deliver the usual public oration over the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen was now cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force, there still remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed during the past, the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it successfully, and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of Philip at Chæroneia, in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thêbes by Alexander and the danger of Athens after it, in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands of the Macedonian king, the Athenian people could never be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenês or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy. How much art and ability were employed to induce them to do so by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschinês is enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken of schemes which end in misfortune, how great a mental relief is usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders, it would have been no matter of surprise if, in one of the many prosecutions wherein the fame of Demosthenes was involved, the

¹ Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ' προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπάν- καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, των ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυ- &c.—the oath so often cited and νον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι admired.

Dikasts had given a verdict unfavourable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and even honourably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness of temper in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic, and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in his orations throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the minds of his hearers, and that amidst the many general allegations of corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the Dikastery.

The indictment now preferred by Æschinês against Ktesiphon only procured for Demosthenes a new triumph. When Verdict of the Dikasts the suffrages of the Dikasts were counted, Æschinês -triumph did not obtain so much as one-fifth. He became, of Demosthenêstherefore, liable to the customary fine of 1000 exile of drachmæ. It appears that he quitted Athens imme-Æschinês. diately without paying the fine and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander's life (at the time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander's death.1

We cannot suppose that Æschinês was unable to pay the fine of 1000 drachmæ or to find friends who would pay it the exile of for him. It was not, therefore, legal compulsion, but Æschinêsthe extreme disappointment and humiliation of so he was the means of signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens. We procuring coronation must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge for Demossent by himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together auditors, not merely from Athens but from various other Grecian cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenês in his own defence, delivered with all his perfection of voice and action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise and contemptuous bitterness towards his

¹ See the various lives of Æschinês—in Westermann, Scriptores Biographici, pp. 268, 269.

rival, must have been inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of Æschinês became themselves angry with him for having brought the indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been that the vote of the Senate which he indicted was brought forward and passed in the public assembly, and that Demosthenes must have received a public coronation.1 In no other way, under the existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenes have obtained so emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such a mortification was insupportable to Æschinês. He became disgusted with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils. the successful oration of his rival, De Corona. Of course it excited a burst of admiration. "What, if you had heard the beast himself speak it!" exclaimed Æschinês.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant, we have to pass to another trial, a direct accusation brought against him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled here to jump over five years and a half (August, 330 B.C., to January, 324 B.C.) during which we have no information about Grecian history, the interval between

B.C. 324.

Subsequent accusation against Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus.

Alexander's march into Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast at Cape Tænarus in Laconia.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B.C.) that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable

¹ Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 315. εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἤδη πεἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μήδ' ὁτιοῦν
ἀδικεῖν ἀνωμολόγημαι—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντη
μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει, κινδυνεύεις δὲ according to Demosthenês, p. 329.

Flight of Harpalus to Athens -his previous conduct and relations with Athens.

treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers. While satrap, he had invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses, Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached and whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments to her memory, one at Babylon, the other in

Attica, between Athens and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in Kilikia, to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before her and address her as queen. and to have erected her statue along with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and Syria.2 To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.3 Moreover, he had consigned to Chariklês, son-in-law of Phokion, the task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honour of Pythionikê, with a large remittance of money for the purpose.4 The profit or embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the goodwill of Charikles, a man very different from his father-in-law, the honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to quit Asia about the beginning of 324 B.C., he had already acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and protection in that city.5

¹ Diodôr. xvi. 108. He states the in the Dionysiac festival or early treasure brought out of Asia by Harmonths of 324 B.C. palus as 5000 talents.

palus as 5000 talents.

² See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and before his flight to Athens — Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xiii. pp. 586–595. Theopompus speaks in the present tense — κ aì o ρ \hat{q} (Harpalus) \hat{v} n o \hat{v} to λ aou $\pi \rho o \sigma \kappa v v o u \mu \acute{e} v \eta v$ (Glykera), &c. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus (Athenæ. ibid.).

⁵ Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satyrical drama called Agen, represented before Alexander at Susa,

months of 324 B.C.

4 Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi Fragment. 72, ed. Didot.

Plutarch's narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply that Harpalus gave this money to Chariklês after his arrival at Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and magnificent.

⁵ Curtius, x. 2, 1.

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a

friend and ally, thrown off the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic freedom. Parameter, and ports conprepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic freedom. Such is the colour of the case, as presented in the that the satyric drama called Agên, exhibited before Alexander had idenin the Dionysiac festival at Susa, in February or selves with March, 324 B.C. Such news, connecting itself in

False re-Athenians tified them-Harpalus.

Alexander's mind with the recent defeat of Zopyrion in Thrace, and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries, incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.1 But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of Harpalus.2

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the rumours first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of

¹ Curtius, x. 2, 1. "Igitur triginta navibus Sunium transmittunt" (Harpalus and his company), "unde portum urbis petere decreverunt. His cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus petiturus." Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7, who mentions this hostile intention in Alexander's mind, but gives a different account of the but gives a different account of the cause of it.

cause of it.

The extract from the drama Agin (given in Athenæus, xiii. p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery, with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it, to enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present privations and future ruin:

ruin :-

A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δουλον έκτησθαι βίον, ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουν· νῦν δὲ, τὸν χέδροπα μόνον καὶ τὸν μάραδον ἔσθουσι, πυροὺς δ' οὐ μάλα. Β. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν "Αρπα-

αὐτοῖσι τῶν ᾿Αγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας

σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγο-

Α. Γλυκέρας ὁ σίτος ούτος ην · έστιν δ' ἴσως

αὐτοῖσιν ὀλέθρου κοὐκ ἐταίρας ἀρραβών.

I conceive this drama Agen to have been represented on the banks of the

been represented on the banks of the Choaspes (not the Hydaspes—see my note in the Chapter immediately preceding), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia of 324 B.C. It is interesting as a record of the feelings of the time.

² Nevertheless, the impression that Alexander was intending to besiege Athens must have prevailed in the army for several months longer, during the autumn of 324 B.C., when he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus, the historian, in recounting the flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ Αλέξανδρον της rhodomonicade οι α soldier hamed Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ Αλέξανδρον *Αμμωνος υίδν στεφανοί χρυσοίς τρισ-χιλίοις, καὶ ὅταν 'Αθήνας πο-λιορκή, μυρίαις πανοπλίαις καὶ ταίς ἰσαις καταπέλταις καὶ πᾶσι τοις άλλοις βέλεσιν είς τὸν πόλεμον ἰκανοῖς (Ephippus ap, Athenæum xiii. p. 538. Fragment. 3, ed. Didot).

Harpalus with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were coming to take possession of Peiræus; B.C. 324. and the admiral Philoklês was instructed to adopt Circumstances atprecautions for defence of the harbour.1 But tending the Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krête or to arrival of Harpalus Tænarus, solicited and obtained permission to come at Sunium - debate in to Athens, with a single ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater moment, he Athenian assemblybrought with him a large sum of money, amounting, promises held out by we are told, to upwards of 700 talents, or more than Harpalus— the Athe-£160,000. We must recollect that he was already nians seem favourably known to the people by large presents of at first favourably corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship. disposed to-He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful allies, foreign as

well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would raise the standard of liberation.² To many Athenian patriots, more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy and confi-

1 Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. l. φάσκων κωλύσειν *Αρπαλον εἰς τὸν Πειραῖα καταπλεῦσαι στρατηγὸς ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, ἀς. Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton. s. 4. δς παρ' 'Αρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ἤσθεθ' ἤκειν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν, ἀς.

2 See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty. fragments of the

² See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty, fragments of the oration of Hyperidės against Demosthenės, published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From Fragm. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington's edition), we may see that the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by Harpalus: indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive evidence. Hyperidės addresses Demosthenės—ταὐτας ὑπ. . . ις τῷ ψηφίσματι, τυλλαβὼν τὸν ᾿Αρπαλον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλονς ἄπαντας πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας

ώς 'Αλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν ἀποστροφήν· το ὺς δὲ βαρ βάρους, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄν ἤκον φέροντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους ἔκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, το ὑτο υς σύμπαντας οὐ μόνον κεκώ λυκας ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου τῆ συλλήψει τοῦ Αρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . .

From the language thus used by Hyperidês in his accusation we are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus, upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the people when the case was first under discussion.

The fragment here cited is complete.

The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other fragments the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.

dence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men like Chariklês, who were already in his interest. His cause was espoused by Hyperidês,1 an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and an orator second only to Demosthenês. There seems good reason for believing that, at first, a strong feeling was excited in favour of taking part with the exile, the people not being daunted even by the idea of war with Alexander.2

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavoured to corrupt, resisted of course the proposition of espousing his Phokion

cause. And Demosthenes also resisted it, not less and Demosdecidedly, from the very outset.3 Notwithstanding both agree all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not in dissuing the be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Athenians Alexander. Indeed those who study his orations throughout will find his counsels quite as much

in dissuadfrom taking up Harpalus.

distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism. His prudence on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his political position; for while it incensed Hyperides and the more sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonizing

opponents.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenês and Phokion prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favour. Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should be surrendered.4 The like comply, but requisition was also addressed by the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no less than of Demosthenês. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian vengeance

Demand by Antipater for the surrender of Harpalus-Athenians refuse to they arrest Harpalus and sequestrate his treasure for Alexander.

¹ Pollux, x. 159.
2 Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531.
τῶν γὰρ ᾿Αθηναίων ὡρμημένων ᾿Αρπάλω
βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν ᾿Αλέξανδρον, ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν
ἐπὶ θαλάσση πραγμάτων ᾿Αλεξάνδρου
στρατηγός ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου,

καὶ σιωπῶντος διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσ-θένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ήλιον ἰδόντες, οὶ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν; 3 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch,

Demosthen. 25.

⁴ Diodôr, xvii, 108.

were now brought in such fearful proximity before the people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander; to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit a lenient sentence at his hands.1 Now it

Demosthenês moves the decree Harpalus. who is escapes.

was Demosthenês who moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of the money;2 for arrest of whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from Hyperidês and the other Harpalian partisans who arrested but denounced him as a subservient creature of the allpowerful monarch. Harpalus was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenês, and every one else; for even those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the odium and dishonour of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a

by one of his own companions.3

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were passed, Demosthenês requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus publicly in the assembly what was the amount of his money, which the people had just resolved to impound.4 Harpalus answered, 720 talents; and Demosthenes proclaimed this sum to

certain death. He fled to Krête, where he was soon after slain

¹ Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69.

1 Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 60. ἐἀν τοὺς παίδας καταπέμψη (Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἐαντὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ τούτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, &c.

2 See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration of Hyperides against Demosthenès. That it was Demosthenès who moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis, we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen. sects. 68, 71, 89)—ἔγραψενος, ἀναὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δήμφ Δημοσθένης, ψε δηλονότι δικαίον τοῦ πράγματος ὅντος, ψυλάττειν ἀλεξάνδρφ τὰ εἰς τῆν ἀντικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ ἀλρπάλου χρήματα.

Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97—106) accuses Demosthenês of base flattery to Alexander. Hyperidês also

tery to Alexander. Hyperidês also

makes the same charge—see the Fragments in Mr. Babington's edition, sect. 2, Fr. 11, p. 12; sect. 3, Fr. 5, p. 34.

³ Pausan, ii. 33, 4; Diodôr. xvii. 108.

⁴ This material fact, of the question publicly put to Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of Demosthenês, appears in the Fragments of Hyperidês, pp. 5, 7, 9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῆ κατατομῆ, ἐκέλευσε . . . τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἄρπαλον ὸπόσα εῖη τὰ χρήματα τὰ ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι ἐπτακόσια, &c. κόσια, &c.

The term κατατομή (see Mr. Babington's note) "designates a broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with them".

the people, on the authority of Harpalus, dwelling, with some emphasis, upon its magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents. Now, it is said that Demosthenes did not at once communicate to the people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the acropolis; and

Conduct of Demosthenês in regard to the treasure of Harpalus— deficiency of the sum counted and realized, as compared sum announced by Harpalus.

when the truth became at length known, great surprise and outcry were excited. It was assumed that the missing half of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenês and Hyperidês both included.

In this state of doubt, Demosthenes moved that the Senate of Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the presumed delinquents² fit to be indicted before the Dikastery; he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though Demosthenes is said to have called for it with some impatience. Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting only one who was recently married.3 At length the report appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenês himself, charged with 20 talents, Demades charged with 6000

had proposed to recognize the sentence of the Areopagus as final and peremp-

tory, and as if he stood therefore condemned upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted afterwards; besides that, it is repugnant to the judicial practice of Athens.

3 Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not delivered until after an interval of six months. About their delay and the impatience of Demosthenês, see Fragm. of Hyperidês, pp. 12—33, ed. Babington Babington.

Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenes given by Photius (Cod. 265, p. 494) it is stated that only 308 talents were

² That this motion was made by Demosthenes himself is a point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s. 5, 62, 84, &c.; compare also the Fragm. of Hyperidės, p. 59, ed. Babington.

Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as if Demosthenes

golden staters, and other citizens, with different sums attached to

Suspicions about this money-Demosthenês moves that the Areopagus shall investigate the matter -the Areopagites bring in a report against Demosthenês himself. with Demadês and others, as guilty of corrupt appropriation. Demosthenês is tried on this charge, condemned, and goes into exile.

their names. 1 Upon this report, ten 2 public accusers were appointed to prosecute the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery. Among the accusers was Hyperidês, whose name had not been comprised in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenês was brought to trial first of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500 citizens,3 who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state. Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison; but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Træzên in Peloponnêsus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.4 What was done with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not know. It appears that Demadês⁵—who was among those comprised, and who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenes, by both Hyperidês and Deinarchus—did not appear to take

his trial, and therefore must have been driven into exile; yet if so he must have speedily returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died. Philoklês and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their trial ended does not appear.⁶

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenes, unquestionably the greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian antiquity, is the most painful result of the debates respecting the exile Harpalus. Demosthenes himself denied the

¹ Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperidês in Mr. Rabington p. 18

Babington, p. 18.

² Deinarchus adv. Areistogeiton. s. 6.

Stratoklês was one of the accusers.

3 Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108,

⁴ Plutarch, Demosth. 26.

<sup>Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.
See the two orations composed by</sup>

Deinarchus against Philoklês and Aristogeiton.

In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenes (pp. 1470, 1483,

^{1485),} he is made to state that he alone had been condemned by the Dikastery, because his trial had come on first; that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the evidence against all was the same also, viz., nothing more than the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe, on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.

charge, but unfortunately we possess neither his defence nor the facts alleged in evidence against him, so that our Was Demeans of forming a positive conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the circumstances as far as we know them, there are several which go to show his innocence and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we must know for what

mosthenês guilty of such corrupt appro-priation? Circumstances as known in

service the payment was made. Did Demosthenes take part with Harpalus and advise the Athenians to espouse his cause? he even keep silence and abstain from advising them to reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenes was from the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures for supporting his cause. Plutarch, indeed, tells an anecdote that Demosthenes began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents, which Demosthenes accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers and affected to have lost his voice, upon which the people, detecting this simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given, expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by indignant murmuring. 1 So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenes may, indeed, have been disabled by sore-throat from speaking at some particular assembly; so far the story may be accurate. But that he desisted from opposing Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly not true, for we know from his accusers, Deinarchus and Hyperidês, that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander. fact, Hyperides himself denounces Demosthenes as having from subservience to Alexander closed the door against Harpalus and his prospects.² Such direct and continued opposition is a con-

¹ Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth., Cod. 265, p. 494.

² See the fragment of Hyperidês in Mr. Babington's edition, pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note), insisting upon the prodigious

clusive proof that Demosthenês was neither paid nor bought by

Demosthenês could not have received money from Harpalus since he opposed him from first to last. Harpalus. The only service which he rendered to the exile was by refusing to deliver him to Antipater and by not preventing his escape from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred; and probably the best Athenians of all parties were desirous of favouring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to hand over to a Macedonian execu-

tioner. In so far as it was a crime not to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed as much by Phokion as by Demosthenês, and indeed more, seeing that Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important administrative duties, while Demosthenês was only an orator and mover in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape, for the same motion which decreed his arrest decreed also the sequestration of his money, and thus removed it from his own control.

The charge, therefore, made against Demosthenês by his two

Had Demosthenês the means of embezzling after the money had passed out of the control of Harpalus? Answer in the negative.

accusers, that he received money from Harpalus, is one which all the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole case. Had Demosthenês the means of embezzling the money after it had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to judge.

Demosthenês had moved, and the people had voted, that these treasures should be lodged in trust for

Alexander in the acropolis, a place where all the Athenian public

mischief which Demosthenês had done by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις)

Harpalus.

1 In the life of Demosthenes apud Photium (Cod. 265), the service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as I have stated it in the text—Demosthenes first spoke publicly against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικούς χιλίους (ώς φασι) λαβών πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο (then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of sentiment was manifested, which par-

ticular acts are described as follows)—καὶ βουλομένων τῶν ἄλθηναίων ἀντιπάτρω προδοῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, τά τε ἀρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμω τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.

That Demosthenes should first oppose the reception of Harpalus, and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus to Antipater's requisition, is here represented as a change of politics, requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it. But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.

money was habitually kept, in the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber these new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the Athenian exchequer, and would be just as much out of the reach of Demosthenes as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact than to put it in the recognized place of surety? as to the intermediate process of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis there is no proof, and in my judgment no probability, that Demosthenes was at all concerned in it. to count, verify, and weigh a sum of above £80,000, not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely to be not even Attic but Asiatic, must have been a tedious duty requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to the habits of Demosthenes. The officers of the Athenian treasury must have gone through this labour, providing the slaves or mules requisite for carrying so heavy a burden up to the acropolis. have ample evidence from the remaining inscriptions that the details of transferring and verifying the public property at Athens were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly questioned in the assembly, What was the sum to be carried up into the acropolis? answered by stating the amount which he had originally brought, and not that which he had remaining, Demosthenes might surely repeat that statement immediately after him without being understood thereby to bind himself as guarantee for its accuracy. An adverse pleader like Hyperidês might, indeed, turn a point in his speech 1-" You told the

1 Fragm. of Hyperidês, p. 7, ed. Babington—έν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπτακόσια φήσας of the ordinary gaolers. This is to the cival τάλαντα, νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ακε Demosthenes responsible for the performance of all the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct of the treasurers and the gaolers.

We must recollect that Hyperidês ror not having proposed any decree providing a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or cause of that exile against Alexander.

10—16

assembly that there were 700 talents, and now you produce no more than half"; but the imputation wrapped up in these words against the probity of Demosthenes is utterly groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury. Demosthenês could learn it only from them, and it might certainly be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given, but we neither know by whom nor how soon.1

Accusatory speech of Deinarchus against Demosthenês-virulent invective

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending to refute the charge against Demosthenes. This conclusion will certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed by Deinarchus, which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and evidentiary matter, and running over all the destitute of life of Demosthenes for the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperides also was of the like

desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts-no justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the sums for which each of them was chargeable.2 It appears to have been made ex parte, as far as we can judge—that is, made without hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by Hyperides and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which the Dikasts could not reject.

One of the charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenes is that Demosthenes prevented this from heing accomplished. Yet here is another charge from the same speaker to the effect that Demosthenes did not here the same and the same speaker to the effect that Demosthenes did not have the same and accomplished. keep Harpalus under effective custody for the sword of the Macedonian executioner!

The line of accusation taken by Hyperides is full of shameful inconsistencies.

1 In the Life of Demosthene's (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846) the charge of corruption against him is made to rest chiefly on the fact that he did not make this communication to the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν

αριθμον των ανακομισθέντων μεμηνυκώς μήτε τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμελείαν, &C.
The biographer apud Photium seems
to state it as if Demosthenês did not communicate the amount at the time when he proposed the decree of sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict from the testi-

enabled to contradict from the testimony of Hyperides.

2 Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις πάσας τὰς ὑπέρ τῶν χρημάτων 'Αρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ πεποίηται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ οὐδεμίᾳ προσγέγραφε, δι' ὅτι ἔκαστον ἀποφαίνει ἀλλ' ἐπικεφ ἀλαιον γράψασα, ὁπόσον ἔκαστος είληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ' οὖν ὀφειλέτω λέτω. . .

When Demosthenes demanded, as every defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be proved by some positive evidence, Hyperidês sets aside the demand as nothing better than cavil and special pleading.1

One further consideration remains to be noticed. months after the verdict of the Dikastery against Change of Demosthenês Alexander died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenes was then recalled; received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as had never been accorded months. to any returning exile since the days of Alkibiadês; took a leading part in the management of the war; and perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser Hyperidês.

Only nine mind respecting Demosthenês, in the Athenian public, in a

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenês counte-

nances the conclusion which seems to me suggested by against him was not judicial, but political, growing respecting the money of Harpalus the other circumstances of the case—that the verdict reality of

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a and the declaration of active support from the Athenians was the Areomatter of life and death, distributed various bribes to

sentence of

all consenting recipients who could promote his views, and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing them, -to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperidês himself, as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest recipients.2 Here was abundant bribery-notorious in

1 Hyperid. Frag. p. 16, ed. Babingt. έγω δ' ὅτιμὲν ἐλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, ἱκαν ὁν οἰμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν βουλὴν σοῦ καταγνῶναι (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46, and the beginning of the second Demosthonic existic.)

s. 46, and the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).

Hyperid. p. 16, ed. Babington. καὶ συκοφαντεῖς την βουλην, προκλήσεις προτιθείς, καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ' τοως ἐρωτήσεις καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν.

This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favour of the defendant, and a still stronger presumption against the accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.

The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperides and four other orators procured (κατεσκεύασαν) the condemnation of Demosth. by the

Areopagus.

2 The biographer of Hyperidês (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself unbribed; the comic writer Timoklês names Hyperidês along with Demosthenês and others as recipients (A. Athana, viii p. 342). (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).

the mass, though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian case. When the tide of sentiment turned-when fear of Macedonian force became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover, the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no more than 350 were forthcoming. It was indispensable that some definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenes himself was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the Areopagites.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent in the investigation of facts; and if it had been, the report when published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is that their time was passed quite as much in partydiscussions as in investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling out Demosthenês as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and embodying Demadês also, by way of compromise, in the same list of delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious. I have already observed that Demosthenes was at that time unpopular with both the reigning parties; with the philo-Macedonians, from long date, and not without sufficient reason: with the anti-Macedonians, because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of

¹ See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.

course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It leaves Demosthenes innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion; but to the Athenian politicians generally it is noway creditable; while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure of dangers from without, worked upon by party intrigues within.1

During the half year and more which elapsed between the arrival of Harpalus at Athens and the trial of Demos- B.C. 324. thenes, one event at least of considerable moment Rescript of occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nikanor to the Alexander to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal Grecian cities directletter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall ing that the exiles all its citizens that were in exile, except such as were should be under the taint of impiety. The rescript, which was recalled in publicly read at the festival by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus: "King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities. We have not been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not recall you of their own accord." 2

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript had been procured. It would seem that

¹ We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom his master had corrupted, and that Demosthenes was not among them. As the statement goes it sowes 2 Dioder viv 8 far as this statement goes it serves

seqq.).

2 Diodôr. xix. 8.

Antipater had orders further to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan or Arcadian cities,1 and to enforce not merely recal of the exiles, but restitution of their properties.2

Purpose of the rescript -to provide partisans for Alexander in each of the cities-Discontents in Greece.

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each city with devoted partisans of Alexander, we cannot doubt. It was on his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereigntysetting aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of Greece-disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to attempt a distinction

between just and unjust sentences—over-ruling in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the Hellenic world. Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander were sure to look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities, and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have refused to execute the order.3 It is one evidence of the disgust raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenês is severely reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.4

In the winter or early spring of 323 B.c. several Grecian cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them, but we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.⁵ There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during this winter and spring (322 B.C.). The disbanded

¹ See the Fragments of Hyperidês.

p. 36, ed. Babington.
2 Curtius, x. 2, 6.
3 Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodôrus (xviii. 8) that the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks except the Athenians and Etolians cannot be credited. It was popular, doubtless, with the exiles themselve and their immediate friends.

⁴ Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81: compare Hyperid. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Babington.

⁵ Diodôr. xvii. 113. There seem to have been cases in which Alexander interfered with the sentences of the Athenian Dikastery against Athenian citizens: see the case of a man liberated from a judicial fine at his instance. Pseudo-Demosthenes, Epistel 3 n. 1480 tol. 3, p. 1480.

soldiers out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenes, an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments. accepted the command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens. and with the Ætolians.1 Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance of the troops who had accompanied him over.

Such was the general position of affairs when Alexander died at Babylon in June, 323 B.C. This astounding news, B.C. 323. for which no one could have been prepared, must Summer. have become diffused throughout Greece during the Effect month of July. It opened the most favourable in Greece prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by by the death of Macedonian dominion. The imperial military force Alexander. resembled the gigantic Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus: 2 Alexander had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands. Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various subject neighbours.3 No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified

than the anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people to declare themselves Athenians first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to organize a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenês was then in exile; but Leosthenês, Hyperidês, and other orators of the same party found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a warlike feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition on the part of Phokion and his partisans.4

declare themselves champions of the liberation of Greece, in spite of Phokion's opposition.

The rich

¹ Diodôr. xvii. 111: compare xviii. cal of the exiles. He seems to over21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5; viii. 52, 2) state the magnitude of their doings are state the magnitude of their doings before the death of Alexander.

2 A striking comparison made by the orator Demadês (Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 181).

3 See Frontinus, Stratagem. ii. 11, 4.

4 Plutarch, Phokion, 23. In the painding dead some the comparison, Instin. of Alexander and against Alexander's will. The number here given seems incredible, but it is probable enough that he induced some to come across. Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance was prepared by the Athenians and Aktolians against Alexander himself during the latter months of his life in eference to the mandate enjoining retreatme, but it is probable enough that he induced some to come across. Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander himself during the latter months of his life in

men for the most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200 quadriremes and 40 triremes should be equipped: that all Athenians under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation. Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects, still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his functions as one of the generals.2 But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and others of his friends fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

Leosthenês, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put

The Ætolians and many other Greeks join the confederacy for liberation -activity of the Athenian Leosthenês. as general. Athenian envoys sent round to invite cooperation from the various Greeks.

himself at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favour and encouragement almost everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Athamanes, and Dolopes; by most of the Malians, Œtæans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis; by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian tribes. In Pelopon-

unknown speaker, supposed by C. Müller to be Phokion, against it (Fragm. Hist. Grec, vol. iii. p. 668).

1 Diodôr. xviii. 10. Diodôrus states

that the Athenians sent the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenės. He seems to fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents which he had carried away from Asia,

afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in Krête, got possession of the Harpalian treasures

possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries, and carried the mover to Kyrênê, in Africa.

² It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if true) must be referred. The Athenians were eager to invade Beeotia unseasonably; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept them back by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and upwards for service, and offering to march himself. but it is certain that no more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the Athenian assembly, and of these only half were really forthcoming. Moreover, Diodôrus is not consistent with himself when he says in the next certain that no more than 700 as general of eighty years old, kept them back by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 818).

nêsus, the Argeians, Sikvonians, Epidaurians, Træzenians, Eleians, and Messenians enrolled themselves in the league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.¹ These adhesions were partly procured by Hyperides and other Athenian envoys, who visited the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round in like manner to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenes, then living as an exile in Peloponnêsus.

To Demosthenês the death of Alexander, and the new prospect

of organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance of success, came more welcome lent to the than to any one else. He gladly embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch

Athenian envoys by Demosthe. nês, though in exile. He is recalled to Athens. and receives an enthusiastic welcome.

him to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens came down to the harbour to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full of impassioned emotion, Demosthenês poured forth his gratitude for having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiadês on returning from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted by force. His fine could not be remitted consistently with Athenian custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Sotêr; and his execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the fine.2

What part Demosthenes took in the plans or details of the war, we are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on, under the military command of Leosthenes. The confederacy against Antipater included a larger assemblage of

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4. 2 Plutarch, Demosth. 27.

Hellenic states than that which had resisted Xerxês in 480 B.C.

Autumn.

Large Grecian confederacy against Antipater, nevertheless without Sparta. Bœotia strongly in the Macedonian interest. Leosthenês with the confederate army Thessaly.

Nevertheless, the name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa, Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thêbes, having received from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thêbes herself, were well aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued marches into pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. seems probable also that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia, in Corinth, and in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander's orders in the preceding summer; 1 for we find no mention made of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a considerable land force to join Leosthenês at Thermopylæ—a citizen force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenês himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his army, attacked the Beetian troops, gained a

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the energetic movements of Leosthenês. Still less was he

complete victory, and opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster, including Ætolians and Athenians. into Thessaly to meet Antipater, who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force immediately at his disposal--13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry-and with a fleet of

110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.2

¹ See the Fragments of Hyperidês,

cies, but it seems that some considerp. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς able change was made in them at the κοινοὺς συλλόγους 'Αχαιῶν τε καὶ 'Αρκά-δων. . . . We do not know what was done to these district confedera- 2 Diodôr. xviii. 13.

prepared for the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, &c.—soliciting reinforcements; but in the meantime he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenês. In the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia. No better resource was left to him than the fortified town of Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of Thessaly), where he calculated on holding is slain.

Battle in Thessaly— victory of Leosthenes over Antipater, who is compelled to throw himself into Lamia, and await succours from Asia-Leosthenês forms the blockade of

out until relief came from Asia. Leosthenês immediately commenced the siege of Lamia, and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to storm the town. But its fortifications were strong, with a garrison ample and efficient so that he was repulsed with considerable loss. Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding, and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.1 Phokion, on hearing the confident language of those around him, remarked-"The stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly; but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course".2 At this critical moment, Leosthenês, in inspecting the blockading trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.3 A funeral oration in his honour, as well as in that of the other combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperidês.4

 ¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.
 2 Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23; Plutarch,
 Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 803.
 3 Diodôr. xviii. 12, 13.
 4 A fine fragment of the Λόγος Ἐπι τάφιος by Hyperidês is preserved in Stobæus, Tit. 124, vol. iii. p. 618. It is gratifying to learn that a large additional portion of this oration has been recently brought from Egypt in a papy-

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Misfortune Grecian freedom. For the last generation, Athens of the death of had produced several excellent orators, and one who Leosthenês. Antiphilus combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic is named councils. But during all that time, none of her in his place. Relaxed citizens, before Leosthenês, had displayed military genius and ardour along with Pan-hellenic purposes. efforts of the Grecian His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity. The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous army of Greeks, who after the battle easily persuaded themselves that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenês, the Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended. When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate, Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name Phokion had been made and rejected.² But during this interval, there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to keep the army together. Hence the precious moments for rendering the blockade really stringent were lost, and Antipater was enabled to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from the fact that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers to surrender at discretion 3—with which condition he refused to comply.

Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade, and moved off by rapid

rus, and is about to be published by Mr. Churchill Babington (1856) ¹ Diodôr· xviii. 13—15.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 24. ³ Diodôr. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

marches to attack Leonnatus apart from Antipater. plished this operation with vigour and success. Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over Leonnatus, who was himself slain; and the Macedonian phalanx, having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with the dead bodies. On the very next day Antipater came up, bringing the troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army from Thessalv into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground, out of the reach of cavalry.2

He accom-B.C. 323-Autumn to winter. Leonnatus, with a Macedonian arıny from Asia. arrives in Thessaly. His defeat and death. Antipater escapes from Lamia, and takes the command.

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessalv. it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the eastern coast of Attica repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian fleet of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the

War carried on by sea between the Macedonian and Athenian fleets.

Athenian fleet under Ection, near the islands called Echinades. at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up the losses sustained.3 Our information is not sufficient to reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through (Eniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the Ætolians; 4 and perhaps this may have been the reason why the Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital opportunity had been missed of taking Antipater captive in Lamia, still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodôr. xviii. 14, 15: compare Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.

² Diodôr. xviii. 15. 3 Diodôr. xviii. 15.

⁴ Diodôr. xviii. 8.

footing.

B.C. 322. Spring.

Reluctance of the Greek contingents to remain on longcontinued service. The army in Thessaly is thinned by many returning home.

The Grecian contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution of the common purpose, and what had been already achieved was quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless, Greek citizens were not like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties, hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army of Antiphilus in Thessaly became much thinned, though still remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of Antipater, even aug-

mented as they had been by Leonnatus, and to compel him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow under Kraterus.

Expected arrival of Kraterus to reinforce Antipater. Relations between the Macedonian officers.

State of the regal family and of the Macedonian generals and soldiery after the death of Alexander.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian commanders, Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus, it is necessary to go back to June, 323 B.C., the period of Alexander's death, and to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world. On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon

with its large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except a child named Hêraklês, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of his wives, was indeed pregnant, and amidst the uncertainties of the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married, to be entrapped and assassinated along with her sister.2 There was, however, at Babylon, a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia, there were Olympias, Alexander's mother; Kleopatra, his sister, widow of the Epirotic Alexander; and Kynanê,3 another sister, widow of Amyntas (cousin of

¹ Diodôr, xviii, 17. ² Plutarch, Alexand. 77.

³ Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

Alexander the Great, and put to death by him), -all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the deceased conqueror in the scramble now open for power.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister; among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to Ptolemy; Syria, to Laomedon; Kilikia, to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia, and the greater Phrygia,

Aridæus is proclaimed king: the satrapies are distributed among the principal officers.

to Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenês; Media, to Pithon. The eastern satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with Illyrians, Triballi, Agriânes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to Antipater and Kraterus.1 We thus find the Grecian cities handed over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of deputies at Corinth was no longer thought necessary.

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants, administering portions of an empire one and indivisible under Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority bearing on the entire empire were Perdikkas, chiliarch of the horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort Eumenês of vizir,2 and Seleukus, commander of the Horse

Perdikkas the chief representative of central authority

Guards. No one at this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the other chiefs, he represented the imperial family and the integrity of the empire, contending

¹ Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. ut p. 667, ed. Didot (De Rebus post Alexsupra; Diodôr. xviii. 3, 4; Curtius x. 10; Dexippus, Fragmenta ap. Photium, Cod. 82, ap. Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. 2 Arrian and Dexippus—De Reb. post Alex. ut supra; cp. Diodôr. xviii. 48.

tus and Kleopatra.

against severalty and local independence. In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most effective auxiliary was Eumenês of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathês (who had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to transfer it to Eumenês, to whom it had been allotted in the general scheme of division.

At the moment of Alexander's death, Kraterus was in Kilikia at the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. List of pro-He had been directed to conduct them home into jects entertained by Macedonia, with orders to remain there himself in Alexander at the time place of Antipater, who was to come over to Asia of his death. with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him Thegenerals dismiss a paper of written instructions from Alexander, emthem as too vast. Plans bodying projects on the most gigantic scale; for of Leonna-

wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe, erection of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and Macedonia, &c. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for any one but Alexander to think of.2 Kraterus and Antipater had each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering upon the Hellespont. and had received propositions from Kleopatra, at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him (through Hekatæus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after the defeat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.3 This scheme remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus was slain in his first encounter with

western conquest, transportation of inhabitants by

¹ Diodôr, xviii, 16.

² Diodôr, xviii, 4.

³ Plutarch, Eumenês, 3.

the Greeks. To them his death was a grave misfortune; to Antipater it was an advantage which more than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous rival.

It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater, to whom he ceded the command, Kraterus found himself at the head of a powerful armyjoins Antipater in Macedonia 40,000 heavy infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 3000 archers and slingers. He again marched into Thessalv against with a powerful the Greeks under Antiphilus; and the two armies army. Battle of came in sight on the Thessalian plains near Krannon. Krannon in Thessaly. Antipater The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry and 3500 cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, gains a victory over of admirable efficiency. The soldiers in general were the Greeks, brave, but insubordinate; while the contingents of though not a complete many cities had gone home without returning, in spite of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry, the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of Antipater's infantry and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult neighbouring ground, where they were soon joined by their victorious cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men: that of the Macedonians, 120,1

The defeat of Krannon (August, 322 B.C.) was noway decisive, or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit of Leosthenês, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding council, declined to await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater; who however returned for answer that he would not recognize or treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the

Antiphilus tries to open negotiations with Antipater, who refuses to treat, except with each city singly. Discouragement among the Greeks. Each city treats separately. Antipater grants favourable terms to all, except Athenians and Ætolians.

Grecian commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately, the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætolians. In a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thêbes-within two

days' march of Athens.1

B.C. 322. Antipater and his army in Bœotia-Athens left alone and unable to resist. Demosthenês and the other anti-Macedonian orators take flight. Embassy of Phokion, Xenokratês, and others to Antipater.

Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian orators, especially Demosthenês and Hyperides, retired from the city at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina. Phokion and Demadês, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater, were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submissiou of the city, and petitioners for lenient Demadês is said to have been at this time disfranchised and disqualified from public speakinghaving been indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the Graphê Paranomôn; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief, to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Phokion nor Demadês, however, could prevail upon

Antipater to acquiesce in anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion—the same terrus as Leosthenes had required from Antipater himself at Lamia. Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty that Phokion obtained

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.

the abandonment of this intention; after which he returned to Athens with the answer. The people having no choice except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater, 1 Phokion and Demades came back to Thebes to learn his determination. This time, they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokratês the successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokratês had long resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact, Xenokratês did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to silence, by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added, to his honour, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than either of the other envoys.2

According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war; to surrender Demosthenes, Hyperides, and posed upon Athens by seemingly at least two other anti-Macedonian orators; Antipater. to receive a Macedonian garrison in Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution, and disfranchise all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dispossessed and the island re-transferred to the Samian exiles and natives.

It is said that Phokion and Demadês heard these terms with satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokratês entered against them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted,3

¹ Democharês, the nephew of Demosthenês, who had held a bold language and taken active part against Antipater throughout the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such was the story connected with his statue, rected a few years afterwards at Athens, representing him in the costume of an orator, but with a sword in

when he said—"If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are moderate; if as freemen, they are severe". To Phokion's entreaty, that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with, Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians: while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos. Antipater was prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.

If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that

Disfranchisement and deportation of the 12,000 poorest Athenian citizens.

he expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander had pronounced and executed against Thêbes. Under no other comparison can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens, all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ were condemned to dis-

franchisement and deportation. The number below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty, was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as turbulent, noisy democrats: the 9000 richest citizens, the "party of order," were left in exclusive possession, not only of the citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast, some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonidês, the friend of Demosthenes, and one of his earnest advocates when accused respecting the Harpalian treasures.1 At the request of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some exiles, Agnonidês among the rest, to remain within the limits of Peloponnêsus.² We shall see him presently contemplating a still more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.

¹ See Fragments of Hyperidês adv. Demos. pp. 61—65, ed. Babington.
2 Diodôr. xviii. 18. οὖτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν μυρίων (instead of δισμυρίων, which seems a mistake), καὶ δισχιλίων μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος οἰ δὲ τὴν ὡρισμένην τίμησιν ἔχοντες περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, ἀπεδείχθησαν κύριοι τῆς

τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἐπολιτεύοντο. Plutarch states the disfranchised as above 12,000.

Plutarch, Phokion, 28, 29. δμως δ'οδυ δ Φωκίων καὶ φυγῆς ἀπήλλαξε πολλούς δεηθεὶς τοῦ 'Αντιπάτρου' καὶ φεύγουσι διεπράξατο, μὴ καθάπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν μεθισταμένων ὑπὲρ τὰ Κεραύνια ὅρη καὶ

It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three sentences of Plutarch and Diodôrus, without any details from contemporary observers. It is called by Diodôrus a return to the

Hardship suffered by the deported poor of Athens —Macedonian garrison placed in Munychia.

Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were prodigiously liberal and enfranchising compared with what he found established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must, indeed, have brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in foreign lands analogous to that which Solôn describes as having preceded his Seisachtheia, or measure for the relief of debtors. What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their new constitution we do not know. Whatever they did must now have been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison, which entered Munvchia, under the command of Menyllus, on the twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, the multitudinous festal procession of citizens escorted the god Iacchus from Athens to Eleusis.2

One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was to condemn to death, at the motion of Demades, the distinguished anti-Macedonian orators who had already fled-Demosthenês, Hyperidês, Aristonikus, and Himeræus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius the Phalerean. last having taken refuge in Ægina, and Demosthenês in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword. At this miserable

τὸν Ταίναρον ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀλλ' ἐν Πελοποννήσω κατοικεῖν, ὧν ἡν καὶ 'Αγνωνίδης ὁ συκοφάντης.
Diodòrus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that Antipater assigned residence in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus, or

to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those who went beyond Tænarus would probably be sent to Libya: see Thucydides, vii. 19, 10; vii. 50, 2.

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 28. ἐκπεπολι-ορκημένοις ἐψκεσαν: compare Solôn, Fragment 28, ed Gaisford.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

season Greece was full of similar exiles, the anti-Macedonian

B.C. 322. October.

Demosthenês, Hype-ridês, and others are condemned to death in their absence. Antipater sends officers to track and seize the Grecian exiles. He puts Hyperidês to death.

leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of the time the exile-hunters, were everywhere on the look-out to seize these proscribed men; many of the orators from other cities as well as from Athens were slain; and there was no refuge except the mountains of Ætolia for any of them.2 One of these officers, a Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the three Athenian orators-Hyperidês, Aristonikus, and Himeræus —dragging them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of Æakus. They were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched for-

ward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ, in Peloponnêsus. All were there put to death by his order. It is even said, and on respectable authority, that the tongue of Hyperides was cut out before he was slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out, being put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several different stories.3

Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias pro-

B.C. 322. October.

Demosthenês in sanctuary at Kalauria— Archias with Thracian soldiers comes to seize him-he takes poison and expires.

ceeded with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenês. temple of Poseidôn there The situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary, was held in such high veneration that Archias. hesitating to drag him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily, under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenes, well aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple, and when the dose was beginning to take effect came out of the sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary.

Plut. Demos. 28. 'Αρχίας ὁ κληθεὶς
 Φυγαδοθήρας. Plut. Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846.
 2 Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated as matter of traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century afterwards. In the speech of his Akarterioran and the speech of the th nanian opponent there is nothing to

contradict it, while the fact is in itself highly probable. See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland, ch. 71,

³ Plutarch, Demos. 28: Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849; Photius, p. 496.

accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different ways. 1 Eratosthenês (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that Demosthenês carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to a third story it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was seen to bite and suck while composing a last letter to Antipater. Amidst these contradictory details we can only affirm as certain that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out. The most remarkable assertion was that of Democharês, nephew of Demosthenês, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards. Democharês asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that Archias, the exilehunter, was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonour and wretchedness.2

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian Dêmos, the Miserable suppression of the public Dikasteries, the occupation of Greece of Athens by a Macedonian garrison and of Greece —life and character generally by Macedonian exile-hunters, are events of Demosbelonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world.

Of Hyperidês as a citizen we know only the general fact that he maintained from first to last, and with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenês, a strenuous opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece, though his persecution of Demosthenês respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as it comes before us) discreditable.

¹ Plutarch, Demosth. 30. τῶν δ' ἄλλων, ὅσοι γεγράφασί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ, παμπολλοι δ' εἰσὶ, τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπεξελθεῖν,

The taunts on Archias's profession,

as an actor, and as an indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of Demosthenes (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the man or of the occasion; nor are they sufficiently

avouched to induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit Demosthenes might choose to manifest at such a moment would surely be vented on the chief enemy (Antipater), not upon the mere instrument. ² Plutarch, Demosth. 30; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846; Photius, p. 494; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

Of Demosthenês we know more—enough to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352-351 B.C.). We are thus sure that even at that early day he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger at a time when the older and more influential politicians either could not or would not see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only entailed unpopularity upon himself. period when Demosthenês first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace, and would probably have been so kept had Demosthenês possessed in 351 B.C. as much public influence as he had acquired ten years afterwards in 341 B.C.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down to the battle of Chæroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years' war which ended with the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians in the main followed his counsel, and disastrous as were the ultimate military results of that war, for which Demosthenês could not be responsible, its earlier periods were creditable and successful, its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur is, that they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Pan-hellenic also. It was not Athens alone that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole Hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Periklês, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epameinondas; whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than Hellenic. He carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxês and the generation immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the

Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his numerous orations are those of the noblest and largest patriotism, trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment of an autonomous Hellenic world as the indispensable condition of a dignified and desirable existence,1 but inculcating at the same time that these blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

From the destruction of Thêbes by Alexander in 335 B.C. to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens Dishonourneither was nor could be conducted by Demosthenês. But, condemned as he was to comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens in the Harpalian affair of 324 B.C. If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperides, the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably have prevailed,

able position of Phokion at Athens, under the miserable condition of the people, and the Macedonian occupation.

and war would have been declared against Alexander. In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw himself into it with unreserved ardour, and was greatly instrumental in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of success. was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions in the empire left by Alexander, on mutual hostility among the principal officers, and on the probability of having only to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another

¹ Demosthenes, De Corona, p. 324. Ελλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν και οὖτοι — τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδένα κανόνες, ἀνατετραφότες, &c. ἔχειν δεσπότην αὖτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις

year, its termination would probably have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian Dêmos to distant lands, Demosthenês himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally also for himself, before the Dikastery, and of the numerous stimulating and admonitory harangues on the public affairs of the moment which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.

CHAPTER XCVI.

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM.

THE death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances, recounted in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city half depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen. and which he had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonour of Phokion's position must have been aggravated by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian settlers from Samos, which island was now taken from Athens, after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in the name of Aridæus.1 Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokratês, who was only a metic, or resident non-freeman; but Xenokratês declined the offer, remarking that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had protested as envoy.2 This

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 18; Diogen. Laërt. x. 1, 1. I have endeavoured to show, in a previous portion of this History (Ch. lxxix.), that Diodôrus is correct in giving forty-three years as the duration of the Athenian Kleruchies in Samos, although both Wesseling and

Mr. Clinton impugn his statement. The Athenian occupation of Samos began immediately after the conquest of the island by Timotheus, in 366—365 B.C.; but additional batches of colonists were sent thither in later years.

2 Plutarch, Phokion, 29, 30.

mark of courageous independence, not a little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.

B.C. 322-321. Autumn to winter.

Antipater purges and remodels the Peloponnesian cities. He attacks the Ætolians. with a view of deporting them across to Asia. His presence becomes necessary in Asia: he concludes a pacification with the Ætolians.

Throughout Peloponnêsus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities, Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing in each an oligarchy of his own partisans-sometimes with a Macedonian garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling hostile, or intractable, or democratical citizens.1 Having completed the subjugation of Peloponnêsus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the interior deserts of the empire.2 His army was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians defended them-

selves bravely, withdrew their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. Ætolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus, as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a view to the crossing of the

φίλων καὶ ξένων.

That citizens were not only banished, but deported, by Antipater from various other cities besides Athens, we may see from the edict issued by Poly-

ρον αύτους καταπολεμήσαι, και με τα σ-τήσαι πανοικίους απαντας είς την ερημίαν και πορρωτάτω της 'Ασίας κειμένην χώραν.

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. φανεροῦ δ' ὅντος, ὅτι Κάσσανδρος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀνθέξεται, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πατρικαῖς φρουραῖς φυλάττεσθαι, τὰς δ' ὑπ' ὁλιγαρχιῶν διοικεῖσθαι, κυριευομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Αντιπάτρου

Hellespont and operating in Asia. They concluded a pacification with the Ætolians-postponing till a future period their design of deporting that people—and withdrew into Macedonia: where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.1

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikea, had been sent over to Asia not long before, to become the wife of That general, acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander's family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had given birth to a posthumous son, called

Intrigues with Perdikkas, and with the princesses at Pella.

Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip Aridæus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at Pella-Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, the widow of the Molossian Alexander, who had always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander's order) with her daughter Eurydikê. It has been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra. Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenês, his ablest friend and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but to send her away after no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenês. Kynanê also (daughter of

Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas), a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydikê for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Aridæus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydikê.1

All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdikkas, who, for that and other reasons, began to look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised

of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manœuvres of Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.

To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so

Unpropitious turns of fortune for the Greeks, in reference to the Lamian war.

Antigonus

detects the intrigues,

and reveals them to

Antipater and Kra-

terus.

far as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed, how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of fortune throughout the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual combatants only, but for their posterity also.2 Until the battle of Krannon and the surrender of Athens.

everything fell out so as to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known to hate him, first raised up Leon-

1 Diodôr. xviii. 23; Arriau, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92. Diodôrus alludes to the murder of Kynanê or Kynna in another place (xix. 52).

Compare Polyenus, viii. 60, who mentions the murder of Kynanê by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different explanation of her purpose in passing into Asia.

About Kynanê, see Duris, Fragm. 24, in Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 475; Athenæ. xiii. p. 560.

² The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii.

640) on the effects of the battle of Pharsalia may be cited here :-

"Majus ab hac acie, quam quod sua sæcula ferrent,

Vulnus habent populi : plus est quam

vita salusque Quod perit: in totum mundi prosternimur ævum.

Vincitur his gladiis omnis, quæ serviet,

Proxima quid soboles, aut quid meruere nepotes,

In regnum nasci?" &c.

natus, next Perdikkas, against him. Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least weakened, if not paralyzed: had Perdikkas declared himself earlier, the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him presently doing with the Ætolians.1 Through causes thus purely accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus to close the Lamian war. The disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenes himself. Such issue is not to be regarded as proving that the project was desperate or illconceived on the part of its promoters, who had full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.

In the spring of 321 B.C., Antipater and Kraterus, having concerted operations with Ptolemy, governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia and began their conflict with Perdikkas, who himself, having the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy, leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenês as general, to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Alketas, discouraged by the adverse Asia Minor. feeling of the Macedonians generally, threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenês, though embarrassed and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against him as a Greekand though compelled to conceal from these soldiers the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the opposite side-displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained an important victory,2 in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus

в.с. 321.

Antipater Kraterus in Asia— Perdikkas marches to attack Ptolemy in Egypt, but is killed in a mutiny of his own troops. Union of Antipater, Ptolemy, Antigonus, &c. New distribution of the satrapies, made at Triparadisus.

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 38. 'Αντιπάτρου δ' εἰς 2 Plutarch, Eumenês, 7; Cornel. τὴν 'Ασίαν διαβεβηκότος, Αἰτωλοὶ κατὰ κορος, Eumenês, 6. 4. Eumenês had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian εὐστράτευσαν εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν, &c.

perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenês with his own hand, after a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and at the cost of a severe wound to himself. After the victory, he found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man; and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be honourably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.

This new proof of the military ability and vigour of Eumenês, together with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and Neoptolemus, proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his demeanour towards the other officers, and withal so unsuccessful in his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile, that his own army mutinied and slew him.2 His troops joined Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behaviour gained their goodwill. Only two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenes reached the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly altered. Eumenes would have occupied the most commanding position in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news arriving at the moment when it did caused throughout the army only the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He, together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were slain.3

the short pike and sword of the Macedonian Companions, relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the alternation of charging and retiring, usual to Asiatics.

Diodorus (xviii. 30, 31, 32) gives an account at some length of this battle. He as well as Plutarch may probably

have borrowed from Hieronymus of Kardia.

1 Arrian, ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii. 8; Diodôr. xviii. 33. 2 Diodôr. xviii. 36.

³ Plutarch, Eumenês, 8; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenês, 4; Diodôr. xviii. 36,

By the death of Perdikkas and the defection of his soldiers complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united. He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydikê, who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the soldiers, and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds to liquidate at At Triparadisus, in Syria, Antipater made a the moment. second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. Ptolemy was assured Egypt and Libya-to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia - as each had had before.1

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in Asia, to crush Eumenês and the other war bechief adherents of Perdikkas, most of whom had tween Antigonus and Eumenês been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedoin Asia. nian army. After a certain interval, Antipater Energy and himself, accompanied by the kings, returned to ability of Eumenês. Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed He is worsted, and blocked demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonus, first against up in Nora. Eumenês in Kappadokia, next against Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at length successfully finished.2 Eumenês, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonus.3

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 39. Arrian, ap. Photium.

2 Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. lib. ix. 10, ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Nepos, Eumenês, c. 5; Diod. xviii. 41.

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close, Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell B.C. 319into sickness, and presently died. One of his latest 318. acts was to put to death the Athenian orator Demadês. Sickness and death who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit of Antipater. The the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Athenian Antipater had promised, or given hopes, that if the orator Demadês is oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens mainput to death in tained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would Macedonia. withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavoured

to prevail on Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this promise; but he steadily refused. Demadês, who willingly undertook the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him by Demadês. inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence "on an old and rotten warp"-meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demadês is said to have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son Kassander, who caused Demadês with his son to be seized—first killed the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude. All the accounts which we read depict Demadês, in general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement; at the same time we have no specific facts to prove it.

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of Alexander's veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch or general of the body-guard.² He thought that this disposi-

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 30; Diodôr. xviii. 48; Plutarch, Demosth. 31; Arrian, De Reb. post Alex. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has

In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently Antigonus instead of Perdikkas.

It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the accuser

of Demadês on such a matter, as Arrian and Plutarch state. Arrian seems to put the death of Demadês too early, from his anxiety to bring it into immediate juxtaposition with the death of Demosthenès, whose condemnation Demadês had proposed in the Athenian assembly.

² Diod. xviii. 48.

tion of power would be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and of B.C. 318. longer military service than any other among Alexander's generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses; 1 all of whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydikê - were energetic characters, and the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards Antipater) furious and implacable.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the change to be made

Antipater sets aside his son Kassander, and names Polysperchon vicerov. Discontent and opposition of Kassander.

Kassander sets up for himself. gets pos-session of Munychia, and forms alliance with Ptolemy and Antigonus against Polysper-

-assuming that he knew the real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander.2 Kassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. envoys being generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia.3 It suited the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.

¹ Diod. xix. 11. ² Plutarch, Phokion, 31. Diodôr. (xviii. 64) says also that Nikanor was

nominated by Kassander. 3 Diodôr. xviii. 54.

в.с. 318-317. Plans of Polysperchonalliance with Olympias in Europe, and with Eumenês

in Asia—

chisement of the

enfran-

Grecian cities.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Kassander, placed all the great real powers in active hostility against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)-to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenês, appointing him to the supreme command 1

—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

Ineffectual attempts of Eumenês to uphold the imperial dynasty in Asia: his gallantry and ability: he is betrayed by his own soldiers and slain by Antigonus.

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander's empire in Asia against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it, now lay in the fidelity and military skill of Eumenês. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only friend and saviour to whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenês replied by assuring

them of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia: or if she did come, at all events to abstain from vindictive and Both these recommendations, honourable as cruel proceedings. well to his prudence as to his humanity, were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the management of affairs; and although her imposing title of mother to the great conqueror raised a strong favourable feeling, yet her multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal enmity

¹ Diodôr, xviii, 49-58.

against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenês. though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them.1 His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant struggles, first in Kilikia and Phœnicia, next (when driven from the coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parætakênê, continued for two years against the greatly preponderating forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops.2 They do not belong to Grecian history. They are, however, among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While, even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself, they evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenês remained unsubdued. He was betrayed to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.3

¹ Plutarch, Eumenês, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenês, c. 6; Diodôr.

Diodór. xvii. 58. ἦκε δὲ καὶ παρ' Όλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα, δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης βοηθείν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἐαυτῆ ' μόνον γὰρ ἐκεῖνον πιστότατον ἀπολελεἰφθαι τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμενον διορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς βασιλικῆς

Cornelius Nepos, Eumenês, 6. "Ad hunc (Eumenem) Olympias, quum literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, consultum, ntrum repetitum Macedoniam veniret (nam tum in Epiro habitabat) et eas res occuparet—huic ille primum suasit ne se moveret, et expectaret quoad Alexandri filius regnum adipisceretur. Sine aliqua cupiditate raperetur in Macedoniam, omnium injuriarum oblivisceretur, et in neminem acerbiore uteretur imperio. Horum illa nihil fecit. Nam et in Macedoniam profecta est, et ibi crudelissime se gessit." Compare Justin xiv. 6; Diodòr. xix. 11.

The details respecting Eumenes may be considered probably as depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus, of Kardia, had written a copious history of his own time, which, though now lost, was accessible both to Diodòrus and Plutarch. Hieronymus was serving with Eumenes and was taken prisoner along with him by Antigonus, who spared him and treated him well, while Eumenes was put to death (Diodòr. xix. 44). Plutarch had also read letters of Enmenes (Plut. Eum. 11).

² Diodôr. xviii. 63-72; xix. 11, 17,

32, 44.

3 Plutarch (Eumenės, 16—18), Cornelius Nepos (10—13) and Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the trouching circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenes. On this point Diodôrus is more brief, but he recounts at much length the preceding military operations between Eumenes and Antigonus (xix. 17, 32, 44).

The original source of these

For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over Eumenês to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability. Indeed, we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander. In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenês, if the violent temper of Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty: which, having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks, might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favour of free Hellenic community.2 On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities

had sent envoys to Pella.3 To all the governments of Edict issued by Poly-sperchon at Pella, in the these cities, composed as they were of his creatures, name of the imperial dynasty-

subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies in the Grecian cities, restoring poli-tical exiles

and granting free con-After reciting the steady goodwill of Philip stitutions

it was a matter of the utmost moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies, drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

to each. and Alexander towards Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded cities. from the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings were now determined to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in the times of Philip and Alexander;

particulars must probably be the history of Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, who has been copied, more or less accurately, by others. 3 Diodon 3 Diodon 3 Plutarch, Eumenês, 13; Diodon 3 Prograde

² Plutarch, Eumenês, 3.

³ Diodôr. xviii. 55. είθὺς οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας πρεσβευτάς προσκαλεσάμενοι, &C.

that before the thirteenth of the month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or deported, by the generals. should be recalled and received back; that their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act of recal were excluded the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon, and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans, implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not Orôpus; in all other respects she was placed on the same footing as in the days of Philip and Alexander. "All the Greeks (concluded this proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear arms or otherwise act in hostility against us, on pain of exile and confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures. Obey him as we have before written to you to do; for we shall not omit to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation."1

Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after the Lamian war. It ordered the recal of the host of exiles then expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of Alexander-which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was a death-blow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys-including probably

and measures of Polysperchon to enforce the edict. State of Athens: exiles returning: complicated political parties: danger of

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is given verbatim. (Πολυσπέρχοντος) These words must For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa, Trikka, Herakleia, &c., we do not know the grounds.

Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—ὑμεῖς οὖν, καθάπερ ὑμῖν καὶ πρότερον ἐγράψαμεν, ἀκούετε τούτον (Πολυσπέρχοντος) These words must allude to written answers given to applications. No general proclamation earlier than this can have been issued since the death of Antipater.

deputations from the exiles, as well as envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that the Antipatrian leading men should be banished, with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to death, 1 the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that such stringent measures could not be executed without force—the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment, for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.

To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recal of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion, with the other leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death.2 The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began reentering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Kassander, the latter being himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties, each distinct in views and interests from the rest, some decidedly hostile to each other.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting Munychia, which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned

trick to ruin Phokion is only correct so Athens.

¹ Diod. xviii. 57.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however, that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere thigh to a viii. Phokion is any correct so that only correct so.

Athere

an evasive answer, promising compliance as soon as circumstances

permitted, but in the meantime entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater.1 He seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare nor, goverin his favour-and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian leaders and a large proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but dread the

tions of the Athenians Munychia for Kas-

execution of Polysperchon's edict. And he had also what was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of Phokion, who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had before done with Menyllus 2-and who had greater reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly held in Peiræus to discuss the subject. Nikanor even ventured to present himself in person in the company and under the introduction of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the proposition of alliance with Kassander. with the people, the prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison, and to procure the evacuation of Munychia; for which object, of course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping, even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he pleaded that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor's personal safety.3

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found that he could not obtain seizes Peiany declared support from the Athenians, he laid a surprise. scheme for surprising and occupying the town and Phokion, though forharbour of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the warned, adjoining eminence and harbour on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding all his pre-

ræus by takes no precautions against it.

cautions, it became known to various Athenians that he was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in the neighbouring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree

³ Plutarch, Phokion, 32. ² Plutarch, Phokion, 31. 1 Diodôr, xviii, 64.

was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion, disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer, making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus by surprise, placed both the town and harbour under military occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms. But Phokion as general damped their ardour, and even declined to head them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with Konôn (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation, all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to whom they must address their application.1 He thus again tried to bring Athens into communication with Kassander.

Mischief to the Athenians, as well as to Polysperchon, from Nikanor's occupation of Peiræus: culpable negligence, and pro-bable collusion, of Phokion.

The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the loss fell hardly less severely than

upon the Athenians. Now Phokion, in his function as general. had he been forewarned of the danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favouring the

¹ Diodôrus, xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2,

seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon and the Atheniansa fact which we must not forget, when we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.1

The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus. produced a strong sensation. Presently arrived a Arrival of letter addressed to him by Olympias herself, com- Alexander manding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, Polysperupon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. treacherous But Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support from Kassander. The arrival of nians: Alexander (Polysperchon's son) with a body of troops, Rassan reaches encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was

chon): his policy to the Athe-Kassander

Peiræus. come to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes however were again disappointed. Though encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian forces to co-operate with him in attacking it, but entered into open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavoured to persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place. 2 When this negotiation failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on his march towards Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus: nor did he choose to invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been compelled to make over the place when taken,—which they so ardently desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever; moreover, by this delay the opportunity of

Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. "Concidit autem maxime uno crimine: "Concidit autem maxime uno crimine: quod cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi, et Nicanorem, Cassandri præfectum, insidiari Piræo Atheniensium, a Dercyllo moneretur: idemque postularet, ut provideret, ne commeatibus civitas privaretur—huic, audiente populo, Phokion negavit esse

periculum, seque ejus rei obsidem fore pollicitus est. Neque ita multo post Nicanor Piræo est potitus. Ad quem recuperandum cum populus armatus concurrisset, ille non modo neminem ad arma vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem præesse voluit, sine quo Athenæ omnino esse non possunt."

2 Diod. xviii 65: Plut. Phokion, 33. ² Diod. xviii. 65; Plut. Phokion, 33.

attacking the place was altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it before Polysperchon.

Intrigues of Phokion with Alexander he tries to secure for himself the protection of Alexander against Athenians.

It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored exiles, and without any foreign controlling force, was an assured sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kas-

sander, he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet unfinished—and offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself.¹ Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander's army. It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops along with the exiles, as friends and allies, within the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the city, but that this project was impracticable, in consequence of the mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.2

The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or evil-now approached its close. As soon as the returning

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 65, τῶν γὰρ 'Αντιπάτρω γεγονότων φίλων τινὲς (ὑπῆρχον) καὶ οἱ περὶ Φωκὶ ωνα φοβο ὑ μενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας, ὑπήντησαν 'Αλεξάνδρω, καὶ διδάξαντες τὸ συμφέρον, ἐπεισαν αὐτὸν ἱδία κατέχειν τὰ φρούρια, καὶ μὴ παραδιδόναι τοῦς 'Αθηναίοις μέχρις ὰν ὁ Κάσσανδρος καταπολεμήθη. 2 Plutarch, Phokion, 3: Diod. xviii. 65, 66. This seems to ine the probable sequence of facts, combining Plutarch with Diodòrus. Plutarch takes no notice of the negotiation opened by Phokion with Alexander, and the understanding established between

exiles found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state officers, and for the reestablishment of the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy, and who still continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion stood first: along with him were his son-inlaw Chariklês, the Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon. Nikoklês, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philoklês, These persons were not only deposed, but condemned, some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property. Demetrius, Chariklês, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander's camp, throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of

Return of the deported exiles to Athenspublic vote passed in the Athenian assem-bly against Phokion and his colleagues. Phokion leaves the city, is pro-tected by Alexander. and goes to meet Polysperchon in Phokis.

the recent understanding.1 Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to do all in their power to support him.2 Armed with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solôn, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.3

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus, and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems

Agnonidês and others are sent as deputies to Polysperchon, to accuse Phokion, and to claim the benefit of the regal edict.

¹ Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Pho- συμπράξειν.
on, 35.
This application of Phokion to This application of Phokion to 2 Diodôr. xviii. 66. προσδεχθέντες δὲ $i\pi^*$ αὐτοῦ (Alexander) φιλοφρόνως, γράμματα ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Πολυσπέρο Plutarch, though they are important circumstances in following the last Φωκίωνα τ ἀκ είνου πεφρονηκότες, καὶ νῦν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι πάντα 3 Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

plain that this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On the proposition of Agnonidês and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.

The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis,

Agnonidês and Phokion are heard before Polysperchon—Phokion and his colleagues are delivered up as prisoners to the Athenians.

as early as Phokion's company, which had been detained for some days at Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon, and presented the letter of Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably have obtained a more favourable reception. But as the arrival of the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both of them at the same audience, before King Philip

Aridæus in his throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonidês—chief of the Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenês in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing but confusion; until Agnonidês himself exclaimed: "Pack us all into one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgment from the Athenians". The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonidês then set forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having betrayed Peiræus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal proclamation to Athens.²

¹ Diodôr. xviii. 66.
2 Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel.
Nepos, Phokion, 3. "Hic (Phocion)
ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Pireum
Nicapori prodidisset ex consilii senten.

tia in custodiam conjectus, Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret judicium."

ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Piraum Plutarch says that Polysperchon, Nicanori prodidisset, ex consilii senten before he gave this hearing to both

Now, on the last of these two heads, Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield, nor to hand over Peiræus to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter, accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having been personally cognizant of his (the speaker's) good disposition towards the Athenian people (he had been probably sent to Pella as envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy), Polysperchon exclaimed: "Do not utter falsehoods against me before the king". Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start from his throne and snatch his spear, with which he would have run Hegemon through—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom and autonomy.1

The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the city; being carried along the Keramcikus in carts, through sympathizing friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have contained many

parties, ordered the Corinthian Deinarchus to be tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot be Deinarchus the logographer—of whom we have some specimens remaining, and who was alive even as late as 292 B.C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there were

two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann supposes, Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement of Plutarch must allude to an order given, but not carried into effect; which latter seems to me most probable.

1 Plut. Phok. 33, 34; Diod. xviii. 66.

Phokion is conveyed as prisoner to Athens, and brought for trial before the assem-bly. Motion of his friends for exclusion of nonqualified persons.

foreigners and slaves. But it would have been fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was mainly composed of Phokion's keenest enemies, the citizens just returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons, since the lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved that on occasion of so important a

trial foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles. chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who

were trying to exclude them.

It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than those which iuflamed the bosoms of these Intense exasperareturned exiles. We must recollect that at the close tion of the of the Lamian war the Athenian democracy had been returned exiles forcibly subverted. Demosthenes and its principal against Phokion leaders had been slain, some of them with antecedent grounds for that feeling. cruelties; the poorer multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens, had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly, when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends, as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism of Demophantus,1 consecrated by an

¹ Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 96, 97; Lykurgus adversus Leokratem, sect. 127.

oath taken by Athenians generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the government was subverted.

When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling of antipathy against him burst out in furious Agnonidês, the principal accuser, manifestations. supported by Epikurus and Demophilus, found manifestheir denunciations welcomed and even anticipated, when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to the subversion of the constitution,—

Phokion is condemned to deathvindictive tations against him in the assembly, furious and unanimous.

to the sufferings of his deported fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betraval of Peiræus to Nikanor 2 constituted a new crime; fastening on the people the voke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded. Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried down in like manner, until at length he gave up the case in despair, and exclaimed: "For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct: but why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?" "Because they are your friends, Phokion," was the exclamation of those around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree to the effect that the assembled people should decide by show of hands whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not, and that, if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present cried out that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed, after which the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more ini-

¹ Not the eminent philosopher so tionis suspicionem Piræi, maximeque quod adversus populi commoda in control ita exacuerontur propter prodi-

posing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph. To many of them, doubtless, the gratification of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest moments of life.¹

After sentence, the five condemned persons-Phokion, Nikoklês, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythoklês—were consigned Death of to the supreme magistrates of police, called The Phokion and his Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having colleagues. the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion, who turned to the public officers and exclaimed: "Will no one check this indecent fellow?" This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects his tranquillity and selfpossession were resolutely maintained during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion, the day on which the Athenian Horsemen, or Knights (the richest class in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments), celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in honour of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion replied—"I tell him emphatically not to hold evil memory of the Athenians". The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion's friends allowed to light a funeral pile for the burning of his body, which was carried out of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also

¹ Diodór. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Phokion, 34, 35; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2, 3.

collected the bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address-"Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses."1

After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a towards Phokion, statue in his honour, and put to death Agnonides by public judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by Phokion's sbown to son.2

Alteration of the sentiment of the Athenians not long afterwards. Hononrs his memory.

These are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity. Nikoklês entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion before Phokion; npon which the latter replied—"Your request, Nikoklês, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused you anything throughout my life, I grant this also".

also".

After the four first had drunk, all except Phokion, no more hemlock was left, upon which the gaoler said that he would not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmæ of money were given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place, until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money, sarcastically remarking that it was hard if a man could not even die matis at Athens. gratis at Athens.

As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato's Phædon (152—155), the details of the death of Sokratês, we shall see that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a gradual and painless manner, the person who had swallowed the potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs grew heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually chilled and became insen-As to the first of these anecdotes—

sible, first in the extremities, next in the vital centres. Under these circum-stances, the question, which of the persons condemned should swallow the first of the five potions, could be of very

Then as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the Athenian prison, what would have been the alternative if Phokion's friend had not furnished the twelve drachmæ? Would he have retwelve drachmæ? Would he have remained in confinement without being put to death? Certainly not, for he was under capital sentence. Would he have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose that the Eleven had allotted to this gaoler a stock of hemlock (or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion's sarcasm touches upon the strangeness of a man touches upon the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own execution.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 38.

Peiræus and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oli-

Explanation of this alteration. Kassander gets possession of Athens, and restores the oligarchical or Phokionian party. garchical or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under Antipater.

No wonder that, under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion should be honoured. But this is a very different thing from spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no reason why such change of opinion should have occurred,

nor do I believe that it did occur. The Dêmos of Athens, banished and deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did Antipater's work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial, the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theatre is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.

We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an old man above eighty,—personally brave, character of mild, and superior to all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular execuation. when we look at the whole case—when we survey, not merely the details of Phokion's administration, but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that this judgment is fully merited. In Phokion's patriotism-for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it-no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had neither the Pan-hellenic sentiment of Aristeidês, Kallikratidas, and Demosthenês, nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epameinondas to Thêbes. To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among them, or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man. The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting lay at the bottom of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world. Had Themistoklês, Aristeidês, and Leonidas resembled him. Greece would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia. The brilliant, though chequered, century and more of independent politics which succeeded the repulse of Xerxês would never have occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion's political and military influence that the Greeks were degraded from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendency as well as freedom, into absolute servitude. In so far as this great public misfortune can be imputed to any one man, to no one was it more ascribable than to Phokion. He was strategus during most of the long series of years when Philip's power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of Demosthenês, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were wanting to Demosthenes-military energy and aptitude. Had he lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future history of Greece might have been altogether different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted with Æschinês and the philippizers; without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desiredby nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and the other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia. Phokion received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the fruit and the proof of his past political action -anti-Hellenic as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it is the most honourable point in his character that he always refrained from abusing their marked favour towards himself, for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxês gave to Themistoklês. He even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything, consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at Sardis.¹

The Lamian war, and its consequences, were Phokion's ruin. He continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his opinion against it; for it is to be remarked that, in spite of his known macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others. On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the thankless and dishonourable function of satrap under Antipater at Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Dêmos in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these proceedings. Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished Dêmos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation (along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less dangerous, and less discreditable, than these manœuvres, which still further darkened the close of his life, without averting from him, after all, the necessity of facing the restored Dêmos. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the seizure of the Peiræus-but against his public policy. It was the last protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.

a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.

I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards Peloponnêsus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance.1 At any rate, he was tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000 soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000 Greek allies. 1000 cavalry, and sixty-five elephants—animals which were now seen for the first time in European Greece.

B.C. 317. April.

between Polysperchon and Kassander in Attica and Peloponnêsus. Polysperchon is repulsed in the siege of Megalopolis, and also defeated at sea.

He at first besieged Kassander in Peiræus; but finding it difficult to procure subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching in person the various Peloponnesian towns, or addressing them by means of envoys, he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the mass of the citizens.2 In most of the towns this revolution was accomplished; but in Megalopolis the oligarchy held out; not only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending it against him successfully. made two or three attempts to storm it, by movable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them,3 and obliged to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from Peiræus) and Antigonus.4

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated Peloponnêsus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian

¹ Diodôr, xix, 35, ² Diodôr, xviii, 69.

³ Diodôr. xviii. 70, 71. 4 Diodôr, xviii, 72,

Increased strength of Kassander in Greecehe gets possession of Athens.

Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened. The first effect of this was the surrender of Athens. The Athenians in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could no longer endure that complete severance from the sea to which the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia

by Kassander had reduced them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable: in fact, Peiræus was considered by its great constructor, Themistoklês, as more indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself. The subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected, and the arsenals, docks, ships, &c., of the state kept up. It became evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their city, with the port Peiræus, their ships, and revenues; that the exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards; that Kassander should hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean (i.e. an Athenian of the Dême Phalerum), one of the colleagues of Phokion, who had gone into voluntary exile since the death of Antipater, but had recently returned.2

This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian government, yet without the severities which had marked its original establishment, and with some modifications in various

¹ Thucyd. i. 93.

² Diodôr, xviii, 74.

ways. It made Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and by the fortification of Munychia, which had now been greatly enlarged and strengthened, holding a practical command over Peiræus, though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians. But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens; moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ.

Restoration of the oligarchical government at Athens, though in a mitigated form, under the Phalerean Deme-

fixed for the political franchise, though excluding the multitude. must have been felt as an improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmæ prescribed by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the field against him with a rival army and an established ascendency in many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.

Towards this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle, and of the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive and luxurious habits; towards which he devoted the most of the population. Athenian public revenue—1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and

Administration of the Phalerean Demetrius at Athens, in a moderate spirit. Census taken of the

moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation of funerals.2 He himself extolled his own decennial period as one of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens.3

1 See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years afterwards (Diodôr. xx.

The Phalerean Demetrius composed,

among numerous historical, philosophical, and literary works, a narrative of his own decennial administration (Diogenês Laërt. v. 5, 9; Strabo, ib.) -περὶ της δεκαετίας.

The statement of 1200 talents, as the annual revenue handled by Demetrius, deserves little credit.

3 See the Fragment of Democharês, 2; Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot,

 ² Cicero, De Legg. ii. 26, 66; Strabo, ix. p. 398; Pausanias, i. 25, 5. τύραννόν τε 'λθηναίοις ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον, &c. Duris ap. Athenæum, xii. 542. Fragm. 27, vol. iii. p. 477, Frag. Hist.

But we learn from others, and the fact is highly probable, that it was a period of distress and humiliation, both at Athens and in other Grecian towns; and that Athenians, as well as others, welcomed new projects of colonization (such as that of Ophellas from Kyrênê) not simply from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing evils.1

What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval, we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have been in large practice as a logographer, or composer of discourses for others.2 But the fact that three hundred and sixty statues were erected in honour of Demetrius while his administration was still going on demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans, the subjection of the people, and the practical abolition of all free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken of the inhabitants of Attica, and that there were numbered 21,000 citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.3 Of this important enumeration we know the bare fact,

vol. ii. p. 448, ap. Polyb, xii. 13. Democharês, nephew of the orator Demosthenês, was the political opponent of Demetrius Phalereus, whom he reproached with these boasts about commercial prosperity, when the liberty and dignity of the city were overthrown. To such boasts of Demetrius Phalereus probably belongs the statement cited from him by Strabo (iii. p. 147) about the laborious works in the Attic mines

α Laureium.

1 Diodor. xx, 40. ὥσθ' ὑπελάμβανον μὴ μόνον ἐγκρατεῖς ἔσεσθαι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι.

απαλλαγήσεσθαι.

² Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Dinarcho, pp. 633, 634; Plutarch, Demetrius, 10. λόγω μὲν δλιγαρχικής, ἔργω δὲ μοναρχικής, καταστάσεως γενομένης διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαληρέως δύναμιν, ἀc.

³ Ktesiklés ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 272. Mr. Fynes Cliuton (following Wesseling) supplies the defect in the text of Athenæus, so as to assign the census to the 115th Olympiad. This conjecture may be right, yet the reasons for it are not conclusive. The census may have been taken either in the 116th or in the 117th Olympiad; we have no in the 117th Olympiad; we have no means of determining which. The administration of the Phalerean Deme-

trius covers the ten years between 317 and 307 B.C. (Fast. Hell. Append. p.

388).
Mr. Clinton (ad ann. 317 B.C. Fast. Hell.) observes respecting the census— Hell.) observes respecting the census—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the public assembly, or all the males above the age of twenty years; the 10,000 μέτοικοι described also the males of full age. When the women and children are computed, the total free population will be about 127,660; and 400,000 slaves, added to this total, will give about 527,660 for the total population of Attica." See also the Appendix to F. H. p. 390 seq.

This census is a very interesting fact; but our information respecting it

This census is a very interesting fact; but our information respecting it is miserably scanty, and Mr. Clinton's interpretation of the different numbers is open to some remark. He cannot be right, I think, in saying—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the assembly, or all the males above the age of twenty years". For we are expressly told that, under the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, all persons who did not possess 1000 drachmæ were excluded from the political franchise; and, therefore, a large tical franchise; and, therefore, a large number of males above the age of

without its special purpose or even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from the Ætolians and others.1

The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the Athenians, procured for Autumn. him considerable support in Peloponnesus, whither Kassander he proceeded with his army.2 Many of the cities, intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon; while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls.3 This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically

in Peloponnêsusmany cities join him— the Spartans surround their city with

how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an unwalled city was one of the deepest and most

twenty years would have no vote in the assembly, Since the two categories assembly, Since the two categories are not coincident, then, to which shall we apply the number 21,000? To those who had votes? Or to the total number of free citizens, voting or not voting, above the age of twenty? The public assembly, during the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, appears to have been of little moment or efficacy, so that a distinct record of the number of persons entitled to vote in it is not likely to have been sought.

Then, again, Mr. Clinton interprets the three numbers given upon two principles totally distinct. The two first numbers (citizens and metics) he considers to designate only males of full age; the third number, of ointeract, he considers to include both sexes and all ages.

all ages. This is a conjecture which I think very doubtful, in the absence of further knowledge. It implies that the enumerators take account of the slave women and children, but that they take no account of the free women and children, wives and families of the citizens and unetics. The number of the free women and children are wholly

unrecorded, on Mr. Clinton's supposi-tion. Now, if, for the purposes of the census, it was necessary to enumerate the slave women and children, it surely would be not less necessary to enumerate the free women and children.

The word οἰκέται sometimes means, not slaves only, but the inmates of a family generally—free as well as slave. If such be its meaning here (which however, there is not evidence enough to affirm), we eliminate the difficulty of supposing the slave women and children to be emperated, and the free women

supposing the slave women and children to be enumerated, and the free women and children not to be enumerated.

We should be able to reason more confidently if we knew the purpose for which the census had been taken—whether with a view to military or political measures, to finance and taxation, or to the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see tion, or to the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see Mr. Clinton's Fast. H. ad. ann. 444 B.C., about another census taken in reference to imported corn).

1 See Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 658 Reisk.

2 Diodôr. xviii. 75.

3 Justin, xiv. 5: Diodôr. xviii. 75; Pausan. vii. 8, 3; Pausan. i. 25, 5.

cherished of Lykurgean traditions-a standing proof of the fearless bearing and self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the foreigner had become so overwhelming as not to leave them even safety at home.

B.C. 317. Autumn.

Feud in the Macedonian imperial family--Olympias puts to death Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê-she reigns in Macedonia: her bloody revenge against the partisans of Antipater.

The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now embittered by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydikê, alarmed and indignant at the restoration of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Macedonia at his disposal. In this however they failed. Olympias, assisted not only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirotic prince Æakidês, made her entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317 B.C. She brought with her Roxana and her child—the widow and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê to resist

her, were so overawed by her name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight, and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydikê became her prisoners: the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander, were put to death, together with his brother Nikanor; 1 while the sepulchre of his deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned Alexander the Great, was broken up.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylæ, while Kassander was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander, son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging himself from these embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylæ by a maritime transit to Thessaly, seized the Perrhæbian passes before they had been put under guard, and

¹ Diodôr. xix. 11; Justin, x. 14, 4; Pausanias, i. 11, 4.

entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias, having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced B.C. 316. to shut herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna. Kassander with Roxana, the child Alexander, and Thessalonikê. passes into Macedonia daughter of her late husband Philip, son of Amyntas,1 -defeats Here Kassander blocked her up for several months Olympias, and beby sea as well as by land, and succeeded in defeatcomes ing all the efforts of Polysperchon and Æakidês to master of the country relieve her. In the spring of the ensuing year (316 —Olympias is besieged B.C.), she was forced by intolerable famine to surin Pydna. Kassander promised her nothing more captured. and put to than personal safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses, Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently, however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by order of Olympias. were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly. Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected with her name, that no one except the injured men themselves could be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalonikê to wife—confining Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of Amphipolis-where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to be slain.2

While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial family were disappearing from the scene in that country—the defeat and death of Eumenês (which happened nearly at the same time as the capture of Olympias 3) removed the last faithful partisan of that family in Asia. But at the same time it left in the hands of Antigonus such overwhelming preponderance throughout Asia, that he aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire, as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal family. His power appeared indeed so formid-

B.C. 315. Great power of Antigonus in Asia. Confederacy of Kassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus against him.

¹ Diodôr. xix. 36.
2 Diodôr. xix. 50, 51; Justin, xiv. 5; Amphipolis in her interest, considered Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix. 7, 1.
3 Even immediately before the death 50).

able, that Kassander of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukus of Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an active alliance, against him.

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears simply as a group of subject cities, held, B.C. 315 garrisoned, grasped at, or coveted by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in Macedonia Kassander founds after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take Kassandreia and refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander restores Thêbes. to make the best struggle that he could in Peloponnêsus, so that Kassander was now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallene, and near the site where Potidea had stood, the new city of Kassandreia; into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the neighbourhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus and Potidæa,—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty years before. He next marched into Peloponnêsus with his army against Alexander, son of Polysperchon. Passing through Bœotia, he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thêbes, which had been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great, and had ever since existed only as a military post in the ancient citadel called Kadmeia. The other Bœotian towns, to whom the old Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks, even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus, under Kassander's supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban Epameinondas, lent strenuous aid. Thêbes was reestablished in the original area which it had occupied before Alexander's siege, and was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the mastery of Bœotia and Greece.2

Diodôr, xix, 52; Pansanias, v. 23, 2.
 7, 2—5. This seems an explanation of Diodôr, xix, 52, 54, 78; Pausan, ix.
 Kassander's proceeding more probable

After some stay at Thêbes, Kassander advanced towards Peloponnêsus. Alexander (son of Polysperchon) B.C. 314. having fortified the Isthmus, he was forced to em-Measures of Antigonus bark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and against cross over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dis-Kassander -he possessed Alexander of Argos, of Messenia, and even promises freedom to of his position on the Isthmus, where he left a the Grecian powerful detachment, and then returned to Mace-Ptolemy His increasing power raised both apprepromises the like. hension and hatred in the bosom of Antigonus, who Greatpower endeavoured to come to terms with him, but in vain.2 of Kas-Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Greece. Seleukus, and Lysimachus against Antigonus, who was now master of nearly the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them.3 Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money, Antigonus despatched the Milesian Aristodêmus to strengthen Alexander against Kassander, whom he further denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused the absent Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian assembly, upon these and other charges.

Antigonus further proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly. that all the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons or military occupation.4 It was expected that these brilliant promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander; accordingly, Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus, thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterwards, tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself.⁵ These promises, neither executed nor intended to be executed by either of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the Greeks.

The arrival of Aristodêmus in Peloponnêsus had reanimated the party of Alexander (son of Polysperchon), against whom

than that given by Pausanias; who tells us that Kassander hated the memory of Alexander the Great, and wished to undo the consequences of his acts. That he did so hate Alex-ander is, however, extremely credible:

see Plutarch, Alexand. 74.

1 Diodôr, xix. 54.

² Diodôr. xix. 56.
³ Diodôr. xix. 57.

⁴ Diodôr. xix. 61. ⁵ Diodôr, xix, 62.

Kassander was again obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus, and other places, Kassander was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnêsus, though in subordination to himself. Alexander accepted the offer, becoming Kassander's ally,1 and carried on war, jointly with him, against Aristodêmus, with varying success, until he was presently assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow, Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself in considerable force at Sikyôn.² Kassander's most obstinate enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention as a substantive confederacy.3 Ætolians became the allies of Antigonus as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check through their neighbours the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous petty townships into a few considerable towns—Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf.4 His general Philippus gained two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.5

The power of Antigonus in Asia underwent a material diminution, by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now acquired in Babylonia; from which event the æra of the succeeding Seleukidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonus gained ground on Kassander. He sent thither his

¹ Diodôr. xix. 63, 64.

² Diodôr. xix. 62, 67.

³ Diodôr. xix. 66. 'Αριστόδημος, ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δικαιολογησάμενος, προετρέψατο τὰ πλήθη

βοηθείν τοῖς 'Αντιγόνου πράγμασιν, &c.

4 Diodôr. xix. 67, 68; Justin, xv.
2. See Brandstätter, Geschichte des
Ætolischen Volkes und Bundes, p. 178
(Berlin, 1844).

⁵ Diodôr. xix. 74.

nephew Ptolemy with a large force to liberate the Greeks, or, in other words, to expel the Kassandrian garrisons; B.C. 312. while he at the same time distracted Kassander's attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and Antigonus in Greece. invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) Considerexpelled the soldiers of Kassander from Eubea, Beotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in Eubœa was at this time Kassander. the chief military station of Kassander; Thêbes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with him; but the remaining Beeotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy, having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he conciliated by leaving them without any garrison—together with Orôpus, Eretria, and Karystus, entered Attica, and presented himself before Athens. So much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to open negotiations with Antigonus, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica. Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas found means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander's garrisons, and to escape from his dominion. The affairs of Antigonus were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus, who seized Elis, and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia. Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the god.2

In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonus on one side, and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian), and Lysimachus on the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of belligerents Roxana: Thrace being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and the whole of guaranteed in name by Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time all. Kassander puts sander puts to death free.3 Towards the execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done. Nor does it appear

B.C. 311.

Pacification Grecian autonomy Roxana and her child.

that the treaty had any other effect, except to inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child; both of

² Diodôr. xix. 87. 3 Diodôr. xix. 105. 1 Diodôr, xix, 77, 78, 89.

whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaukias, in the fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined.1 The forces of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece. But this general presently (310 B.C.) revolted from Antigonus, and placed them in co-operation with Kassander: while Ptolemy of Egypt, accusing Antigonus of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance against him.2

Polysperchon—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion

Polysperchon espouses the pretensions of Hêraklês son of Alexander. against Kassander. He enters into compact with Kassander, assassinates the young prince, and is recognized as ruler of Southern Greece.

over various parts of Peloponnêsus, with a military force distributed in Messênê and other towns3—was now encouraged by Antigonus to espouse the cause of Hêraklês (son of Alexander by Barsinê), and to place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander. This young prince Hêraklês, now seventeen years of age, was sent to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself, but also by the Ætolians. invaded Macedonia, with favourable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander, who offered to him partnership in the

sovereignty of Macedonia, with an independent army and dominion in Peloponnêsus. Polysperchon, tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Hêraklês, and withdrew his army towards Peloponnêsus. But he found such unexpected opposition, in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters in Lokris⁴ (309 B.C.). From this time forward, as far as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate ally or partner of Kassander, whose Macedonian dominion, thus confirmed, seems to have included Akarnania and Amphilochia

¹ Diodôr. xix. 105.

² Diodôr, xx, 19.

³ Messênê was garrisoned by Polysperchon (Diodôr. xix. 64).

⁴ Diodôr. xx. 28; Trogus Pompeius

Proleg. ad Justin, xv.; Justin, xv. 2.
 Diodór. xx. 100—103; Plutarch,
 Pyrrhus, 6. King Pyrrhus was of προγόνων ἀεὶ δεδουλευκότων Μακεδόσι at least this was the reproach of Lysimachus (Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 12).

on the Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a supremacy over many of the Epirots.

The assassination of Hêraklês was speedily followed by that of Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and B.C. 308. daughter of Philip and Olympias. She had been for Assassinasome time at Sardis, nominally at liberty, yet under tion of Kleopatra. watch by the governor, who received his orders from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, surviving relative of for the purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of Alexander the Great, by Antibecoming his wife. She had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several of the gonus. great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however, Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death. All the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonikê, wife of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) had now successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its name, thus came to an end.

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He acquired possession of the important Ptolemy of cities-Sikyôn and Corinth -- which were handed Egypt in over to him by Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander, son after some successes, of Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamahe contion his purpose as a liberator, inviting aid from the concludes a truce with Peloponnesian cities themselves against the garrisons Kassander. Passiveness of Kassander. From some he received encouraging of the Greanswers and promises; but none of them made any cian cities. movement, or seconded him by armed demonstrations. thought it prudent therefore to conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving however secure garrisons in Sikyôn and Corinth.² The Grecian cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity of self-defence, and

averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon them enmity without any prospect of advantage, they awaited only the turns

¹ Diodôr, xx. 37: compare Justin, xiii. 6; xiv. 1. ² Diodôr, xx. 37.

of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates around them.

B.C. 307. Sudden arrival of Demetrius Poliorkêtês in Peiræus. The Athenians declare in his favour. Demetrins Phalereus retires to Egypt. Capture of Munychia

Megara.

The Grecian ascendency of Kassander, however, was in the following year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered, by the sudden invasion of Denietrius called Poliorkêtês, son of Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he actually entered the harbour of Peiræus (on the 26th of the month Thargelion—May) without expectation or resistance from any one, his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard the harbour, found himself compelled to leave it in pos-

session of the enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius, the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The young prince ostentatiously proclaimed that it was the intention of his father Antigonus and himself to restore and guarantee to the Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained permission from the invader to retire to Thêbes, from whence he passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city declared in favour of Demetrius Poliorkêtês; who however refused to enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia, as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among the most conspicuous

features in his character, procuring for him the surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians free. levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future from all foreign garrison.1

After these successes, Demetrius Poliorkêtês triumphant entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly, that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He also promised them a further boon from his father triumph. Antigonus and himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these announcements were received with grateful exultation. feelings of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and admiration towards the young conqueror, but also in effusions of unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratoklês (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenes in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention

made his

B.C. 307.

Demetrius Poliorkêtês Athens in He promises restoration of the democracy. Extravagant votes of flattery passed by the Athenians towards him. Two new Athenian tribes created.

in devising new varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonus and Demetrius were proclaimed to be not only kings, but gods and saviours: a high priest of these saviours was to be annually chosen, after whom each successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was re-named as Demetrion; two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten; the annual senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of 500; the portraits and exploits of Antigonus and Demetrius were to be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athênê, into the splendid and voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had alighted from his chariot was consecrated with an altar

¹ Philochor. Fragm. 144, ed. Didot; by Demetrius Poliorkêtês is related Diodôr. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 8, 9. The occupation of Peiræus 7, 6.

erected in honour of Demetrius Katæbatês, or the Descender. Several other similar votes were passed, recognizing and worshipping as gods the saviours Antigonus and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars were voted to Phila-Aphroditê, in honour of Phila, wife of Demetrius; and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leæna and Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adeimantus and others, his convivial companions or flatterers. At the same time the numerous statues, which had been erected in honour of the Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown, and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast greater scorn upon the past ruler.2 The demonstrations of servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Poliorkêtês, were in fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these degenerate Athenians of his own time.3

In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle B.C. 307. of Chæroneia, and that during all this time the Alteration of tone and Athenians had been under the practical ascendency sentiment and constantly augmenting pressure of foreign potenin Athens, during the tates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macelast thirty donia had been continually strengthened by all the vears. subsequent events: by the capture and destruction of Thêbes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests of Alexander; by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian War, the slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens; lastly, by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or Munychia. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalereus, and the other leading statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Polior-

² Diogen. Laërt. v. 77. Among the numerous literary works (all lost) of

¹ Plutarch, Demetrius, 9—11; Diod. the Phalerean Demetrius, one was xx. 47; Democharês ap. Athenæum, vi. entitled 'Αθηναίων καταδρομή (ib. v. p. 253.

^{82).} 3 Democharês ap. Athenæum, vi. p.

kêtês (322-307 B.C.) had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed antipathy.

During these thirty years, of which the last half had been an aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How few of those who received Demetrius Poliorkêtês had taken part in the battle of Chæroneia, or listened to the stirring exhortations of Demosthenes in the war which preceded that disaster !1 the citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must have perished with Leosthenês in the Lamian war! The Athenians of 307 B.C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible intervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Lysimachus, &c. If they shook off the yoke of one potentate, it could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a citizen military force, furnished by confedcrate and co-operating citics, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armies, organized by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.

Two centuries before (510 B.C.), when the Lacedæmonians expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from Athens, there sprang up at once among the Athenian people a forward and devoted patriotism, which made them willing to brave, and competent to avert, all dangers in defence of their newly-acquired liberty.2 At that time, the enemies by whom they were threatened were Lacedæmonians, Thebans, Æginetans,

Contrast of Athens as proclaimed free by Demetrius Poliorkêtês with Athens after the expulsion of Hippias.

Chalkidians, and the like (for the Persian force did not present itself until after some interval, and attacked not Athens alone, but Greece collectively). These hostile forces, though superior in number and apparent value to those of Athens, were yet not

¹ Tacitus, Annal. i. 3. "Juniores quotusquisque reliquus, qui rempubli-post Actiacam victoriam, seniores cam vidisset?" plerique inter bella civium, nati: ² Herodotus, v. 78.

so disproportionate as to engender hopelessness and despair. Very different were the facts in 307 B.C., when Demetrius Poliorkêtês removed the Kassandrian mercenaries with their fortress Munychia, and proclaimed Athens free. To maintain that freedom by their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of organized force residing in the potentates around, one or more of whom had nearly all Greece under military occupation—was an enterprise too hopeless to have been attempted even by men such as the combatants of Marathôn or the contemporaries of Periklês. "Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow!" but the Athenians had not force enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by Demetrius Poliorkêtes was a boon dependent upon him for its extent and even for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was held under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honour of Demetrius Poliorkêtês by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly find a single pronounced opponent.

One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several

Opposition made by Democharês, nephew of Demosthenês to these obsequious public flatteries. of the votes—the nephew of Demosthenês—Democharês, who deserves to be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratoklês ended in banishment four years afterwards.¹ He appears to have discharged the functions of general

during this period, to have been active in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the city, and to have been employed in occasional missions.²

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone into voluntary exile; when their trials came on they were not forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who remained, and presented

¹ Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

² Polybius, xii. 13; Decretum apud Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt p. 851.

themselves for trial, were acquitted; 1 so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion. Stratoklês also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus (who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his eldest surviving descendant.2 Among those who accompanied the Phalerean Demetrius into exile was the rhetor or logographer Deinarchus.

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also, towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against the liberty of philosophising. It was decreed, on the proposition of a citizen named Sophoklês, that no philosopher should be allowed to open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with one accord left Athens. This spirited

Demetrius Phalereus condemned in his absence. Honourable commemoration of the deceased Lykurgus.

Restrictive law passed against the philosophersthey all leave Athens. The law is repealed next year, and the philosophers return to Athens.

¹ Philochori Fragm. 144, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 636.

² Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. pp. 842—852. Lykurgus at his death (about 324 B.C.) left three sons, who are said, shortly after his death, to have been denounced by Menesæchmus, indicted by Thrasiklês, and put in prison ('handed over to the Eleven''). But Demoklês, a disciple of Theophrastus, stood forward on their behalf, and Demosthenês, then in banishment at Trœzén, wrote emphatic remonstrances Demosthenės, then in banishment at Trczén, wrote emphatic remonstrances to the Athenians against such unworthy treatment of the sons of a distinguished patriot. Accordingly the Athenians soon repented and released them.

This is what we find stated in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 842. The third of the so-called Demosthenic Epistles purports to be the letter written on this subject by Demosthenes

The harsh treatment of the sons of The harsh treatment of the sons of Lykurgus (whatever it may have amounted to, and whatever may have been its ground) certainly did not last long, for in the next page of the very same Plutarchian life (p.843) an account is given of the family of Lykurgus, which was ancient and sacerdotal; and it is there stated that his sons after his death fully sustained the dignified posi-tion of the family.

On what ground they were accused

we cannot make out. According to the Demosthenic Epistles (which epistles I have before stated that I do not believe to be authentic), it was upon some allegation which, if valid at all, ought to have been urged against Lykurgus himself during his life (pp. 1477, 1478); but Lykurgus had been always honour-

ably acquitted, and always holdurably acquitted, and always held thoroughly estimable up to the day of his death (p. 1475).

Hyperidês exerted his eloquence on behalf of the sons of Lykurgus. A behalf of the sons of Lykurgus. A fragment of considerable interest from his oration has been preserved by Apsinés (ap. Walz. Rhetor. Græc. ix. p. 545). Ύπερείδης ὑπὲρ Δυκούργου λέγων—Τίνα φήσουσιν οἱ παριώντες αὐτοῦ τὸν τάφον; οὖτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως, ταχθεὶς δ΄ ἐπὶ τῆ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὖρε πόρους, ἀκοδόμησε δὲ τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ἀδεἰον, τὰ νεώρια, τριήρεις ἐποιήσατο καὶ λιμένας τοῦτον ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἡτίμωσε, καὶ τοὺς παίδας ἐδησεν αὐτοῦ.

This fragment of Hyperidês was pointed out to my notice by Mr. Churchill Babington, the editor of the recently-discovered portions of Hyperi-

recently-discovered portions of Hyperi-

protest, against authoritative restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching, found responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity still remaining to them—when their power had become extinct, and when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly, a year had hardly passed, when Philon-impeaching Sophoklês the author of the law, under the Graphê Paranomôn -prevailed on the Dikastery to find him guilty, and condemn him to a fine of five talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers returned. It is remarkable that Democharês stood forward as one of its advocates, defending Sophoklês against the accuser Philon. From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Demochares, we gather that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their fellow-citizens.2

Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of 150,000 medimni of wheat, with

¹ Diogen. Laërt. v. 38. It is perhaps to this return of the philosophers that to this return of the philosophers that the φυγάδων κάθοδος mentioned by Philochorus, as foreshadowed by the omen in the Acropolis, alludes (Philochorus, Frag. 145, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 637).

2 See the few fragments of Democharês collected in Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 445, with the notes of Carl Müller

See likewise Atheneus, xiii. 610, with the fragment from the comic writer Alexis. It is there stated that Lysimachus also, king of Thrace, had banished the philosophers from his dominions.

Democharês might find (besides the persons named in Athenæ. v. 215, xi. 508) other authentic examples of pupils of Plato and Isokratês who had been atrocious and sanguinary tyrants in their native cities: see the case of Klearchus of Herakleia, Memnon ap. Photium, Cod. 224. cap. 1. Chion and Leonidês, the two young citizens who slew Klearchus, and who perished in endeavouring to liberate their country, were also pupils of Plato (Justin, xvi. 5). In fact, aspiring youths of all varieties of purpose were likely to seek this mode of improvement. Alexander the Great, too, the very impersonation of subduing force, had been the pupil of Aristotle. persons named in Athenæ. v. 215, xi.

timber sufficient for 100 ships. He at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be taken for the common interests of Greece. It was his interest at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself, during the absence of Demetrius, whom he was compelled to summon into Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy in Syria and

B.C. 307.

Exploits of Demetrius Poliorkêtês. His long siege of Rhodes. Gallant and successful resistance citizens.

Cyprus. The following three years were spent by Demetrius-1. In victorious operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt-by Lysimachus, in Thrace-and by Seleukus, in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and Syria,2—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of Alexander's family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorkêtês. All their efforts however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise: the Rhodians submitted to enrol themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet under proviso not to act against Ptolemy.3 Towards the latter they carried their grateful devotion so far as to erect a temple to him, called the Ptolemæum, and to worship him (under the sanction of the oracle of Ammon) as a god.4 Amidst the rocks and shoals through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by the giant-republic of Rome,

¹ Diodôr. xx. 46.
2 Diodôr. xx. 53; Plut. Demetr. 18.
3 Diodôr. xx. 99. Probably this proviso extended also to Lysimachus and

Kassander (both of whom had assisted Rhodes) as well as to Ptolemy, though Diodôrus does not expressly say so.

⁴ Diodôr, xx. 100.

the Rhodians conducted their political affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

B.C. 307-

His prolonged war, and ultimate success in Greece. against Kassander.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus, Kassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnêsus and its neighbourhood.1 We make out no particulars respecting this war. The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying depredations.2 The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in

certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered defeat.3 But we can discover little respecting the course of the war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and that about the beginning of 303 B.c. he was blockading, or threatening to blockade, Athens. The Athenians invoked the aid of Demetrius Poliorkêtês, who, having recently concluded an accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Bœotia.4 He was received at Athens with demonstrations of honour equal or superior to those which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Bootians to evacuate the Euboean city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their alliance with Kassander. drove that prince out of Attica, expelled his garrisons from the two frontier fortresses of Attica-Phylê and Panaktum-and pursued him as far as Thermopylæ. He captured, or obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth, Argos, and Sikyôn; mastering also Ægium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns (except Mantineia), and various other towns in Pelopon-

¹ Diodôr. xx. 100. 2 That the Ætolians were just now most vexatious enemies to Athens may be seen by the Ithyphallic ode addressed to Demetrius Poliorkêtês (Athenæus,

Johnson Tollotrees (Atlehens, vi. p. 253).

Joindon xx. 50; Plutarch, Demetrius, 11. In reference to this defeat near Amorgos, Stratoklês (the complaisant orator who moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Anti-

gonus) is said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and the people were angry with Stratoklės. "What harm has happened to you?" replied he; "have you not had two days of pleasure and satisfaction?" This is at any rate a yeary good story. very good story.

4 Diodôr. xx. 100; Plutarch, Deme-

trius, 23.

nêsus.1 He celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heræa at Argos; on which occasion he married Deidameia. sister of Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to a short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city the name of Demetrias.2 At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation the appointment of leader or emperor of the Greeks, as it had been conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to have been either occupied by his garrisons or enlisted among his subordinates.

So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however, elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair, renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and All these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of Antigonus, and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him down.3

After uninterruped prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer of 302 B.C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens, about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian mysteries.4 He was welcomed Return of by festive processions, hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous congratulation. One to Athensof these hymns is preserved, sung by a chorus of Ithyphalli-masked revellers, with their heads and arms encircled by wreaths-clothed in white tunics, and in feminine garments reaching almost to the

Demetrius Poliorkêtês his triumphant reception memorable Ithyphallic hymn addressed to him.

This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears prevalent among Athenians of that day, and as affording a measure of their

1 Diodôr. xx. 102, 103; Plutarch, De-

metr. 23—25.

² Diodôr. xx. 102; Plutarch, Demetr. 25; Pausanias, ii. 7, 1. The city was withdrawn partially from the sea, and approximated closely to the acropolis. The new city remained permanently; but the new name Demetrias gave place to the distance. to the old name Sikyôn.

³ Diodôr, xx, 106,

⁴ That he returned from Leukas about the time of these mysteries is attested both by Democharés and by the Ithyphallic ode in Athenæus, vi. p. 253. See also Duris ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 535.

⁵ Semus ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 622.

self-appreciation. It is moreover among the latest Grecian documents that we possess, bearing on actual and present reality. The poet, addressing Demetrius as a god, boasts that two of the greatest and best-beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the same moment-Dêmêtêr (coming for the season of her mysteries), and Demetrius, son of Poseidôn and Aphroditê. "To thee we pray (the hymn proceeds); for other gods are either afar off-or have no ears-or do not exist-or care nothing about us ; but thee we see before us, not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things, establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who domineers, not merely over Thêbes, but over all Greece—the Ætolian, who (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight. times the Ætolians robbed their neighbours; but now they rob far as well as near." 1

Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more Helpless condition remarkable, as betraying a loss of force, a senility, of the and a consciousness of defenceless and degraded posi-Athenians proclaimed tion, such as we are astonished to find publicly proby them-selves. claimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but even against the incursions of the Ætolians,— Greeks like themselves, though warlike, rude, and restless.2 When such were the feelings of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organizing—and still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close, and that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the stronger currents that surround them.

1 Athenæus, vi. p. 253.

*Αλλοι μὲν ἢ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν θεοὶ, ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὧτα, ἢ οὐκ ἔξουσιν ὧτα, ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἔν· σὲ δὲ παρόνθ' ὁρῶμεν, οὐ ξύλινον, ἀλλ' ἀληθινόν. εὐχόμεσθα δὴ σοί *πρῶτον μὲν εἰρήνην ποιῆσον, φίλτατε, κύριος γὰρ εἶ σύ.
τὴν δ' οὐχὶ Θηβῶν, ἀλλ' ὅλης τῆς 'Ελλάδος,

Σφίγγα περικρατοῦσαν,
Αἰτωλὸς ὁστις ἐπὶ πέτρας καθήμενος,
ὥσπερ ἡ παλαιὰ,
τὰ σώμαθ ἡμῶν πάντ ἀναρπάσας φέρει,
κο ὑ κ ἔχω μ άχεσθαι.
Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἀρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
νυνὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ πόβρω—
μάλιστα μὲν δἡ κόλασον αὐτός · εἰ δὲ μὴ,
Οἰδίπουν τιν εὖρε,
τὴν Σφίγγα ταύτην ὅστις ἡ κατακρημνιεῖ
ἡ σπίνον ποιήσει.
2 Compare Pausanias, vii. 7, 4.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being considered as the guest of the goddess Athênê. But his dissolute habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a domicile; while the violence which he offered to tiated in beautiful youths of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued unabated. It is even affirmed that, in order to compensate for

B.C. 301.

Idolatry of Demetrius at Athens, He is inithe Eleumysteries. out of the regular

something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree, on the proposition of Stratoklês, declaring that everything which Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the gods and just in regard to men. The banishment of Demochares is said to have been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree.² In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and his Grecian allies for a march into Thessalv against Kassander: but before his departure he was anxious to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February, the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once, and to receive, in immediate succession, the preparatory and the final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was habitually required. Accordingly he placed himself disarmed in the hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation in the month of April, immediately before his departure from Athens.3

¹ Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

Moreover, we cannot determine when the "four years' war," or the alliance with the Beotians, occurred. Neither the discussion of Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. 302 B.C., and Append. p. 380) nor the different hypotheses of Droysen are satisfactory on this point: see Carl Müller's discussion on the Fragments of Democharés, Fragm. Hist. Gr. v. ii.

οι Democharts, Flagin Fist. στ. ν. 19. 446.
3 Diodôr. xx. 110. παραδούς οὖν αὐτὸν ἄνοπλον τοῖς ἰερεῦσι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὑρισμένης ἡμέρας μυηθείς, ἀνέζευξεν ἐκ τῶν ᾿Αθηνῶν.

The account of this transaction in the text is taken from Diodôrus, and is

¹ Plutarch, Demetr. 24.
2 Such is the statement of Plutarch (Demetr. 24); but it seems not in harmony with the recital of the honorary decree passed in 272 B.C., after the death of Democharês, commemorating his merits by a statue, &c. (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850). It is there recited that Democharês rendered services to Athens (fortifying and arming the city, concluding peace and alliance with the Bœotians, &c.), ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς πολέμου, ἀνθ' ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον. οἱ καταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον cannot mean either Demetrius Poliorkêtês or Stratoklês.

Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men, of

B.C. 301.

March of Demetrius into Thessalv-he passes into Asia and ioins Antigonusgreat battle of Ipsus, in which the four confederates completely defeat Antigonus, who is slain, and his Asiatic power broken up and partitioned.

whom 25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment over the Grecian cities.1 But after two or three months of hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned into Asia by Antigonus to assist in meeting the formidable army of the allies-Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander, whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or control. This stipulation served only as an honourable pretext for leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be observed.2 In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle of Ipsus in Phrygia (B.C.

300) by Antigonus and Demetrius, against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus, with a large army and many elephants on both sides. Antigonus was completely defeated and slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became from henceforward ascendant, from the coast of Syria

a simple one: a vote was passed granting special licence to Demetrius to receive the mysteries at once, though

it was not the appointed season.

Plutarch (Demetr. 26) superadds other circumstances, several of which have the appearance of jest rather than reality. Pythodôrus the Daduch or Torch bearer of the Mysteries stood alone in his protest against any celebration of the ceremony out of time; this is doubtless very credible. Then (according to Plutarch) the Athenians passed decrees, on the proposition of Stratokles, that the month Muny-Stratoklês, that the month Munychion should be called Anthesteriou. This having been done, the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated, in which Demetrius was initiated. Next, the Athenians passed another decree, to the effect that the month Munychion should be called Boêdromion; after which the Greater Mysteries (which belonged to the latter month) were forthwith celebrated. The comic writer Philippidês said of Stratoklês that he

had compressed the whole year into one single month.

This statement of Plutarch has very much the air of a caricature, by Philippidês or some other witty man, of the simple decree mentioned by Diodôrus a special licence to Demetrius to be ini-

a special licence to Demetrius to be initiated out of season. Compare another passage of Philippides against Stratoklės (Plutarch, Demetr. 12).

1 Diodôr. xx. 110.
2 Diodôr. xx. 111. It must have been probably during this campaign that Demetrius began or projected the foundation of the important city of Demetrias on the Gulf of Magnesia, which afterwards became one of the great strongholds of the Macedonian ascendency in Greece (Strabo, ix. pp. 436—443, in which latter passage the reference to Hieronymus of Kardia seems to prove that that historian gave a full description of Demetrias and its foundation). See about Deme and its foundation). See about Demetrias, Mannert, Geogr. v. Griech. vii. p. 591.

eastward to the Caspian Gates and Parthia: sometimes, though imperfectly, farther eastward, nearly to the Indus.1

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece. The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius, retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian in Greece. envoys, who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At the same time, his wife Deidameia, whom he had left at Athens, was sent away by the Athenians under an honourable escort to Megara, while some ships of war which he had left in the Peiræus were also restored to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still further mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in Greece.2 His garrisons were for

B.C. 300.

Restoration of the Kassandrian dominion Lacharês makes him-self despot at Athens, under Kassander. Demetrius Poliorkêtês returns, and expels Lacharês. He garrisons Peiræus Munychia.

the most part expelled, and the cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus, who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the Kassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lachares, who, seconded by Kassander's soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens such as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles, driven out by his tyranny, invited Demetrius Poliorkêtês, who passed over again from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnêsus, and laid siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lacharês having made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not without great fear of the

¹ Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hell. B.C. 301) places the battle of Ipsus in August, 301 B.C., which appears to me some months earlier than the reality. It is clear from Diodôrus (and indeed from Mr. Clinton's own admission) that winter quarters in Asia intervened between the departure of Demetrius from Athens 2 Plutarch, Demetr. 31.

treatment awaiting them. But he behaved with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all, supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiræus and Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled circle of Athens itself 1 (B.C. 298).

B.C. 298-296.

Death of Kassander. Bloody feuds among his family. Demetrius acquires the crown of Macedonia.

While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleukus. New prospects however were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year. Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a

sanguinary hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonikê, and threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid both from Demetrius and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus, being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater, receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between Epirus and Macedonia), together with Akarnania, Amphilochia, and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his chief city and residence.2 Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia, he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander (who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of Kassander and his sons were alike odious.3

¹ Plutarch, Demetr. 34, 35; Pausan. i. 25, 5. Pausanias states (i. 26, 2) that a gallant Athenian named Olympiodorus (we do not know when) encouraged his fellow-citizens to attack the Museum, Munychia, and Peiræus, and expelled the Macedonians from all of them. If this be correct, Munychia and Peiræus

must have been afterwards reconquered by the Macedonians; for they were garrisoned (as well as Salamis and Sunium) by Antigonus Gonatas (Pausanias, ii. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aratus, 34).

2 Plutarch, Pyrrhus 6.

3 Plut. Dem. 36; Dexip. ap. Syn. p. 264 seq.; Paus. ix. 7, 3; Just. xvi. 1, 2.

Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnêsus. He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering Thêbes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in Bœotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia, once the attached friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenês. But Greece as a whole was managed by

B.C. 294. Antigonus

Gonatas, son of Demetrius. master of Macedonia and Greece. Permanent footing of the Antigonid dynasty in Macedonia, until the conquest of that country by the Romans.

during all his father's lifetime; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B.C.) a captive in the

Antigonus (afterwards called Antigonus Gonatas) son

of Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken

hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy Keraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and Sosthenês, Antigonus Gonatas regained it in 277 B.C. His descendants, the Antigonid kings, maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom incorporated with the Roman conquests.2

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except

that the greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and his son Antigonus; either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons, or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was other by broken, and their habits of combined sentiment and

Spirit of the Greeks brokenisolation of the cities from each Antigonus.

action had disappeared. The invasion of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the defence of Thermopylæ in 279 B.C. So intolerable were the cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities as well as Antigonus were driven by fear to the efforts necessary for repelling them.3 A gallant army of Hellenic confederates was

Plutarch, Demetr. 39.
 See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici,

τὰ φρονήματα, τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν τοῦ δείματος προήγεν ἐς ἀνάγκην τῆ Ἑλλάδι ἀμύνειν: ἐώρων δὲ τόν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀγῶνα, οὐχ Append. 4, pp. 236—239. ἐώρων δὲ τόν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀγῶνα, οὐχ \$ Pausanias, i. 4, 1; x. 20, 1. τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας γενησόμενον, κάθα ἐπὶ δέ γε Ἑλλησι κατεπεπτώκει μὲν ἐς ἄπαν τοῦ Μήδου πότε. . . . ὡς οὖν ἀπολωλέναι

mustered. In the mountains of Ætolia and in the neighbourhood of Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished. But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonus Gonatas continued to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from alliances with other cities in its neighbourhood-planting in most of them local despots-and compressing the most important by means of garrisons. Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled in their power of self-action. The Achæan league too developed itself afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian liberty,2 though never attaining to anything better than a feeble and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign aid.3

With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It

The Greece of Polybius cannot form a subject of history by itself, but is essentially dependent on foreign neighbours.

forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my opinion justly, as having no history of its own,4 but as an appendage attached to some foreign centre and principal among its neighbours-Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbours acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those of Homer, Archi-

lochus, Solôn, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydidês, Xenophôn, and Demosthenês—present as their most marked characteristic a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions in the self-prompted co-operations and conflicts—the abortive attempts to bring about something like an effective federal organization, or to maintain two permanent rival confederacies—

δέον ἢ ἐπικρατεστέρους εἶναι, κατ' ἄνδρα τε ἰδία καὶ αἰ πόλεις διέκειντο ἐν κοινῷ. Αδδος τὸ 'Αχαϊκόν.

(On the approach of the invading Gauls.)

¹ Polyb. ii. 40, 41. πλείστους γὰρ δὴ Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὐτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες μονάρχους οὖτος (Antigonus Gonatas) ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. Justin, xxvi. 1.

² Pausanias, vii. 17, 1. ἄτε ἐκ δένδρου

λελωβημένου, ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς 'Ελλαϊκόν.

³ Plutarch, Aratus 47. ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι χερσὶν, καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὐτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες (the Αchæans), &c. Compare also c. ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. Justin, applications to Ptolemy, king of Egypt.

² Polybius, i. 3, 4; ii. 37.

the energetic ambition and heroic endurance of men to whom Hellas was the entire political world. The freedom of Hellas, the life and soul of this history from its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of Alexander's reign. After following to their tombs the generation of Greeks contemporary with him, men like Demosthenes and Phokion, born in a state of freedom, I have pursued the history into that gulf of Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad evidence of the degrading servility and suppliant kingworship into which the countrymen of Aristeides and Perikles had been driven, by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from without.

I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what

the leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere which now bedimmed his city. Democharês, the nephew of Demosthenês, has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest public offices; he was conspicuous for his free speech, both as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies; he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the democratical constitution, and was banished public for a time by its opponents. In the year 280 B.C., he

Evidence of the political nullity of Athenspublic decree in honour of Democharêswhat acts recorded as his titles to gratitude.

prevailed on the Athenians to erect a public monument, with a commemorative inscription, to his uncle Demosthenes. Seven or eight years afterwards, Democharês himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Lachês proposed and obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an annexed inscription, to his honour. We read in the decree a recital of the distinguished public services, whereby Democharês merited this compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree, his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last half of the father's public life (since his return from exile), is as follows:-1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus, from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty talents, the other of one hundred talents.

3. He proposed the vote for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater, received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at the Eleusinian festival.1

When such begging missions are the deeds for which Athens both employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian accustomed to the Grecian world, as described by Herodotus, Thucydidês, and Xenophôn, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close.

1 See the decree in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850. The Antipater here mentioned is the son of Kassander, not the father. There is no necessity for admitting the conjecture of Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hell. App. p. 380) that the name ought to be Antigonus and not Antipa-

ter, although it may perhaps be true that Democharês was on favourable terms with Antigonus Gonatas (Diog. Laërt. vii. 14).

Compare Carl Müller ad Democharis

Fragm. apud Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 446, ed. Didot.

CHAPTER XCVII.

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS.—AGATHOKLES.

It has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the

history of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct

Constitufrom that of the Central and Asiatic. We parted tion established last from the Sicilian Greeks, at the death of their by Timoleon at Syracuse —exchanged champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B.C.), by whose energetic exploits and generous political for an oligarchy. policy they had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank; which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory settlement. or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described as an oligarchy, implying that the constitution established by Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by cou-The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom Sosistratus and Herakleidês appear as leaders.2 We hear generally that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus either first originated or first firmly established his oligarchy, after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the citizens of Krotôn against their interior neighbours and assailants the Bruttians.

¹ See Ch. lxxxv. teenth Book the previous circumstances 2 Diodôr. xix. 3. It appears that of these two leaders, but this part of his Diodôrus had recounted in his eighnarrative is lost: see Wesseling's note.

Not merely Krotôn, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of Italian danger and decline, similar to those which were Greekspressed operating upon so many other portions of the Hellenic upon by enemies world. Their non-Hellenic neighbours in the infrom the terior were growing too powerful and too aggressive interior-Archito leave them in peace or security. The Messapians, damus king of Sparta the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other native slain in Italian tribes were acquiring that increased strength Italy. which became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome. I have in my preceding chapters recounted the acts of the two Syracusan despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast. Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338 B.C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat assistance. Spartan king Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, perhaps ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the time of the battle of Chæroneia² (338 B.C.)

About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still

Rise of the Molossian kingdom of Epirus by Macedonian aid— Alexander the Molossian king, brother of Olympias. pressed by the same formidable neighbours, invoked the aid of the Epirotic Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into an importance which they had never before enjoyed.³ Philip of Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects not

habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference

¹ See Chaps. lxxxiii. lxxxv.

² Diodôr. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Camill. 19; Pausan. iii. 10, 5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same day.

³ The Molossian King Neoptolemus

was father both of Alexander (the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merleker, Darstellung des Landes und der Bewohner von Epeiros, Königsberg, 1844, pp. 2—6.

that the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian ascendency) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the Epirotic kings. Alexander further cemented his union with Macedonia by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias. In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great the Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian; governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian Alexander, or as regent after his death.1

It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian Alexander undertook his expedition into Italy; 2 doubtless instigated in part by emulation of the 331. Asiatic glories of his nephew and namesake. Though The Mohe found enemies more formidable than the Persians lossian at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable. He crosses into Italy to gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town His exploits of Consentia and the Bruttian town of Tereina; he and death.

в.с. 332--

Alexander assist the Tarentines.

established an alliance with the Pædiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over all its population -over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians. He demanded

defence of Euxenippus, recently published by Mr. Babington, p. 12. The Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonæan Zeus, had sent to Dodona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had dressed and adorned the statue of Diônê there situated. Olympias addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as a trespass upon her dominions—ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἤλθε παρ' 'Ολυμπιάδος ἐν ταις ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ἡ χώ ρα εἰ ἡ ἡ Μο λο σ στία αὐτῆς, ἐν ἢ τὸ ἰερόν ἐστιν· οὔκουν προσῆκεν ἡμῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ ἐν κινεῖν. Olympias took a high and insolent tone in this letter (τὰς τραγψὲίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατmandate from the Dodonæan Zeus, had (τὰς τραγφδίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, &c.).

The date of this oration is at some period during the life of Alexander the

¹ A curious proof of how fully Great, but cannot be more precisely Olympias was queen of Epirus is preserved in the oration of Hyperidês in ander, Olympias passed much time in ander, Olympias passed much time in Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of Antipater

secure from the enmity of Antipater (Diodôr. xviii. 49).

Dodona had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage for the Hellenic race, especially for the Athenians. The order here addressed to them, that they should abstain from religious manifestations at this sanctuary, is a remarkable proof of the growing encroachments on free Hellenism, the more so as Olympias sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without asking permission: we learn this from the same fragment of Hyperidés.

² Livy (viii. 3—24) places the date of this expedition of the Molossian Alexander eight years earlier, but it is universally recognized that this is a mistake.

and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus. exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He further endeavoured to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities. which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth. But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile, in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of Pandosia and Acheron-two names which he well knew, and therefore avoided, in Epirus, but which he had not before known to exist in Italy.1

The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be contended for between the Epirotic kings and the Assistance native Italian powers—as they again became, still sent by the Syracusans to Krotôn more conspicuously, fifty years afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They were first rise of Agathoklês. now left to seek foreign aid where they could obtain it, and to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the formidable name of Agathokles first comes before usseemingly about 320 B.C.² The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by a general named Antander, whose brother Agathoklês served with him in a subordinate command.

To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathoklès—respecting which romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men—it appears that his father, a Rhegine exile, named Karkinus, came from Therma (in the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus

¹ Livy, viii. 17—24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.
² Diodôr. xix. 3.

was in comparative poverty, following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathoklês learnt also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his father at Syracuse.1 Though starting from this humble beginning, and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful habits, Agathokles soon attained a conspicuous position, partly from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favour of a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome, tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply so heavy that no other soldier could fight with it: he was moreover ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. became much attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money, but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this capacity Agathoklês acquired great reputation for courage in battle, ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathoklês married the widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in Syracuse.2

Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no

particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleidês, were unprincipled and sanguinary men.³ By this government an expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast, to assist the inhabitants of Krotôn against their aggressive neighbours the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathoklês, was one of the generals commanding this armament, and Agathoklês

Agathoklês distinguishes himself in the Syracusan expedition; he is disappointed of honours becomes discontented and Syracuse.

himself served in it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration, nor the issue of this expedition. But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathoklês to display his adven-

Diodôr, xix. 2.

² Diodôr. xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1. writt Justin states the earliest military part exploits of Agathoklês to have been part i against the Ætnæans, not against the note.

¹ Timæus apud Polybium, xii. 15; Agrigentines.
odôr. xix. 2.
2 Diodôr. xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1.
stin states the earliest military ploits of Agathoklês to have been part is not preserved: see Wesseling's

turous bravery and military genius, which procured for him high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse, to be entitled to the first prize for valour; but Sosistratus and the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred another. So deeply was Agathoklês incensed by this refusal, that he publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.

Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian mercenaries, which he maintained by various He levies a mercenary enterprises for or against the Grecian cities. force-his attacked Krotôn, but was repulsed with loss; he took exploits as general in Italy and service with the Tarentines, fought for some time Sicily. against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed. Next, he joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and to seize the government.1 Though repulsed in both of them, he nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.

Change of government at Syracuse-Agathoklês is recalledhis exploits against the exiles-his dangerous character at home.

Under the new government, Agathoklês obtained his recal, and soon gained increased ascendency. The dispossessed exiles contrived to raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians, so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered necessary, Agathoklês took a forward part, distinguishing himself among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with

¹ Diodôr. xix. 4; Justin, xxii. 1.
"Bis occupare imperium Syracusarum voluit; bis in exilium actus est."
In the same manner the Syracusan exile Hermokratês had attempted to extort by force his return at the head of 3000 men, and by means of partisans within; he failed and was slain—B.C. 408 (Diodôr. xiii. 75).

1000 soldiers, to surprise Gela by night; but finding the enemy on their guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded: yet by an able manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs to the Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestorides, who had been named general of the cityprobably from recollection of the distinguished services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming persuaded that the presence of Agathoklês was full of peril to the city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on the road during the night. But Agathoklês, suspecting their design, disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while Agathoklês escaped by favour of his disguise. He and his partisans appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.1

Not long afterwards another change took place in the government of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and peace made with the Carthaginians. Further internal It appears that a senate of 600 was again installed as changes at the chief political body; probably not the same men recal of as before, and with some democratical modifications. At the same time, negotiations were opened, through readmitted the mediation of the Carthaginian commander Ha- amnesty milkar, between the Syracusans and Agathoklês. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amidst the numerous

Syracusethe exiles— Agathoklês -swears and fidelity.

discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one, and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in terminating them. Agathokles affected to enter cordially into these projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the

c. 6—τοὺς αὐτῷ πρότερον συμπορευθέντας ginians as one π ρ ὸ ς Καρχηδονίους (see Wesseling's whereby he was note on the translation of π ρ ὸ ς). This supreme power.

Syracusan oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recal of Agathoklês, and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behaviour of that exile. Agathoklês, and the other exiles along with him, were accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of Dêmêtêr, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathoklês swore by the most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold faithfully the existing government, and carry out the engagements of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realizing the prevailing aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended (it seems) by Hamilkar.1

Agathoklês, in collusion with Hamilkar, arms his partisans at Syracuse, and perpetratés a sanguinary massacre of the citizens.

All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathoklês with Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the supreme power. As general of the city, Agathoklês had the direction of the military force. Under pretence of marching against some refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3000 soldiers strenuously devoted to him-mercenaries and citizens of desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a reinforcement of Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at daybreak in

the Timoleontion (chapel or precinct consecrated to Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Deklês, two chiefs of the senate already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with him

¹ The account here given is the best which I can make out from Diodôrus (xix. 5), Justin (xxii. 2), Polyanus (v. 3, 8). The first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathoklês— παραχθείε είς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἰερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅμοσε μηδὲν ἐναντιωθή· when executed for treason by the Carthaginians—"Objectans illis (Carthaginians—"Objectans illis (Carthaginians—"Objectans illis (Carthaginians—"Objectans illis (Carthaginians—"Objectans illis (Carthaginians—"Objectans illis (Carthaginians—"Objectans illis facere, quam hossequia Pœnorum" can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become subject to Carthage; there was

some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathoklês suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a response full of ardour, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the richest men in Syracuse. soldiers rushed into the streets with ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators, but many others also. unarmed and unprepared, each man selecting victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within, and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of Agathoklês; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many more were seized as prisoners. political purposes of Agathoklês, as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated at 6000, who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this Deinokratês, one among the prisoners, was scene of horror. liberated by Agathoklês from motives of former friendship; he too, probably, went into voluntary exile.1

After a massacre thus perpretrated in the midst of profound peace, and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian despots—Agathoklês convened what he called an assembly of the people. Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or in

¹ Diodôr. xix. 8, 9; Justin, xxii. 2.

any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or expelled; so that the assembly probably included few besides his Agathoklês-addressing them in terms of conown soldiers. gratulation on the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as one among the many; in token of which he threw off his general's cloak and put on a common civil But those whom he addressed, fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathoklês, with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a singlehanded authority, without any colleagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited power, or despot.1

Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and B.C. 317. twenty-two years after Timoleon had rooted out the His popular Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its ruins a free manners, military On accepting the post, Agathoklês took polity. energy, pains to proclaim that he would tolerate no further and conmassacre or plunder, and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent. He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. at the same time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and He speedily extended his authority over all the his revenues.

¹ Diodôr, xix, 9,

territorial domain of Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully over many other parts of Sicily.1

The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance had helped Agathoklês to this blood- B.C. 317stained elevation, appears to have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a Progress of large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in conquerin alliance with Carthage itself. Complaints having ing Sicily. The Agri-gentines take alarm been made to Carthage, this officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was sent and organize a defensive in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings of Agathoklês during the first years of againsthim. his despotism; but he went on enlarging his sway over the neighbouring cities, while the Syracusan exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum (under Deinokratês), partly at Messênê. About the year 314 B.C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messênê, which he was on the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning (as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath which had been sworn by Agathoklês at Syracuse under the guarantee of the Carthaginians.2 Though thus disappointed at Messênê, Agathoklês seized Abakænum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed to him-and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively, that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles there harboured, became convinced of the danger of leaving such encroachments unresisted.3 people of Agrigentum came to the resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily, and allied themselves with Gela and Messênê for the purpose.

But the fearful example of Agathoklês himself rendered them so apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at

¹ Diodôr. xix. 9; Justin, xxii. 2.
2 Diodôr. xix. 65. καθ΄ ὅν δὴ χρόνον ἤκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος πρέσβεις, οἱ τῷ μὲν ἀς an be here meant, except that oath described by Justin under the ψησαν, ὡς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας τοῦς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην παρεσκεύασαν, καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστήσαι τὸν τύραννον, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς ἀγαβοκλέα συσκευαζόμενον τὰς πόλεις.

1 Το 29

την Λιβυην.

I do not know what συνθῆκαι can be here meant, except that oath described by Justin under the words "in obsequia Pœnorum jurat" (xxii, 2).

once native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner. Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose They invite and invoke some Spartan of eminence and ability, as the Spartan Akrotatus to command Archidamus had recently been called to Tarentum; -his bad enduct and and even more as Timoleon had been brought from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The failure. old Spartan king Kleomenês (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then unpopular at home, and well disposed towards foreign warfare. This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to the envoys, and left Peloponnêsus with a small squadron, intending to cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavourable winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathoklês. He reached Agrigentum with favourable hopes, was received with all the honours due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general: he dissipated in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign, emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical, and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to a height when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.2

Sicily the only place in which a glorious Hellenic career was open.

To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal grandeur with that of Timoleon, against an enemy, able indeed and formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple worth-

¹ Diodôr. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater the severe Lacedæmonian laws against those who fled from battle had been suspended for the occasion, as had been done before after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the only person (μόνος) who opposed this suspension, whereby he incurred the most violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred so far that they even attacked, beat him, and conspired against his life (οὐτοι γὰρ συστραφέντες πληγάς τε ένεφόρησαν αὐτῷ καὶ διετέλουν ἐπιβουλεύοντες).

This is a curious indication of Spartau manners.

2 Diodôr, xix. 71.

lessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity, at a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic career was still open, when no similar exploits were practicable by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.

The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active

operations against Agathoklês. Peace was presently concluded with the latter by the Agrigentines and cluded by their allies, under the mediation of the Carthaginian Agathokles with the general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention, Agrigen-tines—his great power in Sicily. all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous, yet under the hegemony of Agathoklês; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue, under Carthage. Messênê was the only Grecian city standing aloof from this convention; as such, therefore, still remaining open to the Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favourable to Agathoklês, that they were much disapproved at Carthage.1 Agathoklês, recognized as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his military means at home. He sent a force against Messênê, to require the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure at the same time the recal of the Messenian exiles, partisans of his own, and companions of his His generals extorted these two points from the Messe-Agathoklês, having thus broken the force of Mcsscnê, secured to himself the town still more completely, by sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him, and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents at

It only remained for Agathoklês to seize Agrigentum. Thither he accordingly marched. But Deinokratês and the Syracusan exiles, expelled from Messênê, had made themselves heard at Carthage, insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments

Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than

six hundred.2

¹ Diodôr. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies Herakleia, Selinus, and Himera as being under the Carthaginians, this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive Cartha-

of Agathoklês. The Carthaginians, alarmed, sent a fleet of sixty sail, whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege He is repulsed from by Agathoklês, was preserved. The recent conven-Agrigentum tion was now broken on all sides, and Agathoklês -the Carthaginians kept no further measures with the Carthaginians. send an armament He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed to Sicily against him. some of their forts: while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden descent with their fleet on the harbour of Syracuse. They could achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian merchant-vessel, out of two there They disgraced their acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare) of cutting off the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathoklês.1

The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the

в.с. 310.

Position of the Carthaginians be-tween Gela and Agrigentum— their army reinforced from home.

Carthaginians in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus, in the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine border. Here Agathoklês approached to offer them battle, having been emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokratês and the Syracusan exiles near Kentoripa and Gallaria.2 So superior was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to

remain in their camp; and Agathoklês returned in triumph to Syracuse, where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers; 2000 native Carthaginians, partly men of rank; 10,000 Africans; 1000 Campanian heavy-armed, and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sunk with all on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily. The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public mourn-

¹ Diodòr. xix. 103. It must be taken in arms, whom he called rebels noticed, however, that even Julius (Bell. Gall. viii. 44). Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes out off the hands of his Gallic prisoners 2 Diodòr. xix. 103, 104.

ing was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black serge.

Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with Agathoklês. He encamped on or Operations of Agathonear Eknomus, summoned all the reinforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected addithem-his tional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of citizens at 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.1 At the same time, a Carthaginian armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messênê, fell in with twenty armed ships belonging to Agathoklês, and captured them all with their crews. The Sicilian cities were held to Agathoklês principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens might forestal him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached thither, on various pretences, several small parties of soldiers, who presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize the town. Agathoklês then marched into Gela with his main force. trusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite to it.² The two camps were separated by a

For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies remained stationary, neither of them choosing to B.C. 310. make the attack. At length Agathoklês gained what Battle of he thought a favourable opportunity. A detachment the Himera, from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit of Agathokles some Grecian plunderers; Agathokles posted some Carthamen in ambush, who fell upon this detachment ginians.

the river Himera.3

between

level plain or valley nearly five miles broad, through which ran

¹ Diodôr, xix, 106. 2 Diodôr, xix, 107, 108. 3 Diodôr, xix, 108, 109.

unawares, threw it into disorder, and pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success, Agathoklês brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera, and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding. They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the stockade, and were forcing their way into the camp. They were, however, repulsed by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000 Balearic slingers in Hamilkar's army, who hurled stones weighing a pound each, against which the Grecian armour was an inadequate defence.

Total defeat of Agathoklês by the Carthaginians. Still Agathoklês, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be renewed on several points at once, and with apparent success, when a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general

These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the attack. rear of the Greeks, who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian cavalry, 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them, that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on the banks.1 At length they obtained shelter in their own camp, after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated at 500.

Agathokles, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela, which was well fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should

¹ Diodôr, xix, 109.

be completed. But Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the thaginians recover a purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His large part great victory at the Himera had produced the of Sicily strongest effect upon many of the Sicilian cities, who thokles. His were held to Agathoklês by no other bonds except condition those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proat Syracuse. clamations, inviting them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana, Tauromenium, Messênê, Abakænum, with several other smaller towns and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable as to give universal satisfaction. Agathokles appears to have been thus dispossessed of most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse. Even the harbour of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet, placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathoklês collected the corn from the neighbourhood, and put the fortifications in the best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was

In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; He conceives the surrounded indeed with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully executed, to change attacking the Carthaaltogether the prospects of the war. He resolved to ginians in carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at home, but unable even to imagine it as

no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful

defence.1

practicable. It was known that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recal of the Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps the consequences of it might be yet greater.

How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but His energy and sagacity also at sea. Agathoklês had no chance except by keepalso at sea. Agathoklês had no chance except by keeping this expedition.

His renewed fitted out an armament, announced as about to sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against and spoliasome unknown town on the Sicilian coast. tion. selected for this purpose his best troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the battle of the Himera: he could not transport horses, but he put the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers, many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the requisite funds, his expedients were manifold: he borrowed from merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families. Agathoklês publicly proclaimed that the siege of Syracuse, which the Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure them, but that those who felt themselves unequal to the effort might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathoklês set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their possessions to himself.1 By such tricks and enormities, he provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were

¹ Diodôr. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyænus, v. 3-5.

going: there was a general talk about the madness of Agathoklês: nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence. Agathoklês named Antander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnon.1

The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbour. It happened one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbour being thus left unguarded. Agathoklês took the opportunity of striking with his Eclipse of armament into the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle, which they

He gets out of the harbour in spite of the blockading fleet. the sun. He reaches Africa safely.

presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise, he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark. and the stars were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon, that all the artifice and ascendency of Agathoklês were required to inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights, they approached the coast of Africa. Carthaginian ships had pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they appeared in sight just as Agathoklês was nearing the land. Strenuous efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land first; Agathoklês secured that advantage, and was enabled to put himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarkation of his own soldiers, at a point called the Latomiæ or Stone-quarries.2

After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers, the first proceeding of Agathoklês was to burn his vessels

¹ Diodôr. xx. 4—16. nine days' march eastward from Carlindor. xx. 6. Procopius, Bell. thage as far as Juka the land is $\pi \alpha \nu \tau \epsilon$ -Vand. i. 15. It is here stated that for $\lambda \hat{\omega}_S \hat{\alpha} \lambda \hat{\iota} \mu \epsilon \nu \sigma_S$.

-a proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet in truth the ships were now useless; for if He burns he was unsuccessful on land, they were not enough to his vessels impressive enable him to return in the face of the Carthaginian ceremony for effecting fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if he this, under vow to retained them, it was requisite that he should leave Dêmêtêr. a portion of his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, the patron goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in particular. He then apprised his soldiers that, during the recent crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed a vow to these goddesses, engaging to make a burnt-offering of his ships in their honour, if they would preserve him safe across to Africa. The goddesses had granted this boon; they had further, by favourably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full success to his African projects; it became therefore incumbent on him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being now brought, Agathoklês took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the admiral's ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.1

Agathoklês marches into the Carthaginian territorycaptures Tunêscultivation of the country.

Though Agathoklês had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable—thus cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing richness and them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathoklês conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called Megalê-Polis.² His march

1 This striking scene is described by territory (Handbuch der Alten Geogra-

Diodôrus, xx. 7 (compare Justin, xxii. 6), probably enough copied from Kallias, the companion and panegyrist of Agathoklês: see Diodôr. xxi, Fragm.

p. 281.

² Megalê-Polis is nowhere else mentioned, nor is it noticed by Forbiger in his list of towns in the Carthaginian

phie, sect. 109).
Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten-Ländern des Mittelmeeres, vol. i.pp. 131—133) supposes that Agathoklês landed at an indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium Mercurii),

lay for the most part through a rich territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we thus obtain into the condition of territory near Carthage is of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm-buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, &c., all excited the astonishment and stimulated the cupidity of Agathoklês and his soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the coast.1 The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea, were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled habitually with harshness and oppression.² The Liby-Phænicians appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit necessary for lightening it.3 Agathoklês, having marched through this land of abundance, assaulted Megalê-Polis without delay. The inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with

forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage. There are stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalê-Polis not far off from this spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near the spot afterwards called Misua.

A map, which I have placed in this volume, will convey to the reader some idea of the Carthaginian territory.

1 Justin, xxii. 5. "Huc accedere, quod urbes castellaque Africæ non muris cinctæ, non in montibus positæ sint: sed in planis campis sine ullis munimentis jaceant: quas omnes metu excidii facile ad belli societatem perlici posse."

² Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius, Bell. Vandal. i. 5; i. 15).

³ Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in the Carthaginian

chary (xxix, 20), in recounting the landing of Scipio in the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second Punic war, says: "Emporia ut peterent, gubernatoribus edixit. Fertilissimus ager, eoque abundans omnium copia rerum est regio, et imbelles (quod plerumque in uberi agro evenit) barbari sunt: priusque quam Carthagine subveniretur, opprimi videbantur posse."

About the harshness of the Carthaginian rule over their African subjects, see Diodôr. xi. 77; Polyb. i. 72. In reference to the above passage of Polybius, however, we ought to keep in mind—That in describing this harshness, he speaks with express and exclusive reference to the conduct of the Carthaginians towards their subjects during the first Punic war (against Rome), when the Carthaginians themselves were hard pressed by the Romans Rome), when the Carthagmians themselves were hard pressed by the Romans and required everything that they could lay hands upon for self-defence. This passage of Polybius has been sometimes cited as if it attested the ordinary character and measure of Carthaginian dominion, which is contrary to the intention of the author. surprise and terror, made little resistance. Agathoklês easily took the town, abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich property within to his soldiers, who enriched themselves with a prodigious booty both from town and country -furniture, cattle, and slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called Tunes (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like manner. He fortified Tunês as a permanent position; but he kept his main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to fight.1

The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathoklês during his

Consternation at Carthage the citymarches out -Hanno and Bomilkar named generals.

crossing from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed in Africa, on their own territory, and even burnt his fleet, they at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held against him him prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military array against Megalê-Polis, they divined his real purposes, and were filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-

ornaments of his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred. Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathoklês had been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from their fleet: whereby they learnt the real state of affairs in Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist Agatho-

in the rebellion of the mercenary soldiers and native Africans against Carthage, which followed on the close of the first Punic war (Polyb, i. 73); and by the revolted Libyans in 396 B.C. (Diodôr. xiv. 77).

Diodôrus places Tunês at the distance of 2000 stadia from Carthage, which must undoubtedly be a mistake. He calls it White Tunês—an epithet drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.

drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.

¹ Diodôr. xx. 8. Compare Polyb. i. 29, where he describes the first invasion 25, where he describes the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory by the Roman consul Regulus. Tunes was 120 stadia or about fourteen inles south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67). The Tab. Peuting, reckons it only ten miles. It was made the central place for hostile over tions against Carthage for hostile operations against Carthage, both by Regulus in the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 30); by Matho and Spendius

klês. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were named generals conjointly.

They were bitter political rivals; but this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each would serve as a check upon the other, and as a guarantee to the state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the separate election of the other.1 These two generals, unable to wait for distant succours, led out the native forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived altogether from citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunês and Carthage) not far from Agathoklês; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders, and so confident were they of victory, that they carried with them 20,000 pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.2

Agathoklês placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites round him to combat the Sacred Band; the Inferior command of his right he gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls artifices to encourage -scarcely equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy, the soldiers.

numbers of Agathoklês

Some of the ships' crews were even without arms—a deficiency which Agathokles could supply only in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men, stationed in the rear,

¹ Diodôr. xx. 10. ² Diodôr. xx. 10—13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the battle of the Krimesus), Diodôr. xvi. 80, 81; also this History, Chap.

expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have been 700,000 the Sacred Band of Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the battle of the Krimesus), Diodôr. xvi. 80, 81; also this History, Chap. lxxxv.

The amount of native or citizen force given here by Diodôrus (40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for appreciating it, however, are lamentably scanty, and we ought to

had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites. As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathoklês tried to hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favourites of Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the sight.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made little or no impression; but the infantry Treachery of the Carof their right pressed the Greeks seriously. Especially thaginian Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him, behaved general Bomilkar with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed victory of Agathoklês. to be gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately His death not only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno's death than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred Band. though fighting with unshaken valour, were left unsupported, attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathoklês, who found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought for fettering their expected captives.1

Conquests of Agathoklês among the Carthaginian dependencies on the eastern coast.

This victory made Agathoklês for the time master of the open country. He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars, constructed expressly for the purpose-since he had no ships of his own remaining. Having fortified Tunês, and established it as his central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast (Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the north-

¹ Diodôr. xx. 12. The loss of the others at 6000. The loss in the Carthaginians was differently given: army of Agathoklês was stated at 200 some authors stated it at 1000 men, men.

ern and southern portions of it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns dependent on Carthage,1

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards the reigning city. the Cartha-Neither the native Libyans or Africans, nor the ginians. mixed race called Liby-Phænicians, who inhabited the sacrifice. towns,2 could be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance. They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and on their omissions of duty towards the gods. To the Tyrian Hêraklês they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required by their religion a backwardness which they now endeavoured to make up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch. they also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children, born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the family. But it was now found out, on investigation. that many parents had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for the public safety. The statue of Kronus-placed with outstretched hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately underneath—was fed at that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably with 500, living children.3 By this monstrous holocaust

¹ Diodôr. xx. 17. τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντας τούτ ϕ τῷ 2 Diodôr. xx. 55. θε ϕ τῶν υίῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον 3 Diodôr. xx. 14. ἠτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνούμενοι λάθρα παΐδας καὶ θρέψαντες Κρόνον αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως

the full religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow-ornaments taken from the ships of Agathoklês. They at the same time equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack Tunes. Agathokles had fortified that

town, and established a strong camp before it; but

of Agathoklês on the eastern coast of Carthage—capture of Neapolis, Adrumetum, Thapsus, &c.

Operations

he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the territory of Carthage. Among these towns he first attacked Neapolis with success, granting to the inhabitants favourable terms. He then advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced the siege, with the assistance of a neighbouring Libyan prince named Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathoklês was engaged in the siege of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger while besieging

γενομένης, εὐρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιετούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἐννοίαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοὶς τείχεσιν ὁρῶντες των βεων τοῦς τοὶς τείχεσιν ὁρῶντες τοὰς πατρίους τῶν θεῶν ταταλελικότες τὰς πατρίους τῶν θεῶν τιμάς ὁ διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας πατίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν τοῦς ταιθαικοίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν απαίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν απαίδων προκρίναντες ἐθυσαν απαίδων προκρίναντες ἐθυσαν απαίδων προκρίναντες ἀθυσαν απαίδων προκρίναντες απαίδων αποκυτώς ἐαντούς ἔδοσαν, οὐκ ἐλάττους ἀνδριὰς κοίντιας ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χείρας ὑπτίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, δὶς παρὶς ἀντοίς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς τὰς ἐκτετακὼς τὰς ἐκτετακὸς τὰς ἐκτε

In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us), one clause is not perfectly clear respecting the three

We read in the Fragment of Ennius

"Pœni sunt soliti suos sacrificare
puellos": see the chapter iv. of Münter's work, Religion der Karthager, on this subject.

Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the siege, Agathoklês left his main army before it, stole away with only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to an elevated spot-half-way between Adrumetum and Tunes, vet visible from both-he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a prodigious number of fires. The effect of these fires. seen from Adrumetum on one side and from the army before Tunês on the other, was to produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging Tunês fancied that Agathoklês with his whole army was coming to attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on capitulation.2

By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathoklês both relieved Tunês and acquired possession He fortifies of Adrumetum. Pushing his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus, with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance interior southward.3 He also occupied and fortified the important position called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far distant again.

Aspisundertakes operations country defeats the Carthagi-

pâs τοῖs πολεμίοις εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγενημένης.

² Diodôr. xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodôrus is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good authorities before him in his history of Agathoklês. If true, it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at Herkla, while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a prodigious distance from Tunis. Other

and nearer to Tunis.

Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist with the narrative of Diodôrus. Both the others are too distant. Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth, p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very much more distant, and therefore out of the question. question.

question.

Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, pp. 142—154; Forbiger, Handb. d. Geog. p. 845). It is, therefore, probable that the narrative of Diodôrus is not true, or must apply to some other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel) taken by Agathoklês, and not to Adrumetum.

3 Diodôr. xx. 17.

from it-a point convenient for maritime communication with Sicily.1

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than 200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathoklês became master along the eastern coast.2 He next endeavoured to subdue the towns in the interior, into which he had advanced as far as several days' march. But he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunês, that the Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches, he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians, but was now defeated and slain.3 The Carthaginians, however, though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathoklês at Syracuse had taken a turn unexpectedly favourable. He had left that city blocked up partially by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition, Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received

¹ Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as founded by the Siculi; Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea), being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, as more convenient for communication with Sicily than either Carthage or Tunis, or any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal experience (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres, i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the necessity of getting round not under the necessity of getting round the headland.

the headland.

In the case of Agathoklês there was a further reason for establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this

they must get from the Gulf round Cape Bon.

² Diodôr. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired, either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent cities of Carthage (Appian, Punica, c. 3). Respecting the prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very learned and instructive work of Movers, Die Phönikier, vol. ii. p. 454 seqq. Even at the commencement of the third Punic war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some authors very vaguely. Thus Poseidonius ridiculed the affirmation of Polybius (Strabo, iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians. Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.

3 Diodôr. xx. 17, 18. learned and instructive work of Movers,

from Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa, yet also bringing the brazen prow-ornaments Proceedings taken from the ships of Agathoklês. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth, and to spread abroad news that Agathoklês had been destroyed with his armament; in proof of which he produced the dering-he prow-ornaments—an undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to Antander and the other authorities, Hamilkar

of Hamilkar before Syracuse—the city is near surrenis disappointed, marches away from

demanded from them the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favourable terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with the view of making an attack. Antander, with others, believing the information and despairing of successful resistance, was disposed to comply; but Erymnon the Ætolian insisted on holding out until they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000 persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the mercy of Hamilkar and his army without; who not only suffered them to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late calamitous expulsion than from the grief of those who believed that their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathoklês. Hamilkar had brought up his batteringengines, and was preparing to assault the town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathoklês, arrived from Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favour of darkness escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious position of Agathoklês. There was no further talk of capitulation; Hamilkar, having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously resisted, withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of 5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa,1

During some months he seems to have employed himself in

operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout Sicily. But at length he concerted B.C. 309. measures with the Syracusan exile Deinokratês, who Renewed attack of was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled Hamilkar upon Syracountrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. cuse—he tries to fleet already blockaded the harbour, and he now with surprise his army, stated as 120,000 men, destroyed the Eurvalus, but is totalneighbouring lands, hoping to starve out the inhabily defeated, tants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he made prisoner occupied the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olymand slain. pius, near the river Anapus and the interior coast of the Great From hence—probably under the conduct of Deinokratês and the other exiles, well acquainted with the groundhe undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main purpose, as that of Demosthenes during the Athenian siege, after he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of Nikias.¹ Even Demosthenes, though conducting his march with greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss. Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or point of junction for the two converging walls-one skirting the northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.² The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully It was attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked them vigorously

¹ See Ch. lx. of this History, together with the second Plan of Syracuse, annexed to the volume (vi.) in which that chapter is contained.

² For a description of the fortifica-

and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar himself. making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the eves of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on entering the city as a conqueror. He did indeed take his evening meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent to Africa.2

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing The Agribetween the exiles under Deinokratês and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the besieging stand forward as army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting champions by the depression both of Carthaginians and exiles. stood forward publicly, proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency,

gentines stand of Sicilian freedom against Agathoklês and the Carthaginians.

against both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathoklês on the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus, who set himself with vigour to the task of expelling everywhere the mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and, in conjunction with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits to others. popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their free

¹ Diodôr. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.

² Diodôr. xx. 30. τον δ' οῦν 'Αμίλκαν οὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δειναῖς αἰκίαις κατ' αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνείλον.

governments,1 Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,2 Leontini, and Kamarina were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathoklês; while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway of the Carthaginians, and joined the Agrigentine confederacy. The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than before.3

The ascendency of Agathoklês was thus rather on the wane in

Mutiny in the army of Agathoklês at Tunêshis great danger, and address in extricating himself.

Sicily; but in Africa he had become more powerful than ever-not without perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin. receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their view in triumph: they made respectful prostration before it,

but the sight was astounding and mournful to them.4 While they were thus in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in the camp of Agathoklês at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus, which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the head of Archa-They found sympathy with the whole army, who seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak, immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers. offering to them large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer was at first so favourably entertained, that the envoys returned with confident hopes of success, when Agathoklês, as a last resource, clothed himself in mean garb.

¹ Diodôr. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς 1 Diodor, XX. 31. οἰαβοηθείσης δὰ της by Polybus (i. 15) midway between the τῶν ᾿Αγραγαντίνων ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πᾶσα domain of Syracuse and that of Carthy νήσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὀρμὴ τοῖς πόλεσι thage.

2 Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far to the northeast of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed προσκυνήσαντες, &c.

by Polybius (i. 15) midway between the

and threw himself on the mercy of the soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their faces. such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. not only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm, calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and promising unabated obedience for the future. Agathoklês gladly obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardour to attack forthwith the Carthaginians, who, expecting nothing less, were defeated with considerable loss.2

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a

considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only to in the turn the war to their own profit. Agathokles, leaving interior-attacked by his son in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior with a large portion of his The Carthaginian generals were cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Neverthe-by the Numidians. less Agathoklês felt confident enough to assail them

B.C. 308—

Carthaginian army sent to act Agathoklês with some successhis camp is pillaged

in their camp; and after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an indccisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the fact that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage. The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by Agathoklês.3

1 Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens at Ticinum.

Valens at Ticinum.

"Postquam, immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem cœptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem sequuntur.—Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum tegebatur." (Presently the feeling changes by the adroit management of Alphenus

Varus, prefect of the camp)—then, "silentio, patientia, postremo precibus et lacrymis, veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem inco-lumis Valens, processit, gaudium, mise-ratio, favor: versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque circumdatum aquilis signisque in tribunal ferunt."

² Diodôr. xx. 34.

³ Diodôr. xx. 39.

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader that the force of resistance possessed by Carthage Agathoklês was more than he could overcome—that though invites the aid of humbling and impoverishing her for the moment, Ophellas he could not bring the war to a triumphant close: from Kyrênê. since the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not be besieged except by means far superior to his.1 We have already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before. He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê, and despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.2

To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (i.e. Antecedent the five neighbouring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its circumport Apollonia, Barka, Teucheira, and Hesperides), stances of an earlier chapter of this History has already been Kyrênê. Division Unfortunately information respecting devoted.3 of coast between them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander Kyrênê and the Great, is almost wholly wanting. Carthage. among a Libyan population, many of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for the festival chariotmatches and in battle, was one example. The Libvan tribes useful as neighbours, servants, and customers,4 were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B.c. we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes, and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse during the Athenian siege.⁵ About 401 B.C. (shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again so hard pressed

¹ Diodôr. xx. 59. ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἤν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τῆν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ὸχυρότητα.

² Diodôr. xx. 40.

³ See Ch. xxvii.

⁴ See Isokratês, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbours and slaves.

⁵ Thucvd. vii. 50.

by the same enemies, that she threw open her citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them. invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then expelled from Peloponuêsus, and proscribed by the Spartans: they went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.1 Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Graeco-Libyan Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis, was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and Carthage, at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philani, ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.² We cannot doubt that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

In the year 331 B.C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt, the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.3 We hear nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander's life (324 B.C. to 323 B.c.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê kyrênê by exiles. His chequered rescript of Alexander (proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B.C., and directing that all Grecian victorious exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should be

Thimbron with the Harpalian mercenaries is invited over to career, on the whole in Libya.

recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by force. To this end they invited from Krête an officer named Thimbron, who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krête, with the treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries brought over from Asia by that satrap.4 Thimbron willingly

<sup>Pausan, iv. 26; Diodôr, xiv. 34.
Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell.</sup>

Jugurth. p. 126.

3 Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodôr. xvii. 49. It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown) applied to Plato to make laws

4 Diodôr. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, detter avouched.

4 Diodôr. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, detter avouched.

5 Por Rebus post Alexandr. vi. apud Photium, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.

for them, but that he declined. See Thrige, Histor. Cyrênês, p. 191. We should be glad to have this statement

carried over his army to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of Barka and Hesperides sided with him, so that he was strong enough to force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to pay 500 talents--to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia. While he plundered the merchants in the harbour, he proclaimed his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage. His schemes were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named Mnasiklês, who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid these two cities, Thimbron moved his quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence Mnasiklês contrived to surprise that valuable port, thus mastering at once his base of operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his soldiers. Thimbron's fleet could not be long maintained without a harbour. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water, were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed by storms.2

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field, and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnêsus. This reinforcement again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their side also thought it necessary to obtain succour, partly from the neighbouring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But on this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of success; he

pressed both Kyrênê and the harbour so vigorously, that famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens. The oligarchical men, expelled by the mere popular party, sought shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron, some at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt.1

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron, worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikidês, governor for Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and placed under the government of Ophellas.2

The Kyreneans invite aid from the Egyptian Ptolemy, who sends Ophellas thither. Defeat and death of Thimbron. Kyrênaica annexed to the dominions of Ptolemy, under Ophellas as viceroy.

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As a proof and guarantee of this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city, a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B.C. 312) the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,3 Kyrênê passed once more under the vicerovalty of Ophellas.

¹ Diodôr, xviii. 21.

² Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodôr. xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.

³ Diodôr. xix. 79. οἰ Κυρηναῖοι . . .

τὴν ἄκραν περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, &c. 4 Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas

[&]quot;rex Cyrenarum"; but it is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), 'Οφέλλα τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not necessarily imply an independent authority.

To this viceroy Agathoklês now sent envoys, invoking his aid

B.C. 308.

Position and hopes of Ophellas. He accepts the invitation of Agatho-klês. He collects colonists from Athens and other Gre-cian cities.

against Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience. He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife, Euthydikê, a lineal descendant from Miltiadês, the victor of Marathôn, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens. In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage, the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered. Agathoklês (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that island in conjunction with an

African dominion.

To Ophellas, such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on the look-out for aggrandizement towards the west, and had sent an exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa, even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.2 Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to be afterwards acquired;3 the conquest of which was known to have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer. To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation of Agathoklês. Having learnt in

¹ Diodôr. xx. 40.
2 From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of Northern Africa, to the Strait of Gibraltar, and round the old Phænision estilements on the western coast. of Gibraitar, and round the old Phoenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco. Some euinent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ 'Οφέλα (or 'Οφέλλα) περιπλοῦ, which is sustained by a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of their research; and the seeding which their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has nothing to

recommend it. In my judgment, Ophellas, ruling in the Kyrénaica and indulging aspirations towards con-quests westward, was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an examination of the North

about, an examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this fact may have induced Agathoklês to apply to him.

3 Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. 34, ap. Photium, Cod. 92. Αίγυπτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπέκεινα ταύτης τὴν πολλὴν, καὶ ὅ, τι περ ἄν πρὸς τούτοις δ' ὅριον ἐπικτήσηται πρὸς δυομένου ἡλίου, Η πολεμίου είναι. Πτολεμαίου είναι.

the service of Alexander not to fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through his wife's relatives. he was enabled to make known his projects at Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much favour. this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas, or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the victories of Agathoklês—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed possessions, and the maritime position of her citizens—was a prize well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not well informed of the intervening difficulties.1

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê, some even with wives and children. total number is stated at 10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well-appointed army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen days the post of Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.2 From thence he proceeded westward along the shore

March of Ophellas, with his army and nists, from Kyrênê to the Carthaginian territory sufferings endured in the march.

between the two Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and almost without water (with the exception of particular points of fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time all his provisions were exhausted. passed through the territory of the natives called Lotophagi, near

¹ Diodôr. xx. 40. πολλοὶ τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς τὴν στρατείαν about to be founded by a powerful οὐκ ὁλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, state, see Thucyd. iii. 93, about Hera-ἐσπευδον κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, kleia Trachinia—πᾶς γάρ τίς, Λακε-ἐλπίζοντες τήν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης κατακληρουχήσειν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι βεβαίαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.

Δε το τὸν στος στουμογραφονος hold

2 Diodôr, xx. 41.

As to the great encouragement held

out to settlers when a new colony was

the lesser Syrtis, where the army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there abounded. Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings of every kind endured by his soldiers --still more of course by the less hardy colonists and their families-were most distressing. After miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathoklês in the Carthaginian territory; with what abatement of number we do not know, but his loss must have been considerable.2

B.C. 307. Perfidy of Agathoklês he kills Ophellasgets possession of the colonists.

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he had accepted. Agathoklês at first received him with the warmest protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the confidence and favourable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn them to his own purposes. Convening

suddenly the most devoted among his own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced Philotas before Agathoklês then at once called them to arms, set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathoklês at length succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts, partly by intimidation; for this unfortunate army, left without any commander or fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into his service.3 He thus found himself (like Antipater after the death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas-more unfortunate

¹ Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3, p. 127, ed. Schneider.

The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians concerned in the expedition.

² Diodôr. xx. 42. See the striking description of the miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382—940:—

[&]quot;Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi,

Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus

Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus Durum iter."

The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer than two months; probably Diodôrus speaks only of the more distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν οδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, &c. (xx. 42).

3 Diodôr. xx. 42; Justin, xxii. 7.

still, since they could be of no service to Agathoklês—were put by him on board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered at sea; some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy, and a few only reached Syracuse.1 Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean expedition of Ophellas, one of the most commanding and powerful schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from any Grecian city.

It would have fared ill with Agathoklês had the Carthaginians

been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately succeeding the death of Ophellas. Sedition at It would also have fared yet worse with Carthage, Bomilkar had Agathoklês been in a position to attack her dur-seize the ing the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same supreme time, within her walls by the general Bomilkar.2 This traitor (as has been already stated) had long thrown and cherished the design to render himself despot, and

Terrible Carthagepower-he is over-

had been watching for a favourable opportunity. Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle-fought in conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathoklês—he had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard. Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers, retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens and 4000 mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting city; dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in the great market place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded and paralyzed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their defence against the assailants, combated them in the streets, and poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise was faithfully

kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar himself, who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone severe tortures.1

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet the effects of so formidable a conspiracy B.C. 307. weakened them for some time against their enemy Further without: while Agathoklês, on the other hand, successes of reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger Agathoklês in Africathan ever. So elate did he feel, that he assumed the he captures Utica, Hippo-Zatitle of King; 2 following herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus, Ptolemy, rytus, and Hippagreta. Selenkus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory

of Alexander being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death. Agathoklês, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west of the city. He attached Utica, -the second city next to Carthage in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles around the Gulf on land.3 The Uticans had hitherto remained faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection elsewhere. Agathoklês marched into their territory with such unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city), that he seized

¹ Diodôr. xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description given by Appian (Punic. 128) of the desperate defence made by the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the assault of the Romans, from these house-

assautor the tomains, from these house-tops and in the streets.

There are yet remaining coins—
'Αγαθοκλέος Βασιλέως—the earliest
Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince (Humphreys, Ancient Coins and

Medals, p. 50).

3 Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polybius, i. 73.

4 Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that
the inhabitants of Utica and of Hippu-Akm (a little farther to the west than Utica) remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities carried on by Agathoklės. This enables us to correct the passage wherein Diodórus describes the attack of Agathoklės

upon Utica (xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ἀφεστηκότας, ἄφνω δὲ αὐτῶν τῆ πόλει προσπεσών, ἀc. The word ἀφεστηκότας here is perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted from Agathoklês; yet Diodôrus has not before said a word about Uticans nor proposed that they had Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathoklês or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodôrus has reported hitherto about Agathoklês relates to operations among the towns east or south-east of Carthage.

It appears to me that the passage ought to stand— $\epsilon\pi$ ì $\mu \epsilon \nu$ Ίτυκαίους έστράτευσεν οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας, i.e. from Carthage, which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.

the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed their walls, attaching in front of his battering-engines the three hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken resolution; but Agathoklês found means to force an entrance through a weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants, armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica, which had also remained faithful to Carthage, and which now, after a brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.1 The Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock, did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that Agathoklês, firmly established in Tunês as a centre of operations, extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great privations.2 He even occupied and fortified strongly a place called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts within a short distance both east and west of her gates.3

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the opportunity favourable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men, leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging his father's conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range of interior

¹ Diodôr. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the northernmost point of Africa), Agathoklês is said to have got the better in a naval battle—νανμαχία περιγενόμενος. This implies that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.

2 Diodôr. xx. 59.

3 Appian distinctly mentions this place Hippagreta as having been distinctly describes it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot, therefore, be the same place as Hippu-Carytus), which was considerably farther from Carthage than Utica was.

Numidia, B.C. 306-305

Agathoklês goes to Sicily, leaving Archagathus to command in Africa. Successes of Archagathus in the interior country.

capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra, and enriching his soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition, endeavouring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region abounding in wild cats: and another, in which there were a great number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in the houses with men, being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as gods.1

B.C. 305. Redoubled efforts of the Carthaginiansthey gain two great victories over Archagathus.

The

Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both in vigour and in provident combinations, against the common enemy. They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus, leaving a sufficient guard at Tunês, marched to meet

them, distributing his army in three divisions also; two under himself and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno contriving to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory, wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all retreat. remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a neighbouring hill, but, being without water, nearly all soon perished, from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.2

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army, Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged

¹ Diodôr. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to second Hippu-Akra is supposed to be attempt to identify the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius: Tokae may be Tucca Terebinthina, in the southeastern region, or Byzakium.

2 Diodôr. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to second Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius: Tokae may be Tucca Terebinthina, in the southeastern region, or Byzakium.

to concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phoe- B.C. 305. nician cities and rural Libyan tribes, who had before Danger of joined Agathoklês, now detached themselves from Archagathus—he is him when his power was evidently declining, and blocked up thaginian generals established fortified camps round at Tunês. Tunês, so as to restrain the excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up his harbour. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties that he would come

The career of Agathoklês in Sicily, since his departure from Africa, had been chequered, and on the whole unpro- B.C. 306-Just before his arrival in the island.2 his 305. Agathoklês generals Leptinês and Demophilus had gained an in Sicily. important victory over the Agrigentine forces com-His career at first manded by Xenodokus, who were disabled from prosperous. Defeat of keeping the field. This disaster was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines and to the cause which gentines. they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous citygovernment with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the presidency of Agrigentum.³ The outlying cities confederate with Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the attacks of Leptines, animated and fortified by the recent arrival of his master Agathoklês. That despot landed at Selinus, subdued Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of Sicily, then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was repulsed with loss. At Apollonia 4 he was also unsuccessful in his first attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town. To avenge his loss, which had

to the rescue.1

¹ Diodôr. xx. 61.

² Diodôr. xx. 56. 'Αγαθοκλής δὲ, τῆς μάχης ἄρτι γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας της Σικελίας είς Σελινοῦντα, &c.

³ Diodôr. xx. 56. οὶ μὲν οὖν 'Ακραγαντίνοι ταύτη τῆ συμφορῆ

περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν έαυτῶν μὲν τὴν

περιπεσοντες, οιελυσαν εαυτών μεν την καλλίστην ἐπιβολην, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.

4 Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii.

been severe, he massacred most of the citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.¹

From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after an absence of (apparently) more than two years B.C. 306in Africa. During all this interval the Syracusan harbour had been watched by a Carthaginian fleet, Activity of Agathoklês in Sicily— Deinokratês obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing partial scarcity.² But there was no blockading army in great on land; nor had the dominion of Agathoklês, upheld force against him. as it was by his brother Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the Carthaginian blockading squadron he made efforts to procure maritime aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy; while on land his forces were now preponderant, owing to the recent defeat and broken spirit of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile Deinokratês, who made profession of taking up that generous policy which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall. announcing himself as the champion of autonomous city-government and equal confederacy throughout Sicily. Deinokratês received ready adhesion from most of the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy, all of them who were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding city had left them unprotected against Agathoklês. He was soon at the head of a powerful army-20,000 foot and 1500 horse. large proportion of his army were not citizen militia but practised soldiers, for the most part exiles driven from their homes by the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean æra.4 For military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not only kept the field against Agathoklês, but several times offered him battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept. Agathoklês could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while

¹ Diodôr. xx. 56.

² Diodôr. xx. 62.

³ Diodôr, xx. 61.

⁴ Diodôr. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις τοῦ πονεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων, &c.

the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his aggressions.

Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathoklês received messengers from his son reporting the defeats in Africa. Preparing immediately to revisit that armyunder Xenodokus country, he was fortunate enough to obtain a reinforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at the mouth of the Syracusan harbour. A clear passage ity of the to Africa was thus secured for himself, together with

Agrigentine -opposed to the mercenaries of Agathoklês -superior-

ample supplies of imported provisions for the Syracusans.1 Though still unable to combat Deinokratês in the field, Agathoklês was emboldened by his recent naval victory to send for Leptinês with a force to invade the Agrigentines—the jealous rivals rather than the allies of Deinokratês. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus, whom Leptinês had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries conducted by Leptines had made arms a profession; and were used to fighting as well as to hardships.² Here, as elsewhere in Greece, we find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional soldiership, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument for administrative details.

Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force, was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptinês, and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathoklês passed over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunes, in great the Carthadespondency and privation, and almost mutiny, for

Defeat of Xenodokus by Leptinês -Agatho-klês passes over into Africa-bad state of his army there defeated by ginians.

want of pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls, Samnites, and Tyrrhenians, 1500 cavalry, and no less than 6000 (if the number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous body of Libyan allies, faithless time-servers watching for the turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying

¹ Diodôr. xx. 61, 62.

² Diodôr. xx. 62.

strong camps in the vicinity of Tunes, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So desperate was the position of Agathokles, that he was compelled to go forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of their entrenchments. But, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their camp.¹

The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in both camps—even in that of the victorious Nocturnal Carthaginians. The latter, according to the ordinances panic and disorder in of their religion, eager to return their heartfelt thanks both camps. to the gods for this great victory, sacrificed to them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.2 During this process the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the gods, close to the altar as well as to the general's tent, accidentally took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides, the fire spread rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for the time dispersed; and Agathoklês, had he been prepared, might have destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour his own camp was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.3

His position at Tunês had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had all declared against him after the recent defeat. He could neither continue to hold Tunês, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea. Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger son Herakleidês; abandoning Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose, were thoroughly resolved

Diodôr. xx. 64; Justin, xxii. 8.
 Diodôr. xx. 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod. vii. 180)—the Persians in the invasion of Greece by Xerxês sacrificed the handsomest

Grecian prisoners whom they captured on board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands.

³ Diodôr. xx. 66, 67.

that the man who had brought them into destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathoklês was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched, arrested. and held prisoner by the indignant soldiery. The whole town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the rumour that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the general alarm the guards who had been set over Agathoklês, thinking his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition, their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration, notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathoklês was again at liberty. But, insensible to everything except his own personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a skiff, with a few attendants but without either of his sons, and was lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the coast of Sicily.1

So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that Agathoklês had accomplished his desertion, that they

slew both his sons, Archagathus and Herakleidês. No resource was left but to elect new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands and capitulate with various other towns besides Tunês; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all fear of Agathoklês,

The deserted army kill the two sons of Agathoklês the Carthaginians.

thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation. It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose to enter into the African service of Carthage should be received on full pay, but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts,

¹ Diodôt. xx. 69; Justin, xxii. 8. . . . καὶ μετ' ὀλίγων ἐμβὰς εἰς τὸ πορθμεῖον, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, ὡς εἶδεν, εἰς έλεον ἐτράπη, ἔλαθεν ἐκπλεύσας κατὰ τὴν δύσιν τῆς καὶ πάντες ἐπεβόων ἀφεῖναι· ὁ δὲ λυθεὶς Πληΐάδος, χειμῶνος ὄντος.

being rash enough to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to rural work as fettered slaves.1

Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathoklês to

African expedition of Agathoklês —boldness of the first conception -imprudently pushed and persisted in.

Africa, after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By the vana mirantes,2 who looked out for curious coincidences (probably Timæus), it was remarked that his ultimate flight, with the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of the year following his assassination of Ophellas.3 Ancient writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception of transferring the war to Africa,

at the very moment when he was himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force. But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy of Agathoklês, we must not forget that his success in Africa was materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian general Bomilkar--an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor is it to be overlooked that Agathoklês missed the opportunity of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa by making large concessions to him in Sicily.4 He imprudently persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was beyond his strength —and though it was still more beyond his strength to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not attached to her; but neither were they attached to him; nor, in the long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathokles is a man of force and fraud, consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a series of successful adventures and strokes of bold ingenuity to extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all predetermined general plan, or measured range of

¹ Diodôr. xx. 69. 2 Tacit. Annal. i. 9. "Multus hinc 2 Tactt. Annal. 1. 9. "Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo, plerisque rana mirantibus—quod idem dies accepti quondam imperii princeps, et vitæ supremus—quod Nolæ in domo et cubiculo, in quo pater ejus Octavius, vitam finivisset," &c.

3 Diodôr. xx. 70.

⁴ This is what Agathoklês might have done, but did not do. Nevertheless, Valerius Maximus (vii. 4, 1) represents him as having actually done it, and praises his sagacity on that ground. Here is an example how little careful these collectors of anecdotes sometimes are about their facts.

ambition, to which these single exploits might be made subser-

After his passage from Africa, Agathoklês landed on the western corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard pressed for money: he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the Egestæans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force, he employed it to commit revolting massacre

Proceedings of Aga-thoklês in Sicilyhis barbari-Egesta and Syracuse.

and plunder in Egesta. The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these Agathoklês caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered; the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated, Agathoklês changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning it as a residence to such deserters as might join him. This atrocity. more suitable to Africa² than Greece (where the mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunês, had after his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander, his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives of those Syracusans who had served him in the African This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are expedition. assured) accurately and to the letter. Neither age nor sexgrandsire or infant—wife or mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no mutilations.3

¹ Diodôr, xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta was afterwards resumed.

² Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess Pheretimê (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).

3 Diodôr. xx. 72. Hippokratês and

Epikydės — those Syracusans who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieronymus of Syracuse to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal, because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii 2)

Still Agathoklês tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian

Great mercenary force under Deinokratês in Sicily— Agathoklês solicits peace from him, and is refusedhe concludes peace with Carthage.

towns which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokratês. That exile was now at the head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military force in Sicily; so that Agathoklês, feeling the inadequacy of his own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions. He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast

of the island—Therma and Kephaloidion—were assigned to his mercenaries and himself. Under this proposition, Deinokratês, and the other Syracusan exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting the free-city government. Deinokratês been another Timoleon, the city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish. commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and licence such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the proposition of Agathoklês, requiring still larger concessions: until at length the Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries from Agathoklês himself) began to suspect his selfish projects, and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathoklês, being repudiated by Deinokratês, addressed himself to the Carthaginians, and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return for this concession, he received from them a sum of money and a large supply of corn.1

Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathoklês presently ventured to march against the army of Deinokratês. Battle of The latter was indeed greatly superior in strength, Torgiumvictory of Agathoklês but many of his soldiers were now lukewarm or disover Deinoaffected, and Agathoklês had established among them kratês. correspondences upon which he could rely.

great battle fought near Torgium, many of them went over on

¹ Diodôr. xx. 78, 79. Some said that ginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated the sum of money paid by the Cartha- it at 150 talents.

the field to Agathoklês, giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokratês was completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements) surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up their arms, Agathoklês, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be surrounded by his own army, and massacred.1

It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret and treacherous compact between Agathoklês Accommoand Deinokrates, and as if the prisoners massacred dation and by Agathoklês were those of whom Deinokratês between wished to rid himself as malcontents: for immediately after the battle a reconciliation took place between krates.

and Deino-

the two. Agathoklês admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while Deinokratês not only brought into the partnership all the military means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but also betrayed to Agathoklês the revolted general Pasiphilus, with the town of Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that Agathoklês, generally faithless and unscrupulous towards both friends and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with Deinokratês to the end of his life.2

The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with a great extent of dominion in Sicily. remainder of his restless existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles,3 the Italian cities and the Bruttians, the island of Korkyra. We are unable Italy, and Korkyra to follow his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable attack 4 by the Spartan prince

Operations of Aga-thoklês in the Liparæ, Kleonymus

of Sparta.

Kleonymus, who was invited by the Tarentines to aid them But Kleonymus found against the Lucanians and Romans. enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy, undertook

¹ Diodôr, xx. 89.

² Diodôr, xx. 90.

³ Diodôr. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathoklês against the Liparæan Fragment. Hist. Gradieles seems to have been described in 4 Diodôr. xx. 104.

detail by his contemporary historian the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments of that author, in Didot's Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 383,

operations with success against the Lucanians, and even captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the town; moreover his own behaviour was so tyrannical and profligate, as to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra, Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against Italy.1 He failed however in various expeditions both in the Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorkêtês and Kassander alike tried to conclude an alliance with him, but in vain.2 At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was relieved by Agathoklês with a powerful armament. That despot was engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself.3 On returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries, he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of 2000.4

As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathoklês, we find him seizing the towns of Krotôn and Hipponia in Italy, establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorkêtês,5 and giving his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of Epirus. At the age of seventy-two, still in the

¹ Diodôr. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78), respecting two native Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.

Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78), respecting two native Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.

That Agathoklés, in his operations on the coast of southern Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their importance was now strongly felt, we may judge by the fact that the Syracusan Kallias (contempodate).

² Diodôr. xx. 105.

³ Diodôr, xxi. Fragm. 2, p. 265.

⁴ Diodôr. xxi. Fragm. 3, p. 266.

⁵ Diodôr. xxi. Fragm. 4, 8, 11, pp.

B.C. 300-

jects of

Agathoklês -mutiny of

289. Last pro-

plenitude of vigour as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against the Carthaginians in Africa. with two hundred of the largest ships of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by domestic enemies.

He proclaimed as future successor to his domi-

grandson Archaganion his son, named Agathoklês; but Archagathus thus-sickhis grandson (son of Archagathus who had perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous poisoning, and death of qualities, had already been singled out for the most Agathokles. important command, and was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathoklês, wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his favoured son Agathoklês to Ætna. with written orders directing that Archagathus should vield up to him the command. Archagathus, noway disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathoklês to a banquet, and killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather, the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon, a citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathoklês massacred most of the Egestean population. The beauty of his person procured him much favour with Agathoklês; but he had never forgotten, and had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathoklês, as we are told, by means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth after dinner, 1 Combining together the various accounts, it seems probable that Agathoklês was at the time sick-that this sickness may have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his uncle, seems by means of his army to

have made himself real master of the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed, could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife Theoxena and

¹ Diodôr. xxi. Fragm. 12, pp. 276—278. Sents Agathoklês as having died by a Neither Justin (xxiii. 2), nor Trogus violent distemper. He notices, how-before him (as it seems from the Prologue), alludes to poison. He representation of the uncle by the nephew.

his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard with all his rich movable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he expired.1

The great lines in the character of Agathoklês are well marked.

Splendid genius of action and resourcenefarious dispositions —of Agathoklês.

He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionvsius -a soldier of fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit of political power -and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and military resource not surpassed by any

one, even of the generals formed in Alexander's school. He was an adept in that art at which all aspiring men of his age aimed —the handling of mercenary soldiers for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and for predatory aggrandizement abroad. I have already noticed the opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and Agathoklês were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of action within his knowledge.2 Apart from this enterprising genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition, we know nothing of Agathoklês except his sanguinary, faithless, and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands pre-eminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly all predecessors.3 Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy, he seems

I Justin (xxiii. 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting between Agathoklês and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile Justin's narrative with that of Diodôrus; but on this point, as far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodôrus.

2 Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, Ch. lxxxiii.

3 Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathoklês, though cruel in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after his power was once established. The latter half of this statement is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know respecting Agathoklês. As to Timeus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from Sicily by Agathoklês, and who wrote the history of the latter in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as

had good reason to censure him, as

being unmeasured in his abuse of Agathoklės. For Timæus not only recounted of Agathoklės numerous acts of nefarious cruelty—acts of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being known—but also told much scandal about his private habits, and represented him (which is citil

much scandal about his private habits, and represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timæus ap. Hist. Græc. ed. Didot, Fragm. 144—150.

All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathoklês, as described in the preceding pages, have been copied from Diodôrus, who had as good authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodôrus does not copy the history of Agathoklês from Timæus; on the contrary, he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice towards Agathoklês, in terms not less forcible than those which Polybius employs (Fragm.

to have had a geniality and apparent simplicity of manner (the same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.1

Agathoklês, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course of events in Sicily continued under agency in Hellenic agency, without the preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of Agathokles during the life of indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he, comes then as well as they, kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the

Hellenic continues subordinate to preponderant foreigners.

death of Agathoklês; but it continues no longer. After his death, Hellenic power and interests become incapable of selfsupport, and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overridden or contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing among them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law of Agathoklês) interposed to arrest their progress. From this time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended for-first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus-next, between the Carthaginians and Romans²—until at length they dwindle

authorities, among them some authors whose feelings would lead them to favour Agathoklės, the Syracusan Kallias, and Antander, brother of Agathoklės. seems to have had before him other

xxi. p. 279). Diodôrus cites Timeus by name, occasionally and in particular instances; but he evidently did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative. He as making the Carthaginians tremble for their occasions in Sicily. Person. as making the Carthaginians tremble for their possessions in Sicily. Person-ally, Hiero seems to have deserved this praise; and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military force was altogether secondary in the great struggle be-tween Rome and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily

¹ Diodôr. xx. 63.

² The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) mastery of Sicily.

into subjects of Rome: corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres, and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathoklês.

CHAPTER XCVIII.

OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES.

- 1. IN GAUL AND SPAIN.
- 2. ON THE COAST OF THE EUXINE.

To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its decline into the half-life of a dependent condition, we must say a few words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of the Euxine) its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign elements, and often adulterated by them. It is indeed little that we have the means of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.

In my twenty-seventh chapter I briefly noticed the foundation and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Massalia—its situation and Liguria. This Ionic city, founded by the enterprising Phokæans of Asia Minor, a little before their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and career of its own, apart from those political events which determined the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnêsus, Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of commerce, friendship, or hostility with their barbaric neighbours, the Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They

carried out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast-navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from other Greeks and sustained by a force hardly sufficient even for defence, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of dealing with neighbours. That they were found equal to this necessity appears sufficiently attested by the few general statements transmitted in respect to them: though their history in its details is unknown.

Their city was strong by position, situated upon a promontory washed on three sides by the sea, well fortified, and possessing a convenient harbour securely closed against enemies.1 domain around it however appears not to have been large, nor did their population extend itself much into the interior. The land around was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive; wine was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul.2 It was on shipboard that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it was by maritime enterprise that their power, their wealth, and their colonial expansion were obtained. In an age when piracy was common, the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defence not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorning the temples.3 The city contained docks and arsenals admirably provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various muniments of naval war.4 Except the Phænicians and Carthaginians, these Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western Mediterranean, from the year 500 B.C., downward, after the energy of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed by inland potentates. The Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landsmen, not occupying permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying neighbours to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from their depredations by land. To all these

¹ Cæsar, Bell. Gall. ii. 1; Strabo, iv. p. 179.

² See Poseidonius ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 152.

Strabo, iv. p. 180.

⁴ Strabo (xii. p. 575) places Massalia in the same rank as Kyzikus, Rhodes, and Carthage—types of maritime cities highly and effectively organized.
⁵ Livy, xl. 18; Polybius xxx. 4.

landsmen, however, depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the Massaliots, with their colonies. were the only ministers, along the Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontiers of Tuscany) to the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain. It was not until the first century before the Christian æra that they were outstripped in this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbours, exalted into Roman colonies.

Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and consecrated by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own patron goddess, the Ephesian Artemis.2 Towards the east were Tauroentium, Olbia, Antipolis, Nikæa, and the Portus Monœki : towards the west, on the coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporiæ, Alônê, Hemeroskopium, and Artemisium or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on outlying capcs or

Colonies planted by Massalia— Antipolis, Nikæa, Rhoda, Emporiæ —pêculiar circumstances of Emporiæ.

sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic, and as depôts for trade with the interior, than for the purpose of spreading inland, and including a numerous outlying population round the walls. The circumstances of Emporiæ were the most remarkable. That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet of the coast of Iberia; after a certain interval it became extended to the adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to joint residence within the new-walled circuit there established. This new circuit however was divided in half by an intervening wall, on one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks. One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on the spot. Every night onethird of the Greek citizens kept guard on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed and the intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely coalesced into one

¹ The oration composed by Demosthenês $\pi\rho$ òs $Z\eta\nu\delta\theta\epsilon\mu\nu$, relates to an affair wherein a ship, captain and mate, all from Massalia, are found engaged c. 7 (Göttingen).

community.1 It is not often that we are allowed to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salves; we hear of these Ligurians hiring themselves as labourers to dig on the fields of Massaliot proprietors.2 The various tribes of Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the conquests of the Romans in the second and first century before the Christian era.3

The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly

Oligarchical government of Massalia -prudent political administra-

by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called Timuchi), elected for life, and by a small council of fifteen, chosen among this larger body to take turn in executive duties.4 The public habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens, frugal

and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and marriage ceremonies.⁵ They were careful in their dealings with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose History closed about 340 B.C.) respected the Gauls as especially phil-Hellenic 6—an impression which he could hardly have

¹ Livy, xxxiv. 8; Strabo, iii. p. 160. At Massalia, it is said that no armed

At Massalia, it is said that no armed stranger was ever allowed to enter the city, without depositing his arms at the gate (Justin, xliii. 4).

This precaution seems to have been adopted in other cities also: see Æneas, Poliorket. c. 30.

2 Strabo, iii. p. 165. A fact told to Poseidonius by a Massaliot proprietor who was his personal friend.

In the siege of Massalia by Cæsar, a detachment of Albici, mountaineers not far from the town, and old allies or dependents, were brought in to help in the defence (Cæsar, Bell. G. i. 34).

3 Strabo, iv. p. 180.

3 Strabo, iv. p. 180.
4 Strabo, iv. p. 181; Cicero, De Republ. xxvii. Fragm. Vacancies in the senate seem to have been filled up from meritorious citizens generally, as far as we can judge by a brief allusion in Aristotle (Polit. vi. 7). From another passage in the same work, it seems that the narrow basis

of the oligarchy must have given rise to dissensions (v. 6). Aristotle had included the Μασσαλιωτῶν πολιτεία in his lost work Περὶ Πολιτειῶν,

⁵ Strabo, l. c. However, one author from whom Atheneus borrowed (xii. p. 523) described the Massaliots as luxurious in their habits.

⁶ Strabo iv n. 199 **Edococ δὲ insections and strabo iv n. 199 **Edococ δὲ insections in the control of the contro

1 (1 καιτιους in their habits.

6 Strabo, iv. p. 199. Έφορος δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῷ μεγέθει λέγει τὴν Κελτικὴν, ὥστε ἦσπερ νῦν Ἡρηρίας καλοῦμεν
ἐκείνοις τὰ πλεῖστα προσνέμειν μέχρι
Γαδείρων, φιλ έλληνάς τε ἀποφαίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ
πολλὰ ἰδίως λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐοικότα
τοῖς νῦν. Compare n. 181 τοις νῦν. Compare p. 181.

It is to be remembered that Ephorus was a native of the Asiatic Kyme, the immediate neighbour of Phokæa, which was the metropolis of Massalia. The Massaliots never forgot or broke off their connexion with Phokæa: see the statement of their intercession with the Romans on behalf of Phokea (Justin, xxxvii. 1). Ephorus, therefore, had

derived from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliots (who in the first century before Christ were trilingues, speaking Greek, Latin, and Gallic¹) contributed to engraft upon these unlettered men a certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation of that taste for letters which afterwards became largely diffused throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea, and in traffic, the Phoenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active co-operation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favourable treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their reach.

Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was a genuine specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences -acting not by force or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity - by power of Massalia in ministering to wants which must otherwise have Pytheas, remained unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilization upon ruder neighbours. This is the more to be noticed as it contrasts strikingly

Hellenizing influence of the Westnavigator and geographer.

with the Macedonian influences which have occupied so much of the present volume-force admirably organized and wielded by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all details respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented; and hardly less that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330-320 B.C.),2 with an adventurous boldness even more than Phokæan, sailed through

good means of learning whatever Massaliot citizens were disposed to com-

saliot citizens were disposed to communicate.

1 Varro, Antiq. Fragm. p. 350, ed. Bipont.

2 See the Fragmenta Pytheæ collected by Arfwedson, Upsal, 1824. He wrote two works—1. Γης Περιόδος; 2. Περὶ Ὠλεανοῦ. His statements were greatly esteemed and often followed by Eratosthenès; partially followed by Hipparchus; harshly judged by Polybius, whom Strabo in the main follows. Even by those who judge him most severely, Pytheas is admitted to have been a good mathematician and astronomer (Strabo, iv. p. 201), and to have travelled extensively in person. Like Herodotus, he must have been forced

to report a great deal on hearsay, and all that he could do was to report the

the Pillars of Hêraklês, and from thence northward along the coast of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet farther. Probably no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved except the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that the publication of his "Survey of the Earth"—much consulted by Eratosthenês, though the criticisms which have reached us through Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or supposed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.

From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the

eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its Pontic western coast south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesem-Greeks— Pentapolis bria, Kalatis, Odessus, and probably Istrus)—and of on the Tyras near the mouth of the river so called (now south-west coast. Dniester)—we have little to record; though Istrus and Apollonia were among the towns whose political constitutions Aristotle thought worthy of his examination. But Herakleia on the south coast, and Pantikapæum or Bosporus between the Euxine and the Palus Mæotis (now Sea of Azof), are not thus unknown to history; nor can Sinôpê (on the south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west) be altogether passed over. Though lying apart from the political headship of Athens or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and competitors for the Pan-hellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists. All too were (like Massalia and Kyrênê) adulterated partially-Olbia and Bosporus considerably—by admixture of a non-hellenic element.

Of Sinôpê and its three dependent colonies, Kotyora, Kerasus, and Trapezus, I have already said something,² in describing the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its dependencies, Antipolis, Nikæa, and others, Sinôpê enjoyed not merely partial independence, but considerable prosperity and local dignity, at the time when Xenophôn and his companions marched through those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually advantageous, with Korylas prince

1 Aristotle, Politic. v. 2, 11; v. 5, 2. 2 See Ch. lxxi.

of Paphlagonia, on the borders of whose territory they dwelt.

It is probable that they figured on the tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and paid an annual sum; but here ended their subjec-Their behaviour towards the Ten Thousand tion. Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with Persian governors or military occupation. Alexander however numbered them among the subjects of Persia; and it is a remarkable fact that envoys from Sinôpê were found remaining with Darius almost to his last hour, after

Sinôpêits envoys present with Darius in his last days— maintains its independence for some time against the Pontic princesbut becomes subject to them ultimately.

he had become a conquered fugitive, and had lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian envoys fell into the hands of Alexander, who set them at liberty with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic confederacy, but subjects of Persia, their presence as envoys near Darius was very excusable.2 The position of Sinôpê placed her out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander's successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian Achæmenidæ),3 who ultimately ripened into the kings of Pontus, had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence until the reign of Pharnakês, in the second century before Christ. Sinôpê then passed under his dominion; exchanging (like others) the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing however of the intermediate events.

Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete. That city-much nearer than Sinôpê to the mouth of the Thracian Bosporus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day's voyage of a row-boat—was established by Megarians and Bœotians on the coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and reduced to a kind of serfdom, whereby they

¹ See the remarkable life of the (cap. 7, 8). Compare Xenoph. Hellenic. Karian Datamês, by Cornelius Nepos, iv. 1, 4. which gives some idea of the situation of Paphlagonia about 360—350 B.C. ² Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 6. ³ Polybius, v. 43.

became slaves, yet with a proviso that they should never be sold

The Pontic Herakleiaoligarchical government -the native Mariandyni reduced to serfs.

Adjoining, on the westward, out of the territory. between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian Thracians-villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their coast. We are told in general terms that the government of Herakleia was oligarchical; perhaps in the hands of the

descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who formed a small but rich minority among the total population. We hear of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the territory of Leukon, prince of the Kimmerian Bosporus.3 They were also engaged in land-war with Mithridatês, a prince of the ancient Persian family established as district rulers in Northern Kappadokia.4

Towards 380-370 B.C., the Herakleots became disturbed by

Political discord at Herakleiabanishment of Klearchus -partial democracy established.

violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy themselves; 5 some of whom opposed, and partially threw open, a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the course of which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished. Presently however the contest assumed

larger dimensions; the plebs sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands.⁶ A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which the classification of the citizens was

¹ Xenoph. Anab. vi. 6, 2.

² Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 5.

Another passage in the same work, however (v. 4, 2), says that in Herakleia the democracy was subverted immediately after the foundation of the colony through the popular leaders, who com-mitted injustice against the rich. These rich men were banished, but collected strength enough to return and subvert the democracy by force. If this passage alludes to the same Herakleia (there were many towns of that name), the

government must have been originally democratical. But the serfdom of the natives seems to imply an oligarchy.

3 Aristot. Polit. vii. 5, 7; Polyæn. vi. 9, 3, 4: compare Pseudo-Aristotle, Economic. ii. 9.

The reign of Leukon lasted from about 392—352 B.C. The event alluded to be Debrewer with the server and the server of the se

to by Polyænus must have occurred at some time during this interval.

⁴ Justin, xvi. ⁴.
⁵ Aristot. v. 5, 2; 5, 10.
⁶ Justin, xvi. ⁴.

altered. Instead of three tribes and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four centuries, the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the original four centuries the rich men had been so enrolled as to form separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed along with them), while the three tribes had contained all the rest of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrolment, and to disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater number of poor.1

Still, however, the demands of the people were not fully granted, and dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the population of serfs-homo-Continued geneous, speaking the same language, and sympathizpolitical ing with each other, like Helots or Penestæ—when troubles a Herakleia troubles at once agitated by the hope of liberty, were with diffi--assistance invoked culty appeased. The government, though greatly democratized, found itself unable to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without. Application was made first to the Athenian Timotheus-next to the Theban Epameinondas; but neither of them would interfere, nor was

there, indeed, any motive to tempt them. At length application

This exile, now about forty years of age, intelligent, audacious, and unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens, partly in hearing the lessons of Plato and Isokratês, and had watched with emulous curiosity the brilliant stances of Klearchus fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom both these philosophers took interest.2 During his banishment, moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian exiles: he had taken service

was made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.

Character and circum-—he makes himself despot of Herakleia his tyranny and cruelty.

¹ Æneas, Poliorket. c. 11. I have given what seems the most probable

explanation of a very obscure passage.

It is to be noted that the distribution of citizens into centuries (ἐκατοστύες) prevailed also at Byzantium: see Inscript. No. 2060 ap. Boeck. Corp. Inscr. Græc. p. 130. A citizen of Olbia, upon whom the citizenship of Byzantium is conferred, is allowed to enrol himself in any one of the ἐκατοσταίες. himself in any one of the ἐκατοστύες that he prefers.

² Diodôr. xv. 81. ἐζήλωσε μὲν τὴν Διονυσίου τοῦ Συρακουσίου διαγωγήν, &c. Memnon, Fragm. c. 1; Isokratês, Epist. vii.

It is here that the fragments of Memnon, as abstracted by Photius (Cod. 224), begin. Photius had seen only eight books of Memnon's History of Hemyllein (Rooksix—xv. inclusive): of Herakleia (Booksix.—xvi. inclusive); neither the first eight books (see the end of his Excerpta from Meinnon), nor those after the sixteenth, had come

with the enemy of his native city, the neighbouring prince Mithridatês, and probably enough against the city itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much, acquiring renown with the prince and influence over the minds of soldiers. Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political discords prevailing. It was the oligarchical party who invited him to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation, but with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia. Obtaining from Mithridatês a powerful body of mercenaries, under secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order and upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a separate stronghold in the city, under colour of keeping them apart in the stricter discipline of a barrack.² Having thus secured a strong position, he invited Mithridatês into the city, to receive the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement, he detained the prince as a prisoner, and only released him on payment of a considerable ransom. He next cheated, still more grossly, the oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule, declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly seconded him in his measures—even extreme measures of cruelty and spolia-

under his view. This is greatly to be regretted, as we are thus shut out from the knowledge of Heraklean affairs anterior to Klearchus.

It happens not unfrequently with Photius that he does not possess an entire work, but only parts of it; this is a curious fact, in reference to the libraries of the ninth century A.D.

The Fragments of Memnon are collected out of Photius, together with those of Nymphis and other Herakleotic historians, and illustrated with useful notes and citations in the edition of Orelli, as well as by K. Müller in Didot's Fragm. Hist. Gree. tom. iii. p. 525. Memnon carried his history down to the time of Julius Cæsar, and appears to have lived shortly after the Christian æra. Nymphis (whom he

probably copied) was much older, having lived seemingly from about 300—230 B.C. (see the few Fragmenta remaining from him in the same work, iii. p. 12). The work of the Herakleotic author Herodôrus seems to have been altogether upon legendary matter (see Fragm. in the same work, ii. p. 27). He was half a ceutury earlier than Nymnia

phis.

1 Suidas, v. Κλέαρχος.

2 Polyænus, ii. 30, 1; Justin, xvi. 4.

"A quibus revocatus in patriam, per quos in arce collocatus fuerat," &c.

Ameas (Poliorket. c. 12) cites this proceeding as an example of the mistake made by a political party, in calling in a greater number of mercenary auxiliaries than they could manage or keep in order. keep in order.

tion-against their political enemies. A large number of the rich were killed, imprisoned, or impoverished and banished: their slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the new exiles. The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many of the women even killed themselves. some after having first killed their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair, procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by Klearchus, who after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting than ever.1

He was now in irresistible power, despot of the whole city, plebs as well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be for twelve years, during which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies, together with unabated cruelty towards the citizens. further indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanour, adopting an oriental costume

He continues despot for twelve years—he is assassinated at a

and ornaments, and proclaiming himself the son of Zeus-as Alexander the Great did after him. Amidst all these enormities. however, his literary tastes did not forsake him; he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession.² Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length two young men, Chion and Leonides (they too having been among the hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the wound, in torture and mental remorse.3

His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the sceptre and continued the despotism, with cruelty not merely undiminished, but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not inferior to his pre-

dôr. xvi. 36.

¹ Justin, xvi. 4, 5; Theopompus ap. Athen. iii. p. 85, Fragm. 200, ed. Didot. ² Memnon, c. 1. The seventh epistle of Isokratês, addressed to Timotheus, son of Klearchus, recognizes generally

this character of the latter; with whose memory Isokratês disclaims all sympathy.

3 Memnon, c. 1; Justin, xvi. 5; Dio-

decessor in energy and vigilance, Satyrus was in this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered.

Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving stated crown for his brother's children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to them an undisaggravated cruelty—his military vigour.

To ensure to them an undisturbed succession, he took every precaution to avoid begetting children of his own wife.¹ After a rule of seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and

painful distemper.

The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle. Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings towards the citizens. At the same time, he was a

man of adventurous courage, carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his power respected all around. With his younger brother Dionysius he maintained perfect harmony, treating him as an equal and partner. Though thus using his power generously towards the Herakleots, he was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town, with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years, he died, deeply mourned by every one.²

1 Memnon, c. 2. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆ φιλαδελφία τὸ πρῶτον ἡνέγκατο · τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισῖν ἀνεπηρέαστον συντηρῶν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τῆς αὐτῶν κηδεμονίας λόγον ἐτίθετο, ὡς καὶ γυναικὶ συνῶν, καὶ τότε λίαν στεργομένη, μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι παιδοποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μηχαιρῆ πάση γονῆς στέρησιν ἐαυτῷ δικάσαι, ὡς ἄν μήδ' ὅλως ὑπολίποι τινὰ ἐφεδρεύοντα τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισίν.

φοῦ παισίν.

In the Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia, we read that Demetrius, son of Antigonus Gonatas, died leaving his son Philip a boy. Antigonus, called Doson, younger brother of Demetrius, assumed the regency on behalf of Philip; he married the widow of Demetrius, and had children by her; but he was so anxious to guard Philip's succession against all chance of being disturbed, that he refused to bring up his own children—ὁ δὲ παιδῶν γενομένων

ἐκ τῆς Χρυσηίδος, οὐκ ἐνεθρέψατο, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ Φιλίππῷ περισώζων (Porphyry, Fragm. ap. Didot, Fragm. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p. 701).

In the Greek and Roman world, the father was generally considered to have the right of determining whether he would or would not bring up a newborn child. The obligation was only supposed to commence when he accepted or sanctioned it, by taking up the child.

² Memnon, c. 3. The Epistle of Isokratês (vii.) addressed to Timotheus in recommendation of a friend is in harmony with this general character, but gives no new information.

Diodôrus reckons Timotheus as immediately succeeding Klearchus his father, considering Satyrus simply as regent (xvi. 36).

Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandizement, yet with many new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighbourhood; for his three predecessors 1 had been all enterprising chiefs, commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement of his reign, indeed, the ascendency of Memnon and the Persian force in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than ordinary; it appears too that Klearchus—and probably his successors also—

B.C. 336.

Despotism of Dionysius -his popular and vigorous government —his prudent dealing with the Macedonians. during the absence of Alexander in the East.

had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian court.² But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B.C.), with the battle of the Granikus, which totally extinguished the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. Persian control being now removed from Asia Minor---while Alexander with the great Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east leaving viceroys behind him-new hopes of independence or aggrandizement began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as satrap in Phrygia.3 The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand, enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way. He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded; he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighbouring Sinôpê (as has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept his eyes upon Alexander; taking care to establish a footing at Pella, and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander's sister, the princess Kleo-

¹ We hear of Klearchus as having besieged Astakus (afterwards Nikomedia), at the interior extremity of the northeastern indentation of the Propontis, as defined as a called the Gulf of Astakus (Polyæn. ii. 30, 3). 2 Memnon, c. 1. 3 Memnon, c. 20.

patra.¹ He was the better qualified for this courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes, and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius, all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for presents.²

By the favour of Antipater and the regency at Pella, the

Herakleotic despot was enabled both to maintain and Return of Alexander extend his dominions, until the return of Alexander to Susa--to Susa and Babylon in 324 B.C. All other authority he is solicited was now superseded by the personal will of the omniby the Herakleotic potent conqueror: who, mistrusting all his delegates exiles-—Antipater, the princesses, and the satraps—listened danger of Dionysius, readily to complaints from all quarters, and took averted by the death of particular pride in espousing the pretensions of Grecian exiles. I have already recounted how, in Alexander. June, 324 B.C., Alexander promulgated at the Olympic festival a sweeping edict, directing that in every Grecian city the exiles should be restored by force, if force was required. Among the various Grecian exiles, those from Herakleia were not backward in soliciting his support, to obtain their own restoration, as well as the expulsion of the despot. As they were entitled, along with others, to the benefit of the recent edict, the position of Dionysius became one of extreme danger. He now reaped the full benefit of his antecedent prudence, in having maintained both his popularity with the Herakleots at home, and his influence with Antipater, to whom the enforcement of the edict was entrusted. He was thus enabled to ward off the danger for a time; and his good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by the death of Alexander in June, 323 B.C. That event, coming as it did unexpectedly upon every one, filled Dionysius with such extravagant joy, that he fell into a swoon; and he commemorated it by erecting a statue in honour of Euthymia, or the tranquillizing goddess. His position however seemed again precarious, when the Herakleotic exiles renewed their solicitations to Perdikkas; who favoured their cause, and might probably have restored them, if he had chosen to direct his march towards the Hellespont against Antipater and Kraterus, instead of undertaking the illadvised expedition against Egypt, wherein he perished.3

¹ Memnon, c. 3. See in this History, Ch. lxxxv. ³ Memnon, c. 4.

The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favour of Dionysius. With Antipater and Kraterus, the preponderant potentates in his neighbourhood, he was on the best terms; and it happened at this juncture to Prosperity suit the political views of Kraterus to dismiss his Persian wife Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius, and conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself married Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila daughter of Antipater. Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius; for him, a splendid

B.C. 322—

and prudence of Dionysiushe marries Amastris his favour with Antigonus -his death.

exaltation—attesting the personal influence which he had previously acquired. His new wife, herself a woman of ability and energy, brought to him a large sum from the regal treasure, as well as the means of greatly extending his dominion round Herakleia. Noway corrupted by this good fortune, he still persevered both in his conciliating rule at home, and his prudent alliances abroad, making himself especially useful to Antigonus. That great chief, preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing his ascendency in Bithynia and the neighbourhood of the Propontis, by founding the city of Antigonia in the rich plain adjoining the Askanian Lake. Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B.C.). To the other Ptolemy, nephew and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage; and he even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king, after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the like.2 He died after reigning thirty years with consummate political skill and uninterrupted prosperity-except that during the last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.3

Dionysius left three children under age - Klearchus, Oxathrês, and a daughter-by his wife Amastris; whom he constituted regent, and who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained the Herakleotic dominion unimpaired. Presently Lysimachus, king of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of which he had founded the city of Lysimacheia),

³ Nymphis, Fragm. 16, ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 549; Ælian, V. H. ix. 1 Strabo, xii. p. 565. ² Memnon, c. 4: compare Diod. xx. 53. 13.

coveted this as a valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, B.C. 304.

Amastris governs Herakleia -marries Lysimachus —is divorced from him-Klearchus and Oxathrês kill Amastris are killed by Lysima-

and married her. The Herakleotic queen thus enjoyed double protection, and was enabled to avoid taking part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300 B.C.); wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being slain, and his Asiatic power crushed. Lysimachus got possession of Antigonia, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and changed its name to Nikæa, 1 After a certain time, however, Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoê, daughter of the Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris

divorced herself from him, and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her own residence, the neighbouring city of Amastris, about sixty miles eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine.2 These young men, Klearchus and Oxathrês, assumed the government of Herakleia, and entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only that Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Getæ, sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Both afterwards obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to Herakleia; where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathrês) of killing his mother Amastris. crime was revenged by her former husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of friendship (B.C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathrês to be put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular government.3

Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoê to make over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris; and Arsinoê sent thither a Kymæan officer named Herakleidês, who carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former despotism with its oppressions and cruelties.

¹ Strabo, xii. p. 565. So also Antioch, on the Orontes in Syria, the great foundation of Seleukus Nikator, was established on or near the site of another Antigonia, also previously

founded by Antigonus Monophthalmus (Strabo, xv. p. 750).

² Strabo, xii. p. 544.

³ Memnon, c. 6.

other purposes too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoê was all-powerful. She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former marriage) Agathoklês, a young prince of the most estimable and eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two princes. Lysimachus was defeated and slain, by the hand and javelin of a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.1

Arsinoê mistress of Herakleia. Defeat and death of Lysimachus. Power of Seleukus.

This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to Seleukus. At Herakleia, too, its effect was so powerful that the citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first tried to make terms with the governor Herakleides, offering him money as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry refusal; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay, together with the citizenship. Herakleots were thus enabled to discard Herakleidês,

B.C. 281.

Herakleia emancipated from the despots, and a popular government established -recall of the exilesbold bearing of the citizens towards Seleukus death of Seleukus.

and regain their popular government. They signalized their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing their Bastile—the detached fort or stronghold within the city, which had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism.2 The city, now again a free commonwealth, was further reinforced by the junction of Nymphis (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored and welcomed by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony; yet with express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution of their properties, long since confiscated.3 To the victor Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodisius, the bold bearing of the newly-emancipated Herakleots proved offen-They would probably have incurred great danger from sive.

¹ Memnon, c. 7, 8, ² Memnon, c. 9; Strabo, xii. p. 542. 3 Memnon, c. 11. 10 - 26

him, had not his mind been first set upon the conquest of Macedonia, in the accomplishment of which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus.

The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free

Situation and management of Herakleia as a free government -considerable naval power.

citizens, without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison; yet they lost, seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland dynasts, several of their outlying dependencies-Kierus, Tium, and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterwards by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris; but Eumenês, who held it,

hated them so much that he repudiated their money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian chief Ariobarzanês.1 That their maritime power was at this time very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their immense ships-numerously manned, and furnished with many brave combatants on the deck—which fought with eminent distinction in the naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonatas.2

It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of

Prudent administration of Herakleia, as a free city, among the powerful princes of Asia Minor -general condition and influence of the Greek cities on the

Herakleia. It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action, until the successful war of the Romans against Mithridatês (B.C. 69). In Asia Minor the Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the epoch of their subjugation by the great division of power which prevailed in the interior; for the potentates of Bithynia, Pergamus, Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord, while all of them were

menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves settlements in Galatia (B.C. 276).

These are rare examples, in ancient history, of cities acquiring territory or

¹ Memnon, c. 16. The inhabitants of Byzantium also purchased for a considerable sum the important position called the Ἱερόν, at the entrance of the Euxine on the Asiatic side (Polybius, iv. 50).

These are paragraphics in applications of the control of the con

dependencies by purchase. Acquisitions were often made in this manner by the free German, Swiss, and Italian cities of mediæval Europe; but as to the Hellenic cities, I have not had occasion to record many such transactions in the course of this History.

2 Memnon, c. 13: cp. Polyb. xviii. 34.

The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept partially in check by these new and formidable neighbours,1 who were themselves, however, hardly less formidable to the Grecian cities on the coast.2 Sinôpê, Herakleia, Byzantium—and even Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position-isolated relics of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbours almost at their gates,3 dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It was however frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers, literati, artists, actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament and recreation, from some Greek city. them all more or less of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated; along with the Greek language which spread its roots everywhere, even among the Gauls or Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.

Of the Grecian maritime towns in the Euxine south of the Danube-Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five (seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis.4 About the year 312 B.C., we hear of them as under the power of of the Lysimachus king of Thrace, who kept a garrison in Ovid at Kallatis, probably in the rest also. They made a

Grecian Pentapolis on the south-west Euxine-

made by Memnon, c. 19.
² See the statement of Polybius,

xxii. 24.

3 Contrast the independent and commanding position occupied by Byzantium in 399 B.C., acknowledging no superior except Sparta (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 1), with its condition in the third century B.C., harassed and pillaged almost to the gates of the town by the neighbouring Thracians and Gauls, and only purchasing immunity by continued money payments: see Polybius, iv. 45.

4 Strabo, vii. p. 319. Philip of Macedon defeated the Scythian prince Atheas or Ateas (about 340 B.C.) somewhere between Mount Hæmus and the Danube (Justin, ix. 2). But the

Danube (Justin, ix. 2). But the relations of Ateas with the towns of Istrus and Apollonia, which are said to have brought Philip into the country, are very difficult to under-

This is a remarkable observation ade by Memnon, c. 19.

2 See the statement of Polybius, it. 24.

3 Contrast the independent and comanding position occupied by Byzan
2 See the statement of Polybius, it. 24.

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5 Contrast the independent and comanding position occupied by Byzan
5 Contrast the i Boeckh supposes them to be Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, and Tomi; but Istrus seems more probable than Tomi. Odêssus was on the site of the modern Varna, where the Inscription was found; greatly south of the modern town of Odessa, which is on the site of another town

Ordésus.

An Inscription (2056) immediately An Inscription (2007) Immediately preceding the above, also found at Odéssus, contains a vote of thanks and honours to a certain citizen of Antioch, who resided with (name imperfect), king of the Scythians, and rendered great service to the Greeks by his influence.

by his influence.

struggle to shake off his yoke, obtaining assistance from some of the neighbouring Thracians and Scythians, as well as from Antigonus. But Lysimachus, after a contest which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection. Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective residents, who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of Bosporus. It was in pushing his conquests vet farther northward, in the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ, Dromichætês, by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released.2 I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with his last defeat and death by Seleukus (281 B.C.). By his death the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary independence. But their barbaric neighbours became more and more formidable, being reinforced seemingly by immigration of fresh hordes from Asia; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus' time were on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries afterwards, even south of the Danube. By these tribes-Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, and Sarmatians-the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively pillaged. Though renewed, indeed, afterwards from the necessity of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves, they were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric residents.³ Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more than half barbaric, and their Greek not easily intelligible. The Sarmatian or Getic horsebowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furloug of the town there was no security either for person or property. The residents were clothed in skins or leather; while the women, ignorant both of spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in carrying on their heads pitchers of water.4

Diodôr. xix. 73; xx. 25.
 Strabo, vii. pp. 302—305; Pausa-

nias, i. 9, 5. 3 Dion Chrysost., Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenitica), p. 75, Reisk. είλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην (Olbia) Γέται, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριστέροις τοῦ Πόντου πόλεις,

μέχρι 'Απολλωνίας · ὅθεν δη καὶ σφόδρα ταπεινά τὰ πράγλματα κατάστη τῶν ταύτη 'Ελλήνων· τῶν μὲνοὐκέτι συνοικισθεισῶν πόλεων, τῶν δὲ φαυλῶς, καὶ τῶν πλείστων βαρβάρων εἰς αὐτὰς συγὸρεόντων.

'The picture drawn by Ovid, of his situation as an exile at Tomi, can

By these same barbarians Olbia also (on the right bank of the

Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that comfort and prosperity which it had enjoyed when visited by Herodotus. In his day the Olbians lived on good terms with the Scythian tribes in their rus-inneighbourhood. They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents besides to the prince and his immediate favourites; and on these conditions, their persons barbaric and properties were respected. The Scythian prince

the days of Herodotus and Ephocreased numbers and inroads of the hordes.

Skylês (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus, who had familiarized him with Greek speech and letters) had built a fine house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment to Greek manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near the gates without molesting anyone.1 It is true that this proceeding cost

never fail to interest, from the mere beauty and felicity of his expression; but it is not less interesting, as a real description of Hellenism in its last phase, degraded and overborne by adverse fates. The truth of Ovid's picture is fully borne out by the analogy of Olbia, presently to be mentioned. His complaints run through the five books of the Tristia, and the four books of Epistolæ ex Ponto (Trist, v. 10. 15). Ponto (Trist. v. 10, 15).

"Innumeræ circa gentes fera bella minantur,

Quæ sibi non rapto vivere turpe putant. Nil extra tutum est: tumulus de-

fenditur ægre Mœnibus exiguis ingenioque soli.

Cum minime credas, ut avis, densissimus hostis Advolat, et prædam vix bene visus

Sæpe intra muros clausis venientia portis

Per medias legimus noxia tela vias. Est igitur rarus, rns qui colere audeat, isque

Hac arat infelix, hac tenet arma manu.

Vix ope castelli defendimur: et tamen intus

Mista facit Græcis barbara turba

Quippe simul nobis habitat discri-

Barbarus, et tecti plus quoque parte tenet.

Quos ut non timeas, possis odisse, videndo

Pellibus et longâ corpora tecta

Hos quoque, qui geniti Graiâ creduntur ab urbe,
Pro patrio cultu Persica bracca tegit," &c.

This is a specimen out of many others: compare Trist. iii. 10, 53; iv. 1, 67; Ex Ponto, iii. 1.

Ovid dwells especially upon the fact

ovid dwells especially upon the fact that there was more of barbaric than of Hellenic speech at Tomi—"Graiaque quod Getico victa loquela sono est" (Trist. v. 2, 68). Woollen clothing, and the practice of spinning and weaving by the free women of the family, were among the most familiar circumstances of Gracian life; the absence of these of Grecian life; the absence of these feminine arts, and the use of skins or leather for clothing, were notable departures from Grecian habits (Ex Ponto, iii. 8):-

"Vellera dura ferunt pecudes; et Palladis uti

Arte Tomitanæ non didicere nurus. Femina pro lana Cerealia munera

frangit,
Suppositoque gravem vertice portat aquam."

1 Herodot. iv. 16—18. The town was called *Olbia* by itsinhabitants, but Borysthenes usually by foreigners; though it was not on the Borysthenes river (Dnieper), but on the right bank of the Hypanis (Bug).

Skylês his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate their own prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though they did not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the Greeks.1 To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously, and those customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish. Still they were warriors rather than robbers; they abstained from habitual pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for honesty and fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early poets. Such were the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably about 440 to 430 B.C.); and the picture drawn by Ephorus a century afterwards (about 340 B.C.) appears to have been not materially different.² But after that time it gradually altered. New tribes seem to have come in the Sarmatians out of the East, the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace northward to the Tanais and the Palus Mæotis, the most different tribes became intermingled-Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, Sarmatians, &c.3 Olbia was in an open plain, with no defence except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of Greeks with Scythians, and the various Scythian tribes who had become partially sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation had probably also acquired habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves, they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated hostile incursions.

A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or Borysthenês) seen by Herodotus, with the later days— same town in the second century B.C.4 At this latter decline of security and period the city was diminished in population, impoproduction. verished in finances, exposed to constantly increasing

¹ Herodot. iv. 76—80. ² Strabo, vii. p. 302; Skymnus Chius, v. 112, who usually follows Ephorus.

The rhetor Dion tells us (Orat. xxxvi. init.) that he went to Olbia in order that he might go through the Scythians to the Getw. This shows that in his time (about A.D. 100) the Scythians must have been between the Bur and Drivister the Getw nearest to Bug and Dniester, the Getæ nearer to the Danube, just as they had been four centuries earlier. But many new

hordes were mingled with them.

3 Strabo, vii. pp. 296—304.

4 This Inscription, No. 2058, in Boeckh's Inscr. Græc., part xi. p. 121 seq., is among the most interesting in that noble collection. It records a vote of public gratitude and honour to a citizen of Olbia named Protogenes, and recites the valuable services which he as well as his father had rendered to the city. It thus describes the numerous situations of difficulty and danger from which he had contributed

exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes, and scarcely able to defend against them even the security of its walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnes with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass. called Saii. Whenever they came they required to be appeased by presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents did not always avert ill treatment or pillage. Already the citizens of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay a semi-Hellenic population in their neighbourhood (Mix-Hellenes, like the Liby-Phœnicians in Africa); but the inroads became more alarming, and their means of defence less, through the uncertain fidelity of these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior. In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover, even corn was scarce, and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus, this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had

to extricate them. A vivid picture is presented to us of the distress of the city. The introduction prefixed by Boeckh (pp. 86-89) is also very in-

Boeckh (pp. 86—89) is also very instructive.

Olbia is often spoken of by the name of Borysthenês, which name was given to it by foreigners, but not recognized by the citizens. Nor was it even situated on the Borysthenês river; but on the right or western bank of the Hypanis (Bug) river, not far from the modern Oczakoff.

The date of the above Inscription is not specified, and has been differently determined by various critics. Niebuhr assigns it (Untersuchungen über die Skythen, &c., in his Kleine Schriften, p. 387) to a time near the

close of the second Punic war. Boeckh also believes that it is not much after that epoch. The terror inspired by the Gauls, even to other barba-rians, appears to suit the second cen-tury B.C. better than it suits a later period.

The Inscription No. 2059 attests the

The Inscription No. 2059 attests the great number of strangers resident at Olbia; strangers from eighteen different cities, of which the most remote is Milêtus, the mother-city of Olbia.

1 On one occasion, we know not when, the citizens of Olbia are said to have been attacked by one Zopyrion, and to have succeeded in resisting him only by emancipating their slaves, and granting the citizenship to foreigners (Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 11).

now been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased devastation and insecurity.

After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric neighbours, this unfortunate city, about fifty years Olbia pilbefore the Christian era, was at length so miserably laged and abandoned sacked by the Getæ, as to become for a time aban-_afterdoned.1 Presently, however, the fugitives partially wards renewed. returned to re-establish themselves on a reduced For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide: moreover it was from the coast near Olbia, and from the care of its inhabitants, that many of the neighbouring tribes derived their supply of salt.2 Hence arose a puny aftergrowth of Olbia-preserving the name, traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to dishellenize both the speech and the personal names in the town.3

Visit of Dion the rhetor-Hellenic tastes and mannersardent interest in Homer.

To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a summer visit (about a century after the Christian era), of which he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which was marked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied a narrow corner; with poor houses.

low walls, and temples having no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly under arms or on guard; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighbourhood of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending with the difficulties.

¹ Dion Chrys. (Or. xxxvi. p. 75)—
ἀεὶ μὲν πολεμεῖται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ

²Dion Chrysost., Orat. (xxxvi. Borysthenit.), pp. 75, 76, Reiske.

³ See Boeckh's Commentary on the language and the personal names of the Olbian Inscriptions, part xi. pp. 108—116.

privations, and dangers of this inhospitable outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed; in this respect much superior to the Tomitans of Ovid. In particular, they were passionate admirers of Homer; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia could repeat the Iliad from memory. Achillês (localized under the surname of Pontarchês, on numerous islands and capes in the Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they addressed their prayers.2 Amidst Grecian life, degraded and verging towards its extinction, and stripped even of the purity of living speech, the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment thus continues without suspension or abatement.

Respecting Bosporus or Pantikapæum (for both names denote the same city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed dominion), founded by kapæum. Milesian settlers³ on the European side of the Kimmerian Bosporus (near Kertch), we first hear, about the period when Xerxês was repulsed from Greece (480-479 B.C.). It was the centre of a dominion including Phanagoria, Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been an oligarchy, called the Archæanaktidæ, for forty-two years 4 (480-438 B.C.).

After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was succeeded by Seleukus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyrus I. (407-393 B.c.); Leukon (393-353 B.c.); Spartokus III. (353 -348 B.C.); Parisadês I. (348-310 B.C.); Satyrus II.,

Princes of Bosporusrelations between Athens and Bosporus.

1 Dion, Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.), p. 78, Reiske. . . . καὶ τἄλλα μὲν οὐκέτι σαφῶς ἐλληνίζοντες, διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσοις οἰκεῖν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅμως τήν γε Ἰλιάδα ὀλίγου πάντες ἴσασιν ἀπὸ στόματος. I translate the words ὀλίγου πάντες with some allowance for rhetoric.

The representation given by Dion of the youthful citizen of Olbia—Kallistratus—with whom he conversed, is curious as a picture of Greek manners in this remote land; a youth of eighteen years of age, with genuine Ionic features, and conspicuous for his beauty (Alva ralla) is a realistic and constitution of the control of beauty (είχε πολλούς έραστάς); a zealot

for literature and philosophy, but especially for Homer; clothed in the costume of the place, suited for riding, the long leather trousers and short black cloak; constantly on horseback for defence of the town, and celebrated as a warrior even at that early age, having already killed or made prisoners several

Sarmatians (p. 77).

² See Inscriptions, Nos. 2076, 2077, ap. Boeckh; and Arrian's Periplus of the Euxine, ap. Geogr. Minor. p. 21, ed. Hudson.

3 Strabo, vii. p. 310.
 4 Diodôr. xii. 31.

Prytanis, Eumelus (310-304 B.c.); Spartokus IV. (304-284 B.c.); Parisadês II.¹ During the reigns of these princes, a connexion of some intimacy subsisted between Athens and Bosporus: a connexion not political, since the Bosporanic princes had little interest in the contentions about Hellenic hegemony-but of private intercourse, commercial interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of the Tauric Chersonêsus, between Pantikapæum and Theodosia, was well suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Mæotis. Corn, salted fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers, were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous: 2 while oil and wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable in Bosporus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been greatly under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as their maritime empire subsisted. Enterprising citizens of Athens went to Bosporus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonêsus) to push their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens, where they were more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413 B.C., that Athens first acquired her position as a mercantile centre for the trade with the Euxine; which we afterwards find her retaining, even with reduced power, in the time of Demosthenes.

¹ See Mr. Clinton's App. on the Kings of Bosporus, Fast. Hellen. App. c. 13, p. 280, &c., and Boeckh's Commentary on the same snoject, Inscript.

Græc., part xi. p. 91 seq.

2 Polybius (iv. 38) enumerates the principal articles of this Pontic trade; among the exports τά τε δέρματα καὶ τὸ among the exports $\tau \dot{\alpha} \tau \dot{\epsilon}$ dermar kai τo $\tau \hat{\omega} \nu$ eis $\tau \dot{\alpha} s$ doude(as $\dot{\alpha} y o \nu o \mu \dot{\epsilon} \nu \omega \sigma \omega \mu \dot{\alpha} \tau \omega \nu$ where Schweighäuser has altered $\delta \dot{\epsilon} \rho \mu \alpha \tau \alpha$ to $\theta \rho \dot{\epsilon} \mu \mu \alpha \tau \alpha$, seomingly on the authority of one MS. only. I doubt the propriety of this change, as well as the fact of any large exporta-

tion of live cattle from the Pontus, whereas the exportation of hides was

whereas the exportation of hides was considerable: see Strabo, xi. p. 493.

The Scythian public slaves or policemen of Athens are well known. Σκύθαινα also is the name of a female slave (Aristoph. Lysistr. 184). Σκύθης, for the name of a slave, occurs as early as Theography v. 896.

Theognis, v. 826.

Some of the salted preparations from the Pontus were extravagantly dear; Cato complained of a κεράμιον Ποντικῶν ταρίχων as sold for 300 drachmæ (Polyb. xxxi. 24).

How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosporus, during her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum (south of Pantikapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually.1 Not until the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosporanic princes; betraved (according to Æschinês) by the maternal grandfather

Nymphæum among the tributary cities under the Athenian empire —here it passed under the Bosporanic princes.

of Demosthenês, the Athenian Gylon; who, however, probably did nothing more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen condition of Athens. We thus see that Nymphæum. in the midst of the Bosporanic dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged in the corn-trade. Gvlon was rewarded by a large grant of land at Kepi-probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also-by the Bosporanic prince, who did not grudge a good price for such an acquisition. We find also other instances, both of Athenian citizens sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus, and of Pontic Greeks who, already in correspondence and friendship with various individual Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce, society, and refinements of Athens.3 Such facts attest the correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial greatness, with Bosporus.

The Bosporanic prince Saturus was in the best relations with Athens, and even seems to have had authorized representatives there to enforce his requests, which met with very great attention.4 He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosporus with equity and

¹ Harpokratiôn and Photius, v. Nυμφαῖον, from the ψηφίσματα collected by Kraterus. Compare Boeckh, in the second edition of his Staatshaushaltung

with two shiploads of corn and with money besides, and then despatched him to Athens ἄμα κατ' ἐμπορίαν καὶ

πππ το Athens αμα κατ εμποριών κατ 4 Isokratės, Trapezit. s. 5, 6. Sopæus, father of this pleader, had incurred the suspicions of Satyrus in the Pontus and second edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 658.

² Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 78, c. 57. See my preceding Ch. lxxxvii.

³ Lysias, pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4; Isokratês (Trapezitic.), Or. xvii. s. 55. The young man, whose case Isokratês sets forth, was sent to Athens by his father Sopæus, a rich Pontic Greek (s. 52) much in the confidence of Satyrns. Sopæus furnished his son sends to Athens to seize the property for the son, to order him home, and if he refused, then to require the Athenians to deliver him up—ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῦς ἐνθάδε ἐπιδημοῦστν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντον τά Satyrns.

Alliance and reciprocal good offices between Satyrus, Leukon, &c., and the Athenians. Immunities of trade granted to the Athenians.

even favour, granting to them a preference in the export of corn when there was not enough for all. His son Leukon not only continued the preference to Athenian exporting ships, but also granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of corn (the medimnus being about 1½ bushel); the total quantity of corn brought from Bosporus to Athens in a full year being 400,000

medimni.² It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favour by public votes of gratitude and honour, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship, together with immunity from all the regular burthens attaching to property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging to Leukon,3 who was therefore open (under the proposition of Leptines) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties, technically termed Antidosis. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade of Bosporus appears to have been farther extended; for we learn that he established an export from Theodosia as well as from Pantikapæum. His successor Parisadês I., continuing to Athenian exporters of corn the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens still higher honours than Leukon; for we learn that his statue, together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on the motion of Demosthenês.4 The connexion of Bosporus with Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn-trade being of high importance to the subsistence of the people. Every Athenian exporter was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens. The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics) upon interest and conditions

¹ Isokratês, Trapezit. s. 71. Demos-

name stands Berisadês as printed in the oration, but it is plain that Pari-sadês is the person designated. See Boeckh, Introd. ad Inscr. No. 2056, p. Theorem 1 sokrates, Trapezit. s. 71. Demosthenes also recognizes favours from the oration, but it is plain that Pari-Satyrus—καὶ αὐτὸς (Leukou) καὶ οἱ sadês is the person designated. See mpόγονοι, &c. (adv. Leptin. p. 467.

2 Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 469.
4 Demosth. adv. Phormion. p. 917;
Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 34. The of corn from Bosporus.

enforced by the Athenian judicature, was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the value of equitable treatment, not to say favour, from the kings of Bosporus-when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate behaviour of Kleomenês, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of Egyptian corn.1

The political condition of the Greeks at Bosporus was somewhat peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them substantially as despots, condition assumed no other title (in respect to the Greeks) than Greeks of that of Archon. They paid tribute to the powerful Bosporus —the princes called side, and even thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow isthmus, from some point near their em-Theodosia northward to the Palus Mæotis, as a protection against incursions.2 Their dominion did not

Political themselves archonspire over barbaric

tribes. extend farther west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western boundary; and even for the land within it they paid tribute. But on the Asiatic side of the strait they were lords paramount for a considerable distance, over the feebler and less warlike tribes who pass under the common name of Mæotæ or Mæêtæ—the Sindi, Toreti, Dandarii, Thatês, &c. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisadês I., record him as King of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of Bosporus and Theodosia.³ His dominion on the Asiatic side of the Kimmerian Bosporus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries, was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.4

Parisadês I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis,

¹ Demosth. adv. Dionysidor. p. 1285.
2 Strabo, vii. p. 310, 311.
3 See Inscript. Nos. 2117, 2118, 2119, in Boeckh's Collection, p. 156. In the Memorabilia of Xenophôn (ii. 1, 10), Sokratês cites the Scythians as an example of ruling people, and the Mæotæ as an example of subjects. Probably this refers to the position of the Bosporanic Greeks, who paid tribute to the Scythians, but ruled over the Mæotæ. The name Mæotæ seems confined to tribes on the Asiatic side of the Palus Mæotis, while the Scythians were on the European side of that sea.

Sokratês and the Athenians had good means of being informed about the situation of the Bosporani and their neighbours on both sides. See K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, b. ii. p. 216.

4 This boundary is attested in another Inscription, No. 2104, of the same collection. Inscription No. 2103 seems to indicate Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Leukon: about the mercenaries see Diodôr, xx. 22.

ries, see Diodôr. xx. 22.
Parisadês I. is said to have been worshipped as a god after his death (Strabo, vii. p. 310).

and Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the crown, sought aid without, and prevailed B.C. 310on various neighbours --- among them a powerful 304. Thracian king named Ariopharnês—to espouse his Family cause. At the head of an army said to consist of feuds among the 20,000 horse and 22,000 foot, the two allies marched Bosporanic princes— warbetween to attack the territories of Satyrus, who advanced to Satyrus and meet them, with 2000 Grecian mercenaries, and 2000 Eumelus-Thracians of his own, reinforced by a numerous death of Satyrus II. body of Scythian allies-20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him a plentiful supply of provisions in waggons. He gained a complete victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnes to retreat and seek refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis; a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh, and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received a wound of which he shortly died, after a reign of nine months. Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza, from whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pan-

tikapæum.1

Compare Niebuhr's Untersuchungen

über die Skythen, &c. (in his Kleine Schriften, p. 380), with Boeckh's Commentary on the Sarmatian Inscriptions, Corp. Ins. Græc., part xi. pp. 83

The mention by Diodôrus of a wooden fortress surrounded by morass and forest is curious, and may be illustrated by the description in Herodotus (iv. 108) of the city of the Budini. This habit of building towns and fortifications of wood prevailed among the Slavonic population in Russia and Poland until far down in the middle ages. See Paul Joseph Schaffarik, Slavische Alterthümer, in the German translation of Wuttke, vol. i. ch. 10, p. 192; also K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 91.

¹ Diodôr, xx. 24. The scene of these military operations (as far as we can pretend to make it out from the brief and superficial narrative of Diodôrus) seems to have been on the European side of Bosporus, somewhere between the Borysthenês river and the Isthmus of Perekop, in the territory called by Herodotus Hylæa. This is Niebuhr's opinion, which I think more probable than that of Boeckh, who supposes the operations to have occurred on the Asiatic territory of Bosporus. So far I concur with Niebuhr, but his reasons for placing Dromichætês, king of the Getæ (the victor over Lysimachus), east of the Borysthenês, are noway satisfactory.

Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered by Eumelus, assumed the sceptre, and marched forth to continue the struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favour of Eumelus; who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother in battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Palus Mæotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions. Enmelus entered Pantikapæum as conqueror. Nevertheless. the defeated Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, of his made a renewed attempt upon the crown: wherein

Civil war between Prytanis and Eumevictory of Eumelushe kills the wives, children, and friends

he was again baffled, forced to escape to Kêpi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus and Prytanistogether with all their principal friends. One youth alone-Parisadês, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the

Scythian prince Agarus. Eumelus had now put down all rivals; yet his recent cruelties

had occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bospo-His reign ranic citizens. He convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation, 1 Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force, appeased, or at least silenced, the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit. While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the surrounding tribes. constituted himself a sort of protector of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achæi (among the Caucasian mountains to the east) as well as of the Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea), much to the satisfaction of the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus, and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest and aggrandizement, when an accident terminated his life, after a reign of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to Pantikapæum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or waggon) and four with a tent upon it, his horses took fright and ran away. Perceiving that they were carrying him towards a precipice, he tried to jump out; but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the spot.1 He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned twenty years (304-284 B.C.); afterwards came the son of Spartokus. Parisadês II.: with whose name our information breaks off.2

This dynasty, the Spartokidæ, though they ruled the Greeks

Decline of the Bosporanic dynasty, until it passed into the hands of Mithridatês.

of Bosporus as despots by means of a mercenary force, vet seem to have exercised power with equity and moderation.3 Had Eumelus lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain even as much as he left. We

have no means of following their fortunes in detail; but we know that about a century B.C. the then reigning prince, Parisades III.. found himself so pressed and squeezed by the Scythians,4 that he was forced (like Olbia and the Pentapolis) to forego his independence, and to call in, as auxiliary or master, the formidable Mithridatês Eupator of Pontus; from whom a new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject however, after no long interval. to the dominion and interference of Rome.

Monuments left by the Spartokid princes of Bosporus— sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapæum).

The Mithridatic princes lie beyond our period; but the cities of Bosporus under the Spartokid princes, in the fourth century B.C., deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners; analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at Kyrênê with its Battiad

¹ Diodôr. xx. 25.

¹ Diodor. xx. 25.

² Diodor. xx. 100. Spartokus IV., son of Eumelus, is recognized in one Attic Inscription (No. 107), and various Bosporanic (Nos. 2105, 2106, 2120) in Boeckh's Collection. Parisadès II., son of Spartokus, is recognized in another Bosporanic Inscription, No.

^{2107;} seemingly also in No. 2120 b.

3 Strabo, vii. p. 310. Deinarchus, however, calls Parisadès, Satyrus, and Georgippus, τοὺς ἐχθίστους τυράννους (adv. Demosth. s. 44).

4 Strabo, vii. p. 310. οὐχ οἶός τε ὧν ἀντέχειν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους φόρον πραττομένους μείζω τοῦ πρότερον, &c.

princes. Among the facts attesting the wealth and power of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapæum); some of which have been recently examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans), cyclopian works piled up with prodigious labour and cost-have been found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious metals (gold, silver, and electron, or a mixture of four parts of gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic population. "The contents of the tumuli already opened are so multifarious, that from the sepulchres of Pantikapæum alone we might become acquainted with everything which served the Greeks either for necessary use or for the decoration of domestic life." 1 Statues, reliefs, and frescoes on the walls have been found, on varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets, rings, drinking cups, &c., of precious metal—several with coloured beads attached.2 The costumes,

¹ Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 503.

² An account of the recent discoveries near Kertch or Pantikapæun will be found in Dubois de Montpéreux, Voyage dans le Caucase, vol. v. p. 135 seqq.; and in Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, pp. 483—533. The last-mentioned work is peculiarly copious and instrucwork is peculiarly copious and instructive, relating what has been done since Dubois' travels, and containing abundant information derived from the recent memoirs of the St. Petersburg

cent memoirs of the St. Petersburg Literary Societies.

The local and special type, which shows itself so much on these works of art, justifies the inference that they were not brought from other Grecian cities, but executed by Grecian artists resident at Pantikapæum (p. 507). Two marble statues, a man and woman, both larger than life, exhumed in 1850, are spoken of with peculiar admiration (p. 491). Coins of the third and fourth century B.C. have been found in several (pp. 494—495). A great number of the so-called Etruscan vases have also been discovered, probably fabricated from a

species of clay still existing in the neighbourhood: the figures on these vases are often excellent, with designs and scenes of every description, religious, festal, warlike, domestic (p. 522). Many of the sarcophagi are richly ornamented with carvings in wood, ivory, &c., some admirably executed (p. 521). Unfortunately, the belief prevails and has long prevailed among the neighbouring population, that these thin which is the contain hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them, called

timuli contain hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them, called the Kul-Obo, was opened in 1830 by the Russian authorities. After great pains and trouble, the means of entrance were discovered, and the interior chamber was reached. It was the richest that had ever been opened, being found to contain some splendid colder or represents as well as many being found to contain some splendid golden ornaments as well as many other relics. The Russian officers placed a guard to prevent any one from entering it, but the cupidity of the population of Kertch was so inflamed by the report of the expected treasure being discovered, that they forced the guard, broke into the interior, and equipment, and physiognomy represented, are indeed a mixture of Hellenic and barbaric; moreover, even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalized, in those for whom they were destined. But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the Hellenic workshop; and there is good ground for believing that in the fourth century B.C. Pantikapæum was the seat, not only of enterprising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous and well-directed artistic genius. Such manifestations of the refinements of Hellenism, in this remote and little-noticed city, form an important addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior to its days of subjection, -which it has been the purpose of this history to present.

I have now brought down the History of Greece to the point of time marked out in the Preface to my First Volume-the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander-the epoch, from whence dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom and self-action, but also the decay of productive genius, and the debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence which the fourth century B.C. had seen exhibited in Plato and Demosthenês. The contents of this last Volume indicate but too clearly that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer exists; a considerable portion of it is employed in depicting Alexander and his conquests—ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν, κρατερὸν μήστωρα

pillaged most of the contents (p. 509). The Russian authorities have been generally anxious for the preservation and gradual excavation of these monuments, but have had to contend against repugnance and even rapacity on the

repugnance and even rapacity on the part of the people near.

Dubois de Montpéreux gives an interesting description of the opening of these tunuli near Kertch, especially of the Kul-Obo, the richest of all, which he conceives to have belonged to one of the Spartokid kings, and the decorations of which were the product of Hellenic art:—

"Si l'on a enterré (he observes) un centouré d'un luxe Scythique, ce sont des Grecs et des artistes de cette nation

des Grecs et des artistes de cette nation qui out travaillé à ses funérailles"

(Voyage autour du Caucase, pp. 195, 213, 227). Pantikapæum and Phanagoria (he says) "se reconnoissent de loin à la foule de leurs tumulus" (p. 137).

¹ How marked that degradation was may be seen attested by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Antiquis Oratoribus, pp. 445, 446, Reiske—ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ὑητορικὴ προπηλακιζομένη καὶ δεινὰς ὑβρεις ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο. ἀρξαμένη μέν ἀπὸ τῆς 'Αλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος τελευτῆς ἐκπνεῖν καὶ μαραίνεσθαι κατ' ὁλίγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἡλικίας μκροῦ δεήσασα εἰς τέλος ἡφανίσθαι. Compare Dionys., De Composit. Verbor. pp. 29,30, Reiske, and Westermann, Geschichte der Griechischen Beredtsamkeit, s. 75—77.

φόβοιο 1—that Non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks are absorbed, with their intellectual brightness bedimmed, their spirit broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the melancholy emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon victims overtaken by the day of slavery.²

One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone, which continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under the preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of speculation and philosophy. During the century which we have just gone through, this spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose names have been scarcely adverted to in this History. Among these names, indeed, there are two of peculiar grandeur, whom I have brought partially before the reader, because both of them belong to general history as well as to philosophy: Plato, as citizen of Athens, companion of Sokratês at his trial, and counsellor of Dionysius in his glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also, and an estimate of their speculative characteristics; but I find the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this volume The exposition of the tenets of distinguished would afford. thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or modern, among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural expectations of their readers; but is reserved for the special historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my History of Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something towards supplying this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy in the fourth century B.C.

¹ Hom. Πiad. vi. 97. Ζεὺς 2 Hom. Odyss. xvii. 322 :— ἀνέρος, εὖτ' ἄν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἢμαρ ἢμισυ γάρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύοπα ἕλησιν.

APPENDIX.

ON ISSUS AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD AS CONNECTED WITH THE BATTLE.

The exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned upon the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined within a few miles north or south; and what is even more important, the general features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented. The Plan of the country round the Gulf of Issus will enable the reader to follow easily what is certain, and to understand the debate about what is matter of hypothesis.

That the battle was fought in some portion of the narrow space intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the western flank of Mount Amanus-that Alexander's left and Darius's right, rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexauder unexpectedly from the rear, thus causing him to return back a day's march from Myriandrus, and to reoccupy a pass which he had already passed through and quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was fought, was at a certain distance south of Issus, the last town of Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian, ii. 7, 2)—ès την υστεραίαν προυγώρει (Darius from Issus) ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πίναρον—Ritter erroneously states that Issus was upon the river Piuarus, which he even calls the Issus river (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2, pp. 1797—1806). We know also that this river was at some distance north of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through which Alexauder passed and repassed.

But when we proceed beyond these data (the last of them only vague and relative) to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his History, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions of various geographers.

To those whom he has cited may be added—Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the Transactions of the Geographical Society for 1837)—Mützell's Topographical Notes on the third book of Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter's Erdkunde. published only this year (1855), ch. xxvii. p. 1778 segg.

We know from Xenophôn that Issus was a considerable town close to the sea—two days' march from the river Pyramus, and one day's march northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and That it was near the north-eastern corner of the Gulf may also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across Asia Minor, as stretching from Sinôpê or Amisus to Issus—and who also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination at Issus (Strabo, xiv. p. 677; xvi. p. 749). The probable site of Issus has been differently determined by different authors; Rennell (Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis, pp. 42-48) places it near Oseler or Yusler; as far as I can judge, this seems too far distant from the head of the Gulf, towards the south.

In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophôn and Arrian. It is evident that, in Xenophôn's time, this pass and the road of march through it lay between the mountains and the sea, -and that the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when Alexander passed no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophôn and Alexander; and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophôn's time, Kilikia was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary, maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers on his boundary towards Syria. But in Alexander's time, Kilikia was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary walls, between two conterminous satrapies under the same master, were unnecessary, and must even have been found inconvenient, during the great collective military operations of the Persian satraps against the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia as a base, about 380 B.C., Diodôr. xv. 2)-as well as in the subsequent operations against the Phœnician towns (Diodôr. xvi. 42). Hence we may discern a reason why all artificial obstructions may have been swept away before the time of Alexander; leaving only the natural difficulties of the neighbouring ground, upon which Xenophôn has not touched.

The spot still retained its old name-"The Gates of Kilikia and

Syria"-even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that name, in Arrian's description, designates a difficult and narrow point of the road over hills and rocks-a point which Major Rennell (Illustrations, p. 54) supposes to have been about a mile south of the river and walls described by Xenophôn. However this may be, the precise spot designated by Xenophôn seems probably to be sought about seven miles north of Scanderoon, near the ruins now known as Jonas's Pillars (or Sakal Tutan), and the Castle of Merkes, where a river called Merkes, Mahersy, or Kara-su, flows across from the mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Kersus of Xenophôn is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Mützell, as well as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, Erdk. p. 1792). At the spot here mentioned the gulf indents eastward, while the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and drops with unusual steepness towards it. Hence the road now followed does not pass between the mountain and the sea, but ascends over a portion of the mountain, and desceuds again afterwards to the low ground skirting the sea. Northward of Merkes, the space between the mountain and the sea gradually widens towards Bayas. At some distance to the north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is considered. I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the Merkes with the Pinarus. Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Monceaux notices six streams as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Mützell ad Curtium, p. 105). Which among these is the Pinarus cannot be settled without more or less of doubt.

Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophôn and Arrian in the above passages, there are also other Gates called the Amanian Gates, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr. Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing the maritime passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea, from the inland passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian, and Kallisthenês. Strabo uses the phrase Amanian Gates twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751); in both cases designating a maritime pass, and not a pass over the mountain—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676, he means by al 'Aμανίδες πύλαι the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu, between Ægæ and Issus,

or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi. 751—he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole the strip of land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and to call both the beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates. But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian, who, in describing the march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1)—ύπερβαλών δή τὸ όρος Δαρείος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς 'Αμαγικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ Ίσσον προῆγε, καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν 'Αλεξάνδρου λαθων. Here, let it be observed, we do not read ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας—nor can I think that the words mean, as the translator gives them-"transit Amanum, eundo per Pylas Amanicas". The words rather signify that Darius "crossed over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates"-i.e. where it adjoined the strip of land skirting the Gulf, and lying between those two extreme points which Strabo denominates Amanian Gates, Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a col over the mountain ridge.

On the other hand, Kallisthenes (if he is rightly represented by Polybius, who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the words Amanian Gates to signify the passage by which Darius entered Kilikia-that is, the passage over the mountain. That which Xenophôn and Arrian call the Gates of Kilikia and Syria-and which Strabo calls Amanian Gates—is described by Polybius as τὰ στενὰ,

καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ἐν τῆ Κιλικία πύλας.

I have marked on the Plan the pass by which Darius crossed Mount Amanus, as it stands on Kiepert's Map, and on Chesney's Map; in the line from Aintab to the head of the Gulf, near the 37th parallel. It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius's line of march. because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus before he reached Issus. The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th parallel are indeed called in question by Mützell (ad Curtium, p. 102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than the maritime line of road through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and the pass of Beylan, which, as the more usual, was preferred both by the Cyreians and by Alexander.

Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a question, substantially to this effect: "Since Alexander intended to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?" Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order to eliminate it he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr. Williams, which places Myriandrus at Bayas, and the Kiliko-Syrian Gates at Demir-Kapu—an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on the Cicilian and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible objections.

I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to Myriandrus, in their way to the Pass of Beylan, we may reasonably infer that, whether that town was in the direct line or not, it was at least in the usual road of march—which does not always coincide with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however, let us assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan without passing by Myriandrus, there would still be reason enough to induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the sea-ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him repulsed and forced to retreat, it would be a material assistance to his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well as the other sea-ports.

In the approaching months, we shall find him just as careful to make sure of the Phœnician cities on the coast, before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.

Farther, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to gain by haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape; it would either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging his march to Sochi for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of advance) to Soli and Anchialus.

It seems probable (as Rennell (p. 56) and others think), that the site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland; that there has been an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.

The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of ${}^{2}A\lambda \epsilon \xi a\nu \delta \rho \epsilon ia$ $\kappa a\tau$ "Issue, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in commemoration of the victory of Issue. According to Ritter (p. 1791), "Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandria for the trade of the East with Egypt". The importance of the site of Scanderoon, in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him; and it is certain that his successors had no such idea, because they founded the Great cities of Antioch and Seleukeia (in Pieria), both of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of importance as being the harbour of Aleppo; a city (Berea) of little consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the East, and Seleukeia among the first: see Ritter, p. 1152.



INDEX.



INDEX.

ABANTES.

A.

Abantes, ii. 532.

Abdêra, the army of Xerxês at, iv. 141.

Abrokomas, vii. 196, 201. Abydos, march of Xerxês to, iv. 129; revolt of, from Athens, vi. 319: Athenian victory at, over the Pelopon-nesians, vi. 340; Athenian victory over Pharnabazus at, vi. 353; Derkyllidas at, vii. 484 seq.; Anaxibius and Iphikratės at, vii. 532 seq.

Achwan origin affected by Spartan kings, i. 448; league, x. 324.

Acheans, various accounts of, i. 99; effect of the Dorian occupation of Peloponnésus on, i. 448; Homeric view of, i. 449; of Phthiôtis and Peloponnésus, ii. 205; of Peloponnésus, ii. 224, 255.

Achæmenés, iv. 193. Achæus, i. 99. Achaia, ii. 324; towns and territory of, ii. 376 seq.; Epameinoudas in, B.C. 367, viii. 253; proceedings of the Thebans in, B.C. 365, viii. 254; alliance of, with Sparta and Elis, B.C. 365, viii. 298.

Acharnee, Archidamus at, v. 54 seq.

Achelôus, i. 257 seq. Achilléis, the basis of the Iliad, ii. 108.

Achilles, i. 266 seq., 272 seq.
Achilles, i. 266 seq., 272 seq.
Achradina, capture of, by Neon, ix. 154.
Acropolis at Athens, flight to, on
Xerxês' approach, iv. 206; capture
of, by Xerxês, iv. 212 seq.; visit of
the Peisistratids to, after its capture
by Xerxês, iv. 214; inviolable reserve fund in, v. 61 seq.

Ada, queen of Karia, x. 43, 47.

Adeimantus, of Corinth, and Themistoklês, at Salamis, iv. 219.

Admêtus and Alkêstis, i. 108 seq.

Admêtus and Themistoklês, iv. 372. Adranum, Timoleon at, ix. 146, 154. Adrastus, i. 251, 254, 255 seq.; ii. 408. Adrastus, the Phrygian exile, ii. 411. Adrumetum, captured by Agathoklês, x. 352.

ÆNIANÊS.

Æa, i. 229 seq. Æakid genealogy, i. 170, 175 seq.

Ægean, islands in, ii. 162; the Macedonian fleet master of, x. 89.

Ægean islands, effect of the battle of Chæroneia on, ix. 487.

Egeids at Sparta, ii. 280. Egeus, i. 188; death of, i. 204.

Ægialeus, i. 79.

Egikoreis, ii. 424.
Egina, i. 170; war of, against Athens, at the instigation of the Thebans, iii. 388, 389; iv. 5; submission of, to Darius, iv. 6; appeal of Athenians to Sparta against the Medism of, iv. 8; attempted revolution at, by Nikodroattempted revolution at, by Nikodromus, iv. 146 seq.; from B.C. 488 to 481, iv. 145, 149 seq.; and Athens, settlement of the feud between, iv. 156; removal of Athenians to, on Xerxês' approach, iv. 205; Greek fleet at, in the spring of B.C. 479, iv. 242; war of Athens against, B.C. 459, iv. 410; subdued by Athens; iv. 419; expulsion of the Æginetans from, by the Athenians, v. 282; and Athens, B.C. 389, vii. 535 seq.; Gorgôpas in, vii. 537 seq.; Teleutias in, vii. 535, 538. 538.

Hydraean scale, ii. 241, 246, 538 seq. Hydraeans and Thebans, i. 170; and the hostages taken from them by Kleomenês and Leotychidês, iv. 145 seq.; pre-eminence of, at Salamis, iv. 228; at Thyrea, capture and death of, B.C. 424, v. 232.

Egistheus, i. 149, 150.

Egospotami, battle of vi. 437 seq.; condition of Athens and her dependent of the the sequence.

cies after the battle of, vi. 442 seq.

Ægyptos, i. 83. Aeimnestus and Dionysius, viii. 450.

Æneadæ at Skêpsis, i. 288. Æneas, i. 278, 287 seq. Ænianês, ii. 210.

ÆOLIC.

Eolic Greeks in the Trôad, i, 305; emigration under the Pelopids, i. 455; Kym³, custom at, in cases of murder, ii. 34(n.); and Doric dialects, ii. 256; cities in Asia, iii. 18 seq.; emigration,

iii. 19, 21; establishments near Mount Ida, iii. 22.

Bolid line, the first, i. 103 seq.; the second, i. 108 seq.; the third, i. 113 seq.; the fourth, i. 116 seq.

Bolis, iii. 22; the subsatrapy of, and Pharmborus vii 376 seq.

Pharnabazus, vii. 376 seq. Æolus, i. 95, 102 seq.

Æpytus, i. 163.

Æschinés, at the battle of Tamynæ, ix. 322; proceedings of, against Philip, after his capture of Olynthus, ix. 356; early history of, ix. 356; as envoy of Athens in Arcadia, ix. 357; desire of, for peace, B.C. 347, ix. 358; and the embassies from Athens to Philip, ix. 369, 393, 399, 402, 410 seq.; and the motion of Philokratês for peace and alliance with Philip ix. 380 seq.; fahrimotion of Philokrates for peace and alliance with Philip, ix. 380 seq.; fabrications of, about Philip, ix. 386, 395, 400 seq.; visit of, to Philip in Phokis, ix. 410; justifies Philip after his conquest of Thermopylæ, ix. 411; corruption of, ix. 416 seq.; at the Amphiktyonic assembly at Delphi, B.C. 339, ix. 455 seq.; on the special Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ, ix. 456; conduct of after the battle 456; conduct of, after the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 489; accusation against Ktesiphon by, x. 224 seq.; exile of, x. 230 seq.

Eschylus, Promêtheus of, i. 74, 344 (n. 2); his Eumenides and the Areopagus, ii. 451 (n. 2); his treatment of mythes, i. 343 seq.; Sophoklês and Enripidês,

vii. 6 seq.

Æsculapius, i. 164 seq. Æsőn, death of, i. 110. Æsymnété, ii. 395.

Æthiopis of Arktinus, ii. 89.

Aëthlius, i. 95.

Ætna, foundation of the city of, iv. 318; second city of, iv. 326; reconquered by Duketius, v. 520; conquest of, by Dionysius, viii. 449; Campanians of, viii. 478.

Ætolia, legendary settlement of, i. 132; expedition of Demosthenes against,

v. 214. Ætolian genealogy, i. 130.

Etolians, ii. 214; rude condition of, ii. 216; immigration of, into Peleponnėsus, ii. 247 seq.; and Akarnanians, iii. 221; and Peleponnesians under Eurylochus attack Naupaktus, v. 218; contest and pacification of, with Antipater, x. 268; Kassander's attempts to check, x. 304.

AGESILAUS.

Ætolo-Eleians, and the Olympic games,

Ætôlus, i. 97, 130; and Oxylus, i. 141. Africa, circumnavigation of, by the Phenicians, iii. 103; expedition of Agathoklės to, against Carthage, x. 343 seq., 373.
Agamédés, and Trophonius, i. 122.

Agamemnôn, pre-eminence of, i. 143 seq., 149, 150, 152: and Orestês transferred to Sparta, i. 154; and the Trojan ex-pedition, i. 265, 268. Agaristê and Megaklês, ii. 413.

Agasias, vii. 317 seq. Agathoklés, first rise of, x. 330; disgathories, first rise of, x. 330; distinction of, in the Syracusan expedition to Krotôn, x. 331; retires from Syracuse to Italy, x. 331; exploits of, in Italy and Sicily, about B.C. 320, x. 332; first ascendency of, at Syracuse, x. 332; his re-admission to Syracuse, x. 333; massacres the to Syracuse, x. 333: massacres the Syracusans, x. 334 seq.; constituted despot of Syracuse, x. 335; his popular manners and military success, x. 336 seq.; and the Agrigentines, x. 337, 338, 339; and Deinokratės, x. 334, 372, 378 seq.; massacre at Gela by, x. 341; defeat of, at the Himera, x. 341; expedition of, to Africa, x. 343 seq., 373; capture of Megalèpolis and Tunès by x. 346; victory of ager. Tunes by, x. 346; victory of, over Hanno and Bomilkar, x. 348 seq.; operations of, on the eastern coast of Carthage, x. 350 seq.; mutiny in the army of, at Tunês, x. 358; in Numidia, army of, at Times, x. 355, in Franklia, x. 359; and Ophellas, x. 360, 364 seq.; capture of Utica by, x. 368; goes from Africa to Sicily, B.C. 306-305, x. 370; in Sicily, B.C. 306-305, x. 371 seq.; returns from Sicily to Africa, where he is defeated by the Carthaginians, and they capitulate, x. 373; deserts his army at Tunês, and they capitulate, x. 374; barbarities of, at Egesta and Syracuse, after his African expedition, x. 377; operations of, in Liparæ, Italy, and Korkyra, x. 379; last projects and death of, x. 381 seq.; genius and character of, x. 382 seq.

Agavé and Pentheus, i. 239. Agéma, Macedonian, x. 14.

Agên, the satyric drama, x. 232, and n. 3.

Agênôr and his offspring, i. 236.

Agesandridas, vi. 294, 298. Agesilaus, character of, vii. 409, 413, 444; nomination of, as king, vii. 410 seq.; popular conduct and partisanship of, vii. 413; expedition of, to Asia, B.C. 397, vii. 422 seq.; humiliation of Lysander by, vii. 426 seq.; Tissaphernes breaks the truce with,

vii. 427; attacks of, on the satrapy of Pharnabazus, vii. 427, 440 seq.; his enrichment of his friends, vii. 428; humanity of, vii. 429; naked exposure of Asiatic prisoners by, vii. 431 seq.; at Ephesus, vii. 431; victory of, near Sardis, vii. 433; negotiations of, with Tithraustès, vii. 434; avainted to command at sea 434; appointed to command at sea and on land, vii. 437; efforts of, to augment his fleet, vii. 440; and Spithridatês, vii. 441; aud Pharnabazus, conference between, vii. 442 seq.; large preparations and recal of, from Asia, vii. 445, 469, 474 seq.; relations of Sparts with her neighrelations of Sparta with her neighbours and allies after the accession of, vii. 450; on the northern frontier of Beeotia, vii. 477; victory of, at Korôneia, vii. 479 seq.; and Teleutias, capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, and of Lecheum by, vii. 503 seq.; capture of Peiræum and Œnoê by, vii. 508; and the Isthmian festival, vii. 508; and the envoys from Thêbes, vii. 510, 516; and the destruction of vii. 510, 516; and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphi-kratės, vii. 511, 517; expedition of, against Akarnania, vii. 518; and the peace of Antalkidas, vii. 548 seg.; miso-Theban sentiment of, viii. 26, 32; his defence of Phœbidas, viii. 59; subjugation of Phlius by, viii. 67 seq.; and the trial of Sphodrias, viii. 95; expeditions of, against Thêbes, viii. 119 seq.; and Epameinondas, at the congress at Sparta, B.C. 371, viii. 158; and the re-establishment of Mantineia, viii. 194 seq.; feeling against, at Sparta, B.C. 371, viii. 197; march of, against Mantineia, viii. 200 seq.; of, against Mantineia, viii. 200 seq.; vigilant defence of Sparta by, against Epameinondas, viii. 210, 315; in Asia, B.C. 366, viii. 279, 281; in Egypt, viii. 345 seq.; and the independence of Messèné, viii. 343; death and character of, viii. 347 seq.

Agesipoles, vii. 519 seq., viii. 32 seq., 63,

Agetus and Aristo, iv. 15.

Agis II., invasion of Attica by, B.C. 425, v. 231; advance of, to Leuktra, B.C. 419, v. 465; invasion of Argos by, v. 470 seq.; retirement of, from Argos, v. 472 seq.; at the battle of Mantineia, B.C. 418, v. 476 seq.; invasion of Attica by, vi. 122, 185; movements of, after the Athenian disaster in Sicily, vi. 196; applications from Eubœa and Lesbos to, B.C. 413, vi. 196; over tures of peace from the Four Hundred to, vi. 278; repulse of, by Thrasyllus to, vi. 273; repulse of, by Thrasyllus, vi. 351; fruitless attempt of, to sur-

AKRISIUS.

prise Athens, vi. 374 invasions of Elis by, vii. 392 seq.; death of, vii.

Agis III., ii. 315 seq.; x. 75, 219 seq.

Aglaurion, iv. 213 (n.).

Agnonidês, x. 285.

Agones and festivals in honour of gods.

Agora, Homeric, ii. 9 seq.; and Boulê, ii. 18.

Agoratus, vi. 454, 459.

Agrigentine generals, accusation and death of, viii. 409.

Agrigentines, and Agathoklês, x. 337, 357; defeat of, by Leptines and Demophilus, x. 371; defeat of, by Leptines, x. 373.

Agrigentum, iii. 179; Phalaris of, iv. 65, 295; and Syracuse before B.C. 500, iv. 295; prisoners sent to, after the battle of Himera, iv. 314; and Syracuse, B.C. 446, v. 523; after the Syracuse, B.C. 440, v. 525; anter the Theronian dynasty, v. 523; and Hannibal's capture of Selinus, viii. 389; defensive preparations at, against Hannibal and Imilkon, viii. 405; strength, wealth, and population of, B.C. 406, viii. 405 seq.; blockade and capture of, by the Carthaginians, viii. 407 seq.; complaints against the viii. 407 seq.; complaints against the Syracusan generals at, viii. 409, 413, 415 seq.; declaration of, against Dionyslus, ix. 6; Timoleon and the fresh colonization of, ix. 184 seq.; siege of, by Agathoklès, x. 339.

Agylla, plunder of the temple at, ix. 24.

Agyrium, Dionysius and Magon at, ix. 7.

Agyrrhius, vii. 532. Ajax, son of Telamôn, i. 172, 176.

Ajaz, son of Oileus, i. 176, 279, 223.

Akanthus, iii. 252; march of Xerxès to, iv. 141; induced by Brasidas to revolt from Athens, v. 315 seq.; speech of Brasidas at, vii. 360 seq.; opposition of, to the Olynthian confederacy,

viii. 49 seq., 54.

Akarnan and Amphoterus, i. 258.

Akarnania, Demosthenės in, B.C. 426,
v. 214; expedition of Agesilaus

v. 214; exped against, vii. 518.

Akarnanians, ii. 215 seq., iii. 225 seq.; and Athens, alliance between, v. 44; under Demosthenês, save Naupaktus, v. 219; and Amphilochians, pacific treaty of, with the Ambrakiots, v.

Akastus, wife of, and Pêleus, i. 109. Akesines, crossed by Alexander, x. 171. Akræ in Sicily, iii. 179.

Akragas, iii. 179.

Akrisius, Danaê and Perseus, i. 85 seq.

AKROTATUS.

Akrotatus, x. 338.
Akteón, i. 238.
Akteón, i. 238.
Akté, Brasidas in, v. 334.
Akusitaus, his treatment of mythes, i. 349.
Alexa, foundation of, viii. 450.
Alatia, Phokæan colony at, iii. 421.
Alazônes, iii. 64.
Alcyone and Kéyx, i. 127.
Alétés, i. 445.
Aleus, i. 163.

Alexander of Macedon, and Greeks at Tempê, on Xerxês' invasion, iv. 166; embassy of, to Athens, iv. 245 seq.; and the Athenians before the battle

of Platæa, iv. 264.

Alexander the Great, his visit to Ilium, i. 296, x. 20; successors of, and Ilium, i. 296; comparison between the invasion of, and that of Xerxês, iv. 331; birth of, ix. 235; at the battle of Cheroneia, ix. 483; quarrels of, with his father, ix. 495, 508; accession of, ix. 500, 505, 510; character, education, and early political action of, ix. 506 and early pointed action of, Articos seq.; uncertain position of, during the last year of Philip, ix. 509; Amyntas put to death by, ix. 511; march of, into Greece, B.C. 336, ix. 514; chosen Imperator of the Greeks, ix. 516; convention at Corinth under, B.C. 336, ix. 516; authority claimed by, under the convention at Corinth, ix. 518; violations of the convention at Corinth by, ix. 519 seq.; expedition of, into Thrace, ix. 524 seq., 527 (n. 1); embassy of Gauls to, ix. 528; victories of, over Kleitus and the Illyrians, ix. 529 seg.; revolt of Thèbes against, ix. 531 seg.; march of, from Thrace to Thèbes, ix. 537; capture and destruction of Thèbes by, ix. 539 seg.; demands the surrender of anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens, ix. 545; at Corinth, B.C. 335, ix. 548; and Diogenês, ix. 548; reconstitution of Beeotia by, ix. 548; Grecian history a blank in the reign of, x. 1; connexion of his Asiatic conquests with Grecian history, x. 2, 124 seq.; Panhellenic pretences of, x. 3; analogy of his relation to the Greeks with those of Napoleon to the Confederation of the Rhine, x. 3(n. 1); military endowments of, x. 4; military changes in Greece during the sixty years before the accession of, x. 5 seq.; measures of, before going to Asia, x. 18: his march to the Hellespont and passage to Asia, x. 19, 27; analogy of, to the Greek heroes, x. 21; review of his army in Asia, x. 22; Macedonian officers of his army in Asia, x. 23;

ALEXANDER.

Greeks in his service in Asia, x. 24; defensive preparations of Darius against, x. 26; victory of, at the Granikus, x. 30 seq.; submission of the Asiatics to, after the battle of the Granikus, x. 38; and Mithrines, x. 38, 150; capture of Ephesus by x. 20; capture of Mildrights by x. 42. 39; capture of Milêtus by, x. 42; debate of, with Parmenio at Milêtus, x. 41; disbands his fleet, x. 42; seq.; conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia by, x. 48; at Kelænæ, x. 49; cuts the Gordian knot, x. 53; refuses to liberate the Athenians refuses to include the American captured at the Granikus, x. 54; subjugation of Paphlagonia and Kappadokia by, x. 59; passes Mount Taurus and enters Tarsus, x. 60 seq.; operations of, in Kilikia, x. 62; march of, from Kilikia to Myriandrus, x. 63; return of, from Myriandrus, x. 66; victory of, at Issus, x. 68 seq.; his courteous treatment of Darins' mother, wife, and family, x. 72, 101; his treatment of Greeks taken at Damascus, x. 77; in Phenicia, x. 78 seq., 97; his correspondence with Darius, x. 78, S8; siege and capture of Tyre by, x. 82 seq.; surrender of the princes of Cyprus to, x. 85; his march towards Egypt, x. 90, 98; siege and capture of Gaza by, x. 90 seq.; his cruelty to Batis, x. 92; in Egypt, x. 93 seq.; crosses the Euphrates at of, from Kilikia to Myriandrus, x. x. 93 seq.; crosses the Euphrates at Thapsakus, x. 97; fords the Tigris, x. 98; continence of, x. 100 (n. 2); victory of, at Arbèla, x. 106 seq.; surrender of Susa and Babylon to, x. 115; his march from Susa to Persepolis, x. 116 seq.; at Persepolis, x. 118 seq.; subjugation of Persis by, x. 123; at Ekbatana, x. 126, 186 seq.; sends home the Thessalian cavalry, x. 127; pursues Darius into Parthia, x. 128 seq.; disappointment of, in not taking Darius alive, x. 131; Asiatizing tendencies of, x. 132, 158, 205; at Hekatompylus, x. 132; in Hyrkania, x. 133; his treatment of the Grecian mercenaries and envoys with Darius, seq., 144; Parmenio and Philotas put to death by, x. 140 seq.; in Gedrosia, x. 144, 176; foundation of Alexandria x. 144, 176; foundation of Alexandria and Caucasum by, x. 144; in Baktria and Sogdiana, x. 145 seq.; and Bessus, x. 145, 149; massacre of the Branchide by, x. 146 seq.; at Marakanda, x. 148, 150 seq.; and the Scythians, x. 148, 156; Kleitus killed by, x. 151 seq., 155 seq., 158; capture of the Sogdian rock and the rock of

Choriênes by, x. 157; and Roxana, x. 157; and Kallisthenes, conspiracy of royal pages against, x. 163; reduces the country between Hindoo-Koosh the country between Hindoo-Koosh and the Indus, x. 166 seq.; crosses the Indus and the Hydaspės, and defeats Porus, x. 169 seq., 170 (n. 1 and 2); conquests of, in the Punjab, x. 171 seq.; refusal of his army to march farther, x. 172; voyage of, down the Hydaspės and the Indus, x. 174; wounded in attacking the Malli, x. 174 consts on the Indus, established 174; posts on the Indus established by, x. 175; his bacchanalian procession through Karmania, x. 177; and the tomb of Cyrus the Great, x. 177; satraps of, x. 177 seq.; discontents and mutiny of his Macedonian soldiers, x. 181 seq.; Asiatic levies of, x. 182; sails down the Pasitigris and up the Tigris to Opis, x. 183; partial disbanding of his Macedonian soldiers by, x. 183; preparations of, for the conquest and circumnavigation of Asia, x. 185, 189; his grief for the death of Hephæstion, x. 186, 191; extermination of the Kossæi by, x. 187; his last visit to Babylon, x. 188 seq.; numerous embassies to, B.C. 323, x. 188; his sail on the Euphratês, x. 190; his incorporation of Persians in the Macedonian phalanx, x. 191; his despatch to Kleomenes, x. 192; forebodings and suspicion of, at Babylon, x. 193 (n.); illness and death of, x. 194 seq.; rumoured poisoning of, x. 196 (n. 1); sentiments excited by the career and death of, x. 196 seq.; probable achievements of, if he had lived longer, x. 198 seq.; character of, as ruler, x. 200 seq.; absence of nationality in, x. 203; Livy's opinion as to his chances if he had attacked the Romans, x. 199; unrivalled excellence of, as a military man, x. 200; not the intentional diffuser of Hellenic culture, x. 204 seq.; cities founded in Asia by, x. 206; Asia not hellenized by, x. 207; increased intercommunication produced by the conquests of, x. 210 seq.; his interest in science and literature, x. 212; state of the Grecian world when he crossed the Hellespont, x. 213; possibility of emancipating Greece during his earlier Asiatic campaigns, x. 214; his rescript directing the recal of Grecian exiles, x. 245 seq.; his family and generals, after his death, x. 254 seq.; partition of the empire of, x. 255, 275; list of projects entertained by, at the time of his death, x. 256.

ALKIBIADÊS.

Alexander, son of Alexander the Great, x. 269, 276, 300, 301, 305. Alexander, son of Polysperchon, x. 283,

300, 302 seq.

Alexander, son of Kassander, x. 322. Alexander, king of the Molossians, x. 328 seg.

Alexander, son of Amyntas, viii. 237. Alexander of Epirus, marriage of, ix.

Alexander, the Lynkestian, ix. 500 seq. Alexander of Pheræ, viii. 236; expeditions of Pelopidas against, viii. 250, 288, 292, 294 (n. 2); seizure of Pelopidas and Ismenias by, viii. 268 seq.; release of Pelopidas and Ismenias by, viii. 271; subdued by the Thebans, viii. 294 seq.; naval hostilities of, against Athens, viii. 353; cruelties and assassination of, ix. 201, seq. Alexandreia Troas, i. 296.

Alexandria in Egypt, x. 93; ad Caucasum, x. 144; in Ariis, and in Arachosia, x. 144 (n. 4); ad Jaxartem,

Alexandrine chronology from the return of the Herakleids to the first Olympiad, ii. 228.

Alexiklês, vi. 292, 294, 296.

Alkæus, Herodotus' mistake about, ii.
519 (n. 1); his flight from battle, iii.
26; opposition of, to Pittakus, iii. 27,
311 seq.; collected works of, iii. 313 (n. 4); subjective character of his poetry, i. 328.

Alkamenes, son of Teleklus, ii. 334.

Alkamenés, appointment of, to go to Lesbos, vi. 196; defeat and death of, vi. 200.

Alkestis and Admêtus, i. 108 seq.

Alketas, viii. 131, 139 (n. 1), 144, ix. 24.
Alkibiades, reputed oration of Andokidês against, iii. 369 (n. 3), iv. 492 (n
3); alleged duplication of the tributemoney of Athenian allies by, iv. 492 (n. 3); at the battle of Delium, v. 11; education and character of, v. 433 sec. and Sokratês, v. 437 seq.; conflicting sentiments entertained towards, v-441; attempts of, to revive his family tie with Sparta, v. 443; early politics of, v. 444; adoption of anti-Laconian politics by, v. 444; attempt of, to ally Argos with Athens, B.C. 420, v 445; trick of, upon the Lacedæmonian envoys, v. 447 seq.; display of, at the Olympic festival, v. 454 seq.; 455 (n. 2); intra-Peloponnesian policy of, B.C. 419, v. 462 seq.; expedition of, into the interior of Peloponnesus, B.C. 419, v. 464; at Argos, B.C. 418, v. 474; and B.C. 416, v. 499; and Nikias, projected contention of ostracism

ALKIDAS.

between, v. 504 seq.; his support of the Egestæan envoys at Athens, B.C. 416, v. 542; and the Sicilian expedition, v. 514, 548 seq., 555 seq.; aftack upon, in connexion with the mutilation of the Hermæ, vi. 8, 12, 43 seq.; the Eleusinian mysteries and, vi. 12 seq., 43 seq., 373; plan of action in Sicily proposed by, vi. 27; at Messene in Sicily, vi. 29; at Katana, vi. 30. received to take his trial. vi. 30; recal of, to take his trial, vi. 31, 45 seq.; escape and condemnation of, vi. 46 seq., 68 (n. 3); at Sparta, vi. 68 seq.; Lacedæmoniaus persuaded by, to send aid to Chios, vi. 198; expedition of, to Chios, vi. 198 seq.; revolt of Milêtus from Athens, caused by, vi. 206; order from Sparta to kill, vi. 233; escape of, to Tissaphernês, vi. 233; advice of, to Tissaphernês, vi. 234; acts as interpreter between Tissaphernês and the Greeks, vi. 235 seq.; oligarchical conspiracy of, with the Athenian officers at Samos, vi. the Atheman officers at Samos, vi. 237 seq.; counter-manœuvres of, against Phrynichus, vi. 242; proposed restoration of, to Athens, vi. 241, 244; negotiations of, with Peisander, vi. 245, 250 seq.; and the Athenian democracy at Samos, vi. 278 seq., 282 seq.; at Aspendus, vi. 325; return of, from Aspendus to Samos, vi. 339; arrival of, at the Hellespont, from Samos, vi. 340; arrest of Tissaphernés by, vi. 343; escape of, from Sardis, vi. 344; and the Athenian fleet, at the Bosphorus. the Athenian fleet, at the Bosphorus, vi. 349; attack upon Chalkedon by, vi. 349; occupation of Chrysopolis by, vi. 350; and Thrasyllus, at the Hellespont, vi. 353; capture of Chalkêdon by, vi. 355; and Pharnabazus, vi. 356; proceedings of, in Thrace and Asia, B.C. 407, vi. 367; return of, to Athens, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; expedition of, to Asia, B.C. 407, vi. 374 seq.; dissatisfaction of the armament at Samos with, vi. 377; accusations against, at Athens, B.C. 407, vi. 378; alteration of sentiment towards, at Athens, B.C. 407, vi. 379 seq.; and Nikias, different behaviour of the Athenians towards, vi. 381; dismissal of, from his command, B.C. 407, vi. 382; at Ægospotami, vi. 438; position and views of, in Asia, after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 528 seq.; assassination of, vi. 531 seq.; character of, vi. 531 seq. Alkidas, v. 158, 160 seq., 191.

Alkmeon, i. 257 seq.
Alkmeonids, curse, trial, and condemnation of, ii. 455; proceedings of,

AMPHIKTYONIES.

against Hippias, iii. 340; rebuilding of Delphian temple by, iii. 341; false imputation of treachery on, at the battle of Marathôn, iv. 45; demand of Sparta for the expulsion of, v. 22.

Alkman, iii. 301, 306, 309 seq. Alkmênê, i. 87.

Allegorical interpretations of mythes, i. 375 seq., 388.

Allegory rarely admissible in the interpretation of mythes, i. 2.

Alôids, the, i. 128.

Alos, sanguinary rites at, i. 118.

Althea, and the burning brand, i. 134.

Althamenés, founder of Rhodes, i. 465.

Atthemenés, and Katreus, i. 206.
Alyattes and Kyaxarês, iii. 56; war of, with Milètus, iii. 78 seg.; sacrilege committed by, iii 79; long reigu, death, and sepulchre of, iii. 79.

Amaltheia, the horn of, i. 139. Amanus, Mount, march of Darius to,

x. 64. Amasis, iii. 152, 455 seq.; death of, iii.

435. Amasis and Polykratês, iii, 455.

Amastris, x. 399 seq.

Amazons, legend of, i. 192 seq.

Ambrakia, iii. 216.

Ambrakiots, attack of, upon Amphilochian Argos, v. 101; attack of, upon Akarnania, v. 113 seq.; projected attack of, on Amphilochian Argos, v. 219; defeat of, at Olpæ, v. 221; Menedæus' desertion of, v. 222 seq.; Demosthenes' victory over, v. 224 seq.; pacific convention of, with the Akamanians and Amphilochians, v. 228.

Ambrysus, refortification of, ix. 477. Ammon, Alexander's visit to the oracle of, x. 95.

Amnesty decreed by Solôn, ii. 471; proposed by Patrokleidès, vi. 444; at Athens, B.C. 403, vi. 511, 518 seq. Amompharetus, iv. 268.

Amoryês, vi. 197; capture of, vi. 218.

Amphiaraus, i. 251, 254. Amphiktyon, i. 95, 99.

Amphiktyonic assembly, i. 95, ii. 173 seq., ix. 237; condemnation of Sparta by, viii. 192 seq.; accusation of Thêbes against Sparta before, ix. 238; accusation of Thêbes against Phokis before, ix. 239; resistance of Phokis to, ix. 240 seq.; sentence of, against the Phokians, and honours conferred upon Philip by, ix. 412, 414; at Delphi, B.C. 339, ix. 455 seq.

Amphiktyonies, or exclusive religious partnerships, ii. 171 seq.

AMPHIKTYONS.

Amphiktyons, punishment of the Kirrhæans by, iii. 287; establishment of the Pythian games by, iii. 289; violent measures of, against the Amphissians, ix. 458 seq.

Amphiktyony at Kalauria, i. 126. Amphilochian Argos, Eurylochus' pro-

jected attack upon, v. 219.

Amphilochians and Akarnanians, pacific treaty of, with the Ambrakiots, v.

Amphilochus, i. 258; wanderings of, i.

Amphiôn and Zethus, i. 241 seq.; Ho-

meric legend of, i. 235.

Amphipolis, foundation of, iv. 497 seq. acquisition of, by Brasidas, v. 322 seq.; proceedings of Brasidas in, v. 334; policy of Kleôn and Nikîas for the recovery of, v. 369 seq.; Kleôn's the recovery of, v. 369 seq.; Kleon's expedition against, v. 374 seq.; topography of, v. 376 seq.; battle of, v. 382 seq.; negotiations for peace after the battle of, v. 400; not restored to Athens on the peace of Nikias, v. 407; neglect of, by the Athenians, v. 502, ix. 229; claim of Athens to, viii. 234 seq., 279; Iphikratês at, viii. 284; failure of Timotheus at, viii. 284; failure of Timotheus at, viii. 285; nine defeats of the Athenians, v. 502, ix. 200, ix. 200 viii. 285; nine defeats of the Athenians at, viii. 287 (n. 1); Kallisthenės at, viii. 353; Philip renounces his claim to, ix. 210; siege and capture of, by Philip, ix. 227 seq.; Philip's dealings with the Athenians respecting, ix. 230.

Amphissa, capture of, by Philip, ix.

Amphissians, accusation of, against Athens, ix. 455 seq.; violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons against, ix. 458 seq.

Amphitryôn, i. 87.

Amphoterus and Akarnan, i. 258. Amyklæ, ii. 249; conquest of, ii. 333. Amykus, i. 156.

Amyntas, and the Peisistratids, iii. 246. Amyntas, father of Philip, viii. 45 seq.,

231 seq.; and the Olynthian confederacy, viii. 46, 52, 55, 61; and Iphikratês, viii. 102; and Athens, viii. 232, 234; death of, viii. 235; assistance of Iphikratês to the family of, viii. 238.

Amyntas, son of Antiochus, ix. 512; x.

65, 73.

Amyntas, son of Perdikkas, ix. 511. Anaktorium, iii. 216 seq., v. 276.

Anaphê, i. 223.

Anapus, crossing of, by Dion, ix. 89.

Anaxagoras, i. 335, v. 26.

Anaxandridés, bigamy of, ii. 303.

ANTIPATER.

Anaxarchus of Abdera, x. 155 seq. Anaxibius, vii. 321 seq., 332 seq.; in the Hellespont, vii. 532; death of, vii. 533 seq.

Anaxikratês, iv. 422. Anaxilaus, iv. 302, 318. Anaximander, iv. 71 seq.; map of, iii. 498 (n. 1).

Anaximenês of Lampsacus, i. 367.

Andokidés, reputed oration of, against Alkibiadês. iii. 369 (n. 3), iv. 492 (n. 3); de Mysteriis, iii. 343 (n. 3); and the mutilation of the Hermæ, vi. 36, 38

Androgeos, death of, i. 203.

Androklus, iii. 9,

Andromachê and Helenus, i. 279.

Andromachus, ix. 145.

Andrôn, story of, respecting Krête, i. 464.

Andros, siege of, by Themistoklês, iv. 235; siege of, by Alkibiadês and Konôn, vi. 374.

Animals, worship of, in Egypt, iii. 140. Ankeus, i. 164. Antalkidas, embassy of, to Tiribazus,

vii. 522 seq.; embassies of, to Persia, viii. 1 seq.; 148; in the Hellespont, vii. 547; the peace of, vii. 548 seq., viii. 1 seq.

Atandrus, expulsion of Arsakês from, vi. 337; the Syracusans at, viii. 369. Ante-Hellenic inhabitants of Greece, ii. 186; colonies from Phœnicia and

Egypt not probable, ii. 192.

Antenôr, i. 278, 290. Antigoné, i. 253._

Antigonus and Perdikkas, x. 269; and Eumenes, x. 273; great power of, x. 301; alliance of Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, against, x. 301, 305, 317, 320; measures of, against Kassander, 200, 201, and forther than the same of the s Kassander, x. 303, 305; pacification of, with Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, x. 305; Roxana and her son Alexander put to death by, x. 308; murders Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, x. 307; Athenian envoys sent

to, x. 314; death of, x. 320. Antigonus Gonatas, x. 323. Antilochus, death of, i. 273. Antimachus of Kolophôn, i. 246. Antiochus, at Samos and Notium, vi. 376 seq.

Antiochus, the Arcadian, viii. 266.

Antiopé, i. 241 seq.

Antipater, embassy of, from Philip to Athens, ix. 376, 379, 380, 384, 386; made viceroy of Macedonia, x. 18; and Olympias, x. 19, 193; defeat of Agis by, x. 221; submission of all Greece to, x. 222; Grecian hostilities against, after Alexander's death, x.

ANTIPATER.

250 seq.; and Kraterus, x. 257 seq., 271; victory of, at Krannon, x. 257; terms imposed upon Atheus by, x. 259 seq.; remodels the Peloponnesian cities, x. 268; contest and pacifica-tion of, with the Ætolians, x. 268; made guardian of Alexander's family, x. 273; death of, x. 274; last directions of, x. 274.

Antipater, son of Kassander, x. 322.

Antiphilus, x. 251, 258. Antiphon, vi. 248, 259 seq., 290 seq., 311

Antiquity, Grecian, a religious conception, i. 397; stripped of its religious character by chronology,

Antisthenés, at Kaunus, vi. 226. Antistrophé, introduction of, iii. 312. Anytus, vi. 354, 462. Aornos, rock of, x. 167 and n. 2, 168. Apate, i. 7.

Apaturia, excitement at the, after the battle of Arginusæ, vi. 413 seq.

Aphareus, i. 158.

Apheidas, i. 163

Aphepsion and Mantitheus, vi. 36. Aphetæ, Persian fleet at, iv. 194, 196, 197.

Aphroditê, i. 5, 50.

Apis, i. 80.

Apodektæ, iii. 357.

Apollo, i. 10; legends of, i. 42 seq., 48;

worship and functions of, i. 46 seq., iii. 6; and Laomedon, i. 53, 261; and Hermês, i. 56; types of, i. 57; and Admêtus, i. 108; and Korônis, i. 164; Sminthius, i. 306; evidence of the Homeric Hymn to, as to early Ionic life, ii. 536; temple of, at Klarus, iii. 12; reply of Delphian, to the remonstrance of Crossus, iii. 406 seg Apollodôrus, his genealogy of Hellên, i.

95 seq.

Apollodôrus and the Theôric fund, ix.

Apollorratês, ix. 102, 104, 115.
Apolloria, iii. 218 seq.; and the Illyrians, iii. 234 seq.; and the Olyuthian confederacy, viii. 49.
Apollonidês, x. 89, 96.
Apriles, reign and death of, iii. 148 seq.

Apsyrtus, i. 220.

Arabia, Alexander's project with regard to, x. 185, 189.

Arachosia, Alexander in, x. 144.

Aradus, surrender of, to Alexander, x.

Arbéla, battle of, x. 106 seq. Arbitration at Atheus, iv. 442.

Arcadia, ii. 224; state of, B.C. 560, ii. 354 seq.; and Sparta, ii. 358 seq., iv. 402; proceedings in, after the battle

AREOPAGUS.

of Leuktra, viii. 194 seq.; invasions of, by Archidamus, viii. 252, 300 seq.; mission of Epameinondas to, viii. 274; dissensions in, viii. 307 seq.; embassy

of Æschinês to, ix. 357.

Arcadians, ii. 226, 354 seq.; sympathy of, with Messenians, ii. 347; impulse of, towards a Pan-Arcadian union, viii. 197; application of, to Athens and Thêbes, for aid against Sparta, viii. 202; Epameinondas and the consolidation of, viii. 205; energetic envoy to Persia from, viii. 264, 266; protest of, against the headship of Thébes, viii. 267; alliance of Athens with, viii. 273; and Eleians, viii. 299 seq., 307; occupation and plunder of Olympia by, viii. 299, 306 seq.; celebration of the Olympic games by, viii. 303 seq.; seizure of, at Tegea, by the Theban harmost, viii. 309 seq.

Archagathus, x. 370, 375. Archégetés, Apollo, i. 47.

Archelaus, vi. 342 seq.; siege of Pydna

by, vi. 342.

Archeptolemus, vi. 310 seq. Archias, œkist of Syracuse, iii. 176.

Archias the Theban, viii. 78, 81. Archias the Exile-Hunter, x. 262 seq.

Archidamus II., speech of, agaiust war with Athens, v. 13 seq.; invasions of Attica by, v. 49 seq., 76, 142; his ex-

Attica by, v. 49 seq., 10. 142; Ins expedition to Platea, v. 106 seq.

Archidamus III., invasions of Arcadia by, viii. 252, 300 seq.; and the independence of Messèné, viii. 276 343; and Philomelus, ix. 243; expedition of, against Megalopolis, ix. 29; aid to the Phokians at Thermopylæ under, ix. 405, x. 219, 330. Archilochus, i. 327, iii. 253, 301, 304 seq.

Archinus, decrees of, vi. 517, 525.

Architects at Athens, under Perikles, iv. 507.

Architecture, Grecian, between B.C. 600-550, iii. 320 seq.

Archonidês, viii. 450.

Archons after Kodrus, ii. 422; the nine, ii. 445; judges without appeal till after Kleisthenês, ii. 497; effect of Kleisthenês' revolution on, iii. 355 seq., 391 seq.; limited functions of, after the Persian war, iv. 365; limitation of the functions of, by Periklês, iv. 443, 452.

Ardys, iii. 51.

Arcopagus, senate of, ii. 444; and the Ephetæ, ii. 450; and the Euuenidês of Æschylus, ii. 451 (n. 1); powers of, enlarged by Solôn, ii. 489; under the Solonian and Kleisthenean constitutions, iii. 368; in early Athens, iv. ARÊS.

438 seq.; oligarchical tendencies of, iv. 440; venerable character and large powers of, iv. 443; at variance with the growing democratical sentiment, B.C. 480-460, iv. 445; a centre of action for the oligarchical party, iv. 446; power of, abridged by Periklês and Ephialtês, iv. 451 seq.

Arês, i. 10. Areté, ix. 53, 81, 127.

Argadeis, ii. 425.

Argaus and Philip, ix. 209. Arganthônius and the Phôkæans, iii.

Argeian Demos, proceedings of, v. 498.

Argeian genealogies, i. 79.

Argeians, attempts of, to recover Thyrea, ii. 362; defeat and destruc-tion of, by Kleomenes, iv. 11; trick of, with their calendar, v. 465; at Epidaurus, v. 464 seq., 488; at the battle within the Long Walls of Corinth, vii. 499; manœuvres of, respecting the holy truce, vii. 519; and the peace of Antalkidas, vii. 547, 550; and Mardonius, iv. 252.

Argês, i. 5.

Argilus, acquisition of, by Brasidas, v.

321 seq.

Arginusæ, battle of, vi. 392 seq.; recal, impeachment, defence, and con-demnation of the generals at the battle of, vi. 401 seq.; inaction of the Athenian fleet after the battle of, vi.

Argo, the, i. 213.

Argonautic expedition, i. 213 seq.; monu-ments of, i. 221 seq.; how and when attached to Kolchis, i. 229; attempts to reconcile the, with geographical knowledge, i. 232 seq.; continued faith in, i. 234; Dr. Wharton and M. Ginguené on the, i. 431 (n. 1).

M. Ginguené on the, i. 481 (p. 1).

Argos, rise of, coincident with the decline of Mykénæ, i. 154; occupation of, by the Dorians, i. 445; and neighbouring Dorians greater than Sparta in 776 B.C., ii. 230; Dorian settlements in, ii. 231, 234; early ascendency of, ii. 235, 241; subsequent decline of, ii. 243; acquisitions of Sparta from, ii. 362 sec.; military classification at, ii. 371; struggles of, to recover the headship of Greece, ii. 374 seq.; and Kleònæ, ii. 375; victorious war of Sparta against, B.C. 496-5, iv. 10 seq.; prostration of, B.C. 496-5, iv. 14; assistance of, to Ægina, iv. 148; neutrality of, on the invasion of Xerxès, iv. 162 seq.; position of, on its alliance with Athens about B.C. 461, iv. 407 seq.; uncertain relations between Sparta uncertain relations between Sparta

ARISTAGORAS.

and, B.C. 421, v. 407; position of, on the Peace of Nikias, v. 415 seq.; the Thousand-regiment at, v. 415; induced by the Corinthians to head a new Peloponnesian alliance, B.C. 421, v. 416; joined by Mantineia, v. 417; joined by the Corinthians, v. 421; joined by Elis, v. 421; refusal of Tegea to join, v. 423; and Sparta, projected alliance between, v. 428; and Bootia, projected alliance be-tween, v. 428 seq.; conclusion of a fifty years' peace between Sparta and, v. 430 seq.; and Athens, alliance between v. 445, 451 seq.; embassy from, for alliance with Corinth, v. 462; attack of, upon Epidaurus, v. 464, 466; invasion of, by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, B.C. 418, v. 470 seg.; Alkibiadês at, B.C. 418, v. 474; political change at, through the battle of Mantineia, B.C. 418, v. 489 seg.; treaty of peace between Sparta and, B.C. 418, v. 491 seq.; alliance between Sparta and, B.C. 418, v. 492; renounces alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, v. 492; oligarchical revolution at, v. 494, 496; restoration of democracy at, v. 496; renewed alliance of, with Athens, v. 498; Alkibiades at, B.C. 416, v. 499; Lacedæmonian intervention in behalf of the oligarchy at, v. 500; envoys from, to the Athenian Demos at Samos, vi. 284; alliance of, with Thêbes, Athens, and Corinth, against Sparta, vii. 467: consolidation of Corinth with, vii. 498; expedition of Agesipolis against, vii. 519 seq.; violent intestine feud at, viii. 189 seq.

Argos, Amphilochian, capture of, by Phormio, v. 44; attack of Ambra-kiots on, v. 101; Eurylochus' pro-

jected attack upon, v. 219.

Argus, destruction of Argeians in the

grove of, iv. 11.

Aria, Alexander in, x. 135.

Ariadné, ii. 204 seq. Ariadné, ii. 204 seq. Ariaus, flight of, after the battle of Kunaxa, vii. 215; and Klearchus, vii. 220, 222; and the Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, vii. 223, 225, 230,

Aridæus, Philip, x. 255, 270.

Ariobarzanés, intervention of, in Greece, viii. 248; revolt of, viii. 279 seq.; at the Susian Gates, x. 117; death of, x. 118.

Arion, iii. 311 seq.
Aristagoras and Megabatês, iii. 495;
revolt of, iii. 495 seq., 496; application
of, to Sparta, iii. 497 seq.; application
of, to Athens, iii. 500; march of, to

ARISTARCHUS.

Sardis, iii. 501; desertion o Ionic revolt by, iii. 506 seq. Aristarchus the Athenian, vi. 309. desertion of the

Aristarchus the Lacedæmonian, vii. 331

Aristeidés, constitutional change introduced by, iii. 364; character of, iv. 28 seq.; elected general, iv. 30; hanishment of, by ostracism, iv. 149; and Themistoklês, rivalry between, iv. 149, 362; restoration of, from banishment, iv. 207; joins the Greek fleet at Salamis, iv. 225; slaughters the Persians at Psyttaleia, iv. 231; equitable assessment of, upon the allied Greeks, iv. 352 seq.; popularity of, after the Persian war, iv. 367; death and poverty of, iv. 377.

Aristous, iv. 553, 555 seq., v. 103. Aristo and Agêtus, iv. 15. Aristocrats, Grecian, bad morality of,

Aristodémus, i. 440 seq. Aristodémus, king of Messenia, ii. 340.

Aristodêmus Malakus, iii. 172. Aristodêmus "the coward," iv. 191, 280.

Aristodémus the actor, ix. 363.

Aristodikus, iii. 416.

Aristogeitőn and Harmodius, iii. 333 seq. Aristoklés and Hipponoidas, v. 484, 488. Aristokratês, king of Orchomenus, ii. 342, 349.

Aristokratés the Athenian, vi. 200.

Aristomaché, viii. 462. Aristomenés, ii. 337, 341 seq.

Aristonikus of Methymna, x. 89, 96. Aristophanês, vii. 12; his reason for showing up Sokratês, vii. 88; his attack upon the alleged impiety of Sokratês, i. 358 (n. 2); and Kleôn, v.

392 seq., 398. Aristotelês the Spartan, ix. 2.

Aristotle on Spartan women, ii. 300; on the Spartan laws of property, ii. 324; meaning of the word Sophist in, vii. 33; formal logic of, vii. 107; novelties ascribed to Sokrates by, vii. 103; and Hermeias, ix. 427, 428 (n. 1); instruction of Alexander by, ix. 507; and Alexander, political views of, compared, x. 204 seq.

Aristozenus of Tarentum, ix. 151.

Aristus and Nikotelês, viii. 447.

Arkas and Kallisto, i. 162.

Arkesitaus the Second, iii. 268; the

Third, iii. 271 seq.
Arktinus, Æthiopis of, ii. 89.
Armenia, the Ten Thousand Greeks in, vii. 269 seq. Armenus, i. 223.

Arnold, his edition of Thucydidês, vi. 338 (n. 4).

Arrhibœus, v. 314, 352, 356 seq.

ASIA.

Arrian on the Amazons, i. 198 seq. conjecture of, respecting Geryôn, i. 229; on Darius' plan against Alexander, x. 59.

Arsakês at Antandrus, vi. 337.

Arsamés, x. 61. Arsinoê, x. 401 seq. Arsités, x. 28.

Art, Grecian, iii. 320 seq.

Artabanus, iv. 108 seq.

Artabazus, Xerxês' general, siege of Potidæa and Olynthus by, iv. 243; jealousy of, against Mardonius, iv. 253; conduct of, at and after the battle of Platea, iv. 273; and Pausanias, iv. 344, 357. Artabazus, satrap of Daskylium, ix. 226,

252, 292,

Artabazus, Darius' general, x. 128, 133. Artaphernés, satrap of Sardis, Hippias application to, iii. 493; and Histiæns, iii. 509, 519; proceedings of, after the reconquest of Ionia, iv. 1; and Datis, Persian armament under, iv. 18 return of, to Asia, after the battle of Marathôn, iv. 49.

Artaphernés, the Persian envoy, v. 276

seq.

Artaxerxês Longimanus, iv. 375 seq., v. 278 seq.

216 seq.
Artaxerxés Mnemon, accession of, vii.
178; and Cyrus the Younger, vi. 529,
vii. 179, 211 seq.; at Kunaxa, vii. 213,
216, 221; death of, viii. 350.
Artayktés, iv. 292 seq.
Artemis, i. 10, 52; worship of, in Asia,

iii. 6.

Artemis, Limnatis, temple of, ii. 339.

Artemisia, iv. 215, 230.

Artemisium, resolution of Greeks to oppose Xerxês at, iv. 169; Greek fleet at, iv. 177, 194 seq.; sea-fight of, iv. 196; retreat of the Greek fleet from, to Salamis, iv. 199.

Arthur, romances of, i. 424. Artizans at Athens, ii. 503 seq.

Arts, rudimentary state of, in Homeric and Hesiodic Greece, ii. 54.

Aryandês, Persian satrap of Egypt, iii. 273.

Asia, twelve Ionic cities in, iii. 1 seq.; Æolic cities in, iii. 18 seq.; collective civilization in, without individual freedom or development, iii. 121; state of, before the Persian monarchy, iii. 399; conquests of Cyrus the Great in, iii. 425; expedition of Greek fleet against, B.C. 478, iv. 343; Alkibiadês in, vi. 367, 374 seq., 528 seq.; expedition of Timotheus to, viii. 240, 279 seq.; Agesilaus in, viii. 279; measures of Alexander, before going to, x. 18; passage of Alexander to, x. 19; review

ASIA.

of Alexander's army in, x. 22; cities founded by Alexander in, x. 206; hellenized by the Diadochi, not by

Alexander, x. 207; how far really hellenized, x. 208.

Asia Minor, Greeks in, ii. 163; non-Hellenic people of, iii. 31 seq.; features of the country of, iii. 32; Phrygian music and worship among Greeks in, iii. 41; predominance of female influence in the legends of, iii. 49; Cimmerian invasion of, iii. 73 seq.; conquest of, by the Persians, iii. 423; arrival of Cyrus the Younger in, vi. 359, 361.

Asia, Upper, Scythian invasion of, iii.

76.

Asiatic customs and religion blended with Hellenic in the Troad, i. 307. Asiatic Dorians, iii. 29.

Asiatic frenzy grafted on the joviality of the Grecian Dionysia, i. 33.

Asiatie Greece, deposition of despots of,

by Aristagóras, iii. 496.

Asiatie Greeks, conquest of, by Crosus, iii. 80 seq.; state of, after Cyrus' conquest of Lydia, iii. 414, applicaconquest of Lydia, III. 414, application, of, to Sparta, B.C. 546, iii. 414; alliance with, against Persia, abandoned by the Athenians, iii. 502; successes of Persians against, iiii. 504; reconquest of, after the fall of Milétus, iii. 517; first step to the ascendency of Athens over, iv. 290; not tributary to Persia, between B.C. 477 and 412, iv. 424 (n. 2); surrender of, to Persia, by Sparta, vii. 373; and Cyrus the Younger, vii. 374; and Tissaphernes, vii. 374; application of, to Sparta for aid against Tissaphernes, vii. 375; after the peace of phernes, vii. 375; after the peace of Autalkidas, viii. 24 seq.; Spartan project for the rescue of, viii. 41.

Asidatês, vii. 340 seq.

Askalaphus and Ialmenus, i. 123.
Askelepiadés of Myrlea, legendary discoveries of, i. 227 (n. 3).
Asképiads, i. 167.
Asképius, i. 164 seq.

Asopius, son of Phormio, v. 152.
Asôpus, Greeks and Persians at, before
the battle of Platea, iv. 259 seq.

Aspasia, v. 23 seq. Aspendus, Phoenician fleet at, B.C. 411, vi. 325, 338; Alkibiadês at, vi. 325; Alkibiadês' return from, to Samos, vi. 339; Alexander at, x. 49.

Aspis, x. 353 seq..

Assembly, Spartan popular, ii. 266, 276; Athenian judicial, iii. 356, 359 seq.; Athenian political, iii. 358.

Assyria, relations of, with Egypt, iii.

ATHENIAN.

Assyrian kings, their command of human labour, iii. 120.

Assyrians and Medes, iii, 51 seq., 110 seq.; contrasted with Phœnicians, Greeks, and Egyptians, iii. 122; and Phænicians, effect of, on the Greek mind, iii. 157 seq.

Astakus, v. 59, 64. Asteria, i. 6.

Asterius, i. 202. Astræus, i, 6; and Eôs, children of, i. 6. Astronomy, physical, thought impious by ancient Greeks. i. 314 (n. 1); and physics, knowledge of, among the early Greeks, ii. 52.

Astyagês, story of, iii. 401 seq. Astyanax, death of, i. 278.

Astyochus, expedition of, to Ionia, vi. 212; at Lesbos, vi. 213; at Chios and the opposite coast, vi. 220; accidental escape of, vi. 222; and Pedaritus, vi. 221; and Tissaphernès, treaty between, vi. 224 seq.; mission of Lichas and others respecting, vi. 226; victory of, over Charminus, and junction with Antisthenes, vi. 227; at Rhodes, vi. 319; at Miletus, vi. 323; recal of, vi. 324.

Atalanta, i. 52, 135 seq.

Atarneus, captured and garrisoned by Derkyllidas, vii. 386; Hermeias of, ix. 427, 428 (n. 1).

Atê, i. 7.

Athamas, i. 116 seq.

Athenagoras, vi. 21 seq.

Athéné, birth of, i. 9; various representations of, i. 51; her dispute with Poseidon, i. 53, 180; Chalkicekus, temple of, and Pausanias, iv. 361; Polias, reported prodigy in the townle of on Veryès'; approach in temple of, on Xerxês' approach, iv.

Athenian victims for the Minôtaur, i. 204; ceremonies commemorative of the destruction of the Minôtaur, i. 205; democracy, Kleisthenês the real author of, iii. 359; people, real author of, iii. 359; people, judicial attributes of, iii. 359; nobles, early violence of, iii. 371; energy, development of, after Kleisthenes' revolution, iii. 394; seamen, contrasted with the Ionians at Ladê, iii. 514; dikasts, temper of, in estimating past services, iv. 58; democracy, origin of the apparent fickleness of, iv. 61 seq.; envoy, speech of, to Gelo, iv. 308; parties and politics, effect of the Persian war upon, iv. 364 seq.; empire, iv. 379 seq., 389 (n. 1), 428, 523, 527 (n. 1), 530, vi. 499 seq.; power, increase of, after the formation of the Delian confederacy, iv. 400; auxiliaries to Sparta against

ATHENIANS.

the Helots, iv. 404 seq.; democracy, consummation of, iv. 464; armament against Samos, under Periklês, So-phoklês, &c., iv. 512 seq.; private citizens, redress of the allies against, citizens, reariess of the alites against, iv. 525; assembly, speeches of the Korkyræan and Corinthian envoys to, iv. 541 seq.; naval attack, iv. 546; envoy, reply of, to the Corinthian envoy, at the Spartan assembly, v. 10 seq.; expedition to ravage Peloponnesus, B.C. 431, v. 58; attachment to Petiden and Collision armament to Potidæa and Chalkidic Thrace, B.C. 429, v. 112; assembly, debates in, respecting Mitylênê, v. 159, 164 seq.; assembly, about the Lacedemonian prisoners in Sphaktarick, and the second sequence of the sequenc teria, v. 242 seq.; assembly, on Demosthenes' application for reinforcements to attack Sphakteria, v. 252 seq.; hoplites, at the battle of Amphipolis, v. 388; fleet, operations of, near Messênê and Rhegium, B.C. 425, near Messene and Anegum, B.C. 425, v. 581; assembly, and the expedition to Sicily, v. 544 seq., 545; treasury, abundance in, B.C. 415, vi. 3; fleet in the harbour of Syracuse, vi. 128, 130 seq., 144 seq., 153 seq.; prisoners at Syracuse, vi. 177 seq.; fleet at Samos, B.C. 412, vi. 220; democracy, constitution in accounting in the sequential sequentia securities in, against corruption, vi. 231; assembly, vote of, in favour of oligarchical change, vi. 245; assembly at Kolônus, vi. 203; democracy, reconstitution of, at Samos, vi. 276; squadron, escape of, from Sestos to Elæus, vi. 229; fleet at Kynosséma, vi. 333 vi. 329; fleet at Kynosséma, vi. 333 vi. 340 vi. 333 seq.; fleet at Abydos, vi. 340; fleet, concentration of, at Kardia, vi. 343; fleet at the Bosphorus, B.C. 410, vi. 349; fleet at Arginusæ, vi. 392 seq.; assembly, debates in. on the generals at Arginusæ, vi. 402-412, 416-425; fleet, inaction of, after the battle of Arginusæ, vi. 435; fleet, removal of, from Samos to Ægospotami, vi. 437; fleet, capture of, at Ægospotami, vi. 438 seq.; kleruchs and allies after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 444; tragedy, growth of, vii. 2; mind, influence of comedy on, vii. 13 seq.; character not corrupted beseq.; character not confuged between B.C. 480 and 405, vii. 54 seq.; confederacy, new, B.C. 378, viii. 97 seq.; and Theban cavalry, battle of, near Mantineia, B.C. 362, viii. 318 seq.; marine, reform in the administration of by Demosthenès, ix. 448. Athenians and the Herakleids, i. 90; and Sigeium, i. 308; and Samians, contrast between, iii. 460; active patriotism of, between B.C. 500-400,

iii. 396 : diminished active sentiment

ATHENIANS.

of, after the Thirty Tyrants, iii. 397; alliance with Asiatic Greeks abandoned by, iii. 502; Darius' revenge against, iii. 508; terror and sympathy against, in. 50s; terror and sympathy of, on the capture of Milètus, iii. 520; appeal of, to Sparta, against the Medism of Ægina, iv. 8; condition and character of, B.C. 490, iv. 23; application of, to Sparta, before the battle of Marathôn, iv. 30; victory of, at Marathôn, iv. 33 seq., 44; alleged fickleness and ingratitude of, towards Miltiades, iv. 56 seq.; answers of the Delphian oracle to, on the eve of Xerxês' invasion, iv. on the eve of Xerxes invasion, iv. 158; Pan-hellenic patriotism of, on Xerxes' invasion, iv. 160 seq.; hopeless situation of, after the battle of Thermopylæ, iv. 204; conduct of, on the approach of Xerxes, iv. 205 seq.; victory of, at Salamis, iv. 208, 215 seq.; honour awarded to, after the battle of Salamis iv. 220; under battle of Salamis, iv. 239; under Pausanias in Bœotia, iv. 256; and Alexander of Macedon, before the battle of Platæa, iv. 264; and Spartans at Platæa, iv. 264; victory of, at Platæa, iv. 270 seq.; and continental Ionians, after the battle of Mykalê, iv. 290; attack the Chersonese, B.C. 479, iv. 291; the leaders of Grecian progress after the battle of Salamis, iv. 332; rebuild their city, after the battle of Platæa, iv. 333 seq.; effect of the opposition to the fortification of Athens upon, iv. 337; induced by Themistoklês to build twenty new triremes annually, iv. 342; activity of, in the first ten years of their hegemony, iv. 388 seq., 391; renounce the alliance of Sparta, and join Argos and Thessaly, iv. 407 seq.; proceedings of, in Cyprus, Phænicia, Egypt, and Megara, B.C. 460; iv. 409; defeat the Æginetaus, B.C. 459, iv. 410; de-feat of, at Tanagra, iv. 415; victory of, at Œnophyta, iv. 418; sail round Peloponnèsus under Tolmidês, iv. 419; march against Thessaly, iv. 419; defeat and losses of, in Egypt, B.C. 460-455, iv. 420; victories of, at Cyprus, under Anaxikratês, iv. 422; defeat of, at Korôneia, iv. 432; personal activity of, after the reforms of Periklês and Ephialtês, iv. 487; pride of, in the empire of Athens, iv. 495; settlements of, in the Ægean, during the Thirty years' truce, iv. 496; decision of, respecting Corinth and Korkyra, iv. 544; victory of, near Potidæa, iv. 555; blockade of Potidæa by, iv. 556; counter-demand of, proporty for experience of the state of the stat upon Sparta, for expiation of sacri-

lege, v. 30; final answer of, to the Spartans before the Peloponnesian war, v. 35; expel the Æginetans from Ægina, B.C. 431, v. 59; ravage of the Megarid by, in the Peloponnesian war, v. 60; irritation of, at their losses from the plague and the Peloponnesians, v. 86; energetic demonstration of, B.C. 428, v. 151; their feeling and conduct towards the revolted Mitylenæans, v. 169 seq., 176 seq.; and Lacedæmonians at Pylus, armistice between, v. 241; Spartans before the Peloponnesian Pylus, armistice between, v. 241: demands of, in return for the release of the Lacedæmonians iu Sphakteria, v. 244; and Bootians, debate between, after the battle of Delium, B.C. 424, v. 307 seq.; discontent of, with Sparta, on the non-fulfilment of the peace of Nikias, v. 413: recapof the peace of Mikias, v. 415; recapture of Skiônê by, v. 426; and Amphipolis, v. 502, ix. 212, 228 seq.; siege and capture of Mêlos by, v. 511 seq.; treatment of Alkibiadês by, for his alleged profanation of the mysteries, alleged profanation of the mysteries, vi. 48 seq.; victory of, near the Olympieion at Syracuse, vi. 55 seq.; forbearance of, towards Nikias, vi. 59 seq.; not responsible for the failure of the Sicilian expedition, B.C. 415, vi. 59 (n. 2); defeat of, at Epipolæ, B.C. 414, vi. 105; conduct of, on receiving Nikias' despatch, B.C. 414, vi. 113, 115 seq.; victory of, in the harbour of Syracuse, B.C. 413, vi. 125; and Syracusans, conflicts between, in the Great Harbour, vi. 128, 132 seq., 149 seq., 157 seq.; postpone-132 seq., 149 seq., 157 seq.; postponement of their retreat from Syracuse by an eclipse of the moon, vi. 147; blockade of, in the harbour of Syracuse, vi. 151 seq., 163 seq.; and Corinthians near Naupaktus, vi. 189 seq.; resolutions of, after the disaster at Syracuse, vi. 193 seq.; suspicions of, about Chios, vi. 199 seq.; defeat about Chios, vi. 199 seq.; deteat Alkamenês and the Peloponnesian fleet, vi. 201; effect of the Chian revolt on, vi. 204; harassing operations of, against Chios, B.C. 412, vi. 214 seq., 222; victory of, near Milêtus, B.C. 412, vi. 216, 217; retirement of, from Milêtus, B.C. 412, vi. 217; naval defeat of, near Eretria, B.C. 411, vi. 298 seq.; moderation of, on the despotism of the Thirty and the Four Hundred, vi. 315 seq., 518 seq.; victory of, at Kyzikus, vi. 344; convention of, with Pharnabazus, about Chalkêdon, vi. 356; capture of Byzantinm by, vi. 357; different behaviour of, towards Alkibiadês and Nikias, vi. 381; victory of, at Arginusæ, vi.

392 seq.; remorse of, after the death of the generals at Arginusæ, vi. 426; first proposals of, to Sparta, after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 446; repayment of the Lacedæmonians by, after the restoration of the demo-cracy, B.C. 403, vi. 522; their treat-ment of Dorieus, vii. 437 seq.; resto-ration of the Long Walls at Corinth ration of the Long wans at Corner by, vii. 503; and Evagoras of Cyprus, vii. 528, 538; successes of Antalkidas against, vii. 547; their alleged envy of distinguished generals, viii. 102 (n. 2); and Alexander of Phere, viii. 270; project of, to seize Corinth, B.C. 366, viii. 275; and Charidemus in the Chersonese, B.C. 360-358, viii. 360 seq.; the alliance of Olynthus rejected by, B.C. 358, ix. 231; their remissness in assisting Methonė, ix. 254; change in the character of, between B.C. 431 and 360, ix. 272; prompt resistance of, to Philip at Thermopyle, ix. 288; expedition of, to Olynthus, B.C. 349, ix. 337; capture of, at Olynthus, ix. 355, 361; letter of Philip to, ix. 398, 403; and the Phokians at Thermopyle, B.C. 347-346, ix. 406 seq.; letter of Philip to, declaring war, B.C. 340, ix. 441 seq.; refusal of, to take part in the Amphiktyonic proceedings against Amphissa, ix. 463; Philip asks the Thobans to assist in attackor, ing, ix. 468 seq.; and Thebans, war of, against Philip in Phokis, ix. 477 seq.; and Philip, peace of Demadês between, ix. 490 seq.; their recognition of Philip as head of Greece, ix. 490, 492 seq.; captured at the Granikus, x. 36; champions of the liberation of Greece, B.C. 323, x. 247; helpless condition of, B.C. 302-301, x. 318.

Athens, historical, impersonal authority of law in, ii. 23; treatment of homicide in, ii. 32 seq.; military classification at, ii. 371; meagre history of, before Drako, ii. 422; tribunals for homicide at, ii. 448; local superstitions at, about trial of homicide, ii. 451; pestilence and suffering at, after the Kylonian massacre, ii. 456; and Megara, war between, about Salamis ii. 461 seq.; acquisition of Salamis by, ii. 462; state of, immediately before the legislation of Solôn, ii. 464 seq.; rights of property sacred at, ii. 475, 481 seq.; rate of interest free at, ii. 483; political rights of Solôn's four classes at, ii. 488 seq.; democracy at, begins with Kleisthenês, ii. 494; distinction between the democracy at, and Solôn's con-

ATHENS.

stitution, ii. 495; Solôn's departure from, ii. 513; Solôn's return to, ii. 519; connexion of, with Thracian Chersonesus, under Peisistratus, iii. 337 seq.; after the expulsion of Hippias, iii. 346; introduction of universal admissibility to office at, iii. 362; necessity for creating a constitutional morality at, in the time of Kleisthenes, iii. 371; application of, for alliance with Persia, iii. 383; and Platæa, first connexion between, iii. 383; successes of, against Beetians and Chalkidians, iii. 386; war of Ægina against, iii: 389, iv. 6; application of Aristagoras to, iii. 500; treatment of Darius' herald at, iv. 7; traitors at, B.C. 490, iv. 21, 45; penal procedure at, iv. 52 (n. 1); and Ægina. war between, from B.C. 488 to 481, iv. 146, 148 seq., 156, 419; first growth of the naval force of, iv. 150; fleet of, the salvation of Greece, iv. 152; and Sparta, no heralds sent from Xerxês to, iv. 155; Pan-hellenic congress convened by, at the Isthmus of Corinth, iv. 156 seq.; and Ægina, occupation of, by Xerxes, iv. 209 seq.; Mardonius at, iv. 248 seq.; first step to the separate ascendency of, over Asiatic Greeks, iv. 291; conduct of, in the repulse of the Persians, iv. 332; Long Walls at, iv. 338 seq., 412 seq., vii. 487 seq.; plans of Themistokles for the naval aggrandizement of, iv. 339 seq.; increase of metics and commerce at, after the enlargement of Peiræus, iv. 341; headship of the allied Greeks transferred from Sparta to, iv. 346 seq.; and Sparta, first open separation between, iv. 348 seq., 379; proceedings of, on being made leader of the allied Greeks, iv. 352 seq.; stimulus to democracy at, from the Persian war, iv. 364; changes in the Kleisthenean constitution at, after the Persian war, iv. 365 seq.; long-sighted ambition imputed to, iv. 382; enforcing sanction of the confederacy of Dêlos exercised by, iv. 386; increasing power and unpopularity of, among the allied Greeks, iv. 389 seq. ; as guardian of the Ægean against piracy, between B.C. 476-466, iv. 392; bones of Theseus conveyed to, iv. 392; quarrel of, with Thasos, B.C. 465, iv. 397; first attempt of, to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymôn, iv. 398; alliance of, with Megara, B.C. 461, iv. 408; growing hatred of Corinth and neighbouring states to, B.C. 461, iv. 408; war of, with Corinth, Ægina, &c., B.C. 459, iv. 410 seq.;

reconciliation between leaders and parties at after the battle of Tanagra, iv. 417; acquisition of Beeotia, Phokis, and Lokris by, iv. 418; and the Peloponnesians, five years' truce between, iv. 421; and Persia, treaty between, B.C. 450, iv. 422 seq.; fund of the confederacy transferred from Dêlos to, iv. 428; position and prospects of, about B.C. 448, iv. 429 seq.; commencement of the decline of, iv. 431 seq.; and Delphi, B.C. 452-447, iv. 431; loss of Beeotia by, iv. 432 seq.; despondency at, after the defeat at Korôneia, iv. 435; and Sparta, thirty years truce between, iv. 435; and Megara, feud between, iv. 436; magistrates and Areopagus in early, iv. 438; iucrease of democratical sentiment at, between the time of Aristeidês and Periklês, iv. 440; choice of magistrates by lot at, iv. 441; oligarchical party at, iv. 446; maritime eupire of, iv. 487 seq., vi. 499, 509, viii. 8 seq.; maritime revenue of, iv. 491, seq., 492 (n. 3), 520; commercial relations of, in the Thirty represents the seq. years' truce, iv. 496; political condition of, between B.C. 445-431, iv. 501 seq.; improvements in the city of, under Periklês, iv. 505 seq., 508 seq.; Periklês, attempt to convene a Grecian congress at, iv. 510; application of the Samians to Sparta for aid against, iv. 515; funeral ceremony of slain warriors at, iv. 516; and her subject-allies, iv. 516; seq., 531; and Sparta, confederacies of, iv. 532; reinforcement from, to Korkyra against Corinth, iv. 544 seq., 549; and Corinth after the second payal and Corinth, after the second naval battle betweeu Corinth and Korkyra, iv. 549 seq.; and Perdikkas, iv. 551 seq., v. 361 seq., 501; non-aggressive, between B.C. 445-431, v.1; Megara prohibited from trading with, v. 1; hostility of the Corinthians to, after their defeat near Potidea, v. 3; discussion and decision of the Spartan assembly upon war with, B.C. 431, v. 5 seq.; position and prospects of, on commencing the Peloponnesian war, v. 19 seq., 33 seq., 44 seq.; requisitions addressed to, by Sparta, B.C. 341, v. 22 seq., 29 seq.; assembly at, on war with Sparta, B.C. 431, v. 31 seq.; conduct of, on the Theban night-surprise of Platea, v. 43 seq.; and the Akarnanians, alliance between, v. 44; crowding of population into, on Archidamus' invasion of Attica, v. 53; clamour at, on Archidamus' ravage of Acharnæ, v. 54; measures

for the permanent defence of, B.C. 431, v. 61 seq.; alliance of Stalkês with, v. 64, 131 seq.; freedom of individual thought and action at, v. 71 seq.; position of, at the time of Perikles' funeral oration, v. 74; the plague at, v. 77 seq., 211; proceedings of, on learning the revolt of Mitylênê, v. 144; exhausted treasury of, B.C. 428, v. 153; new politicians at, after Periklês, v. 165 seq.; revolutions at, contrasted with those at Korkyra, v. 201; political clubs at, v. 208; and the prisoners in Sphakteria, v. 243 seq., 267 seq., 409 seq.; fluctuation of feeling at, as to the Peleponnesian war, v. 271; and her Thracian subject ellips. ject-allies, v. 318 seq.; and Brasidas' conquests in Thrace, v. 326; and Sparta, one year's truce between, B.C. 423, v. 346 seq.; and Sparta, relations between, B.C. 423-422, v. 362 seq.; necessity for voluntary accusers at, v. 397; and Sparta, alliance between, B.C. 421, v. 408; application of Corinthians to, B.C. 421, v. 423; Lacedemonian envoys at, about Panaktum and Pylus, B.C. 420, v. 423, v. 423, v. 424, v. 424 433; and Argos, alliance between, B.C. 420, v. 445 seq.; convention of, B.C. 420, v. 445 seq.; convention o., with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis, B.C. 420, v. 451 seq.; policy of, attempted by Alkibiadės, B.C. 419, v. 462; attack of, upon Epidaurus, B.C. 419, v. 464; and Sparta, relations between, B.C. 419, v. 469; and tions between, B.C. 419, V. 409; and Argos, renewed alliance between, B.C. 417, V. 499; and Sparta, relations between, B.C. 416, V. 500; and the Sicilian expedition, V. 529, 538, 541 seq., 554 seq., vi. 191; and Sicily, relations of, altered by the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, V. 526; mutilation of the Herme at, vi. 4 seq., 31 seq.; injurious effects of Alkibiadės' banishment upon, B.C. 415, vi. 51; Nikias' despatch to, for reinforcements, B.C. 414, vi. 57, 108 seq.; and Sparta, violation of the peace between, B.C. 414, vi. 119; effects of the Lacedæmonian occupation of Dekeleia on, vi. 185; dismissal of Thracian mercenaries from, vi. 188 seq.; revolt of Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ from, B.C. 412, vi. 202 and Klazomenæ from, B.C. 412, Vl. 202 seq.; appropriation of the reserve fund at, vl. 204; loss of Teôs by, B.C. 412, vi. 205; revolt of Lebedos and Erre from, B.C. 412, vi. 207; loss and recovery of Lesbos by, B.C. 412, vi. 212 seq.; recovery of Klazomenæ by, B.C. 412, vi. 214; rally of, during the year after the disaster at Syracuse,

ATHENS.

vi. 232; conspiracy of the Four Hundred at, vi. 232, 237 seq., 258 seq.; loss of Orôpus by, vi. 255; arrival of the Paralus at, from Samos, vi. 259; constitutional morality of, vi. 271; restoration of Democracy at, B.C. 411, vi. 301 seq.; contrast between oligarchy at, and democracy at Samos, B.C. 411, vi. 316 seq.; revolt of Abydos and Lampsakus from, vi. 319; revolt of Byzantium from, B.C. 411, vi. 322; revolt of Kyzikus from, vi. 336; zeal of Pharnabazus against, vi. 337; proposals of peace from Sparta to, B.C. 410, vi. 345 seq.; return of Alkibiadês to, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempt of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 100 per sequence of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise, B.C. 407, vi. 367 seq.; fruitless attempts of Agis to surprise attempts of Agis to sur vi. 374; complaints at, against Alkibiadês, B.C. 407, vi. 379 seq.; conflicting sentiments at, caused by the battle of Arginusæ, vi. 397; alleged proposals of peace from Sparta to, after the battle of Arginusæ, vi. 431; condition of her dependencies, after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 444 seq.; oath of mutual harmony at, after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 445; surrender of, to Lysander, vi. 449 seq.; return of oligarchical exiles to, B.C. 404, vi. 451; oligarchical party at, B.C. 404, vi. 454 seq.; imprisonment of Strombichides and other democrats at, B.C. 404, vi. 454; the Thirty Tyrants at, vi. 455, 458 seq., vii. 350 seq., 365 seq.; Lacedæmonian garrison at, under Kallibius, vi. 461; alteration of feeling in Greece after the capture of, by Lysander, vi. 478, 483, 493; restoration of Thrasybulus and the exiles to, vi. 497; restoration of the democracy at, B.C. 403, vi. 498, 510 seq., 523 seq.; condition of, B.C. 405-403, vi. 509; abolition of Hellenotamiæ and restriction of citizenship at, B.C. 403, vi. 527 seq.; development of dramatic genius at, between the time of Kleisthenês and of Eukleidês, vii. 2 seq., 9 seq.; accessibility of the theatre at, vii. 4; growth of rhetoric and philosophy at, vii. 20 seq.; literary and philosophical antipathy at, vii. 29; enlargement of the field of education at, vii. 31; sophists at, vii. 32 seq., 75 seq.; banishment of Xeno-phôn from, vii. 343; Theban applicaphon from, vn. 345; Theoan applica-tion to, for aid against Sparta, B.C. 395, vii. 457 seq.; alliance of Thêbes, Corinth, Argos, and, against Sparta, vii. 467; contrast between political conflicts at, and at Corinth, vii. 496 (n. 2); alarm at, on the Lacedæ-mouian capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, vii. 555; and Poing, C. Corinth, vii. 505; and Ægina, B.C.

ATHENS.

389, vii. 535 seq.; financial condition of, from B.C. 403 to 387, vii. 541 seq.; creation of the Theôric Board at, vii. 541; property-taxes at, vii. 543 (n. 2); and the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 2, 12; applications of, to Persia, B.C. 413, viii. 6; and Evagoras, viii. 17 seq.; naval competition of with Sparta after the petition of, with Fagri, after the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 39 seg.; and Macedonia, contrast between, viii. 44; Theban exiles at, after the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, viii. 58, 76 seq.; condemnation of the generals at, who had favoured the enterprise of Pelopidas, viii. 90; contrast between judicial procedure at, and at Sparta, viii. 96; hostility of, to Sparta, and alliance with Thebes, B.C. 378, viii. 96; exertions of, to form a new maritime confederacy, B.C. 378, viii. 97 seq.; absence of Atheniau generals from, viii. 102 (n. 2); synod of new confederates at, B.C. 378, viii. 105; nature and duration of the Solonian census at, viii. 106 seq.; new census at, in the archonship of Nausinikus, viii. 108 seq.; symmories at, viii. 110 seq.; symmories at, viii. 110 seq.; financial difficulties of, B.C. 374, viii. 125; displeasure of, against Thêbes, B.C. 374, viii. 126, 140; separate peace of, with the Lacedemonians. B.C. 374 374, viii. 126, 140; separate peace of, with the Lacedæmonians, B.C. 374, viii. 128, 133; disposition of, towards peace with Sparta, B.C. 372, viii. 149, 155; and the dealings of Thebes with Platæa and Thespiæ, B.C. 372, viii. 153 seq.; and the peace of, B.C. 371, viii. 157, 161; and Sparta, difference between, in passive endurance and active energy, viii. 177; the Theban victory at Leuktra not well received at, viii. 179; at the head of a new Peloponnesian land confederacy, B.C. Peloponnesian land confederacy, B.C. 371, viii. 191; application of Arcadians to, for aid against Sparta, B.C. 370, viii. 202; application of Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius to, for aid against Thêbes, B.C. 369, viii. 223 seq.; ambitious views of, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 232 seq.; and Sparta, alliance between, B.C. 369, viii. 240; embassies from, to Persia, viii. 264, 266, 279; loss of Orôpus by, B.C. 366, viii. 272; alliance of, with Arcadia, B.C. 366, viii. 273; partial readmission of, to the Chersonese, B.C. 365, viii. 281 seq.; and Kotys, viii. 284 seq., 355; Theban naval operations against, under Epameinondas, viii. 288 seq.; naval operations of Alexander of Pheræ against, viii. 353; and Miltokythês, viii. 355; Peloponnesian land confederacy, B.C. viii. 353; and Miltokythês, viii. 355;

restoration of the Chersonese to, B.C. 358, viii. 362; transmarine empire of, B.C. 358, viii. 363; condition of, B.C. 360-359, ix. 197; proceedings of Philip towards, on his accession, ix. 209; and Eubœa, ix. 213 seq., 329 seq.; surrender of the Chersonese to, B.C. surrender of the Chersonese to, B.C. 358, ix. 216; revolt of Chios, Kôs, Rhodes, and Byzantium from, B.C. 358, ix. 216 seq., 226; armaments and operations of, in the Hellespont, B.C. 357, ix. 220; loss of power to, from the Social War, ix. 227; Philip's hostilities against, B.C. 358-356, ix. 232; recovery of Sestos by, B.C. 358, ix. 253; intrigues of Kersobleptės and Philip against, B.C. 358, ix. 253; countenance of the Phoklans by, B.C. 353, ix. 256; applications of Sparta 353, ix. 256; applications of Sparta and Megalopolis to, B.C. 353, ix. 257, 283; alarm about Persia at, B.C. 354, ix. 278; Philip's naval operations against, B.C. 351, ix. 296 seq; and Olynthus, 317, 321, 325, 337 seq., 355, 361; and Philip, overtures for peace between, B.C. 348, ix. 359 seq.; application of the Phokians to, for aid against Philip at Thermoplyæ, ix. 365 seq.; embassies to Philip from, ix. 369 seq., 390 seq., 409, 416 seq.; resolution of the synod of allies at, respecting Philip, ix. 377; assemblies at, in the presence of the Macedonian envoys, ix. 379 seq.; envoys from Philip to, ix. 376, 379, 386, 390; motion of Philokratês for peace and alliance between Philip and, ix. 379 seq.; ratification of peace and alliance seq.; alarm and displeasure at, on the surrender of Thermopylæ to Philip to, after his conquest of Thermopylæ, ix. 409; professions of Philip to, after his conquest of Thermopylæ, ix. 411; and the honours conferred upon Philip by the Amphiktyons, ix. 414; and Philip, formal peace between, from B.C. 346 to 340, ix. 428; mission of Python from Philip to, ix. 431; and Philip, proposed amendments in the peace of, B.C. 646, between, ix. 431 seq.; and Philip, disputes between, about the Bosporus and Hellespont, ix. 436; increased influence of Demosthenes at, B.C. 341.338, ix. 438; services of Kallias the Chalkidian to, B.C. 341, ix. 438; and Philip, declaration of war between, B.C. 340, ix. 440 seq.; vote of thanks from Byzantium and the Chersonese to, ix. 446; accusation of the Amphissians against, at the Amphiktyonic assembly, B.C. 339, ix. 455 seq.; and Thêbes, unfriendly

relations between, B.C. 339, ix. 468; proceedings at, on Philip's fortification of Elateia and application to tion of Elateia and application to Thêbes for aid, ix. 468 seq., 474; and Thêbes, alliance of, against Philip, B.C. 339, ix. 474; Demosthenes crowned at, ix. 477, 480; proceedings at, on the defeat at Cheroneia, ix. 485 seq.; lenity of Philip towards, after the battle of Cheroneia, ix. 488; means of resistance at, after the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 491; honorary votes at, in favour of Philip, ix. 492; sentiment at, on the death of Philip, ix. 512; submission of to Alexander, ix. 514; conduct of, on Alexander's violation of the convention at Corinth, ix. 521 seq.; proceedings at, on the destruction of Thêbes by Alexander, ix. 544; Alexander demands the surrender of anti-Macedonian leaders at, ix. 545; pacific policy of, in Alexander's time, x. 215 seq.; position of parties at, during and after the anti-Maceta, during and after the articles at the sequence of the sequence o at, during and after the anti-Macedonian struggle of Agis, x. 223; submission of, to Antipater, x. 258 seq.; state of parties at, on the proclamation of Polysperchon, x. 279; Kassander gets possession of, x. 296; under Demetrius Phalereus, x. 297 seq.; census at, under Demetrius Phalereus, x. 297; Demetrius Polior-ketês at, x. 308 seq., 317, 319 seq., 321; alteration of sentiment at, between B.C. 338 and 307, x. 310; in B.C. 501 B.C. 388 and 307, x. 310; in B.C. 501 and 307, contrast between, x. 311; restrictive law against philosophers at, B.C. 307, x. 313; embassy to Antigonus from, x. 314; political nullity of, in the generation after Demosthenes, x. 325; connexion of, with Bosporus or Pantikapæum, x.

409 seq. Athos, iii. 251; colonies in, iii. 252; Mardonius' fleet destroyed near, iv. 3; Xerxês' canal through, iv. 122 seq.

Atlas, i. 6, 8. Atossa, iii. 465. Atreids, i. 144.

Atreus, i. 143 seq., 148.

Atropos, i. 7.

Attalus, the Macedonian, ix. 495 seq.; and Pausanias, ix. 498; death of, ix. 50,

Attic legends, i. 177 seq.; chronology, commencement of, ii. 423; gentes, ii. 427 seq.; demes, ii. 435, 437, 442, iii. 351 (n. 1); law of debtor and creditor, ii. 466, 476 (n. 1); scale, ratio of, to the Æginæan and Euboic, ii. 538; Dionysia, iii. 294.

Attica, original distribution of, i. 178;

BARKA.

division of, by Kekrops, i. 180; obscurity of the civil condition of, before Solôn, ii. 424; alleged duodecimal division of, in early times, ii. 424; four Ionic tribes in, ii. 425 seq.; original separation and subsequent consolidation of communities in, ii. 440; long continuance of the cantonal feeling in, ii. 441; state of, after Solôn's legislation, ii. 519; Spartan expeditions to, against Hippias, iii. expensions to, against Hippias, iii. 340; Xerxês in, iv. 204 seq.; Lacedæmonian invasion of, under Pleistoanax, iv. 434; Archidamus' invasions of, v. 49 seq., 76, 142; Lacedæmonian invasion of, by Agis, B.C. 427, v. 158; invasion of, by Agis, B.C. 413, vi. 122; king Pausanis' avpedition to vi. 102 cm. Pausanias' expedition to, vi. 493 seq.

Aug₹, i. 163.

Augeas, i. 130.
Aulis, Greek forces assembled at, against Troy, i. 268 seq.; Agesilaus at, vii. 424.

Ausonians, iii. 166.

Autokles at the Congress at Sparta, B.C. 371, viii. 155; in the Hellespont, viii. 355 seq.

Autolykus, i. 113. Azan, i. 163.

В.

Babylon, iii. 111 seq.; Cyrus' capture of, iii. 425 seq.; revolt and reconquest of, by Darius, iii. 444 seq.; Alexander at, x. 115 seq., 189 seq.; Harpalus satrap of, x. 179.

Babytonian scale, ii. 241; kings, their command of human labour, iii. 120.
Babytonians, industry of, iii. 119; deserts and predatory tribes surround-

ing, iii. 122.

Bacchæ of Euripidês, i. 240 (n. 1).

Bacchie of Interest in 230, 379.

Bacchie rites, i. 27, 28, 32, 33, 239.

Bacchus, birth of, i. 238; rites of, i. 239.

Bacon and Sokrates, vii. 127 (n. 1); on the Greek philosophers, vii. 131 (n. 1).

Bad, meaning of, in early Greek writers, ii. 7; double sense of the Greek and Latin equivalents of, ii. 419 (n. 4). Bagœus and Orœtês, iii. 443.

Bagoas, ix. 426, x. 25, 178. Baktria, Alexander in, x. 145, 149, 157

Barbarian, meaning of, ii. 164; and Grecian military feeling, contrast be-

tween, v. 358.

Bards, ancient Grecian, ii. 73, 79. Bardylis, defeat of, by Philip, ix. 211. Barka, modern observations of, iii. 259 (n. 2), 263 (n. 2), 264 (n. 1); foundation of, iii. 268; Persian expedition from

BASILIDS.

Egypt against, iii. 273; capture of, iii. 274; submission of, to Kambysês, iii. 435.

Basilids, iii. 11 (n. 1), 16.

Batis, governor of Gaza, x. 91. Battus, founder of Kyrenê, iii. 256 seq.; dynasty of, iii. 266 seq.; the Third,

iii. 269. Bebrykians, iii. 35. Bellerophón, i. 116.

Bélus, temple of, iii. 115. Bequest, Solôn's law of, ii. 505.

Beræa, Athenian attack upon, iv. 554 (n. 1).

Bessus, x. 128 seq., 145, 149. Bias, i. 85, 105 seq.; of Priènê, iii. 422. Bisaltæ, the king of, iii. 248, iv. 142. Bithynia, Derkyllidas in, vii. 382.

Bithynians, iii. 33. Boar, the Kalydônian, i. 133, 135 seq.

Baotia, i. 452-3; affinities of, with Thessaly, i. 454; transition from mythical saly, 1, 454 ; transition from hydrical to historical, i. 455; cities and confederation of, ii. 218-9; Mardonius in, iv. 244, 252; Pausanias' march to, iv. 257; supremacy of Thèbes in, restored by Sparta, iv. 402, 414; expedition of the Lacedæmonians into, B.C. 458, iv. 414 seq.; acquisition of, by Athens, iv. 418; loss of, by Athens, iv. 432 seq.; 436 (n. 1); scheme of Demosthenes and Hippoterial of the property of the p kratês for invading, B.C. 424, v. 294; Sparta and Argos, projected alliance between, B.C. 421, v. 428 seq.; and Sparta, alliance between, B.C. 420, v. 429; and Eubea, bridge connecting, vi. 335, 341; Agesilaus on the northern frontier of, vii. 477; expeditions of Kleombrotus to, viii. 89 seq., 121; expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from, by the Thebans, B.C. 374, viii. 127; proceedings in, after the battle of Lenktra, viii. 179; retirement of the Spartaus from, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 180; extinction of free cities in, by Thebes, ix. 199; successes of Onomarchus in, ix. 286; reconstitution of, by Alexander, ix. 548.

Baotian war, vii. 455 seq.; cities after the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 27, 31.

Beotiuns, i. 452 seq., ii. 217 seq.; and Chalkidians, successes of Athens against, iii. 386; and Athenians, debate between, after the battle of Delium, v. 307 seq.; at peace during the One year's truce between Athens and Sparta, v. 365; repudiate the peace of Nikias, v. 403, 406; refuse to join Argos, B.C. 421, v. 420.

Bactus, genealogy of, i. 235 (n. 1), 454

(n. 4).

BUTADÆ.

Bomilkar, x. 348 seq., 367.

Boreas, i. 6, 183-4.
Bosphorus, Alkibiadês and the Athenian fleet at the, vi. 349; Autoklês in the, viii. 355; disputes between Philip

and Athens about, ix. 436. Bosporus or Pantikapæum, x. 409 seq.

Bottiwans, iii. 240, 245 (n. 3).
Boulê, Homeric, ii. 9; and Agora, ii.

Branchida and Alexander, x. 146 seq.
Brasidas, first exploit of, v. 58; and
Knėmus, attempt of, upon Peiræus,
v. 129: at Pylus, v. 237; sent with
Helot and other Peloponnesian hoplites to Thrace, v. 286; at Megara, v. 291 seq.; march of, through Thesv. 251 seq., match of shrough the saly, to Thrace, v. 382 seq.; and Per-dikkas, relations between, v. 314, 353, 356 seq.; prevails upon Akanthus to revolt from Athens, v. 315 seq.; proceedings of, at Argilus, v. 321; at Amphipolis, v. 322 seg., 379 seg.; repelled from Eion, v. 325; capture of Lêkythus by, v. 338; revolt of Skione to, v. 348 seg.; and Perdikkas, proceedings of, towards Arrhibæus, v. 314, 352, 356 seq.; personal ascendency of, v. 326, 339; operations of, after his acquisition of Amphipolis, v. 334; surprises and takes Torônê, v. 336; acquisition of Mendê by, v. 352; retreat of, before the Illyrians, v. 356 seq.; Lacedæmonian reinforcement to, v. 362; attempt of, upon Potidea, v. 363; opposition of, to peace on the expiration of the One year's truce, v. 367; death and character of, v. 382, 389 seq.; speech of, at Akanthus, vii. 360 seq.; language of, contrasted with the acts of

Lysander, vii. 362. Brazen race, the, i. 62.

Brennus, invasion of Greece by, x. 323 seq.

Briareus, i. 5.

Bribery, judicial, in Grecian cities, iv.

279 seq. Briseis, **i**. 269. Bromias, ix. 29. Brontés, i. 5.

Brundusium, iii. 202.

Brute, the Trojan, i. 430 seq. Bruttians, ix. 10, 131.

Bryant, hypothesis on the Trojan war, i. 300 (n. 2); on Palæphatus, i. 373 (n, 2).

Bryas, v. 496. Budini, iii. 68.

Bukephalia, x. 170, 173.

Bull, Phalaris' brazen, iv. 296 (n. 1). Bura, destruction of, viii. 148.

Butada, i. 182.

BYBLUS.

Byblus, surrender of, to Alexander, x.

Byzantium, iii. 254; extension of the Ionic revolt to, iii. 502; Pausanias at, iv. 343, 357; revolt of, from Athens, B.C. 411, vi. 322; Klearchus, 1811. the Lacedemonian, sent to, vi. 351; capture of, by the Athenians, vi. 355; mission of Cheirisophus to, vii. 291; return of Cheirisophus from, vii. 312; the Ten Thousand Greeks at, vii. 322 seq.; revolt of, from Athens, B.C. 358, ix. 216 seq., 227; mission of Demosthenes to, ix. 439; siege of, by Philip, ix. 445; vote of thanks from, to Athens, ix. 446; Philip concludes peace with, ix. 447.

Calabrian peninsula, Dionysius' projected wall across, ix. 42.

Calycê, i. 129.

Campanians, ix. 9; of Ætna, viii. 478. Canacc, i. 128 (n. 2).

arthage, iii. 92; foundation and dominion of, iii. 159 seq.; and Tyre, amicable relations of, iii. 162; projected expedition of Kambyses Carthage, against, iii. 435; empire, power, and population of, viii. 374 seq.; and her colonies, viii. 377; military force of, viii. 378 seq.; political constitution of, viii. 380 seq.; oligarchical system and sentiment at, viii. 381 seq.; powerful families at, viii. 382; intervention of, in Sicily, B.C. 410, viii. 384 seq.; and Dionysius, viii. 451, 455, 463, 464 seq.; distress at, on the failure of Imilkon's expedition against Syracuse, viii. 493; danger of, from her revolted Lybian subjects, B.C. 394, viii. 493; Dionysius renews the war with, ix. 39 seq.; Dionysius concludes an unfavourable peace with, ix. 41; new war of Dionysius with, ix. 43; danger from, to Syracuse, B.C. 344, ix. 133; operations of Agathoklès on the eastern coast of, x. 352 seq.; sedition of Bomilkar at,

Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, B.C. 480, iv. 310 seq.; fleet, entrance of, into the Great Harbour of Syracuse, viii.

480.

Carthaginians and Phenicians, difference between the aims of, iii. 96; and Greeks, first known collision between, iii. 161; peace of, with Gelo, after the battle of the Himera, iv. 313; and Egestæans, victory of, over the Selinuntines, viii. 386; blockade and capture of Agrigentum

CHALKIDEUS.

CHARRIDEUS.

by, viii. 407 seq.; plunder of Syracuse by, viii. 464; in Sicily, expedition of Dionysius against, viii. 465 seq.; naval victory of, off Katana, viii. 477; before Syracuse, viii. 480 seq., 488 seq.; defeat of, in the Great Harbour of Syracuse, viii. 482; in Sicily, frequency of pestilence among, ix. 2; purchase the robe of the Lakinian Hêrê, ix. 22; and Hipponium, ix. 42; invade Sicily, B.C. 340, ix. 169; Timoleon's victory over; at the Krimösus, ix. 173 seq.; peace of Timoleon with, ix. 180; their defence of Agrigentum against their defence of Agrigentum against Agathokles, x. 340 seq.; victory of, over Agathokles at the Himera, x. 341 seq.; recover great part of Sicily from Agathoklês, x. 343; expedition of Agathoklês to Africa against, x. 343 seg.; religious terror of, after the defeat of Hanno and Bomilkar, x. 351; success of, against Agathoklés in Numidia, x. 354; victories of, over Archagathus, x. 370; Archagathus blocked up at Tunês by, x. 371, 374; victory of over Agathoklés, near victory of, over Agathoklês, near Tunês, x. 373; noctural panic in the camp of, near Tunês, x. 374; the army of Agathoklês capitulate with,

after his desertion, x. 375.

Caspian Gates, x. 127 (n. 5).

Castes, Egyptian, iii. 133 seq.

Catalogue in the Hiad, ii. 90 seq., 160.

Cato the elder, and Kleón, v. 395 (n. 1, 2), 396 (n. 3).

Census, nature and duration of the Solonian, viii. 106 seq.; in the Archonship of Nausinikus, viii. 108 seq.

Centaur Nessus, i. 139.

Centimanes, i. 8

Ceremonies, religious, a source of mythes, i. 58.
Cestus, iii. 283 (n. 3).
Chabrias, conduct of, at Naxos, vi. 430; defeat of Gorgopas by, vii. 538; proceedings of, between B.C. 387-378, viii. 99; at Thêbes, viii. 119; victory of, near Naxos, viii. 122 seq.; at Corinth, viii. 245; in Egypt, viii. 345; and Charidémus, 382; death of, ix. 219.

Chæreas, vi. 259, 273. Chæroneia, victory of the Thebans over Onomarchus at, ix. 252; battle of, B.C. 338, ix. 483 seq.

Chaldean priests and Alexander, x. 189, 193.

Chaldeans, iii. 111 seq. Chalkedon and Alkibiadês, vi. 350, 355. Chalkideus, expedition of, to Chios, vi. 199, 201 seq.; and Tissaphernês,

CHALKIDIANS.

treaty between, vi. 207; defeat and

death of, vi. 214.

Chalkidians, Thracian, iii. 249 seq., v.
112, 285; of Eubea, successes of

Athens against, iii. 386.

Chalkidiké, success of Timotheus in, viii. 285; three expeditions from Athens to, B.C. 349-348, ix. 325 (n. 1), 339; success of Philip in, ix. 340 seq.,

Chalkis, ii. 533 seq.; retirement of the Greek fleet to, on the loss of three

triremes, iv. 178.

Chalybes, iii. 75, vii. 273 seq., 276. Champions, select, change in Grecian opinions respecting, ii. 363.

Chaonians, iii. 62 seq.

Chaonians, 11. 62 seq.
Chaos, i. 4; and her offspring, i. 4.
Chaoses, assistance of, to Phlius, viii.
258; recal of, from Corinth, viii. 272;
unsuccessful attempt of, to seize
Corinth, viii. 275; in the Chersonese,
B.C. 358, viii. 362; at Chios, ix. 220;
in the Hellespont, ix. 220; accusation
of Ashibastas and Timotheus by ix. of Iphikratês and Timotheus by, ix. 222 seq.; and Artabazus, ix. 226; conquest of Sestos by, ix. 253; ex-

conquest of Sestos by, ix. 253; expedition of, to Olynthus, ix. 339; at the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 485; capitulation of, at Mitylènė, x. 89. Charidėmus, viii. 239; and Iphikratės, viii. 284; and Timotheus, viii. 286; and Kephisodotus, viii. 357; and Kersobleptės, viii. 359, 361, 362; and the Athenians in the Chersonese, B.C. 360-358, viii. 358 seq.; and Miltokythės, viii. 360 seq.; his popularity and expedition to Thrace, ix. 300; expedition of, to Chalkidikė. 300; expedition of, to Chalkidikê, ix. 339; put to death by Darius, x.

Charidêmus, and Ephialtês, banishment of, ix. 546.

Chariklês and Peisander, vi. 34; expedition of, to Peleponnêsus, B.C. 413, vi.

Charilaus and Lykurgus, ii. 265; the Samian, iii. 462.

Charites, the, i. 10.

Charitesia, festival of, i. 121.

Charlemagne, legends of, i. 424. Charmandé, dispute among the Cyreian

forces near, vii. 204. Charminus, victory of Astyochus over, vi. 227.

Charon, the Theban, viii. 78 seq.

Charondas, iv. 100.

Charopinus, iii. 501.

Cheirisophus, vii. 247; and Xenophôn, vii. 259, 263, 273 seq.; at the Kentritès, vii. 266; mission of, to Byzantium, vii. 291; return of, from Byzantium. vii. 312; elected sole general of the

CHŒRILUS.

Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 312; death of, vii. 314.

Chersonese, Thracian, iii. 254; connexion of, with Athens under Peisistratus, iii. 337; attacked by the Athenians, B.C. 479, iv. 291; operations of Periklês in, iv. 495; retirement of Alkibiades to, B.C. 407, vi. 382; fortification of, by Derkyllidas, vii. 385; partial re-admission of Athenians to, B.C. 365, viii. 281 seq.; Epameinondas near, viii. 288, 291; Timotheus at, viii. 287, 291, 352; Ergophilus in the, viii. 353 seq.; Kotys in the, viii. 355; Kephisodotus in the, viii. 357; Charidemus and the Athenian, in the, viii. 357 seq.; restoration of, to Athens, B.C. 358, viii. 362, ix. 216; Kersobleptès cedes part of, to Athens, ix. 253; speech of Demosthenès on, ix. 437; mission of Demosthenès to, ix. 439; votes of thanks from, to Athens, ix. 446.

Chians at Ladè, iii. 515; activity of, in

promoting revolt among the Athenian allies, vi. 206; expedition of, against Lesbos, vi. 212 seq.; improved

condition of, B.C. 411, vi. 320. Chimæra, the, i. 7.

Chios, foundation of, iii. 15; Histiæus Athens, iv. 488; proceeding of Athenians at, B.C. 425, v. 276; application from, to Sparta, B.C. 413, vi. 196; the Lacedæmonians persuaded by Alkibiadês to send aid to, vi. 198; uspricious of the Athenians about suspicions of the Athenians about, B.C. 412, vi. 199; expedition of Chalkideus and Alkibiadês to, vi. 201 seq.; revolt of, from Athens, B.C. 412, vi. 202 seq.; expedition of Strombichides to, vi. 205; harassing operations of the Athenians against, B.C. 412, vi. 214 seq., 220; prosperity of, between B.C. 480-412, vi. 215; defeat of Pedaritus at, vi. 249; removal of Mindarus from Milêtus to, vi. 326; voyage of Mindarus from, to the Hellespont, vi. 327, 328 (n. 1); revolution at, furthered by Kratesippidas, vi. 363; escape of Eteonikus from Mitylênê to, vi. 397, 410; Eteonikus at, vi. 432; revolt of, from Athens at, vi. 432; revolt of, from Athens, B.C. 358, ix. 216 seq., 227; repulse of the Athenians at, B.C. 358, ix. 219; acquisition of, by Memnon, x. 54; capture of, by Macedonian admirals, x. 89.

Chivalry, romances of, i. 424 seq. Chlidon, viii. 79.

Charilus, Näke's comments on, ii. 73 (n. 1); poem of, on the expedition of Xerxés into Greece, iv. 138 (n. 1).

Choric training at Sparta and Krête. iii. 309 seq.

Choriènes, Alexander's capture of the rock of, x. 157.

Chorus, the Greek, iii. 306; improvements in, by Stesichorus, iii. 311.

Chronicle of Turpin, the, i. 424.

Chronological calculation destroys the

religious character of mythical genealogies, i. 397; table from Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, i. 470 sēq.; computations, the value of, dependent on the trustworthiness of the genealogies, i. 476; evidence of early poets, i. 480. Chronologists, modern, i. 473.

Chronologizing attempts indicative of

mental progress, i. 492.

Chronology of mythical events, various schemes of, i. 470 seq.; Alexandrine, from the return of the Herakleids to the first Olympiad, ii. 228; of Egyptian kings from Psammetichus to Amasis, iii. 147 (n. 4); Grecian, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, iv. 393 (n. 1); of the period between Philip's fortification of Elateia and the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 478 (n. 4).

Chrysaor, i. 1, 7. Chryseis, i. 269. Chrysippus, i. 148.

Chrysopolis, occupation of, by the Athenians, vi. 350.

Cimmerian invasion of Asia Minor, iii.

Cimmerians, iii. 59; driven out of their country by the Scythians, iii. 70 seq. Circe and Æêtês, i. 220, 231. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, chronological

table from, i. 470 seq.; opinion on the computations of the date of the Trojan war, i. 474; vindication of the genealogies, i. 476 seq.

Coined money, first introduction of, into Greece, ii. 240.

Comedy, growth, development, and influence of, at Athens, vii. 9 seq.

Comic poets, before Aristophanês, vii. 10; writers, mistaken estimate of, as witnesses and critics, vii. 15 seq.
Commemorative influence of Grecian

rites, i. 406 seg.

Congress at Corinth, B.C. 421, v. 417; at Sparta, B.C. 421, v. 427; at Mantineia, B.C. 419, v. 467 seq.

Conon on the legend of Cadmus, i. 236. Constitutional forms, attachment of the Athenians to, vi. 270; morality, necessity for creating, in the time of Kleisthenes, iii. 372. Corinth, origin of, i. 112 seq.; Dorians at 1445, early distinction of ii. 51.

at, i. 445; early distinction of, ii. 51; Isthmus of, ii. 151; Herakleid kings

CORINTH.

of, ii. 229; Dorian settlers at, ii. 231; despots at, ii. 414 seq.; great power of, under Periander, ii. 416; Sikyôn and Megara, analogy of, ii. 420; voyage from, to Gadês in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., iii. 98; relations of Korkyra with, iii. 214 seq.; and Korkyra, joint settlements of, iii. 214 seq.; iii. 216 seq.; relations between the colonies of, iii. 219; decision of, respecting the dispute between Thebès and Platæa, iii. 384; protest of, at the first convocation at Sparta, iii. 392; Pan-hellenic congress at the Isthmus of, iv. 156 seq.; rush of Peloponnesians to the Isthmus of, after the battle of Thermoyles, iv. 203; growing hatred of, to Athens, B.C. 461, iv. 408; operations of the Athenians in the Gulf of, B.C. 455, iv. 419; and Korkyra, war between, iv. 538 seq.; and Athens, after the naval battle between Corinth and Korkyra, 1v. 549 seq.; congress at, B.C. 421, v. 417 seq.; and Syracuse, embassy from, to Sparta, vi. 68; synod at, B.C. 412, vi. 199; altered feeling of, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, vi. Athens, and Argos, against Sparta, vii. 467; anti-Spartan allies at, vii. 469; battle of, vii. 472 seq., 482; Pharnabazus and the anti-Spartan allies at, vii. 486; philo-Laconian party at, B.C. 392, vii. 494 seq.; coup d'état of the government at, vii. 496; contrast between political conflicts at, and at Athens, vii. 496 (n. 2); and Argos, consolidation of, B.C. 392, vii. 498; victory of the Lacedemonians within the Long Walls at, vii. 498 seg.; the Long Walls of, partly pulled down by the Lacedemonians, vii. 500; the Long Walls of, restored by the Athenians, and taken by Agesilaus and Teleutias, vii. 503 seq.; and the peace of Antalkidas, vii. 550, viii. 2; application of, to Athens, for aid against Thêbes, viii. 223 seq.; Iphikratês at, viii. 226; and the Persian rescript in favour of Thêbes, viii. 268; project of the Athenians to seize, 268; project of the Athenians to seize, B.C. 366, viii. 275; peace of, with Thébes, B.C. 366, viii. 277 seq.; application from Syracuse to, B.C. 344, ix. 133; message from Hiketas to, ix. 141; Dionysius the Younger at, ix. 150 seq.; reinforcement from, to Timoleon, ix. 151, 155, 156; efforts of, to restore Syracuse, ix. 165; Philip chosen chief of the Greeks at the congress at ix. 494; convention at. congress at, ix. 494; convention at, under Alexander, B.C. 336, ix. 516

CORINTHIAN.

seq.; violations of the convention at, by Alexander, ix. 520 seq.; Alexander

at, B.C. 335, ix. 548.

Corinthian envoys, speech of, to the Athenian assembly, in reply to the Korkyræans, iv. 543; speech of, to the Spartan assembly against Athens, v. 6 seq.; speech of, at the congress of allies at Sparta, v. 17 seq.

Corinthian genealogy of Eumelus, i.

114 seq.

Corinthian territory, Nikias' expedition against, v. 271 seq.; war, commencement of, vii. 467; Gulf, naval conflicts of Corinthians and Lacedæ-

monians in, vii. 492.

Corinthians, early commerce and enterprise of, ii. 378; behaviour of, at Salamis, iv. 239; defeated by Myronides, iv. 411; procure the refusal of the Samians' application to Sparta for aid against Athens, iv. 515; instigate Potidæa, the Chalkidians, and Bottiæans, to revolt from Athens, iv. 551 seq.; defeat of, near Potidæa, iv. 555; strive to excite war against Athens after their defeat near Po-Nikias, v. 403, 406; induce Argos to head a new Peloponnesian alliance, v. 416; hesitate to join Argos, v. 420, 453; join Argos, v. 421; application of, to the Beotians and Athenians. B.C. 421, v. 423; and Karneia, ii. 229 (n. 2); and Athenians, naval battle between, near Naupaktus, vi. 190 seq.; and Lacedemonians, naval and land conflicts between, B.C. 393, vii. 492 seq.

Courts of Requests, their analogy to Athenian dikasteries, iv. 479 (n. 2).

Creditor and debtor, law of, at Athens, before Solon, ii. 466; Roman law of, ii. 525.

Cræsus and Solôn, alleged interview between, ii. 515 seq.; moral of Herodotus' story about, ii. 518; reign and conquests of, iii. 80 seq.; power and alliances of, iii. 400; and Cyrus, war between, iii. 405 seq.; and the oracles, iii. 406, 410; solicits the alliance of Sparta, iii. 407; fate of, impressive to the Greek mind iii.

to the Greek mind, iii, 411. Cuma in Campania, iii, 169 seq. Cyclades, ii, 144; Themistoklės levies

fines on, iv. 236. Cycle, epic, ii. 59 seq. Cyclic poets, ii. 59 seq.

Cyclôpes, i. 4. Cyprus, influence of Aphrodité upon, i. 5; Solon's visit to, ii. 514; Phœnicians and Greeks in, iii. 97; extension of the Ionic revolt to, iii. 502; subjuga-

DAMASITHYMUS.

tion of, by Phœnicians and Persians, iii. 504; conquest of, by the Turks in 1570, iii. 504 (n. 2); expedition to, under Kimôn, iv. 421; before and under Evagoras, viii. 13 seq.; subjugation of, to the Persian king Ochus, ix. 423 seq.; surrender of the princes of, to Alexander, x. 85.

Cyrenaica, iii. 263 (n. 2).

Cyreacted, Int. 205 (h. 2).
Cyropedia, Xenophôn's, iii. 400.
Cyrus the Great, early history and rise of, iii. 399 seq.; and Cræsus, war between, iii. 405 seq.; and the Lacedæmonians, iii. 414; conquests of, in Asia, iii. 425; capture of Babylon by, iii 495 seq.; capture of Babylon by, iii 495 seq.; capture of Babylon by, iii. 425 seq.; exploits and death of, iii. 430; effects of his conquests upon the Persians, iii. 431 seq.; the tomb of, x.

Cyrus the Younger, arrival of, in Asia Minor, B.C. 408, vi. 359, 361; Lysan-der's visits to, at Sardis, vi. 363 seq., 433; pay of the Peloponnesian fleet by, vi. 366; and Kallikratidas, vi. 384; entrusts his satrapy and revenues 384; entrusts his sattrapy and revenues to Lysander, vi. 434; and Artaxerxês Mnemon, vi. 529, vii. 178 seq.; youth and education of, vii. 176; his esteem for the Greeks and hopes of the crown, vii. 177; charge of Tissaphernês against, vii. 178; strict administration and prudent behaviour of, vii. 181; forces of collected at Savija. 181; forces of, collected at Sardis, vii. 182; march of, from Sardis to vii. 182; march cf, from Sardis to Kunaxa, vii. 185 seq.; assistance of Epyaxa to, vii. 188; review of his troops at Tyriæum, vii. 189; aud Syennesis, vii. 191; at Tarsus, vii. 192 seq.; desertion of Xenias and Pasion from, vii. 197; at Thapsakus, vii. 198 seq.; in Babylonia, vii. 205; speech of, to his Greek forces in Babylonia, vii. 206; his conception of Grecian superiority, vii. 207; his present to the prophet Silauus, vii. 208; passes the undefended trench. 208; passes the undefended trench. vii. 209; at Kunaxa, vii. 211 seq.; character of, vii. 217; probable conduct of, towards Greece, if victorious at Kunaxa, vii. 218; and the Asiatic Greeks, vii. 374.

D.

Dædalus, i. 203, 206 seq.
Dæmon of Sokratês, vii. 91 seq.
Dæmons, i. 61, 63, 66 seq.; and gods,
distinction between, i. 379 seq.; admission of, as partially evil beings, i.

Damascus, capture of, by the Macedonians, x. 76. Damasithymus of Kalyndus, iv. 230.

DANAÊ.

Danae, legend of, i. 85. Danaos and the Danaïdes, i. 83. Dancing, Greek, iii. 309.

Daphnæus, at Agrigentum, viii. 408 seq.; death of, viii. 426.

Dardanus, son of Zeus, i. 261.

Daric, the golden, iii. 452 (n. 4). Darius Hystaspės, accession of, iii. 438 seq.; discontents of the satraps under, iii. 441 seq.; revolt of the Medes against, iii. 441, 442 (n. 1); revolt of Babylon against, iii. 444; organization of the Persian empire by, iii. 447 seq.; twenty satrapies of, iii. 449 seq.; organizing tendency, coinage, roads, and posts of, iii. 452 seq.; and Sylosôn, iii. 453; conquering dispositions of, iii. 465; probable consequences of an expedition by, against Greece, before going against Scythia, iii. 471 scq.; invasion of Scythia by, iii. 474 seq.; his orders to the Ionians at the bridge over the Danube, iii. 481; return of, to Susa from Scythia, iii. revenge of, against Athenians, iii. 508; preparations of, for invading Greece, iv. 5; submission of Greeks to, before the battle of Marathôn, iv. 5; heralds of, at Athens and Sparta, iv. 7; instructions of, to Datis and Artaphernes, iv. 18; resolution of, to invade Greece a second time, iv. 102; death of, iv. 102. Darius, son of Artaxerxês Mnemon,

viii. 350. Darius Codomannus, enconragement of anti-Macedonians in Greece by, ix. 522; his accession and preparations for defence against Alexander, x. 26; irreparable mischief of Memnon's death to, x. 55; change in the plan of, after Memnon's death, x. 56, 58; puts Charidêmus to death, x. 57; Arrian's criticism on the plan of, against Alexander, x. 59; at Monnt Amanus, x. 64 seq.; advances into Kilikia, x. 64; at Issus before the battle, x. 66; defeat of, at Issus, x. 68 seq.; capture of his mother, wife, and family, by Alexander, x. 71, 100; his correspondence with Alexander, his correspondence with Alexander, x. 78, 88; inaction of, after the battle of Issus, x. 99; defeat of, at Arbéla, x. 106 seq.; a fugitive in Media, x. 128, 126; pursued by Alexander into Parthia, x. 128 seq.; conspiracy against, by Bessus and others, x. 128 seq.; death of, x. 129; Alexander's disappointment in not taking him alive, x. 131; funeral, fate, and conduct of, x. 131. arius Nothus, vii. 175 seq.; death of.

Darius Nothus, vii. 175 seq.; death of,

vii. 178.

DELPHI.

Daskon, attack of Dionysius on the Carthaginian naval station at, viii. 490.

Datamés, viii. 344.

Datis, siege and capture of Eretria by, iv. 21 seq.; conquest of Karystus by, iv. 20; Persian armament at Samos under, iv. 18; conquest of Naxos and other Cyclades by, iv. 19 seq.; forbearance of, towards Délos, iv. 19; the Marthan in 182 december 182. at Marathôn, iv. 22, 42 seq.; return of, to Asia, after the battle of Marathôn, iv. 49.

Debtor and Creditor, law of, at Athens, before Solôn, ii. 466; Roman law of,

ii. 525 sea

Debtors, Solôn's relief of, ii. 469; treat-

ment of, according to Gallic and Tentonic codes, ii. 479 (n. 1).

Debts, the obligation of, inviolable at Athens, ii. 475, 483; distinction between the principal and interest of, in an early society, ii. 477.

Defence, means of, superior to those of attack in ancient Greece, ii. 48.

Deianeira, i. 339. Deinokratês, x. 339, 372, 378 seq. Dêiokês, iii. 53 scq.

Deities not included in the twelve great ones, i. 10; of guilds or trades, i. 312. Dekamnichus, viii. 44.

Dekarchies established by Lysander, vii.

352 seq., 364.

Dekeleia, legend of, i. 157; fortification of, by the Lacedæmonians, vi. 120, 122, 185; Agis at, vi. 185, 373.

Delian Apollo, i. 42.

Delian festival, ii. 534 seq.; early splendour and subsequent decline of, iii.

280; revival of, B.C. 426, v. 229. Delium, Hippokratês' march to and fortification of, B.C. 424, v. 304 seq.; seges and capture of, by the Bostians, B.C.

424, v. 310; Sokratês and Alkibiadês at the battle of, v. 311.

Dêlos, Ionic festival at, ii. 534 seq., iii. 280; forbearance of Datis towards, iv. 19; the confederacy of, iv. 352 seq., 379 seq.; the synod of, iv. 390; seq., 379 seq.; the synou of, iv. sec, first breach of union in the confederacy of, iv. 394; revolt of Thasos from the confederacy, iv. 397, to Athens, iv. 428; transition of the confederacy of, into an Athenian empire, iv. 428; purification of, by the Athenians, v. 229; restoration of the artive novulation to B.C. 421. of the native population to, B.C. 421,

Delphi, temple and oracle of, i. 45 seq., ii. 179; oracle of, and the Battiad dynasty, iii. 271; early state and site of, iii. 284; growth of, iii. 286; con-

DELPHIAN.

flagration and rebuilding of the temple at, iii. 341 seq.; the oracle at, worked hy Kleisthenês, iii. 342; oracle of, and Xerxês' invasion, iv. 179 seq.; Xerxês' detachment against, iv. 211; proceedings of Sparta and Athens at, B.C. 452-447, iv. 431; answer of the oracle of, to the Spartans on war with Athens, B.C. 432, v. 17; reply of the oracle at, about Sokrates, vii. 92 seq.; Agesipolis and the oracle at, vii. 519; claim of the Phokians to the presidency of the temple at, ix. 241 seq.; Philomelus seizes and fortifies the temple at, x. 244; Philomelus takes part of the treasures in the temple at, ix. 248; employment of the treasures in the temple at, hy Onomarchus, ix. 251; Phayllus despoils the temple at, ix. 290; peculation of the treasures at, ix. 364; miserable death of all concerned in the spoliation of the temple at, ix. 419; relations of the Lokrians of Amphissa with, ix. 454; Amphiktyonic meeting at, B.C. 339, ix. 455 seq.

Delphian Apollo, reply of, to the remon-

strance of Crossus, iii. 410.

Delphians and Amphiktyons, attack of, upon Kirrha, ix. 459.

Delphinium at Athens, ii. 454 (n. 1).

Deluge of Deucalion, i. 92 seq.
Demadés, reproof of Philip by, ix. 489;
peace of, ix. 490 seq.; remark of, on
hearing of Alexander's death, x. 196;

macedonizing policy of, x. 216; and Phokion, embassy of, to Antipater, x. 258; death of, x. 274.

Demagogues, ii. 394, 397 seq., vi. 271.

Demaratus and Kleomenės, iv. 15 seq.; conversations of, with Xerxės, iv. 139, 184, 193; advice of, to Xerxės, after the death of Leonides, iv. 138, after the death of Leonides. after the death of Leonidas, iv. 193. Demes, Attie, ii. 437, 442, 443, iii. 347

Demètér, i. 6, 10; foreign influence on the worship of, i. 22; how represented in Homer and Hesiod, i. 34; Homeric hymn to, i. 35 seq.; legends of, differing from the Homeric hymn, i. 40; Hellenic importance of, i. 42.

Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis, on Ilium, i. 298. Demetrius Phalereus, administration of, at Athens, x. 297 seq.; retires to Egypt, x. 308; condemnation of, x. 315.

Demetrius Poliorkêtês at Athens, x. 308 seq., 317, 319 seq., 321; exploits of, B.C. 307-304, x. 315; his successes in Greece against Kassander, x. 316; march of, through Thessaly into Asia, x. 320; return of, from Asia to

DEMOSTHENÊS.

Greece, x. 321; acquires the crown of Macedonia, x. 322; Greece under, x. 323; captivity and death of, x. 323.

Demiurgi, ii. 443.

Democharés, x. 314, 319, 325.

Democracies, Grecian securities against

corruption in, vi. 230.

Democracy, Athenian, ii. 493, 513, iv. 464; effect of the idea of, upon the minds of the Athenians, iii. 394 seq.; at Athens, stimulus to, from the Persian war, iv. 364; reconstitution of, at Samos, vi. 275 seq.; restoration of, at Atheus, B.C. 411, vi. 301 seq., 306 seq., and B.C. 403, vi. 498, 510; moderation of Athenian, vi. 316, 518 seq.; at Samos, contrasted with the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, vi. 316 seq.

Democratical leaders at Athens, and the Thirty, vi. 454, 459 seq.; sentiment, increase of, at Athens, hetween B.C.

479-459, iv. 440.

Dêmokêdês, romantic history of, iii. 466 seq.

Demônax, reform of Kyrênê hy, iii. 269; constitution of, not durable, iii. 275. Demophantus, psephism of, vi. 307.

Demos, at Syracuse, iv. 296.

Demosthenês the General, in Akarnania, v. 214; expedition of, against Ætolia, v. 214 seq.; saves Naupaktus, v. 219; goes to protect Amphilochian Argos, v. 221; his victory over Eurylochus at Olpæ, v. 221 seq.; his triumphant return from Akarnania to Athens, v. 229; fortifies and defends Pylus, v. 232 seq.; application of, for reinforcemeuts from Athens, to attack Sphakteria, v. 250 seq.; victory of, in Sphakteria, v. 258 seq.; attempt of, to surprise Megara and Nisæ, v. 288 seq.; scheme of, for invading Bœotia, B.C. 424, v. 294; uusuccessful descent upon Bœotia by, v. 295; his evacua-tion of the fort at Epidaurus, v. 494; expedition of, to Sicily, vi. 113, 123, 134; arrival of, at Syracuse, vi. 134; plans of, on arriving at Syracuse, vi. 137; night attack of, upon Epipolæ, vi. 138 seq.; his proposals for removing from Syracuse, vi. 142 seq.; and Nikias, resolution of, after the final defeat in the harbour of Syracuse, vi. 162; capture and subsequent treatment of, vi. 172 seq., 179; respect for the memory of, vi. 180; death of, vi. 179.

Demosthenes, father of the orator, ix.

Demosthenes the Orator, first appearance of, as public adviser in the Athenian

DEMOSTHENÊS.

assembly, ix. 258; parentage and early youth of, ix. 258 seq.; and his guardians, ix. 258; early rhetorical tendencies of, ix. 260; training and instructors of, ix. 262 seq.; action and matter of, ix. 265; first known as a composer of speeches for others, ix. 266; speech of, against Leptines, ix. 267; speech of, on the Symmories, ix. 278 seq.; exhortations of, to personal effort and sacrifice, ix. 282, 347; recommendations of, on Sparta and Megalopolis, ix. 284; first Philippine of the 2014, ix. 284; first Philippine of the 2014 section of and Megalopolis, ix. 284; first Philippic of, ix. 301 seq.; opponents of, at Athens, B.C. 351, ix. 309; earliest Olynthiac of, ix. 318 seq.; practical effect of his speeches, ix. 320; second Olynthiac of, ix. 323 seq.; allusions of, to the Theoric fund, ix. 324, 329; third Olynthiac of, ix. 326 seq.; insulted by Meidias, ix. 333; reproached for his absence from the battle of Tamynæ, ix. 334; serves as hoplite in Eubœa, and is chosen senator for, B.C. 349-348, ix. 334; order of the Olynthiacs of, ix. 349 seq.; and Æschines, on the negotiaseq.; and Æschinês, on the negotiations with Philip, B.C. 347-346, ix. 361 (n. 1), 366 (n. 1); speaks in favour of peace, B.C. 347, ix. 361; and the first embassy from Athens to Philip, ix. 369 seq., 375; failure of, in his speech before Philip, ix. 271; and the confederate synod at Athens respecting Philip, ix. 378 (n. 1), 380, 381 (n. 2); and the motion of Philokratês for peace and alliance with Philip, ix. 380 seq.; and the exclusion of the Phokians from the peace and alliance between Athens seq.; and Æschinês, on the negotiapeace and alliance between Athens peace and alliance between Athens and Philip, ix. 388 seq.; and the second embassy from Athens to Philip, ix. 390, 395 seq., 399, 402; and the third embassy from Athens to Philip, ix. 409; charges of, against Eschines, ix. 416; and the peace and elliance of Athens with Eschines, ix. 416; and the peace and alliance of Athens with Philip, B.C. 346, ix. 418; recommends acquiescence in the Amphiktyonic dignity of Philip, ix. 422; vigilance and warnings of against Philip, after B.C. 346, ix. 430; speech on the Chersonese and third Philippic of, ix. 437; increased influence of, at Athens, B.C. 341-338, ix. 438; mission of, to the Chersonese and Byzantium, ix. 439; vote of thanks to, at Athens, ix. 446; reform in the administration of the Athenian marine by, ix. 448 sea. Athenian marine by, ix. 448 seq., 449 (n. 1); his opposition to the proceedings of Æschinês at the Amphiktyonic meeting, B.C. 339, ix. 462; on

DIODOTUS.

the special Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ, ix. 465; advice of, on hearing of the fortification of Elateia hearing of the fortification of Elateia by Philip, ix. 470; mission of, to Thèbes, B.C. 339, ix. 471 seq.; crowned at Athens, ix. 477, 478; at the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 483 seq., 485; con-fidence shown to, after the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 486, 492; conduct of, on the death of Philip, ix. 512; correspondence of, with Persia, ix. 523 seq.; accusation against, respect-ing the revolt of Thèbes against Alexander, ix. 534; position and policy of, in Alexander's time, x. 217 seq.; and Æschinès, judicial contest seq.; and Æschinês, judicial contest between, x. 224 seq.; accusation against, in the affair of Harpalus, x. 231 seq.; recal of, from exile, x. 249; flight of, to Kalauria, x. 258; condemnation and death of, x. 262 seq.;

life and character of, x. 263 seq., life and character of, x. 263 seq. Derdas, at Olynthus, viii. 61. Derkyllidas, in Asia, vii. 375 seq., 382 seq., 421; at Abydos and Sestos, vii. 485; superseded by Anaxibius at

Abydos, vii. 532.

Despots, in Greece, ii. 381, 394 seq.; at Sikyôn, ii. 407 seq., 412; at Corinth, ii. 414 seq.; of Asiatic Greece, deposition of, by Aristagoras, iii. 496; Sicilian, iv. 295, 321.

Deukaliôn, i. 92 seq.

Derizene vii 290, 218 seq. viii 405, 414

Dexippus, vii. 292, 316 seq., viii. 405, 414, 425.

Diadochi, Asia hellenized by, x. 207. Diagoras, prosecution of, vi. 48. Dialectics, Grecian, iii. 317, vii. 22, 28

seq., 130 seq. Dictators in Greece, ii. 395.

Dido, legend of, iii. 160.
Digamma and the Homeric poems, ii.

Ditrephês, vi. 188 seq. Dikœus, vision of, iv. 214.

Dikasteries not established by Solôn, ii. 494; Athenian, iii. 359 seq., iv. 465 seq., 481, 486; constitution of, by Periklês, iv. 441 seq., 451; working of, at Athens, iv. 465 seq.; at Rhodes, and other Grecian cities, iv. 468 (n. 1); jurisdiction of, over the subject-allies

of Athens, iv. 521 seq., 525.

Dikasts, oath of, at Athens, ii. 475, vi. 516; Athenian, iii. 359, iv. 58; under Periklès, iv. 440, 451, 458 seq., 465.

Dikon of Kaulonia, ix. 27.

Dimnus, x. 136, 138.

Diodôrus, his historical version of mythes, i. 369; statement of, respecting the generals at Arginusæ, vi. 406.

Diodotus, speech of, v. 173 seq.

DIOGENÊS.

Diogenés and Alexander, ix. 548. Diokleidês, vi. 34, 39. Dioklês the Corinthian, ii. 220.

Diokles the Syracusan, the laws of, viii. 372 seq.; aid to Himera under, viii. 390; banishment of, viii. 402.

Dio Chrysostom's attempt to historicize the legend of Troy, i. 293.

Dio Chrysostom at Olbia, x. 408 seq.

Diomédés, return of, from Troy, i. 283.

Diomédés, return of, from Troy, i. 283. Diomedon, pursuit of Chians by, vi. 207; at Teos and Lesbos, vi. 213; at Milètus, and Chios, vi. 214 seq.; at Samos, vi. 257; defeat of, by Kallikratidas, vi. 392.

Dion, his Dionysian connexion, and character, ix. 54; Plato and the Pythagoreans, ix. 55 seq.; political views of, ix. 57 seq.; maintains the Elder to the last, ix. 59; his visits to Peloponnèsus and Athens, ix. 59; conduct of, on the accession of Dionysius the Younger, ix. 62 seq.; efforts of, to improve Dionysius the Younger, ix. 65 seq.; entreats Plato Younger, ix. 65 seq.; entreats Plato to visit Dionysius the Younger, ix. 66; and Plato urges Dionysius the Younger to reform himself, ix. 70 seq.; and Plato, intrigues of Philistus against, ix. 74; alienation of Dionysius the Younger from, ix. 75; banishment of, ix. 76; property of, confiscated by Dionysins the Younger, ix. 79; resolution of, to avengo himself on Dionysius the Younger, and free Syracuse, ix. 80 seq., 83; forces of, at Zakynthus, ix. 82; expedition of, against Dionysius the Younger, ix. 83 seq.; entry of, into Syracuse, B.C. 357, ix. 91 seq.; chosen general by the Syracusans, ix. 92; general by the Syracusans, 1x. 92; captures Epipolæ and Euryalus, ix. 93; blockade of Ortygia by, ix. 93, 96, 102; negotiations of Dionysius the Younger with, ix. 94, 102; victory of, over Dionysius the Younger, ix. 95 seq.; intrigues of Dionysius the Younger against, ix. 98, 100; suspicions of the Syracusans against, ix. 98, 101, 116; and Herakleidês, ix.
98, 103, 110, 112 seq., 119; deposition and retreat of, from Syracuse, ix.
103; at Leontini, ix. 104, 106; repulse of Nypsius and rescue of Syracuse of Nypsius and rescue of Syracuse by, ix. 109 seq.; entry of, into Syracuse, B.C. 356, ix. 108; entry of, into Ortygia, ix. 115; conduct of, on his final triumph, ix. 115 seq.; his omission to grant freedom to Syracuse, ix. 117 seq.; opposition to, as dictator, ix. 119 seq.; tyranny, unpopularity, and disquietude of, ix. 120 seq.; death and character of ix 120 seq.; death and character of, ix.

DIONYSIUS.

122 seq.; and Timoleon, contrast between, ix. 193 seq.

Dionysia, Attic, i. 28, iii. 294. Dionysiae festival at Athens, B.C. 349,

ix. 333.

Dionysius, Phôkwan, iii. 512 seq., 516.
Dionysius the Elder, and Konôn, vii.
491; demonstration against, at
Olympia, E.C. 384, viii. 71 seq., ix. 26 seq.; triremes of, captured by Iphikratês, viii. 142; first appearance of, at Syracuse, viii. 403; movement of the Hermokratean party to elevate, viii. 414; harangue of, against the Syracusan generals at Agrigentum, viii. 415 seq.; one of the generals of Syracuse, viii. 415 seq.; first expedition of, to Gela, viii. 420; accusations of, against his colleagues, viii. 421; election of, as sole general, viii. 421; stratagem of, to obtain a body-guard, viii. 422 seq.; establishes himself as despot at Syracuse, viii. to Gela, viii. 429 seq; charges of treachery against, viii. 432, 437; mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen against, viii. 433 seq.; and Imilkon, peace between, viii. 436 seq.; sympathy of Sparta with, viii. 438, 486; strong position of, after his peace with Imilkon, viii. 439; fortification and occupation of Ortygia by, viii. 440 seq.; redistribution of property by, viii. 441 seq.; exorbitant exactions of, viii. 442; mutiny of the Syracusan ol, vii. 442; huthing of the syracusan soldiers against, viii. 443 seq.; besieged in Ortygia, viii. 444 seq.; strengthens his despotism, viii. 447 seq.; conquers Ætna, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini, viii. 449; at Enna, viii. 449; resolution of, to make war upon Carthage, B.C. 400, viii. 451; additional fortifications at Syracuse by, viii. 453 seq.; preparations of, for war with Carthage, B.C. 399-397, viii. 455, 459 seq.; improved behaviour of, to the Syracusans, B.C. 390, viii. 455; to the Syracusans, B.C. 390, viii. 456; conciliatory policy of, towards the Greek cities near the strait of Messênê, B.C. 399, viii. 456 seq.; marriage of, with Doris and Aristomachê, viii. 458, 462; exhorts the Syracusan assembly to war against Carthage, viii. 463; permits the plunder of the Carthaginians at Syracuse viii. 464: declares war Syracuse, viii. 464; declares war against Carthage, E.C. 397, viii. 464; marches against the Carthaginians in Sicily, E.C. 397, viii. 465 seq.; siege and capture of Motyè by, viii. 467 seq.; revolt of the Sikels from, viii. 475; provisions of, for the

DIONYSIUS.

defence of Syracuse against the Carthaginians, B.C. 396, viii. 476; naval defeat of, near Katana, viii. 477; retreat of, from Katana to Syracuse, B.C. 395, viii. 479; Syracusan naval victory over the Carthaginians in the absence of, viii. 482; speech of Theodorus against, viii. 483 seq.; discontent of the Syracusans with, B.C. 395, viii. 483 seq.; and Pharakidas, viii. 486; attacks the Carthaginian camp before Syracuse and sacrifices his mercenaries, viii. 489; success of, by sea and land against success of, by sea and land against the Carthaginians before Syracuse, viii. 490; secret treaty of, with Imilkon before Syracuse, viii. 491; and the Iberians, viii. 492; capture of Libyans by, viii. 493; difficulties of, from his mercenaries, ix. 2; re-establishment of Messênê by, ix. 3; conquests of, in the interior of Sicily, RC 394 ix 4 at Tauromenium ix bc. 394, ix. 4; at Tauromenium, ix. 5, 8; and the Sikels, B.C. 394-393, ix. 5; declaration of Agrigentum against, B.C. 393, ix. 6; victory of near Abakæna, ix. 6; expedition of, against Rhegium, B.c. 393, ix. 7; repulses Magon at Agyrium, ix. 7; plans of, against the Greek cities in Southern Italy, ix. 8; alliance of, with the Lucanians against the the Lucanians against the Italiot Greeks, ix. 11; attack of, upon Rhegium, B.C. 399, ix. 11; expedition of, against the Italiot Greeks, B.C. 389; ix. 14 seq.; his capture and generous treatment of Italiot Greeks, ix. 15; besieges and grants peace to Rhegium, ix. 16; senture of Kaplonia and Historians. capture of Kanlonia and Hipponium by, ix. 17; capture of Rhegium by, ix. 18, 21; cruelty of, to Phyton, ix. 19; and Sparta, ascendency of, B.C. 387, ix. 22; capture of Krotôn by, ix. 22; schemes of, for conquests in Epirus and Illyria, ix. 23; plunders Latium, Etruria, and the temple of Agylla, ix. 24; poetical compositions of, ix. 25; dislike and dread of, in Greece, ix. 25, 30; harshness of, to Plato, ix. 37; new constructions and improvements by, at Syracuse, B.C. 387-383, ix. 38; renews the war with Carthage peace of, with Carthage, B.c. 383, ix. 41; projected wall of, across the Calabrian peninsula, ix. 42; relations of with Carthage, B.c. 383, ix. of, with Central Greece, B.C. 382-369, ix. 42; war of, with Carthage, B.C. 368, ix. 43; gains the tragedy prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens, ix. 44; death and character of, ix. 44 seq., 59; family left by, ix. 53, 60;

DORIANS.

the good opinion of, enjoyed by Dion to the last, ix. 59; drunken habits of his descendants, ix. 130.

his descendants, ix. 130. Dionysius the Younger, age of, at his father's death, ix. 54 (n. 1); accession and character of, ix. 61; Dion's efforts to improve, ix. 65 seq.; Plato's visits to, ix. 66 seq.; Plato's injudicious treatment of, ix. 70 seq.; his hatred and injuries to Dion, ix. 75, 78 seq.; detention of Plato by, ix. 77; Dion's expedition against, ix. 83 seq.; weakness and drunken habits of, ix. 85; absence of, from Syracuse, B.C. 357. absence of, from Syracuse, B.C. 357, ix. 87; negotiations of, with Dion and the Syracusans, ix. 94, 102; defeat of, by Dion, ix. 95 seq.; blockaded in Ortygia by Dion, ix. 96; intrigues of, against Dion, ix. 98, 100; his flight to Lokri, ix. 102; return of, to Syracuse, ix. 130; at Lokri, ix. 131; his surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon,

ix. 148; at Corinth, ix. 150 seq. Dionysius of the Pontic Herakleia, x.

397 seq.

Dionysos, worship of, i. 22, 28, 30; legend of, in the Homeric hymn to, i. 32; alteration of the primitive Grecian idea of, i. 33 seq.

Diopeithês, ix. 436. Dioskuri, i. 158.

Diphilus at Naupaktus, B.C. 413, vi. 190.

Diphridas, in Asia, vii. 526.

Dirkê, i. 241.

Discussion, growth of, among the Greeks, iii. 318.
Dithyramb, iii. 311.
Dôdôna, i. 355 seq.
Doloneia, ii. 119, 130.
Dolonkians and Miltiadês the first, iii.

Dorian cities in Peloponnesus about 450 B.C., ii. 222; islands in the Ægean and the Dorians in Argolis, ii. 243; immigration to Peloponnê-sus, ii. 227; settlers at Argos and Corinth, ii. 231 seq., 234; settlement in Sparta, ii. 249; allotment of land at Sparta, ii. 332 seq.; mode, the, ii. 333; states, inhabitants of, ii. 408; tribes at Sikyôn, names of, ii. 409, 413.

Dorians, early accounts of, i. 96 seq., 438; mythical title of, to the Peloponnêsus, i. 443; their occupation of Argos, Sparta, Messenia, and Corinth, i. 445; early Kretan, ii. 233; in Argolis and the Dorian islands in the Ægean, ii. 244; of Sparta and Stenyklerus, ii. 249 seq.; divided into three tribes, ii. 280; Messenian, ii. 351; Asiatic, iii. 29; of Ægina, iii. 389.

DORIC.

Doric dialect, ii. 256 seq.; iii. 310; emigrations, i. 461 seq.

Dorieus the Spartan prince, aid of, to Kinyps, iii. 265; and the Krotoniates,

iv. 95, 96; Sicily, iv. 297.

Dorieus the Rhodian, vi. 223, 340; capture and liberation of, vi. 382; treatment of, by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, vii. 437 seq.; and Hermokratês in the Ægean, viii. 368.

Doris, i. 97, ii. 213.

Doris, wife of Dionysius, viii. 458, 462. Doriskus, Xerxês at, iv. 131 seq.

Dorkis, iv. 346, 347.

Dôrus, i. 95 seq.

Drako and his laws, ii. 447 seq.
Dramatic genius, development of, at
Athens, vii. 2 seq.

Drangiana, Alexander in, x. 135 seq., 144.

Drepanê, i. 220.

Dryopes, ii. 213.

Dryopians, settlements of, formed by sea, ii. 233.

Duketius the Sikel prince, iii. 186, v. 517 seq.

Dymanes, Hylleis, and Pamphyli, ii.

Dyrrhachium, iii. 218 seq.

E.

Earliest Greeks, residences of, ii. 47 seq. Early poets, historical value of, i. 480.

Echemus, 1. 90, 164.

Echidna, i. 7.

Eclipse of the sun in a battle between

Medes and Lydians, iii. 57; of the moon, B.C. 413, vi. 147; of the moon, в.с. 331, х. 99.

Edda, the, i. 427.

Edessa, the dynasty of, iii. 243, 245. Eetioneia, fort at, vi. 286, 290, 294. Egesta, application of, to Athens, v.

540 seq.; application of, to Carthage, viii. 384 seq.; Syracusan attack upon, viii. 471; barbarities of Agathoklês

at, x. 377.

Egypt, influence of, upon the religion of Greece, i. 21, 27, 29; the opening of, to Grecian commerce, i. 329; ante-Hellenic colonies from to Greece not probable, ii. 192; Solôn's visit to, ii. 514; Herodotus' account of, iii. 127 seq.; antiquity of, iii. 130; peculiar physical and moral features of, iii. 131; large town-population in, iii. 137; profound submission of the people in, iii. 138; worship of animals in, iii. 140; relations of, with Assyria, iii. 141; and Kyrênê, iii. 261; Persian expedition from, against Barka, iii. 273; Kambysês' invasion and con-

ELIS.

quest of, iii. 434; revolt and reconquest of, under Xerxês, iv. 104; defeat and losses of the Athenians in, iv. 420; unavailing efforts of Persia to reconquer, viii. 12; Agesilaus and Chabrias in, viii. 345 seq.; reconquest of, by Ochus, ix. 423, 426; march of Alexander towards, x. 90, 93; Alexander in, x. 93 seq.

Egyptians, ethnography of, iii. 86; contrasted with Greeks, Phænicians, and Assyrians, iii. 121; and Ethiopians, iii. 131; effect of, on the Greek iii. 131; effe mind, iii. 157.

Eileithyia, i. 10.

Ettettiqua, 1. 10.

Eion, capture of, by Kimôn, iv. 383 seq.;
defended by Thucydidés against Brasidas, v. 325; Kleôn at, v. 376.

Ekbatana, foundation of, iii. 54; Darius

at, x. 126; Alexander at, x. 126 seq., 186 seq.; Parmenio at, x. 126, 141 seq. Ekdikus, expedition of, to Rhodes, vii. 527.

Ekklesia, Athenian, iii. 358. Elæa, iii. 19.

Elœus, escape of the Athenian squadrou from Sestos to, vi. 329; Mindarus and Thrasyllus at, vi. 332, 336.

Elateia, refortification of, by Philip, ix. 467.

Elatus, i. 164. Elea, Phokæan colony at, iii. 421, v. 52Í.

Elegiac verse of Kallinus, Tyrtæus, and Mimnermus, iii. 301.

Eleian genealogy, i. 129 seq. Eleians excluded from the Isthmian games, i. 131; and the Olympic games, i. 446, ii. 239; and Pisatans, ii. 351, 352; their exclusion of the Lacedæmonians from the Olympic festival, v. 458 seq.; desert the Argeian allies, v. 475; and Arcadians, viii. 299 seq., 307; exclusion of, from the Olympic festival, B.C. 364, viii. 303 seq.

Elektra and Thaumas, progeny of, i. 7. Elektryôn, death of, i. 87. Eleusinian mysteries, i. 35, 37; alleged profanation of, by Alkibiadês and others, vi. 12 seq., 42 seq.; celebration of, protected by Alkibiadês, vi. 373. Eleusinians, seizure and execution of,

by the Thirty at Athens, vi. 485.

Eleusis, temple of, i. 37; importance of mysteries to, i. 40; early independence of, ii. 442; retirement of the Thirty to, vi. 489; capture of, vi. 499.

Eleutheria, institution of, at Platea, in 231 iv. 281.

Elis, genealogy of, i. 129 seq.; Oxylus and the Ætolians at, i. 446; Pisa,

ELYMI.

Triphylia, and Lepreum, ii. 352; formation of the city of, iv. 402; revolt of, from Sparta to Argos, v. 421 seq.; and Lepreum, v. 421; and Sparta, war between, vii. 391 seq.; claim of, to Triphylia and the Pisatid, viii. 248 seq., 298; alienation of, from the Arcadians, viii. 248; alliance of, with Sparta and Achaia, viii. 298. Elymi, iii. 163.

Emigrants to Ionia, the, i. 461 seq. Emigration, early, from Greece, iii. 163. Emigrations consequent on the Dorian occupation of Peloponnesus, i. 448; Æolic, Ionic, and Doric, i. 456 seq. Empedoklés, i. 379 seq., v. 524, vii. 122.

Emporiæ, x. 387. Endius, vi. 346 seq. Endymiôn, stories of, i. 129.

Eneti, the, i. 290.

England, her government of her dependencies compared with the Athenian empire, iv. 531 (n. 3). Eniênes, ii. 210.

Enna, Dionysius at, viii. 449. Ennea Hodoi, iv. 398, 498.
Ennea Hodoi, iv. 398, 498.
Enômoties, ii. 369 seq.
Entella, Syracusan attack upon, viii.
471, 479.

Eos. i. 6. Epameinondas, and the conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy at Thébes, viii. 78, 83, 117 seq.; training and character of, viii. 114 seq.; and Pelopidas, viii. 114; and Kallistratus, viii. 155, 274; and Agesilaus at the congress at Sparta, viii. 158 seq., 163; at Leuktra, viii. 168; and Orchomenus, viii. 184; proceedings and views of, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 202 seq.; expeditions of, into Peloponnėsus, viii. 206 seq., 242 seq., 253 seq., 314 seq.; foundation of Megalopolis and Messênê by, viii. 213 seq.; his retirement from Peloponnèsus, viii. 222; his trial of accountability, viii. 227 seq.; mildness of, viii. 246; and the Theban expedition to Thessaly, to rescue Pelopidas, viii. 271; mission of, to Arcadia, viii. 274; Theban fleet and naval expedition under, viii. 291 seq.; and Menekleidas, viii. 254, 289 seq.; and the destruction of Orchomenus, viii. 297; and the arrest of Arcadians by the Theban harmost at Tegea, viii. 311 seq.; attempted surprise of Mantineia by the cavalry of, viii. 317 seq.; at the battle of Mantineia, viii. 321 seq.; death of, viii. 332 seq.; character of, viii. 335

Epeians, i. 129 seq., 448. Epeius of Panopeus, i. 276, 285. EPÔDUS.

Epeunakta, iii. 198.
Ephesus, iii. 9 seq.; capture of, by
Cræsus, iii. 82; defeat of Thrasyllus
at, vi. 352; Lysander at, vi. 375, 433;
capture of, by Alexander, x. 39.

Ephetæ, ii. 450 seq. Ephialtés the Alôid, i. 128.

Ephialtes the general, ix. 546, x. 44.

Ephialtes the statesman, iv. 449, 454; and Periklês, constitution of dikasteries by, iv. 441 seq.; judicial reform of, iv. 451.

Ephors, Spartan, ii. 270, 272 seq., 274, v. 426; appointment of, at Athens, vi. 454.

Ephorus, i. 366, ii. 288.

Epic cycle, ii. 59 seq.
Epic poems, lost, ii. 57; recited in public, not read in private, ii. 71; variations in the mode of reciting, ii. 76 seq.; long, besides the Iliad and Odyssey, ii. 89.

Epic poetry in early Greece, ii. 54 seq.

Epic poets and their dates, ii. 59. Epic of the middle ages, i. 429.

Epical localities, transposition of, i. 228; age preceding the lyrical, iii.

Epicharmus, i. 338 (n. 1).

Epidamnus, iii. 218 seq.; and the Illyrians, iii. 234 seq.; foundation of, iv. 535; application of the democracy at, to Korkyra and Corinth, iv. 535; attacked by the Korkyræans, iv. 536; expeditions from Corinth to, iv. 536.

Epidaurus, attack of Argos and Athens upon, v. 464; ravaged by the Argeians, v. 468; Lacedæmonian movements in support of, v. 469; attempts of the Argeians to storm, v. 470; operations of the Argeian allies near, v. 488; evacuation of the fort at, v. 494.

Epigoni, the, i. 254, ii. 65 (n. 4).
Epimenides, visit of, to Athens, i. 26.
Epimenides of Kréte, ii. 456 seq.
Epimetides of, 70.
Epipolee, vi. 78; intended occupation of, by the Syracusans, vi. 81; occupation of by the Athenians vi. 81; defeat of, by the Athenians, vi. 81; defeat of the Athenians at, vi. 106; Demosthenes' night-attack upon, vi. 138 seq.; capture of, by Dion, ix. 93; capture of, by Tinoleon, ix. 159.

Epirots, ii. 161, iii. 165, 223 seq.; attack

of, upon Akarnania, v. 114 seq. Epirus, discouraging to Grecian colonization, iii. 227; Dionysius' schemes of conquest in, ix. 23; government of Olympias in, x. 329 (n. 1). Epistatés, iii. 357.

Epitadas, v. 257. Epitadeus the Ephor, ii. 321. Epôdus, introduction of, iii. 312.

EPYAXA.

Epyaxa and Cyrus the Younger, vii.

Erce, revolt of, from Athens, vi. 207. Erasinides, trial and imprisonment of, vi. 402.

Eratosthenês, vi. 467, 490, 511.

Erechtheion, restoration of, iv. 506.
Erechtheios, i. 177 seq., 183, 186.
Eresus, Thrasyllus at, vi. 327.
Eretria, ii. 531 seq., 536 seq.; assistance of, to the Milesians, iii. 500; siege and capture of, by Datis, iv. 21 seq.; fate of captives taken by Datis at, iv. 49; naval defeat of the Athenians near, vi. 298 seq.; Phokion at, ix. 330; philippizing faction at, ix. 435;

liberation of, ix. 438. Ergoklés, vii. 531 (n. 1). Ergophilus, viii. 354 seq. Erichthonius, i. 178, 181, 261. Eriphylé, i. 249 seq.

Erôs, i. 4; and Aphrodite, function of,

i. 5. Erytheia, i. 228.

Erythræ, iii. 1 seq., vi. 202. Eryx, defeat of Dionysius at, ix. 43. Eryxô and Learchus, iii. 269. Eteoklês, i. 121, 248, 256.

Eteonikus, expulsion of, from Thasos, vi. 351; at Mitylėnė, vi. 393; escape of, from Mitylėnė to Chios, vi. 397, 410; at Chios, vi. 432; removal of, from Chios to Ephesus, vi. 433; in Ægina, vii. 535, 538.

Ethiopians and Egyptians, iii. 131. Etruria, plunder of, by Dionysius, ix.

Euæphnus and Polycharês, ii. 339.

Eubœa, ii. 531 seq.; resolution of the Greeks to oppose Xerxês at the strait on the north of, iv. 169; advance of the Persian fleet to, iv. 197; revolt and recouquest of, by Periklês, iv. 434; application from, to Agis, vi. 196; revolt of, from Athens, B.C. 411, vi. 298; Peloponnesian fleet summoned from, by Mindarus, vi. 334; bridge joining Beetia and, vi. 335, 341; rescued from Thèbes by Athens, B.C. 358, ix. 213 seq.; revolt of, from Athens, B.C. 350-349, ix. 329 seq.; intrigues of Philip in, ix. 329; expedition of Phokion to, B.C. 342, ix. 330 seq.; hostilities in, B.C. 349-348, ix. 335; philippizing factions in, B.C. 342, ix. 435; expedition of Phokion to, B.C. 341, ix. 438.

Euboa in Sicily, iv. 305.

Euboic scale, ii. 240, 245, 537.

Euboic synod, ix. 438. Eubulus, ix. 270, 300, 356, 358, 382. Eudamidas, viii. 54, 60.

Eulmerus' treatment of mythes, i. 367.

EUTHYDEMUS.

Eukleidés, archonship of, vi. 526.

Euklês, v. 323, 325, 328 seq. Eumachus, x. 369, 370. Eumélus of Bosporus, x. 414. Eumélus the poet, i. 114 seq.

Eumenés, x. 24; and Hephæstion, x. 186; and Perdikkas, x. 255; victory of, over Kraterus and Neoptolemus, x. 271 seq.; attempts of, to uphold Alexander's dynasty in Asia, x. 276

seq.; and Antigonus, x. 273.

Eumenidés, Æschylus', and the Areopagus, ii. 451 (n. 1).

Eumolpus, i. 184 seq. Eunomus, vii. 537. Eupatridæ, ii. 443. Euphaés, ii. 340.

Euphémus, speech of, at Kamarina, vi.

Euphilêtus and Melêtus, vi. 38.

Euphræus, ix. 204, 435.

Euphraus, IX. 204, 430.
Euphraus, IX. 204, 430.
199; the Ten Thousand Greeks at, vii. 270; Alexander at, x. 97, 190.
Euphrôn, viii. 255 seq.
Euripidés, faults imputed to, i. 346 seq.; story about the dramas of, and the

Athenian prisoners in Sicily, vi. 178; number of tragedies by, vii. 3 (n. 1); Æschylus and Sophoklês, vii. 6 seq.; and Dekamnichus, viii. 43 seq.

Euripidés, financial proposal of, vii. 543 (n 2).

Euripus, bridge across, vi. 335, 341. Eurôpa, i. 202 seq., 236. Eurotas, crossed by Epameinondas, viii.

Euryalus, Hamilkar's attempt on, x. 356.

Eurybatés, iv. 148. Eurybiades, iv. 177, 216 seq.

Eurydikê, widow of Amyntas, viii. 237. Eurydikė, granddaughter of Philip, x. 269, 273.
Eurydeon, iv. 298.
Eurydeokus, v. 213-221.

Eurymedôn, victories of the, iv. 395.

Eurymedón, at Korkyra, v. 193 seq.; and Sophoklês, expedition of, to Korkyra and Sicily, v. 231 seq.; 273 seq.; at Pylus, v. 239 seq., 249; expeditions of, to Sicily, v. 533, 535, vi. 113; return of, from Sicily to Athens,

Eurynomé, and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10. Euryptolemus, vi. 399 (n. 2), 406, 418, 421

seq. Eurypylus, i. 276. Eurystheus, i. 88, 90, 147. Eurytos, i. 131 seq.

Eurytus, iv. 191.

Eutæa, Agesilaus at, B.C. 370, viii. 200. Euthydemus, Plato's, vii. 74 (n. 1).

EUTHYKRATÊS.

Euthykratés and Lasthenes, ix. 340.
Euxine, Greek settlements on, iii. 61, 255, vii. 288; first sight of, by the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 277; indigenous tribes on, vii. 289; the Greeks on, and the Ten Thousand, vii. 290; Xenophor's deag of fending very Xenophôn's idea of founding a new city on the, vii. 299 seq. Evagoras, vii. 528, 538, viii. 13 seq.

Family tie, in legendary Greece, ii. 24; rites in Greece, ii. 431. Fates, i. 7; and Creesus, iii. 411 seq. Ferdousi, Persian epic of, i. 428 (n. 1). Festivals, Grecian, i. 48, ii. 156, iii. 279, 292 seq., 295 seq.; at Athens, ix. 44. Fiction, plausible, i. 387, 486. Fietitious matter in Greek tradition, i. Financial changes, Kleisthenean, iii. Five Thousand, the, at Athens, vi. 265, 282 (n. 1), 288, 302 (n. 2), 304. Flaying alive by Persians and Turks, iii. 504 (n. 2).

Fleece, Golden, legend of, i. 115.

Flute, use of, iu Sparta, iii. 306.

Fortification of towns in early Greece, ii. 46 seq.; of the Grecian camp in the Iliad, ii. 118. Four Hundred, the oligarchy of, vi. 265 Frenzy, religious, of women, i. 27 seq Funeral ceremony at Athens over slain warriors, iv. 516; orations, besides that of Periklês, v. 65 (n. 2); obsequies of Hephæstion, x. 191, 192. Funerals, Solôn's regulations about, ii.

G.

Gadés, iii. 92 seq.: voyage from Corinth to, in the seventh and sixth centuries to, in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., iii. 98.

Gæa, i. 4, 5, 9.

Gæsylus, ix. 114.

Games, Olympic, i. 95, ii. 169 seq., 238 seq., iii. 281 seq.; Isthmian, i. 117, ii. 229 (n. 2), iii. 290; the four great Grecian, ii. 162, iii. 299, 294 seq.; Solôn's rewards to victors at, ii. 508; Pythian, iii. 284, 289 seq.; Nemean, iii. 290 iii. 290. Gamori, ii. 404; at Syracuse, iv. 296. Ganymédés, i. 261. Gargaphia, fountain of, iv. 259 (n. 2).

Gaugamela, battle of, x. 102 seq. Gauls, embassy of, to Alexander, ix. 528; invasion of Greece by, x. 323. Gaza, capture of, by Alexander, x. 90 8eq.

GODDESSES.

Gedrosia, Alexander in, x. 144, 176.
Gela, iii. 178; and Syracuse, before B.C.
500, iv. 295; Kleander of, iv. 299;
Gelo despot of, iv. 299 seq.; congress
of Sicilian cities at, v. 534; and Hannibal's capture of Selinus, viii. 390; expeditions of Dionysius to, viii. 420, 430 seq.; capture of, by Imilkon, viii. 428 seq.; Timoleon and the fresh colonization of, ix. 184; Agathoklês at, x. 341.

Geleontes, ii. 425. Gelo, iv. 164, 299, 315 seq. Gelôni, iii. 68.

Gelonian dynasty, fall of, iv. 322; citizens of Syracuse, iv. 322 seq.

Genealogies, Grecian, i. 77 seq., 399;

Argeian, i. 79; mythical, i. 177, 398
seq.; Egyptian, i. 399; Clinton's vindical in the seq., i. 399; Clinton's vindical in the seq.,

dication of, i. 478 seq. Genealogy, Corinthian, of Eumélus, i. 114 seq.; of Orchomenos, i. 123 seq.; Eleian, i. 129; Ætolian, i. 132; Laconian, i. 155; Messenian, i. 159; Arcadion, i. 150; Arcadion, i. 160; Arcadion,

dian, i. 160.

Generals, Kleisthenean, iii. 355.

Gentes, Attic, ii. 427 seq., 437 seq.; analogy between those of Greece and other nations, ii. 433 seq.; Grecian, patronymic names of, ii. 435; difference between Grecian and Roman, ii. 437; non-members of, under Solôn, 499.

Geographical knowledge, Hesiodic and Homeric, ii. 51; views of Alexander, x. 172 (n. 4).

Geography, fabulous, i. 225 seq.; Homeric, iii. 31; of the retreat of the Ten Thousand, vii. 281 seq.

Geological features of Greece, ii. 145.

Geomori, ii. 404, 445. Gergis, iii. 24; Derkyllidas at, vii. 381. Gergithes, iii. 24.

German progress brought about by violent external influences, i. 414; mythes, i. 415. Gerontes, ii. 9.

Geronthræ, conquest of, ii. 333. Geryôn, i. 7, 228. Getæ, Alexander's defeat of, ix. 526.

Gigantes, birth of, i. 4, 9 (n. 1). Gillus, iii. 471. Giskon, viii. 368 (n. 1), ix. 176.

Glauke, x. 171. Glaukê, i. 112.

Glaukon, discourse of, iu Plato's Republic, vii. 73.

Glaukus, i. 208. Gnomie, Greek poets, iii. 314 seq. Gnomon, whence obtained by the Greeks, iii. 158.

Goddesses and gods, twelve great, i. 10.

Golden Fleece, legend of, i. 115. Golden race, the, i. 61. Gongylus, the Corinthian, vi. 99, 105. Good, &c., meaning of, in early Greek writers, ii. 7; double sense of the Greek and Latin equivalents of, ii. 419 (n. 4).

Gordian knot, Alexander cuts the, x. 53. Gordium, Alexander's march from, x. 59.

Gordius, legend of, iii. 44. Gorgias of Leontini, v. 524, 529, vii. 51,

Gorgons, i. 86.

Gorgôpas, at Ægina, vii. 538 seq.

Government of historical and legendary Greece, ii. 3 seq.; heroic, ii. 16; earliest changes of, in Greece, ii. 381 seq.; kingly, ii. 384 seq.; change from monarchical to oligarchical in Greece, ii. 391 seq.

Governments, Grecian, weakness of, iii.

Graces, the, i. 10. Grace, i. 7. Graci, ii. 193.

Græcia Magna, iii. 208.

Greeco-Asiatic cities, x. 209. Granikus, battle of the, x. 30 seq.; Athe-

nians captured at the, x. 54.

Graphé Paranomôn, iv. 459 seq.; abolition of, B.C. 411, vi. 264.

Grecian mythes, i. 49, 408 seq.; genealogical in the sequence of the sequence gies, i. 77 seg.; mythology, sources of our information on, i. 101; intellect, expansive force of, i. 326; progress between B.C. 700 and 500, i. 329 seg.; antiquity, i. 397, 400; genealogies, i. 399; townsman, intellectual acquisitions of a, i. 408; poetry, matchless, i. 413; progress, self-operated, i. 413; mythology, how it would have been affected by the introduction of Christianity, B.C. 500, i. 418; mythes, proper treatment of, i. 435 seq.; computation of time, ii. 52 (n. 4); festivals, intellectual influence of, ii. 154; history, first and second periods of, ii. 193 seq., iii. 276; opinion, change in, on the decision of disputes by in, on the decision of disputes by champions, ii. 363; states, growing communion of, between B.C. 600 and 547, ii. 373; "faith," ii. 483; settlements on the Euxine, iii. 61; marine and commerce, growth of, iii. 156; colonies in Southern Italy, iii. 187 seq.; world about 560 B.C., iii. 208; history, want of unity in, iii. 276; games, influence of, upon the Greek mind, iii. 295 seq.; art, beginnings and importance of, iii. 320 seq.; archi-

tecture, iii. 322; governments, weakness of, iii. 370; world, in the Thirty Years' truce, iv. 532; and barbarian military feeling, contrast between, v. 358; youth, society and conversa-tion of, v. 486 (n. 2); states, compli-cated relations among, B.C. 420, v. 453; and B.C. 366, viii. 278; philo-sophy, negative side of, vii. 27; dialectics, their many-sided handling of subjects, vii. 130 seq.; states, embassies from at Pella, B.C. 346, ix. 392 seq.; captives, mutilated, at Persepolis, x. 119; history, bearing of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns on, x. 124 seq.; mercenaries under Darius, x. 128, 133; envoys with Darius, x. 134; world, state of, B.C. 334, x. 214; exiles, Alexander's rescript directing the

recal of, x. 245 seq.

Greece, legends of, originally isolated, afterwards thrown into series, i. 101; legendary and historical state of society and manners in, ii. 1-55; subterranean course of rivers in, 148; difficulty of land communication in, ii. 150; accessibility of, by sea, ii. 151; islands and colonies of, ii. 152; difference between the landstates and sea-states in, ii. 153; effects of the configuration of, ii. 154 seq.; mineral and other productions of, ii. 157 seq.; climate of, ii. 160; difference between the inhabitants of different parts of, ii. 160; ante-Hellenic inhabitants of, ii. 187; discontinuance of kingship in, ii. 384; anti-monarchical sentiment of, ii. 388, iii. 393; the voyage from, to Italy or Sicily, iii. 174; seven wise men of, iii. 316 seq.; first advance of, towards systematic conjunction, iii. 391; probable consequences of a Persian expedition against, before that against Scythia, iii. 471 seq.; on the eve of Xerxès' invasion, iv. 155; first separation of, into two distinct parties, iv. 350 seq., 379; proceedings in central, between B.C. 470-464, iv. 401; state of feeling in, between B.C. 445-431, v. 1; bad morality of the rich and great in, v. 201; atmospherical disturbances in, B.C. 427, v. 211; warlike preparations in, during the winter of B.C. 414-413, vi. 121; alteration of feeling in, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, vi. 478, 483, 494; disgust in, at the Thirty at Athens, vi. 481; degradation of, by the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 2 seq., 9; effect of the battle of Leuktra on, viii. 174, 177, 183; relations of Diouysius with, B.C.

GREEKS.

382-369, ix. 42; state of, B.C. 360-359, ix. 195; decline of citizen-soldiership and increase of mercenaries in, after the Peloponnesian war, ix. 272 seq.; effect of the peace and alliance between Philip and Athens upon, ix. 416; movements and intrigues of Philip throughout, after B.C. 346, ix. 429 seq.; state of, on Alexander's accession, ix. 505, 514 seq.; march of Alexander into, B.C. 336, ix. 514; Macedonian interventions in, B.C. 336-335, ix. 519 seq.; terror in, on the destruction of Thèbes by Alexander, ix. 544; connexiou of Alexander with, history of, x. 1 seq., ix. 195 seq.; an appendage to Macedonia under Alexander, x. 4; military changes in, during the sixty years before Alexander's accession, x. 5 seq.; possibility of emancipating, during Alexander's earlier Asiatic cam-paigns, x. 214; hopes raised in, by the Persian fleet and armies, B.C. the Persian fleet and armies, B.C. 334-331, x. 214; submission of, to Antipater, x. 222; effect of Alexander's death on, x. 247; confederacy for liberating, after Alexander's death, x. 248 seq.; Ptolemy of Egypt in, x. 307; success of Demetrius Poliorkêtés in, against Kassander, 216 a today of the properties of the p x. 316; under Demetrius Poliorkêtês and Antigonus Gonatas, x. 322; invasion of, by the Gauls, x. 323; of Polybus, x. 324.

Greece, Proper, geography of, ii. 141

seq. Greek forces, against Troy, i. 264 seq.; language and the mythes, i. 318; tradition, matter of, uncertified, i. tradition, matter of, uncertified, i. 385; language, various dialects of ii. 167; alphabet, origin of, iii. 157 (n. 2); Latin and Oscan languages, iii. 167; settlements, east of the Strymôn in Thrace, iii. 252; settlements on the Euxine south of the Danube, iii. 255; settlements in Libya, and the nomads, iii. 263; eities, local festivals in, iii. 279, 292 seq.; lyric poetry, iii. 298, 314; poetry about the middle of the seventh century B.C. iii. 297; music. seventh century B.C., iii. 297; music about the middle of the seventh about the middle of the seventh century B.C., iii. 299; poetry, after Terpander, iii. 301; hexameter, new metres superadded to, iii. 303; chorus, iii. 309, 311; dancing, iii. 307; mind, positive tendencies of, in the time of Herodotus, iii. 327 (n. 1); whilesophy in the sixth century B.C. philosophy in the sixth century B.C., iv. 67 seq.; fleet at Artemisium, iv. 177 seq., 182 seq.; fleet at Salamis, iv. 208; fleet at Mykalê, iv. 283 seq.; fleet

after the battle of Mykalê, iv. 291 seq.; fleet, expedition of, against Asia, B.C. 478, iv. 343; generals and captains, slaughter of Cyreian, vii. 239 seq.; heroes, analogy of Alexander

to the, x. 21.

Greeks, return of, from Troy, i. 282 seq.; their love of antiquities, i. 315; their distaste for a real history of the past, i. 322; Homeric, ii. 36, 55; in Asia Minor, ii. 163, iii. 41; extra-Peloponnesian, north of Attica in the first two centuries, ii. 198 seq.; advance of, in government in the seventle and sixth centuries B.C., ii. 393; musical modes of, iii. 39; and Phenicians, in Sicily and Cyprus, iii. 97; contrasted with Egyptians, Assyrians, and Phenicians, iii. 121; influence of and Phrenicians, iii. 121; influence of Phrenicians, Assyrians, and Egyptians on, iii. 157 seq.; and Carthaginians, first known collision between, iii. 161; Sicilian and Italian, monetary and statical scale of, iii. 182; in Sicily, prosperity of, between B.C. 735 and 485, iii. 173 seq.; in Sicily and in Greece Proper, difference between, iii. 184; Italian, between B.C. 700.500, iii. 203 seq.; their talent for command over barbarians, iii. 244: first voyage of. to Libya, iii. 244 ; first voyage of, to Libya, iii. 256 ; and Libyans at Kyrênê, iii. 265 ; political isolation of, iii. 276; political isolation of, iii. 276; tendencies to political union among, after B.C. 560, iii. 277; growth of union among, between B.C. 776-560, iii. 277; rise of philosophy and dialectics among, iii. 318; writing among, iii. 319; Asiatic, after Cyrus' conquest of Lydia, iii. 414; Asiatic, application of, to Sparta, B.C. 546, iii. 414; and Darius, before the battle of Manathôn iv. 5: eminent, liable to Marathôn, iv. 5; eminent, liable to be corrupted by success, iv. 59 seq.; and Persians, religious conception of history common to, iv. 110; northern, and Xerxês, iv. 162, 166; confederate, engagement of, against such as joined Xerxês, iv. 169; effect of the battle of Thermopylæ on, iv. 202 seq.; and the battle of Salamis, iv. 202 seq.; medising, and Mardonius, iv. 243; medising, at Platæa, iv. 272; at Platæa, iv. 274 seq.; at Mykalê, iv. 283 seq.; Asiatic, first step to the ascendency of Athena over iv. 201. Sigilian, analy govern over, iv. 291; Sicilian, early governments of, iv. 297; Sicilian, progress of, between the battle of Salamis and Alexander, iv. 331; allied, oppose the fortification of Athens, iv. 333, 336; allied, transfer the headship from Sparts to Athens headship from Sparta to Athens,

GRYLLUS.

B.C. 477, iv. 346 seq.; allied, Aristeides assessment of, iv. 354; allied, under Athens, substitute moneypayment for personal service, iv. 387 seq.; effect of the Athenian disaster in Sicily upon, vi. 195; and Tissa-phernės, Alkibiadės acts as interpreter between, vi. 235 seq.; Asiatic, surrender of, by Sparta to Persia, vii. 373; Asiatic, and Cyrus the Younger, vii. 374; Asiatic, and Tissaphernės, vii. 374; the Ten Thousand, their position and circum-Thousand, their position and chedmistances, vii. 183; Ten Thousand, at Kunaxa, vii. 211 seq.; Ten Thousand, after the battle of Kunaxa, vii. 216 seq.; Ten Thousand, retreat of, vii. 225, 281, 346 seq.; Ten Thousand, after their return to Trapezus, vii. 288-348; Asiatic, their application to Sparta for aid against Tissaphernês, vii. 375; in the service of Alexander in Asia, x. 24; unpropitious circumstances for, in the Lamian war, x. 270; Italian, pressed upon by enemies

from the interior, x. 328.

Gryllus, death of, viii. 319.

Guilds, Grecian deities of, i. 312; German and early English, ii. 433 (n. 2); compared with ancient political as-

sociations, vi. 247 (n. 1). $Gyg\hat{e}s$, i. 5, in. 48 seq. Gylippus, expedition of, to Syracuse, vi. 75, 95 seq., 105 seq., 124 seq., 150, 156 seg.

Gylon, father of Kleobulê, the mother of Demostheues, ix. 258 (n. 3).

Gymnêsii, ii. 410. Gymdês, distribution of, into channels, by Cyrus, iii. 428.

H.

Hadês, i. 9 seq. Hæmôn and Antigonê, i. 253. Haliartus, Lysander at, vii. 459. Halikarnassus, i. 466, iii. 30; capture of, by Alexander, x. 44 seq. Halonnesus, dispute between Philip and the Athenians about, ix. 433 seq. Halys, the, iii. 34. Hamilkar, defeat and death of, at Himera, iv. 311 seq. Hamilkar, collusion of, with Agathok-lês, x. 334: superseded in Sicily by another general of the same name, x. 337. Hamilkar, victory of, at the Himera, x. 341 seq.; attempt of, upon Syracuse, x. 355; defeat and death of, x. 356. Hannibal, expeditions of, to Sicily, viii. 386-397, 404 seq.

Hanno, silly fabrication of, ix. 156.

HELLESPONT.

Harmodius and Aristogeiton, iii. 333 Harmosts, Spartan, vii. 357, 364, 368 sea. Harpagus, iii. 418, 422. Harpalus, x: 180, 232 seq. Harpies, the, i. 1, 216. Hébê, i. 10. Hector, i. 262, 272. Hegemony, Athenian, iv. 379 seq. Hegesippus, ix. 432. Hegesippus, 1x. 452. Hegesistratus, iv. 261, 283, x. 39, 40. Hekabê, i. 262, 263. Hekatæus on Geryôn, i. 229; on the Argonauts, i. 232; and the mythes, i. 350; and the Ionic revolt, iii. 496,

507.

Hekatompylus, Alexander at, x. 132.
Hekatoncheires, the, i. 4, 5.
Hekatonymus and the Ten Thousand
Greeks, vii. 296 seq.
Helen, i. 149, 151; necklace of, i. 258;
and Paris, i. 264; and Achillês, i.

269; various legends of, i. 279 seq. Helenus and Andromache, i. 279. Heliaa, ii. 490, iii. 356, 360 seq.

Heliasts, iii. 360. Helikê, destruction of, viii. 148.

Helios, i. 6, 313. Helixus, vi. 357.

Hellanikus, his treatment of mythes, i. 349; contrasted with Saxo Gramma-

ticus and Snorro Sturleson, i. 418.

Hellas, division of, i. 96 seq.; proper, ii.

141; mountain systems of, ii. 141
seq.; islands and colonies of, ii. 152; most ancient, ii. 193.

Hellé and Phryxus, i. 117. Hellén and his sons, i. 95 seq. Hellénes, i. 95, ii. 164 seq., 182 seq. Hellenic religion and customs in the Trôad, i. 307; cities, ii. 183.

Hellénion at Naukratis, iii. 152.

Hellenism, definition of, x. 208.

Hellenism, definition of, x. 208.

Hellenotamia, iv. 354, vi. 527.

Hellespont, bridges of Xerxês over, iv. 115 seq., 118 (n. 2); crossed by Xerxês, iv. 131; retreating march of Xerxês to, iv. 236 seq.; Grecian fleet at, B.C. 479, iv. 291; Strombichides at, vi. 320; Peloponnesian reinforcement to, B.C. 411, vi. 322; Mindarus and Thrasyllus at, vi. 327, 331, 340; Athenians and Peloponnesians at, after the battle of Kynossêma, vi. after the battle of Kynossenia, vi. 340; Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês at, vi. 353; Thrasybulus at, vii. 529; Iphikratês at, vii. 533 seq.; Antalkidas at, vii. 547; Epameinondas at, viii. 288, 291; Timotheus at, viii. 291, 357; Autoklês at, viii. 355 seq.; operations of the Athenians at, B.C. 357, and the sequence of the Athenians at the sequence of the disputes between Athens ix. 220; disputes between Athens

HELÔRIS.

and Philip about, ix. 436; imprudence of the Persians in letting Alexander cross the, x. 27.

Helôris, unsuccessful expedition of, ix.

5, 7, 14. Helots, ii. 291 seq.; Pausanias and, iv. 358; revolt of, iv. 403 seq.; at Ithômê, capitulation of, iv. 420; assassination of, v. 283 seq.; Brasidean, v. 424; brought back to Pylus, v. 469; and the invasion of Laconia by Epameinondas, viii. 203 seq.; establishment of, with the Messenians, viii. 218 seq.

Helus conquered by Alkamenês, ii. 334.

Hephæstion, x. 186, 191, 193. Hephæstos, i. 10, 55.

Hêrœon, near Mykênæ, i. 152. Hêrœon Teichos, siege of, by Philip, ix.

299. Hérakleia Pontiea, i. 222, x. 392 seq.; the Ten Thousand Greeks at, vii. 313.

Hêrakleia in Italy, iii. 196, iv. 500. Hérakleia in Sicily, iv. 298; Dion at, ix.

Hérakleia Trachinea, v. 211 seq., 461, vii.

451, 468. Hêrakleid kings of Corinth, ii. 229.

Hérakleidés the Syracusan, exile of, ix. 84; victory of, over Philistus, ix. 97; and Dion, ix. 98, 99, 103, 107, 110 seq., 119; victory of, over Nypsius, ix. 105; death of, ix. 120.

Hêrakleidês, governor of the Pontic Herakleia, x. 401. Hêrakleids i. 90, 438 seq.; Lydian dy-

nasty of, iii. 48.

Héraklés, i. 88 seg.; attack of, on Pylos, i. 106; and Alkèstis, i. 109; overthrows Orchomeuos, i. 122; death of, i. 140; and Hylas, i. 215; and Laomedon, i. 262; Tyrian, temple of,

Hêraklês, son of Alexander, x. 306. Hêrê, i. 6, 10, 54; and Mykênæ, i. 152;

temple of, near Argos, burnt, v. 364; Lakinian, robe of, ix. 22. Herippidas, vii. 441, 479, 492. Herma, mutilation of, at Athens, vi. 4 seq., 31 seq. Hermaias of Atarneus, ix. 427.

Hermes, i. 10, 55 seq. Hermionê, i. 151.

Hermokratean party, viii. 414; exiles,

Hermokratés, at the Congress at Gela, v. 534; and the Athenian armament, vi. 19; recommendations of, after the battle near Olympicion, vi. 61; speech of, at Kamarina, vi. 63; urges the Syracusans to attack the Athenians at sea, vi. 124; postpones the Athenians' retreat from Syracuse, vi.

HIEROMNÊMÔN.

163; and Tissaphernês, vi. 219, 324; in the Ægean, viii. 368 seq.; banishment of, viii. 370 seq.; his return to Sicily, and death, viii. 398—401.

Hermolaus, x. 163. Hermotybii and Kalasiries, iii. 134. Herodotus, on Minôs, i. 209, 210; on Helen and the Trojans, i. 281; treatment of mythes by, i. 350 seq.; his view of Lykurgus, ii. 263; his story of Solôn and Cresus, ii. 515 seq.; chronological mistakes of, ii. 519 (n. 1), iii. 26 (n. 2); chronological discre-1), in. 20 (n. 2); chronological discrepancies of, respecting Kyaxarês, iii. 58 (n. 1); his description of Scythia, iii. 61 seq.; his account of Babylon, iii. 113 seq.; 116 (n. 1); distinction between what he professes to have seen and heard, iii. 127; on the effects of despotism and democracy upon the Athenians, iii. 394; and Ktėsias, on Cyrus, iii. 402; chrono-logy of his life and authorship, iii. 442 (n. 1), iv. 148 (n. 1); his narrative of Darius' march into Scythia, iii. 474 seq.; does not mention Pythagoras in connection with the war between Sybaris and Krotôn, iv. 99; historical manner and conception of, iv. 106, 111 (n. 4); his estimate of the number of Xerxês' army, iv. 134 seq.; doubts about the motives ascribed to Xerxês at Thermopylæ by, iv. 184; a proof of the accuracy of, iv. 188 (n. 3); on the movements of the Persian fleet before the battle of Salamis, iv. 224 (n. 2 aud 3).

Heroes appear with gods and men in mythes, i. 60; Greek, at Aulis, i. 265 seq.; Greek, analogy of Alexander to, x. 21.

Heroie race, i. 61; legends, i. 377. Hesiod, theogony of, i. 4-12, 19, 72; family affairs of, i. 68; Japetids in, i. 70; complaints of, against kings, ii. 16; dark picture of Greece by, ii.

Hesiodie mythes traceable to Krête and Delphi, i. 15; "Works and Days," i. 61 seq.; philosophy, i. 331; Greeks,

ii. 51 seq. ; epic, ii. 56. Hesioné, i. 262.

Hesperides, dragon of, i. 7. Hesperides, town of, iii. 259 (n. 2), 268. Hestia, i. 6, 55.

Hestica on Ilium, i. 298.

Hetæræ, v. 24.

Heteries at Athens, v. 208, vi. 246.
Hexameter, the ancient, i. 69; new metres superadded to, iii. 303.

Hierax, vii. 535.

Hiero of Syracuse, iv. 317 seq. Hieromnémôn, ii. 173.

HIKETAS.

Hiketas, ix. 127; and the Syracusans, ix. 133; message of, to Corinth and to Timoleon, ix. 141; defeat of, at Adranum, ix. 146; and Magon, ix. 154 seq., 157; flight of, from Syracuse to Leontini, ix. 158; capitulation of, with Timoleon, ix. 168; invites the Carthaginians to invade Sicily, ix. 169; defeat, surrender, and death of, ix. 178.

Himera, iii. 179; battle of, iv. 311 seq.; treatment of, by Thêro, iv. 317; capture of, by Hannibal, viii. 393 seq.; defeat of Agathoklês at the, x. 341

Hindoos, rivers personified by, i. 311 (n. 2); their belief with regard to the small-pox, i. 325 (n. 1); belief of, in fabulous stories, i. 383 (n. 1); expensiveness of marriage among, ii. 507 (n. 1); sentiment of, with regard to the discontinuance of sacrifices, ix. 543 (n. 2)

Hindoo Koosh, Alexander at, x. 145; Alexander reduces the country between the Indus and, x. 166 seq.

Hindostan, hoarding in, x. 121 (n. 2). Hipparchus, ii. 87 (n. 1), iii. 332 seq. Hipparinus, son of Dionysius, ix. 128. Hippeus, Solonian, ii. 486.

Hippias of Elis, vii. 63 seq. Hippias the Peisistratid, iii. 332 seq., 337 seq., 493, iv. 44 (n. 2). Hippo, iv. 71.

Hippodameia, i. 146,

Hippodamus, iv. 506. Hippokleidês, ii. 413.

Hippokratês the Physician, i. 334, vii. 106 (n. 1).

Hippokratês of Gela, iv. 301 seq. Hippokratês the Athenian General, v. 288 seq., 284, 296 seq., 305.

Hippon, ix. 181. Hipponikus, ii. 472.

Hipponium, capture of, ix. 17; re-establishment of, ix. 42.

Hipponoidas, v. 484, 488. Histiaus and the bridge over the Danube, iii. 483; and Myrkinus, iii. 485, 488; detention of, at Susa, iii. 488; and the Ionic revolt, iii. 495,

508 seq., 519.

Historians, treatment of mythes by, i. 350 seq.

Historical proof, positive evidence indispensable to, i. 383; sense of modern times not to be applied to an unrecording age, i. 385; evidence, the standard of, raised with regard to England, but not with regard to Greece, i. 433; and legendary Greece compared, ii. 3 seq.

Historicising innovations in the tale of

HYPASPISTÆ.

Troy, i. 293; of ancient mythes, i. 366 seq.; applicable to all mythes or none, i. 393.

History, uninteresting to early Greeks, i. 322; of England, how conceived down to the seventeenth century, i. 430 seq.; and legend, Grecian, blank between, i. 467 seq.; Grecian, first period of, from B.C. 776 to 560, ii. 196, 198; Grecian, second period of, from B.C. 560 to 300, ii. 196 seq.; religious conception of, common to Greeks and

Persians, iv. 110.

Homer and Hesiod, mythology of, i.
11-16; personality and poems of, ii.

11-16; personance, 65 seq. Homeric Zeus, i. 13; hymns, i. 31, 35 seq. 41, 55, 57, ii. 536 seq.; legend of the birth of Héraklès, i. 88 seq.; Pelops, i. 142; gods, types of, i. 316; age, mythical faith of, i. 323; philosophy, i. 331; account of the inhabitants of Belopounèsus, i. 449; Boulê and Peloponnesus, i. 449; Boulé and Agora, ii. 9 seq.; Greeks, social condition of, ii. 36. seq., 42; Greeks, unity, idea of, partially revived, ii. 95 seq.; mode of fighting, ii. 373; geography,

Homérids, the poetical gens of, ii. 67. Homicide, purification for, i. 23; mode of dealing with, in legendary and historical Greece, ii. 32 seq.; tribunals for, at Athens, ii. 448; Drako's laws of, retained by Solôn, ii. 500; trial for, and the senate of Areopagus, iv. 452 (n. 2).

Homoioi, Spartan, ii. 282, 332.

Hopletes, ii. 425.

Hôræ, the, i. 10. Horkos, i. 7, 8.

Horse, the wooden, of Troy, i. 276, 282. Horsemen at Athens, after the restoration of the democracy, B.C. 403, vi.

Hospitality in legendary Greece, ii. 26. Human sacrifices in Greece, i. 120 seq. Hyakinthia and the Lacedemonians, iv. 248.

Hyakinthus, i. 155. Hyblæan Megara, iii. 177. Hydarnés, iv. 186.

Hydaspês, Alexander at the, x. 169 seq.; Alexander sails down the, x. 173.

Hydra, the Lernæan, i. 7. Hydra, sailors of, iv. 150 (n. 2). Hykkara, capture of, vi. 51. Hylas and Hêraklês, i. 215.

Hylleis, ii. 280.

Hyllus, i. 90, 164. Hymns, Homeric, i. 31 seq., 35 seq., 42, 55, 57, ii. 536; at festivals in honour of gods, i. 48.

Hypaspista, x. 12.

HYPERBOLUS.

Hyperbolus, iii. 369, v. 504 seq., vi. 256. Hyperidés, ix. 492, x. 234 (n. 2), 241 (n. 1), 262.
Hyperión, i. 5, 6.
Hypermenés, viii. 137.
Hypermnéstra, i. 84. Hyphasis, Alexander at, x. 172. Hypomeiones, Spartan, ii. 297, 332. Hyrkania, Alexander in, x. 133.

I.

Ialmenos and Askalaphos, i. 123. Iapetids in Hesiod, i. 70. Iapetos, i. 5, 8. Iapygians, iii. 201. lasus, capture of, vi. 218.
Iberia in Spain, iii. 98.
Iberians and Dionysius, viii. 492.
Ida in Asia, iii. 22, 23.
Ida in Ryste. Ida in Krête, Zeus at, i. 6. Idanthyrsus, iii. 479. Idas, i. 157. Idomenê, Demosthenês at, v. 224 seq. Idrieus, ix. 424. Ikarus, i. 207. Riad and the Trojan war, i. 272; and Odyssey, date, structure, and authorship of, ii. 63, 136.
Rium, i. 261, 293 seq.
Rlynia, Dionysius' schemes of conquest in, ix. 23. Rlyrians, different tribes of, iii. 230 seq.; retreat of Perdikkas and Brasidas before, v. 356 seq.; victory of Philip over, ix. 211 seq.; defeat of, by Alexander, ix. 529 seq. Ilus, i. 261. Imbros, iii. 255, 488 seq. Imilkon and Hannibal, invasion of Sicily by, viii. 404 seq.; at Agrigentum, viii. 407 seq.; at Gela, viii. 428 seq.; and Dionysius, viii. 486 seq.; at Motyê, viii. 472; capture of Messênê by, viii. 478 seq.; and the Campanians of Ætna, viii. 478; before Syracuse, viii. 481 seq.; flight of, from Syracuse, viii. 491; miserable end of, viii. 493. Inachus, i. 79. Indus, Alexander at, x. 166 seq., 175 seq.; voyage of Nearchus from the mouth of, to that of the Tigris, x. 179. Industry, manufacturing, at Athens, ii. Infantry and oligarchy, ii. 406. Inland and maritime cities contrasted, ii. 153. Inô, i. 116 seq. Inscriptions, i. 477. Interest on loans, ii. 477 seq., 525.

Interpreters, Egyptian, iii. 144. Io, legend of, i. 80.

Iôn, i. 183, 188.

ISSUS.

Ionia, emigrants to, i. 461 seq.; conquest of, by Harpagus, iii. 418; Mardonius' deposition of despots in, iv. 3; expedition of Astyochus to, vi. 212; expedition of Thrasyllus to, vi. 352.

Imian, the name a reproach, ii. 536.
Imian, the name a reproach, ii. 536.
Imians, i. 448 seq.; and Darius' bridge
over the Danube, iii. 481 seq.; abandonment of, by the Athenians, iii.
502; at Lade, iii. 511 seq.; at Mykale, iv. 285 seq.; after the battle of Mykalê, iv. 288.

1v. 288.

1onic emigration, i. 457, 461 seq., iii. 1;

tribes in Attica, ii. 425, 426 seq.; cities
in Asia, iii. 1 seq., 81; and Italic
Greeks, iii. 208; revolt, iii. 496 seq.,
517 (n. 2); philosophers, iv. 67 seq.;
Sicilians and Athenia, v. 528 seq.; alphabet and the Athenian laws, vi. 525.

Iphigeneia, i. 268. Iphiklos, i. 104.

Iphikratés, destruction of a Lacedæmophikratés, destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by, vii. 493 (n. 1), 506 (n. 1), 511 seq.; military improvements and successes of, vii. 501 seq., 517; defeat of Anaxibius by, vii. 533 seq.; proceedings of, between B.C. 387-378, viii. 101 seq.; and Kotys, viii. 101, 284, 352, 357; expedition of, to Korkyra, viii. 141 seq., 145 (n. 1); and Timotheus, viii. 141, 284, ix. 220 seq.; expedition of, to aid Sparta against Thêbes, viii. 225 seq.; in Thrace and Macedonia, viii. 238 seq., 284; in the Hellespont, ix. 220; and Charês, ix. 220 seq.

220 seq. Iphikratés the Younger, x. 77. Ipsus, battle of, x. 321 Iran, territory of, iii. 404. Irasa, iii. 258.

Iris, i. 7.

Iron race, the, i. 62. Isagoras, iii. 347, 381 seq.

Ischagoras, v. 362. Ischolaus, viii. 207. Ischys, i. 164.

Isidas, viii. 316.

Islands in the Ægean, ii. 160. Ismenias, Leontiadês, viii. 55; trial and execution of, viii. 59. Ismenias and Pelopidas, viii. 264 seq.,

269, 271

Isokratés, his treatment of mythes, i. 364 (n. 4); ou the origin of Pericki, ii. 286; panegyrical oration of, viii. 41, 73; the Plataic oration of, viii. 153; the Archidamus of, viii. 218 (n. 1), 277 (n. 1); his letter to Philip, ix. 422.

Issêdones, iii. 68. Issus, Alexander at, before the battle, x. 62; Darius at, before the battle, x. 64; battle of, x. 68 seq.; inaction of Darius after the battle of, x. 99;

ISTHMIAN.

and its neighbourhood, as connected

with the battle, x. 420 seq.

Isthmian games, i. 117, ii. 169, iii. 290
seq.; Eleians excluded from, i. 131, ii.
229 (n. 2); B.C. 412, vi. 199; and
Agesilaus, vii. 508.

Istôné, Korkyræan fugitives at, v. 196,

273 seq. Italia, iii. 164.

Italian Greeks, iii. 182, 203 seq., ix. 21, x. 328.

Italians, iii. 187.

Italy and Sicily, early languages and history of, iii. 167 (n. 2).

Italy, the voyage from Greece to, iii.

174; Grecian colonies in, iii. 168, 173, 186 seq.; decline of Greek power in, after the fall of Sybaris, iv. 97; Southern, affairs of, B.C. 382-369, ix.

Ithômê, ii. 340, iv. 404.

J.

Jason, i. 110 seq., 214, 215 seq. Jason of Pheræ, viii. 130 seq., 139 (n. 1), 144, 180 seq., 185 seq.

Jaxartes, Alexander at the, x. 148 seq. Jocasta, i. 244 seq. Jurkæ, iii. 68.

Jury-trial, characteristics of, exhibited in the Athenian dikasteries, iv. 469

K.

Kabala, victory of Dionysius at, ix. 40. Kabeirichus, viii. 81. Kadmeia at Thêbes, seizure of, by Phœ-

bidas, viii. 56 seq.; surrender of, by the Lacedæmonians, viii, 85 seq.

Kadmus, i. 235 seq. Kalais and Zêtês, i. 183.

Kalasiries and Hermotybii, iii. 134. Kalauria, i. 53; Amphiktyony at, i. 126;

the Athenian allied armament at. viii. 140; death of Demosthenês at, x. 262 seg.

Kalchas, wanderings and death of, i.

Kalê Aktê, foundation of, v. 522.

Kallias, treaty of, iv. 423 seq. Kallias, son of Kalliadés, iv. 553, 556. Kallias at the congress at Sparta, B.C.

371, viii. 155. Kallias of Chalkis, ix. 331 seq., 436. Kallibius, the Lacedæmonian, vi. 461, vii.

Kalliklês, in Plato, vii. 64 seq. Kallikratidas, vi. 384 seq., 482. Kallimachus, the polemarch, iv. 32, Kallinus, iii. 301, 305.

Kallipidæ, iii, 64.

KASSANDER.

Kallippus, ix. 121 seq., 127 seq.

Kallirhoe, i. 7, 258.

Kallisthenes, the general, failure and condemnation of, viii. 354, ix. 409. Kallisthenes, the historian, i. 367.

Kallisthenês of Olynthus, x. 156, 158 seq.,

164 seq. Kallistô, i. 162.

Kallistratus, viii. 99, 104, 155 seq., 162, 274, ix. 260.

Kallixenus, vi. 416 seq., 423, 426. Kalpe, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, vii. 314 seq. Kalydonian boar, i. 133, 135 seq.

Kamarina, iii. 179; restoration of, to independence, iv. 327; and the Athenians, vi. 30; Áthenian and Syracusan envoys at, vi. 63 seq.; neutral policy of, B.c. 415, vi. 67; evacuation of, viii. 431; and Timoleon, ix. 184.

Kambysês, iii. 273, 434 seq.

Kandaules, iii. 48.

Kannônus, psephism of, vi. 416 (n.)
Kanôpic branch of the Nile, opening of,
to Greek traffic, iii. 145.
Kapaneus, i. 250, 254.
Kappadokia, subdued by Alexander, x.

Kardia, Athenian fleet at, vi. 343; alliance of, with Philip, ix. 436; Eumenês of, x. 24.

Karduehians, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 262 seq.

Karia, resistance of, to Daurisês, iii. 505.

Karmania, Alexander's bacchanalian procession through, x. 176. Karneian festival, ii. 229 (n. 2), iv. 175.

Karneius Apollo, i. 46.

Karnus, i. 440. Karpathus, i. 466. Karystus, iv. 20, 391.

Kassander, Antipater's treatment of, x. 274; schemes of, on Antipater's death, x. 275; and Polysperchon, war between, x. 295; gets possession of Athens, x. 296; in Peloponnesus, x. 299; defeat of Olympias by, x. 301; confederacy of, with Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus against Antigonus, x. 302, 303, 315, 320; founds Kassandreia and restores Thêbes, x. 302; and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, x. 303, 304; and the Ætolians, x. 304; measures of Antigonus against, x. 303, 304; great power of, in Greece, x. 304; Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, pacification of, with Antigonus, x. 305; compact of Polymorbal and the state of sperchon with, x. 306; Ptolemy makes a truce with, x. 307; success of Demetrius Poliorkêtês in Greece against, x. 315; truce of, with Deme-

KASSANDRA.

trius Poliorkêtês, x. 320; death of,

Kassandra, i. 279. Kastôr and Pollux, i. 156 seq.

Katabor and Poliux, 1. 150 seq.
Katabothra, ii. 148.
Katana, iii. 177; and Ætna, iv. 326;
Alkibiadês at, vi. 30; Nikias at, vi. 67; conquest of, by Dionysius, viii. 449; Carthaginian naval victory near, viii. 477; Hiketas and Magon at, ix. 155.

Katônakophori, ii. 410.

Katreus and Althæmenes, i. 206. Kaulonia, iii. 196, ix. 14, 17; Dikon of,

ix. 27.

Kaunus, Antisthenês at, vi. 226. Käystru-Pedion, march of Cyrus from Keramôn-Agora to, vii. 188 (n.).

Kebalinus, x. 136, 139.

Kebatimus, x. 136, 139.
Kekrops, i. 180 seq.; the second, i. 187.
Kelama, Alexander at, x. 49.
Keleos, i. 36 seq., 186.
Keleustés, v. 120 (n. 1).
Kentrités, the Ten Thousand Greeks at the, vii. 266 seq.
Kephallénia, iii. 220, v. 58, 64.

Kephalus and Dionysius at Syracuse. ix. 165.

Kephisodotus, viii. 357, 359. Kerasus, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, vii. 294.

Kersobleptês, viii. 359; and Charidêmus, viii. 360; intrigues of, against Athens, ix. 253; and the peace and alliance between Athens and Philip, ix. 385

seq.; defeat of, by Philip, ix. 430. Kertch, tumuli near, x. 416 seq. Kêtô, i. 7.

Kêyx and Alcvone, i. 127.

Kilikia, Alexander in, x. 62; Darius in,

Kimon and Themistoklês, iv. 367, 369; capture of Skyros by, iv. 392, 393 (n. 1); victories of, at the Eurymedon, iv. 395; trial and acquittal of, iv. 400, 450; and the Spartan applica-tion for aid against the Helots, iv. 404, 450; recal of, from ostracism, iv. 416; death of, iv. 422; political party of, iv. 446; and Periklês, iv. 416, 446 seq., 454; character of, iv. 447; ostracism of, iv. 451.

Kimonian treaty, the so-called, iv. 422

Kinadon, conspiracy and character of,

vii. 415 seq. King, the, in legendary Greece, ii. 4 seq., 16 seq.; the, in historical Greece, ii. 18; English theory of a, ii. 388.

Kings, Egyptian, iii. 140, 147 (n. 4).
Kingship, discontinuance of, in Greece generally, ii. 18, 384; in mediæval and modern Europe, ii. 384 seq.

KLEÔN.

Kinyps and Dorieus, iii. 265.

Kriyps and Dorieus, 11. 200.

Kirrha, iii. 285 seq., and n. 2, ix. 452
seq., 459.

Kirrheans, punishment of, iii. 287 seq.

Kirsidas, viii. 251.

Klarus, temple of Apollo at, iii. 12.

Klazomena, iii. 16, vi. 203, 214, 220.

Kleender of Gela, iv. 299.

Kleander the Lacedæmonian, vii. 316 seq.,

320, 322, 331, x. 141. Kleandridas, iv. 500. Kleandridês, iv. 434. Klearchus the Lacedamonian, at the Hellespont, vi. 322; at Byzantium, vi. 351; and Cyrus the Younger, vii. 180, 192 seq.; and Menon's soldiers, vii. 193; and Ariæus, vii. 230; and Tissaphernês, vii. 227, 237 seq.

Klearchus of the Pontic Herakleia, x. 392

Klearidas, v. 424. Kleinias, ii. 472.

Kleisthenês of Sikyôn, i. 255, ii. 65, 499 seq. Kleisthenés the Athenian, revolution in Attic tribes by, ii. 435, 439; retirement and recal of, iii. 383; development of Athenian energy after, iii. 394; changes in the constitution of, after the Persian war, iv. 365.

Kleiturchus, ix. 435, 438. Kleiturchus, ix. 435, 438. Kleitus the Illyrian, ix. 537 seq. Kleitus, Alexander's general, x. 34, 151

seq. Kleobulé, mother of Demosthenês, ix. 258 (n. 2). Kleobûlus and Xenarês, v. 427 seq.

Kleokritus, vi. 489.

Kleombrotus, viii. 89 seq., 121, 128, 166

**Recommendary VIII. 89 seq., 121, 128, 100 seq., 170 seq. **
**Kleomenés I., his expeditions to Athens, iii. 341, 381 seq.; and Aristagoras, iii. 496; defeat of Argeians by, iv. 11 seq.; return of, without attacking Argos, iv. 12; trial of, iv. 12; and the Æginetans, iv. 14, 17; and Demaratus, iv. 15 seq.; violent proceedings and doubt. 15 seq.; violent proceedings and death of, iv. 144.

Kleomenês III., ii. 270.

Kleomenés III., ii. 270.
Kleomenés, Alexander's satrap, xi. 181, 192, 193 (n. 1).
Kleôn the Athenian, first mention of, by Thucydidés, v. 165; policy and character of, v. 167, 388 seq.; and Mitylênê, v. 169 seq.; political function of, v. 210; and the prisoners in Sphakteria, v. 244 seq.; expedition of, to Pylus, v. 246 seq.; warlike influence of, v. 271, 367 seq.; at Amphipolis, v. 374 seq.; capture of Tôronê by, v. 374 seq.; capture of Tôronê by, v. 375, at Eion. v. 376, 379; Thucydides' at Eion, v. 376, 379; Thucydides' treatment of, v. 390; and Aristophanês, v. 392, 398.

Kleôn of Halikarnassus, vii. 404, 466. Kleônæ and Argos, ii. 375, iii. 290 (n. 3). Kleonikê and Pausanias, iv. 345. Kleonymus, x. 379. Kleopatra, wife of Philip, ix. 496 seq., 501 (n. 2), 509, 513. Kleopatra, daughter of Philip, ix. 495, x. 256, 307. Kleophon, vi. 346, 448.
Kleopus, iii. 15.
Kleruchies, Athenian, revival of, B.C.
365, iv. 521 (n. 1), viii. 282 seq.
Kleruchs, Athenian, in Chalkis, iii. 387; in Lesbos, v. 177; after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 444. Klonas, musical improvements of, iii. Klothô, i 7. Klymenê, i. 6. Klytæmnêstra, i. 150. Knêmus, v. 114 seq., 121, 129. Knidus, settlement of, i. 466; maritime contests near, B.C. 412, vi. 224; Antisthenês and Astyochus at, vi. 227; the battle of, vii. 448; and Agesilaus, vii. 477; reverses of Sparta after the battle of, vii. 483. Knights at Athens, vi. 522. Knôpus, iii. 15. Kodrids, i. 107. Kodrus, i. 459; archons after, ii. 422. Kænus, x. 139, 140. Kæos, i. 5, 6. Kæratadas, vi. 357, vii. 327, 330. Kôes, iii. 481, 485, 497.

Kokalus, i. 209 seq. Kôlæus, his voyage to Tartêssus, iii. 99. Kôlakretæ, iii. 357. Kolchians and the Ten Thousand

Greeks, vii. 278, 293. Kolchis and the Argonautic expedition,

i. 217, 229. Kolophôn, iii. 11 seq.

Konipodes, ii. 410. Konôn, at Naupaktus, vi. 190; at Andros, vi. 374; appointment of, to succeed Alkibiadês, vi. 382; at Samos, vi. 383; at Mitylênê, vi. 380 seq.; escape of, from Ægospotami, vi. 439; renewed activity of, vii. 421, 435; at Rhodes, vii. 436; visit of, to the Persian court, vii. 446 seq.; and Pharnabazus, vii. 447, 483, 486 seq.; rebuilds the Long Walls at Athens, vii. 488; large plans of, vii. 491; sent as envoy to Tiribazus, vii. 522; arrest of, vii. 525; long absence of, from Athens, viii. 102 (n. 2). Kopaïs, lake of, i. 125.

Korkyra and the Argonauts, i. 220; early inhabitants of, iii. 214; relations of, with Corinth, iii. 214 seq.; relations of, with Epirus, iii. 215; and Corinth, joint settlements of, iii. 216 seq.; commerce of, iii. 219 seq.; and Corinth. disputes between, iv. 534 seq.; application of the Epidamnian democracy to, iv. 535; and Corinth, hostilities between, iv. 538, 546 seq.; and Corinth, decision of the Athenians between, iv. 544; oligarchical violence at, v. 185 seq.; vengeance of the victorious Demos at, B.C. 427, v. 194 seq.; Nikostratus and Alkidas at, v. 192; revolutions at, contrasted with those at Athens, v. 201; distress at, B.C. 425, v. 231; expedition of Eurymedon and Sophokles to, v. 231 seq., 273 seq.; muster of the Athenian armament at, vi. 17; Demosthenes' voyage from, to Sicily, vi. 135; renewed troubles at, vi. 342; Lacedemonian expedition against, viii. 133 seq.; expedition of Iphikratês to, viii. 138 seq.; Kleonymus and Agathoklês in, x. 379.

X. 349.

Korkyræan envoys, speech of, to the Athenian assembly, iv. 541 seq.; captives return home from Corinth, v. 185 seq.; oligarchical fugitives at Istônė, v. 196, 273 seq.

Korkyræans and Xerxės' invasion, iv. 184 setteck Endemnus, iv. 536; re-

164; attack Epidamnus, iv. 536; remonstrate with the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, iv. 537; seek the alliance of Athens, iv. 540 seq.

Korôbius and the foundation of Kyrênê, iii. 256.

Korôneia, Athenian defeat at, iv. 432; Theban victory at, vii. 479 scq., vii.

Korônis and Asklêpius, i. 166. Korynêphori, ii. 410.

Kôs, settlement of, i. 466; capture of, by Astyochus, vi. 227; revolt of, from Athens, ix. 216 seq., 227. Kossæi, x. 188. Kottos, i. 5.

Kottyphus, ix. 460, 464, 465. Kotyôra, the Ten Thousand Greeks at,

vii. 296 seq.

Kotys and Iphikratês, viii. 101, 284, 352, 358; and Athens, viii. 284 seq., 355, 359; and Timotheus, viii. 287, 352; and Miltokythês, viii. 355; capture of Sestos by, viii. 356; assassination of, viii. 358.

Kranaus, i. 181.

Krannon, battle of, x. 257. Kraterus and Philotas, x. 137 seq.; and Antipater, x. 254 seq., 270; death of, x. 272.

Kratês, comedy of, vii. 12. Kratesippidas, vi. 351, 363. Kratinus, vii. 10, 15 (n. 1).

Kreôn, king of Thêbes, i. 112, 244.

KREÔN.

Kreôn, archon at Athens, ii, 423. Kresphontés, i. 439 seq., ii. 251. Kretan settlements on the Gulf of Tarentum, i. 207; and Phrygian worship, iii. 41. Krétans and Minôs, i. 207; in the time

of Homer, ii. 41; and Xerxês, iv. 164. Krête, migrations of Dorians to, i. 464; early Dorians in, ii. 233; Periœki in, ii. 283 (n. 3); Phalækus in, ix. 419.
Kréthéis and Péleus, i. 109.
Krétheus, descendants of, i. 108.
Kreusa, i. 183, 188.

Krimesus, Timoleon's victory over the Carthaginians at the, ix. 172 seq.

Krios, i. 5, 6. Krissa, iii. 285 seq.

Kritias and Sokratês, vi. 453 seq.; return of, to Athens, vi. 452 seq.; and Theramenês, vi. 461 seq., 468 seq.; death of, vi. 488.

Krius, iv. 14, 17.

Kronmyon, capture of, vii. 500; recovery of, vii. 517.

Kromnus, capture of Lacedæmonians at, viii. 302 seq. Kronium, Dionysius at, ix. 40.

colonies of, iii. 189 seq.; fall of, iii. 203; maximum power of, iii. 205; eities and government of, iii. 210; and Pythagoras, iv. 83 seq.; and Sybaris, iv. 94 seq.; capture of, by Dionysius, ix. 22; expedition from Syracuse to, x. 331. Kronos, i. 5 seq., 8. Krotôn, foundation,

Krypteia, ii. 295. Kteatos and Eurytos, i. 131. Ktesias and Herodotus on Cyrus, iii. 401; on Darius, iii. 476.

Ktesiphon, x. 224 seq. Kunaxa, battle of, vii. 213 seq.

Kurêtes, ceremonies of, i. 29.
Kyaxarês, iii. 56, 76.
Kydonia, v. 123.
Kyknus, i. 269.
Kylôn the Athenian, attempted usurpa-

tion of, ii. 453 seq. Kylôn of Krotôn, iv. 92.

Kyllyrii at Syracuse, iv. 297.

Kymeans and Pactyas, iii. 416.
Kymé, iii. 18; Alkibiadés at, vi. 376.
Kynegeirus, iv. 39.
Kynosséma, battle of, vi. 333 seq.
Kynurians, ii. 226; in Argolis, ii. 364.
Kypselus, ii. 414; fall of the dynasty

of, ii. 417.

Syrêné, foundation of, iii. 256 seq.; situation, fertility, and prosperity of, iii. 259 seq.; and the Libyans, iii. 261 seq., 265 seq.; second migration of Greeks to, iii. 266; and Egypt, iii. 267; reform of, by Demônax, iii.

LACED EMONIANS.

269; Periœki at, iii. 269; third emigration to, iii. 271; under Arkesilaus the Third, iii. 271; submission of, to Kambysės, iii. 273, 435; history of, from about B.C. 450 to 306, x. 360 seq.; Ophellas, viceroy of, x. 363 seq. Kythėra, capture of, by the Athenians,

v. 280 seg.

Kytinium, occupation of, by Philip, ix.

467.

Kyzikus and the Argonauts, i. 215; revolt of, from Athens, vi. 336; siege of, by Mindarus, vi. 343; battle of, vi. 344.

L.

Labdalum, vi. 82, 102.

Lacedæmonian envoys to Persia, B.C. 430, v. 103; embassy to Athens about the prisoners in Sphakteria, v. 242 seq.; reinforcement to Brasidas in Chalkidikê, v. 362; envoys, at the congress at Corinth, B.C. 421, v. 418; envoys at Athens, about Panaktum and Pylus, v. 432; embassy to Athens, against the alliance of Athens, with Argan v. 446 acceptance. Athens with Argos, v. 446 seq.; army, v. 476, 477 (n. 1); assembly, speech of Alkibiadês in, vi. 69 seq.; fleet under Agesandridas, vi. 293, 298; fleet, victory of, near Eretria, vi. 298 seq.; mora, destruction of a, by Iphikratês, vii. 511 seq.; auxiliaries to the

Phokians at Thermopyle, ix. 405. Lacedemonians and Cyrus the Great, iii. 414; attack of, upon Polykratês, iii. 456; and Themistoklês, iv. 367, 369; and Mardonius' offer of peace to the Athenians, iv. 246 seq.; invoke the aid of their allies against the Helots, iv. 404; dismiss their Athenian auxiliaries against the Helots, iv. 405 seq.; expedition of, into Beeotia, B.C. 458, iv. 414 seq.; victory of, at Tanagra, iv. 415; proceedings of, on Phormio's victory over the Peloponnesian fleet near Rhium, v. 122; proceedings of, for the recovery of Pylus, v. 235 seq.; occupation of Sphakteria by, v. 237; blockade of, in Sphakteria, v. 241 seq., 250 seq., 257 seq.; offers of peace from, after the capture of Sphakteria, v. 268; assassination of Helots by, v. 284 seq.; and the peace of Nikias, v. 403; liberate the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, and plant Helots at Lepreum, v. 424; exclusion of, from the Olympic festival, v. 458 seq.; de-tachment of, to reinforce Epidaurus, B.C. 419, v. 469; and their allies, invasions of Argos by, v. 470 seq.; Gy-

LACHÉS.

lippus sent to Syracuse by, vi. 75; fortification of Dekeleia by, vi. 122, 185; and the Four Hundred, vi. 290; recapture of Pylus by, vi. 354; defeat of, at Arginusæ, vi. 395 seq.; repayment of, by the Athenians, after the restoration of democracy, B.C. 403, vi. 522; assassination of Alkibiadês demanded by, vi. 530; the Cyreians under, vii. 337, 342, 375, 384; and Dorieus, vii. 437 seq.; and Corinthians, conflicts between, B.C. 393, vii. 492 seq.; victory of, within the Long Walls of Corinth, vii. 498 seq.; and the Chynthian confederacy viii and the Olynthian confederacy, viii. 53; seizure of the Kadmeia at Thêbes 53; setzure of the Radmeia at Thebes by, viii. 58 seq.; trial and execution of Ismenias by, viii. 60; their surren-der of the Kadmeia at Thêbes, viii. 85 seq.; defeat of, at Tegyra, viii. 126; expulsion of, from Beeotia, B.C. 384, viii. 127; at Kromnus, viii. 301 seq.; at Mantineia, B.C. 362, viii. 314, 320, 322 seq.; and Alexander, ix. 516.

Laches, expedition to Sicily under, v. 529.

Lachesis, i. 7.

Laconia, genealogy of, i. 155; population of, ii. 282; gradual conquest of, ii. 331; modern, ii. 332(n. 2), 367(n. 2); invasions of, by Epameinondas, viii. 205 seq., 315 seq.; western abstraction of, from Sparta, viii. 216 seq.

Lade, combined Ionic fleet at, iii. 511 seq.; victory of the Persian fleet at, iii. 515.

Laius and Œdipus, i. 243. Lakes and marshes of Greece, ii. 145. Lamachus, v. 544, vi. 28 seq., 88. Lamia, Antipater at, x. 251 seq.

Lamian war, x. 251 seq., 270.
Lampsakus, revolt of, vi. 320; recovery of, by Strombichidės, vi. 321. Language, Greek, dialects of, ii. 167.

Lanikê, x. 151. Laocoôn, i. 277.

Laomedôn, i. 53, 261.

Laphystics, Zeus, i. 118.
Laphystius and Timoleon, ix. 189.
Larissa, Asiatic, iii. 18, 19 (n. 1).
Lash, use of, by Xerxès, iv. 124, 131.

Lasthenés and Euthykratês, ix. 341. Latin, Oscan, and Greek languages, iii. 167.

Latins, Œnotrians and Epirots, relation.

ship of, iii. 164.

Latium, emigration from Arcadia to, iii. 165 (n. 3); plunder of, by Dionysius, ix. 24.

Latona and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10. Laurium, mines of, iv. 152 seq.

Laws, authority of, in historical Athens, ii. 23; of Solon, ii. 500 seq.; of Za-

LEOSTHENÊS.

leukus, iii. 194; and psephisms, distinction between, iv. 457; enactment and repeal of, at Athens, iv. 457 seq. Layard's Ninevéh and its Remains, iii.

124.

Lebedos, revolt of, from Athens, vi. 207. Lecheum, capture of, by the Lacedæ-monians, vii. 500 (n. 2), 503.

Lêda and Tyndareus, i. 155 seq. Legend of Dêmêtêr, i. 38. seq.; of the Delphian oracle, i. 42; of Pandôra, i. 69 (n. 1); of Iô, i. 80 seq.; of Hêraklês, i. 88 seq.; Argonautic, i. 213 (n. 2), 224 seq., 231 seq.; of Troy, i. 260 seq.; of the Minyæ from Lêmnos, i. 462; and history, Grecian, blank between, i. 467 seg.

Legendary Greece, social state of, ii. 4, 56; poems, of Greece, value of, ii. 1

Legends, mystic, i. 30 seq.; of Apollo, i. 42 seq.; of Greece, originally isolated, afterwards thrown into series, i. 101; of Medea and Jasôn, i. 112 (n. 2); change of feeling with regard to, i. 324; Attic, i. 177 seq.; ancient, deeply rooted in the faith of the Greeks, i. 198, 314; of Thèbes, i. 235 seq.; divine allegorized, heroic historicized, i. 377; of saints, i. 420 seq.; of Asia Minor,

Lékythus, capture of, by Brasidas, v. 338.

Leleges, ii. 190. Lelex, i. 155.

Lémnos and the Argonauts, i. 215; early condition of, iii. 255; conquest of, by Otanês, iii. 488; Miltiadês at, iii. 489

seq. Lending-houses, ii. 525.

Leokratês, ix. 487. Leon and Diomedôn, vi. 214 seq., 249, 257.

Leon the Spartan, vi. 250, 320. Leon, mission of, to Persia, viii. 264, 266. Leonidas at Thermopylæ, iv. 173 seq.,

184 seq.

Leonnatus, x. 252, 256.

Leontadés, the oligarchy under, viii. 75
(n. 1); conspiracy of, viii. 56 seq.; at

Sparta, viii. 59; Thèbes under, viii.
75, 76; conspiracy against, viii. 78
seq.; death of, viii. 82.

Leontini, iii. 177; intestine dissension
at, v. 537; Demos at, apply to Athens,
v. 538, 540; Dionysius at, B.C. 396,
viii. 423, 449, 476; the mercenaries of
Dionysius at, ix. 2; Philistus at, ix.
97; Dion at, ix. 104, 106; Hiketas at,
ix. 158, 168; surrender of, to Timoix. 158, 168; surrender of, to Timoleon, ix. 179.

Leosthénés the admiral, viii. 353. Leosthenés the general, x. 248 seq.

LEOTYCHIDÊS.

Leotychidés the Prokleid, ii. 344; chosen king of Sparta, iv. 16; and Æginetan hostages, iv. 17, 145; at Mykalê, iv. 283; banishment of, iv. 349. Leotychides, son of Agis II., vii. 408,

410

Lepreum and Elis, ii. 352, v. 421; Brasi-

dean Helots at, v. 424. Leptinês, brother of Dionysius, viii. 471, 477; ix. 12, 33, 40.

Leptines the Athenian, ix. 266. Leptinês, general of Agathoklês, x. 371, 373.

Lesbians, their application to Sparta,

Lesbos, early history of, iii. 21 seq.; an autonomous ally of Athens, iv. 488; Athenian kleruchs in, v. 177; application from, to Agis, vi. 196; expedition of the Chians against, vi. 212 seg.; Thrasyllus at, vi. 326; Kallikratidas in, vi. 387; Thrasybulus in, vii. 530 Memnon in, x. 54; recovery of, by Macedonian admirals, x. 89.

Lêthê, i. 7. Letô, i. 6, 10.

Leukas, iii. 213 seq. Leukon of Bosporus, x. 412. Leukothea, the temple of, i. 222. Leuktra, the battle of, viii. 171 seq.;

treatment of Spartans defeated at, viii. 182 seq.; extension of Theban power after the battle of, viii. 184; proceedings in Peloponnesus after the battle of, viii. 188, 230; position of Sparta after the battle of, viii. of Sparta after the battle of, vin. 183 seq.; proceedings in Arcadia after the battle of, viii. 194 seq.; proceedings and views of Epameinondas after the battle of, viii. 202 seq. Libya, first voyages of Greeks to, iii. 256; nomads of, iii. 263 seq.; expedition of Kambysës against, iii. 434.

Libyans and Greeks at Kyrênê, iii. 265 seq.; and Dionysius, viii. 496. Liby-Phanicians, viii. 374.

Lichas and the bones of Orestês, ii. 360; and the Olympic festival, iii. 294 (n. 2), v. 456, 457 (n.); mission of, to Milêtus, vi. 226, 228, 323.

Lilyboum, defeat of Dionysius near, ix.

Limos, i. 7, 10 (n. 6). Lion, the Nemean, i. 7.

Lissus, foundation of, ix. 24.
Lisyu, his opinion as to the chances of
Alexander, if he had attacked the
Romans, x. 199; on the character of
Alexander, x. 204 (n. 1).

Lixus and Tingis, iii. 94 (n. 1). Loans on interest, ii. 477, 525. Localities, epical, i. 227. Lochages, Spartan, ii. 371.

LYSANDER.

Lochus, Spartan, ii. 370 seq.; Macedonian, x. 9.

Logographers and ancient mythes, i. 339, 349 seg

Lokri, Epizephyrian, early history of, iii. 191 seq.; and Dionysius, viii. 458, ix. 17, 21, 23; Dionysius the Younger at, ix. 102, 132 seq.

Lokrian coast opposite Eubœa, Athe-

nian ravage of, v. 58. Lokrians, ii. 211; Ozolian, ii. 216; Italian, iii. 191 seq., 389 (n. 1); of Opus and Leonidas, iv. 174; and Phokians,

ix. 243, 246; of Amphissa, ix. 454. Lokris and Athens, iv. 418, 434. Long Walls at Megara, iv. 409; at Athens, iv. 412 seq., 415, 419, 505, vi. 450, vii. 488 seq.; at Corinth, vii. 500

Lucanians, ix. 9 seq., 131. Lucretius and ancient mythes, i. 375 (n.

Lydia, early history of, iii. 46 seq. Lydian music and instruments, iii. 39,

Lydans, iii. 42 seq., 46, 415 seq.

Lydans, iii. 42 seq., 46, 415 seq.

Lykaws, Zeus, i. 160.

Lykawbés and Archilochus, iii. 305.

Lykaôn and his fifty sons, i. 160 seq.

Lykaôn, conquest of, by Alexander, x. 48.

Lykidas the Athenian senator, iv. 249. Lykomêdês, viii. 246 seq., 267, 273. Lykophrôn, son of Pertander, ii. 416. Lykophrôn, despot of Pheræ, ix. 256, 285, 287.

Lykurgus the Athenian, x. 217, 313. Lykurgus the Spartan, laws and disci-pline of, ii. 259-334.

Lykus, i. 188; and Dirkė, i. 241. Lynkeus and Idas, i. 157. Lyre, Hermės the inventor of, i. 56.

Lyric Poetry, Greek, ii. 72, iii. 298.

Lysander, appointment of, as admiral, vi. 361 (n. 3); character and influence of, vi. 361, vii. 465; and Cyrus the Younger, vi. 363 seq., 433, 434; factions organized by, in the Asiatic cities, vi. 366; at Ephesus, vi. 375, 433; victory of, at Notium, vi. 377; superseded by Kallikratidas, vi. 384; revolution at Milétus by the partisans of, vi. 434; operations of, after the battle of Arginusæ, vi. 435 seq.; victory of, at Ægospotami, vi. 438 seq.; proceedings of, after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 442; at Athens, vi. 446 seq., 455; conquest of Samos by, vi. 457; triumphant return of, to Sparta, vi. 457; ascendency and arrogance of, after the capture of Athens, vi. 479, vii. 371, 403 seq.; opposition to, at Sparta, vi. 481, vii. 371; contrasted with Kallikratidas, vi. 482; expedi-

LYSIAS.

tion of, against Thrasybulus, vi. 492; dekarchies established by, vii. 352 seq., 364; contrasted with Brasidas, vii. 362; recal and temporary expatriation of, vii. 372; introduction of gold and silver to Sparta by, vii. 397 seq.; intrigues of, to make himself

seq.; intergues of, to make filmself king, vii. 405 seq., 466; and Agesilaus, vii. 409, 422, 425 seq.; and the Bœotian war, vii. 469; death of, vii. 460.

Lysias, seizure of, by the Thirty, at Athens, vi. 467; speech of, against Phormisus' disfranchising proposition vii. 123; processed viits which of tion, vi. 513; proposed citizenship of, vi. 526; oration of, against Ergoklês, vii. 531; oration of, at Olympia, B.C. 384, viii. 70 seq.; panegyrical oration

of, ix. 28, 30 seq.

Lysiklês, v. 153. Lysiklės, general of Chæroneia, ix. 485. Lysimachus, confederacy of, with Kassander, Ptolemy, and Selenkus, against Antigonus, x. 301, 305, 315, 320; Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus, pacification of, with Antigonus, Arsinoé, x. 401 seq.; death of, x. 401; and Arsinoé, x. 401 seq.; death of, x. 401 and the Pentapolis, on the southwest coast of the Euxine, x. 403.

M.

Macedonia, Mardonius in, iv. 3; Perdik-kas and Brasidas in, v. 356 seq.; in-creasing power of, from B.C. 414, viii. 42; and Athens, contrasted, viii. 44; kings of, after Archelaus, viii. 45; state of, B.C. 370, viii. 237; Iphi-kratês in, viii. 238 seq.; Timotheus in, viii. 285; government of, ix. 207 seq.; military condition of, under Philip, ix. 276 seq., x. 7 seq.; and conquered Greece, ix. 506, x. 5; and the Greeks, on Alexander's accession, ix. 514; Antipater, viceroy of, x. 18; and Sparta, war between, x. 220 seq.; Grecian confederacy against, after Alexander's death, x. 250 seq.; Kassander in, x. 301; Demetrius Deliculé de conjugative productive de control of the contro Poliorkêtês acquires the crown of, x. 322.

Macedonian dynasty, iii. 243 seq.; envoys at Athens, ix. 379, 385 seq.; phalanx, ix. 484, x. 9 seq., 191; interventions in Greece, B.C. 336-335, ix. 519 seq.; pike, x. 8, 50 seq.; troops, x. 11 seq.; officers of Alexander's army in Asia, x. 23; fleet, mester of the in Asia, x. 23; fleet, master of the Ægean, x. 89; soldiors of Alexauder, mutiny of, x. 183 seq.

Macedonians, ii. 161, iii. 230 (n.), 236 seq.; conquered by Megabazus, iii. 487; poverty and rudeness of, ix.

MARDONIUS.

277; military aptitude of, x. 17; small loss of, at the battle of the Granikus, x. 35.

Machaôn and Podaleirius, i. 166.

Maandrius, iii. 458 seg.

Mæonians and Lydians, iii. 46.

Magians, massacre of, after the assassination of Smerdis, iii. 440.

Magistrates of early Athens, iv. 438 seq.;
Athenian, from the time of Perikles,

iv. 441, 443, 451 seq.

Magna Gracia, iii. 209. Magnêsia, iii. 8, 20; Xerxes' fleet near iv. 179 seq.; on the Pagasæan Gulf, ix. 297 (n. 2). Magnétes, Thessalian and Asiatic, ii.

208.

Magon, off Katana, viii. 478; near Abakæna, ix. 6; at Agyrium, ix. 7; death of, ix. 40.

Magon and Hiketas, ix. 154 seq.; death of, ix. 169.

Maia and Zeus, offspring of, i. 10.
Makrônes and the Ten Thousand, vii. 278.

Malians, ii. 208. Malli, x. 174. Mallus, Alexander at, x. 63.

Mamerkus and Timoleon, ix. 178 seq. Mania, sub-satrap of Æolis, vii. 377 seq. Mantineia and Tegea, ii. 357 seq., v. 364, 417; and Sparta, ii. 358, v. 489, viii. 33 seq.; and Argos, v. 423; congress at, v. 467 seq.; battle of, B.C. 418, v. 478 seq.; expedition of Agesipolis to, viii. 34 seq.; and the river Ophis, viii. 33 (n. 1); re-establishment of, viii. 194 seq.; march of Agesilaus against, viii. 200 seq.; muster of Peloponnesian enemies to Thêbes at, viii. 314; attempted surprise of, by the cavalry of Epameinondas, viii. 315 seq.; battle of,

B.C. 362, viii. 320 seq., 334; peace concluded after the battle of, viii. 334. Mantincians and the Pan-Arcadian union, viii. 307 seq.; opposition of, to Theban intervention, viii. 311.

Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, viii. 322. Mantitheus and Aphepsion, vi. 36 seq.

Mantô, iii. 12. Marakanda, Alexander at, x. 148, 150

Marathôn, battle of, iv. 33 seq.

Marathus surrenders to Alexander, x. 76, 77.

Mardi and Alexander, x. 123, 133. Mardonius, in Ionia, iv. 3; in Thrace and Macedonia, iv. 3; fleet of, de-stroyed near Mount Athos, iv. 3; urges Xerxês to invade Greece, iv. 104 seq., 108; advice of, to Xerxês, after the battle of Salamis, iv. 233; forces left with, in Thessaly, iv. 236;

MARINE.

and Medizing Greeks, after Xerxês' retreat, iv. 243; in Bosotia, iv. 244, 252 seq.; offers of peace to Athens by. v. 245, 249 seq.; at Athens, iv. 248; and his Phokian contingent, iv. 255; on the Asopus, iv. 257; at Platæa, iv. 260 seq.

Marine, military, unfavourable to oligarchy, ii. 406.

Maritime and inland cities contrasted, ii. 153.

Marpêssa and Idas, i. 159.

Marriage in legendary Greece, ii. 24; among the Spartans, ii. 302; among the Hindoos, ii. 507 (n. 1).

Marshes and lakes of Greece, ii. 147.

Marsyas, iii. 40 (n. 1). Masistius, iv. 257, 258. Maskamês, iv. 384.

Massagetæ, iii. 70. Massalia, iii. 101, 161, 211 seq.; x. 385

Mausôlus and the Social War, ix. 219. Mazwus at Thapsakus, x. 97; at the battle of Arbèla, x. 110; surrender of Babylon by, x. 114; appointed satrap of Babylon by Alexander, x.

Mazarés, iii. 416 seq.

Mêdea and the Argonauts, i. 218 seq. Medes, early history of, iii. 51 seq.
Media, the wall of, iii. 122 (n. 2), vii.
210 (n. 2); Darius a fugitive in, x.
123, 125.

Medius, x. 194. Medus, i. 189 (n. 2), 223.

Medusa, i. 7, 86. Megabates, iii. 494.

Megabazus, iii. 485, 488. Megabyzus, iv. 420. Megaklês, ii. 418, 454. Megalépolis, capture of, by Agathoklês,

Megalopolis, foundation of, ii. 357, viii. 213 seq., 222 (n. 3); the centre of the

213 seq., 222 (n. 3); the centre of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy, viii. 221; disputes at, viii. 342; and Sparta, ix. 196, 256, 283 seq., 292.

Megapenthés and Perseus, i. 86.

Megara, early history of, ii. 379, 418 seq.; Corinth and Sikyôn, analogy of, ii. 420; and Athens, ii. 461 seq., iv. 408, 434, 436 (n. 1). v. 281 seq.; Long Walls at, iv. 409; Brasidas at, v. 285 seq.; revolution at, v. 288 seq.; Philippizing faction at, ix. 434.

Megara in Sicily, iii. 176, iv. 304.

Megarian Sicily, iii. 177.

Megarians under Pausanias, and Per-

Megarians under Pausanias, and Persian cavalry under Masistius, iv. 257; repudiate the peace of Nikias, v. 403, 406; refuse to join Argos, v. 420; recovery of Nisæa by, vi. 354.

MESSÊNÊ.

Megarid, Athenian ravage of, in the

Peloponnesian war, v. 60.
Meidias of Skepsis, vii. 379 seq.
Meidias the Athenian, ix. 332 (n. 2), 333.

Meilaniôn and Atalanta, i. 135. Meilaniôn and Atalanta, i. 135. Meiliehios, meaning of, vii. 338 (n. 5). Melampus, i. 30, 105, 356, iv. 187. Melampus and Tydeus, i. 251, 255.

Melanthus, i. 459. Meleager, legend of, i. 133 seq. Meleagrides, i. 134.

Melésippus, v. 50.

Melian nymphs, i. 5.
Melissus, iv. 513, 514, vii. 23, 25.
Melkarth, temple of, iii. 90.
Mellon, viii. 78, 84.

Mélos, settlement of, i. 464; expedition against, under Nikias, v. 213; capture of, v. 506 seq.; Antisthenês at, vi. 226.

Memnôn, son of Tithônus, i. 273. Memnôn the Rhotian, operations of, be-tween Alexander's accession and landing in Asia, ix. 549, x. 27; and Mentor, x. 24; advice of, on Alexander's landing in Asia, x. 28; made commander-in-chief of the Persians, x. 40; at Halikarnassus, x. 46 seq.; his progress with the Persian fleet, and death, x. 54 seq.; change in the plan of Darius after his death, x. 55

Memphis, Alexander at, x. 93. Men, races of, in "Works and Days," i.

Mendê and Athens, v. 348 seq. Mendæus and the Ambrakiots, v. 218

Menekleidas and Epameinondas, viii.

254, 289 seq. Meneklés, vi. 423. Menelaus, i. 149 seq. ; iii. 90 (n. 5).

Menestheus, i. 285, 458.

Menækus, i. 252. Menætius, i. 6, 8.

Menon the Thessalian, vii. 200, 239. Menon the Athenian, viii. 356. Mentor the Khodian, ix. 426 seq., x. 24.

Mereenary soldiers, multiplication of, in Greece after the Peloponnesian war,

ix. 274 seq. Mermnads, Lydian dynasty of, iii. 48. Meroé, connexion of, with Egyptian in-

stitutions, iii. 132.

Messapians, iii. 201; and Tarentines, x.

Messéné, foundation of, ii. 177, 336; foundation of, by Epameinondas, viii. 214, 222 (n. 5), 249; and Sparta, viii. 277, 334, ix. 257, 284.

Messênê în Sicily, chorus sent to Rhegium from, iii. 279 (n. 1); recolonization of, by Anaxilaus, iv. 303; Lachês

at, v. 529; Athenian fleet near, v. 531; Alkibiadês at, vi. 29; Nikias at, vi. 57; and Dionysius, viii. 457 seq., ix. 3; Imilkon at, viii. 474 seq.; and Timoleon, ix. 156.

Messénia, Dorian settlements in, i. 448,

ii. 234.

Messenian genealogy, i. 159; wars, ii. 335-352; victor proclaimed at Olympia, B.C. 368, viii. 249.

Messenians and Spartans, early proceedings of, ii. 252 seq.; expelled by Sparta, vii. 396, ix. 3; plan of Epameinondas for the restoration of, viii.

Messénians in Sicily, defeated by Nax-

ians and Sikels, v. 532.

Metaneira, i. 36.

Metapontium, iii. 196.

Methana, Athenian garrison at, v. 273. Methônê, iii. 250 ; Philip at, ix. 255. Methônê in Peloponnêsus, Athenian

assault upon, v. 58. Methymna, v. 143, 146; Kallikratidas at, vi. 387.

Metics and the Thirty at Athens, vi.

Métis and Zeus, daughter of, i. 9.

Metrodôrus, i. 374, 395 (n. 4). Metropolis, relation of a Grecian, to its

colonies, iv. 543 (n. 3). Midas, iii. 37, 44.

Middle ages, monarchy in, ii. 384 seq. Mikythus, iv. 319, 328. Milesian colonies in the Trôad, i. 308. Milesians and Lichas, vi. 323; and Kalli-

kratidas, vi. 385.

Kraudas, vi. 385.

Milétus, early history of, iii. 5 seq.; and
Alyattês, iii. 78 seq.; and Crossus, iii.
80; sieges of, by the Persians, iii.
501, 516; Histiæus of, iii. 483, 488
seq., 492, 495, 507 seq.; Phrynichus'
tragedy on the capture of, iii. 520;
exiles from, at Zanklê, iv. 301 seq.;
and Sames dispute between iv. 511. and Samos, dispute between, iv. 511; revolt of, from Athens, vi. 206, 216 seq.; Tissaphernês at, vi. 207, 228; Lichas at, vi. 228; Peloponnesian fleet at, vi. 255, 320, 323 seq., 326; revolu-tion at, by the partisans of Lysander, vi. 434; capture of, by Alexander, x.

Military array of legendary and historical Greece, ii. 45 seq.; divisions not distinct from civil in any Grecian cities but Sparta, ii. 371; force of early oligarchies, ii. 406; order, Egyptian, iii. 134; arrangements, iii. 355; Kleisthenean, iii. 355. Millas, ix. 86.

Miltiadés the First, iii. 338.

Miltiades the Second, iii. 339; and the bridge over the Danube, iii. 483, 486 MCERIS.

(n. 1); his retirement from the Chersonese, iii. 486; capture of Lêmnos and Imbros by, iii. 489; escape of, and Imbros by, in. 489; escape of, from Persian pursuit, iii. 518; adventures and character of, iv. 24 seq.; elected general, 490 B.C., iv. 30; and the battle of Marathôn, iv. 32 seq.; expedition of, against Paros, iv. 50; disgrace, punishment, and death of,

disgrace, pullishment, one description of the description of the early series of British kings, i. 432; his treatment of British fabulous history, i. 434.

Minnermus, iii. 302.

Mindarus, supersedes Astyochus, vi. 324; deceived by Tissaphernês, vi. 325; removal of, from Milêtus to Chios, vi. 326; eludes Thrasyllus and reaches the Hellespont, vi. 327, 328 (n. 1); at the Hellespont, vi. 330; Peloponnesian fleet summoned from Eubœa by, vi. 335; siege of Kyzikus by, vi. 343; death of, vi. 344. Mineral productions of Greece, ii. 157.

Minêa, capture of, by Nikias, v. 203.

Minêa, capture of, by Nikias, v. 203.

Minês, i. 201 seq.

Minêtaur, the, i. 202 seq.

Minyas, i. 124, 462 seq.

Minyas, i. 121 seq.

Miraculous legends, varied interpretation of, i. 424 (n. 1).

Mistake of ascribing to an unrecording age the historical sense of modern times i 385 times, i. 385.

Mitford, his view of the anti-mouarchical sentiment of Greece, ii. 388 seq. Mithridatês the Persian, vii. 254 seq. Mithridatês of Pontus, x. 392. Mithrinês, x. 38, 150.

Mitylenwan envoys, speech of, to the Peloponnesians at Olympia, v. 147 seq.; prisoners sent to Athens by Paches, v. 164.

Mityleneans at Sigeium, i. 308.

Mityleneans at Sigeium, 1. 308.

Mitylene, iii. 21; political dissensions and poets of, iii. 25; revolt of, from Athens, v. 143 seq.; blockade of, by Paches, v. 158 seq.; and the Athenian assembly, v. 164, 169 seq.; loss and recovery of, by Athens, B.C. 412, vi. 213; Kallikratidas at, vi. 390 seq.; removal of Kallikratidas from, vi. 393 Eteonikus at vi. 393 397, 410. 393; Eteonikus at, vi. 393, 397, 410; blockade of, by Memnôn, x. 54; surrender of, by Charês, x. 89.

Massippus, expedition of, to Korkyra,

viii. 134 seq.

Mnêmosynê, i. 5, 10. Mnêsiphilus, iv. 218.

Mæræ and Ćrœsus, iii. 412 seq Mæris, lake of, iii, 139 (n. 3).

MOLIONIDS.

Molionids, the, i. 131. Molossian kingdom of Epirus, x. 328.

Molossians, iii. 223 seq.

Molossus, i. 174. Mômus, i. 7.

Monarchy, in mediæval and modern Europe, ii. 384 seq.; aversion to, in Greece, after the expulsion of Hippias, iii. 392.

Money, coined, not known to Homeric or Hesiodic Greeks, ii. 54; coined, first introduction of, into Greece, ii.

Money-lending at Florence in the middle ages, ii. 478 (n. 2); and the Jewish law, ii. 480 (n. 1); and ancient philosophers, ii. 481.

Money-standard, Solôn's debasement of, ii. 471; honestly maintained at Athens

after Solôn, iii. 483.

Monsters, offspring of the gods, i. 11 Monstrous natures associated with the gods, i. 1.

Monts de Piété, ii. 528. Monuments of the Argonautic expedi-

tion, i. 221 seq.

Moon, eclipse of, B.C. 413, vi. 147;
eclipse of, B.C. 331, x. 99.

Mopsus, iii. 13.

Mora, Spartan, ii. 370 seq.; destruction of a Spartan, by Iphikratês, vii. 511 seq. Moral and social feeling in legendary Greece, ii. 21.

Moralizing Greek poets, iii. 314 seq. Mosynæki and the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 295. Mothakes, ii. 332.

Motyé, capture of, by Dionysius, viii. 469 seq.; recapture of, by Imilkon, viii. 472.

Motyum, Duketius at, v. 520.

Mountainous systems of Greece, ii. 142

seq.
Müller on Sparta as the Dorian type, ii. 262.

Multitude, sentiment of a, compared with that of individuals, vi. 316.

Munychia and Peiræus, Themistoklês' wall round, iv. 339; Menyllus in, x. 261, 275; Nikanor in, x. 282.

Muse, inspiration and authority of the,

Muses, the, i. 10.

Music, ethical effect of old Grecian, ii. 346; Greek, improvements in, about the middle of the seventh century B.C., iii. 299.

Musical modes of the Greeks, iii. 39. Musicians, Greek, in the seventh cen-

tury B.C., iii. 300 (n. 1). Mΰθος, i. 321, 322 (n. 1), 412. Mutilated Grecian captives at Persepolis, x. 119.

MYTHES.

Mutilation of dead bodies in legendary and historical Greece, ii. 32; of Bessus, x. 149.

Mutiny at Athens immediately before Solôn's legislation, ii. 467.

Mygdonia, iii. 37.

Mykalê, Pan-Ionic festival at, iii. 6; the battle of, iv. 288 seq.

Mykaléssus, massacre at, vi. 188 seq. Mykénæ, i. 86 seq. Myriandrus, Alexander's march from Kilikia to, x. 63; Alexander's return from, x. 66.

Myrkinus, iii. 485, 488.

Myrkinus, 111. 488.

Myrmidons, origin of, i. 170.

Myrönides, iv. 411.

Myrtilus, i. 147.

Mysia, the Ten Thousand Greeks in, vii. 340 seq.

Mysians, iii. 23, 34 seq., 42.

Mysteries, principal Pan-hellenic, i. 26; 35, 38, 40, iv. 299 (n.); and mythes, i. 380 389.

Mystic legends, contrast of, with Egypt, i. 30; legends, contrast of, with Homeric hymns, i. 31; brotherhoods, ii.

Mythe of Pandôra and Prometheus, how used in "Works and Days," i. 67; meaning of the word, i. 321.

Mythes, how to be told, i. 1; Hesiodic, traceable to Krête and Delphi, i. 15, 16; Grecian, origin of, i. 3, 49, 58 seq., 310 seq.; contain gods, heroes, and men, i. 60; formed the entire mental stock of the early Greeks, i. 309, 323; difficulty of regarding them in the same light as the ancients did, i. 309, 310; Grecian, adapted to the personifying and patriotic tendencies of the Greeks, i. 316 seq.; Grecian, beauty of, i. 318; Grecian, how to understant properties. derstand properly, i. 318 seq.; how regarded by superior men in the age regarded by superior men in the age of Thucydidés, i. 338; accommodated to a more advanced age, i. 339 seq.; treatment of, by poets and logographers, i. 339 seq.; treatment of, by historians, i. 350 seq.; historicized, i. 370 seq.; treatment of, by philosophers, i. 375 seq.; allegorized, i. 377 seq.; semi-historical interpretation of, i. 382; allegorical theory of, i. 388; connexion of, with mysteries, i. 389; supposed ancient meaning of. i. 389; supposed ancient meaning of, i. 381; Plato on, i. 394 seq.; recapitulation of remarks on, i. 401 seq.; familiarity of the Greeks with, i. 405 seq.; bearing of, on Greeian art, i. 409 seq.; German, i. 415; Grecian, proper treatment of, i. 435 seq.; Asiatic, iii.

MYTHICAL.

Mythical world, opening of, i. 1; sentiment in "Works and Days," i. 64 seq.; geography, i. 225 seq.; faith in the Homeric age, i. 323; genealogies, i. 398 seq.; age, gods, and men undistinguishable in, i. 400; events, relics of, i. 408; account of the alliance between the Hêrakleids and Dorians. i. 439; races of Greece, i. 455.

Mythology, Grecian, sources of our information on, i. 102; German, Celtic, and Grecian, i. 413; Grecian, how it would have been affected by the introduction of Christianity, B.C. 500,

i. 418. Mythopeic faculty, stimulus to, i. 317; age, the, i. 326; tendencies, by what causes enfeebled, i. 326 seq.; tendencies in modern Europe, i. 419 seq.

Myūs, iii. 7.

N.

Napoleon, analogy between his relation to the confederation of the Rhine and that of Alexander to the Greeks, x. 3.

Nature, first regarded as impersonal, i.

Naukraries, ii. 426, 440. Naukraries, iii. 145, 153 seq. Naupaktus, origin of the name, i. 440; Phormio's victory near, v. 124 seq.; Eurylochus' attack upon, v. 218 Demosthenês at, v. 219; naval battle at, B.C. 413, vi. 190 seq.

Nausinikus, census in the archorship of, viii. 108 seq.

Naval attack, Athenian, iv. 546. Naxians and Sikels, defeat of Messen-

ians by, v. 532.

Naxos, early power of, ii. 533; expedition of Aristagoras against, iii. 494 seq.; Datis at, iv. 19; revolt and conquests of, iv. 394; Chabrias at, vi. 430, viii. 122 seq.

Naxos in Sicily, iii. 174, vi. 29, viii. 449. Nearchus, voyages of, x. 174, 177.

Nebuchadnezzar, iii. 149. Necklaces of Eriphylê and Helen, i. 257

Nectanebus, ix. 424.

Negative side of Grecian philosophy,

vii. 27. Ncileus, or Néleus, i. 104, i. 461, iii. 5. Nekôs, iii. 147 seq. Nektanebis, viii. 346 seq., 350.

Néleids down to Kodrus, i. 107.

Néleus and Pelias, i. 104 seq.

Nemean lion, the, i. 7; games, ii. 375, iii. 290 seq.

Nemesis, i. 7.

Neobulé and Archilochus, iii. 304.

NIKODROMUS.

Neon the Corinthian, ix. 154 seq. Neon the Cyreian, vii. 303 seq., 314 seq. Neoptolemus, son of Achillés, i. 151, 174,

277, 287. Neoptolemus the actor, ix. 362.

Nephelê, i. 116 seq. Nereus, i. 7.

Nereids, i. 7.

Nessus, the centaur, i. 139.

Nestor, i. 105.

Niebelungen Lied, i. 427. Nikæa on the Hydaspes, x. 171, 173.

Nikanor, x. 275, 280 seq

Nikianor, X. 275, 280 seq. Nikias, at Minóa, v. 203; position and character of, v. 203 seq.; and Kleón, v. 208 seq.; at Mélos, v. 213; in the Corinthian territory, v. 271 seq.; at Mendê and Sklónê, v. 353 seq.; peace of, v. 401 seq., 405 seq.; and the Spartans taken at Sphakteria, v. 409 seq.; embassy of, to Sparta, v. 450; and Alkibiadės, v. 504 seg., vi. 80; ap-pointed commander of the Sicilian expedition, B.C. 415, v. 544; speeches and influence of, on the Sicilian expedition, B.C. 415, v. 545 seq., 551, 552; his plan of action in Sicily, vi. 27; dilatory proceedings of, in Sicily, vi. 51, 57, 93 seq.; stratagem of, for approaching Syracuse, vi. 53; at the battle near the Olympieion at Syracuse, vi. 55; measures of, after his victory near the Olympieion at Syracuse, vi. 56; at Messênê în Sicily, vi. 57; for-bearance of the Athenians towards, vi. 59 seq.; at Katana, vi. 67; in Sicily in the spring of B.C. 414, vi. 77; his neglect in not preventing Gylippus's approach to Sicily and Syracuse, vi. 97 seq., 100 seq.; fortification of Cape Plemmyrium by, vi. 103; at Epipolæ, vi. 106; despatch of, to Athens for reinforcements, vi. 108 seq., 114 seq.; opposition of, to Demosthenês' proposals for leaving Syracuse, vi. 142 seq.; consent of, to retreat from Syracuse, vi. 147; exhortations of, before the final defeat of the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse, vi. 154 seq.; and Demosthenes, resolution of, after the final defeat in the harbour of Syracuse, vi. 163; exhortations of, to the Athenians on their retreat to the Athenians on their retreatfrom Syracuse, vi. 168 seq.; and his division, surrender of, to Gylippus, vi. 175 seq., 180 (n. 2); and Demosthenês, treatment of, by their Syracusan conquerors, vi. 179; disgrace of, at Athens after his death, vi. 180; single of Thugydidês about vi. 181; opinion of Thucydides about, vi. 181; opinion and mistake of the Athenians about, vi. 183.

Nikodromus, iv. 146.

NIKOKLĖS.

Nikoklés, viii. 24. Nikomachus the Athenian, vi. 524 scq. Nikomachus the Macedonian, x. 136, 139. Nikostratus, v. 190 seq., 353 seq. Nikotelês, viii. 448. Nile, the, iii. 128. Nineveh, or Ninus, siege of, iii. 59; capture of, iii. 77; and Babylon, iii. 110; site of, iii. 113 (n. 2); and its remains. iii. 124. Nine Ways, nine defeats of the Athenians at the, viii. 287 (n. 1).
Ninon and Kylon, iv. 93. Niobê, i. 146. Nisea, alleged capture of, by Peisistratus, ii. 519 (n. 1); connected with Megara by "Long Walls," iv. 409; surrender of, to the Athenians, v. 288 seq.; recovery of, by the Megarians, vi. 354.
Nisus, i. 188, 203. Nobles, Athenian, early violence of, iii. Nomads, Libyan, iii. 263 seq. Nomios Apollo, i. 57. Nomophylakes, iv. 455.
Nomophylakes, iv. 455.
Nomothete, ii. 490, 492, iv. 456, vi. 514.
Non-Amphiktyonic races, ii. 195.
Non-Hellenic practices, ii. 182.
Non-Olympiads, ii. 348.
Notium, iii. 12; Pachês at, v. 163; recolonized from Athens, v. 164; battle of, vi. 377. Notus, i. 6. Numidia, Agathoklês and the Carthaginians in, x. 359. Nymphæum, ix. 258 (n. 2), x. 411. Nymphs, i. 4, 7. Nypsius, ix. 104, 107, 109.

Ο.

Nyx, i. 4, 6.

Oarus, fortresses near, iii. 478. Oath of mutual harmony at Athens, after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 445. Obæ or Obês, ii. 281. Ocean, ancient belief about, iii. 106 (n. 1). Oceanic nymphs, i. 6. Oceanus, i. 5, 6, 7. Ochus, viii. 351 seq., x. 25, 421 seq. Odeon, building of, iv. 506. Odes at festivals in honour of gods, i. Odin and other gods degraded into men, i. 418.

Odrysian kings, v. 131 scq. Odysseus, i. 266; and Palamèdès, i. 269; and Ajax, i. 274; steals away the Palladium, i. 276; return of, from Troy, i. 282; final adventure and

OLYMPIC.

death of, i. 286 seq.; at the agora in the second book of the Iliad, ii. 14 seq.

Odysscy and Iliad, date, structure, authorship and character of, ii. 63 seq., 131 seq

Œchalia, capture of, i. 139.

Edipus, i. 246 seq. Eneus and his offspring, i. 133 seq. Enoê, v. 50, vi. 309, vii. 509, Enomaus and Pelops, i. 146 seq.

Œnônê, i. 275 (n. 4)

Enophyta, Athenian victory at, iv. 418. Enotria, iii. 164 sec.

Œnotrians, iii. 165, 188, 204. Eta, path over Mount, iv. 172. Etæi, ii. 210.

Office, admissibility of Athenian citizens to, iii. 364.

to, iii. 364.
Ogygés, i. 180.
Okypeté, i. 7.
Olbia, x. 407 seq.
Oligarchical government, change from monarchical to, in Greece, ii. 391 seq.; party at Athens, iv. 441, vi. 454 scq., 519 seq.; Greeks, corruption of, vi. 230; conspiracy at Samos, vi. 237 seq., 258 seq.; conspiracy at Athens, vi. 246, 259 seq.; exiles, return of, to Athens, vi. 450.
Oligarchics in Greece, ii. 394, 404, 406.

Oligarchies in Greece, ii. 394, 404, 406. Oligarchy, conflict of, with despotism, ii. 403; vote of the Athenian assembly in favour of, vi. 245; establishment of, in Athenian allied cities, vi. 262; of the Four Hundred, vi. 265 seq., 272 seq., 301, 308 seq., 319. Olive trees, sacred, near Athens, ii. 502 (n. 1), v. 187 (n. 1).

Olpæ, Demosthenês' victory at, v. 221

Olympia, Agesipolis and the oracle at, yii. 519; Lysias at, viii. 70 seq.; pane-gyrical oration of Isokratês at, viii. 73; occupation of, by the Arcadians, viii. 299, 303 seq.; topography of, viii. 304 (n. 2); plunder of, by the Arcadians, viii. 306 seq. Olympias, ix. 235, 495, 498, 501; and Antipater, x. 19, 193, 196 (n. 1); intrigues of, after Alexander's death, x.

269; return of, from Epirus to Macedonia, x. 276 seq., 300 seq.; death of, x. 301; Epirus governed by, x. 328

(n. 3).

Olympic games, and Aëthlius, i. 95; origin of, i. 131; presidency of, i. 446, ii. 288 seq.; nature and importance of, ii. 169; the early point of union between Spartans, Messenians, and Eleians, ii. 254; and the Delian festival, iii. 280; celebrity, history, and duration of, iii. 281 seq.; interference

of, with the defence of Thermopylæ, iv. 176; and the Karneia, iv. 175 (n. 1); conversation of Xerxês on, iv. 210; of the 90th Olympiad, v. 453 seq.; celebration of, by the Arcadians and Pisatans, viii. 303 seq.; legation of Dionysius to, ix. 26.

Olympicion near Syracuse, battle of, vi.

55 seq.

Olympus, ii. 141. Olympus the Phrygian, iii. 40 (n. 1), 300. Olynthiac, the earliest, of Demosthenes, ix. 318 seq.; the second, of Demosthenês, ix. 322 seq.; the third, of Demosthenês, ix. 326 seq.

Olynthiacs of Demosthenes, order of, ix.

349 seg.

Olynthian confederacy, viii. 47 seq., 64, 363, ix. 315; war, ix. 317-353. Olynthus, iii. 251; capture and repopulation of, by Artabazus, iv. 243; increase of, by Perdikkas, iv. 551; expedition of Eudamidas against, with the control of the control viii. 54; Teleutias at, viii. 61 seq.; Agesipolis at, viii. 63; submission of, to Sparta, viii. 64; alliance of, rejected by the Atheniaus, ix. 231; alliance of, with Philip, ix. 232 seq.; secedes from the alliance of Philip, and makes peace with Athens, ix. 311; hostility of Philip to, ix. 312; Philip's half-brothers flee to, ix. 313; intrigues of Philip in, ix. 313; attack of Philip upon, ix. 317-321; alliance of, with Athens, ix. 317; renewed application of, to Athens, against Philip, ix. 321; assistance from Athens to, B.C. 350, ix. 325; three expeditions from Athens to, B.C. 349-348, ix. 328 (n. 1), 339; expedition of Athenians to, B.C. 349, ix. 327, 338; capture of, by Philip, ix. 340 seq., 354, 360.

Oneirus, i. 7, ii. 116. Oneium, Mount, Epameinondas at, viii.

Onesilus, iii. 503 seq.

Onomaklês, vi. 311 seq.

Onomakritus, iv. 104. Onomarchus, and the treasures in the temple at Delphi, ix. 251; successes of, ix. 256, 285 seq., at Chæroneia, ix. 252; power of the Phokians under, ix. 256; aid to Lykophron by, ix. 285; death of, ix. 286.

Ophellas, x. 364 seq. Ophis, the, viii. 33. Opici, iii. 166.

Opis, Alexander's voyage to, x. 183.

Oracle at Delphi, legend of, i. 45; and the Krêtans, i, 208 (n. 2); and the Battiad dynasty, iii. 271; answers of, on Xerxês' invasion, iv. 159 seq.

OTHRYS.

Oracles, consultation and authority of, among the Greeks, ii. 181; in Bœotia consulted by Mardonius, iv. 244.

Orations, funeral, of Periklês, iv. 516, v.

65 seq.

Orchomenians, i. 285.

Orchomenus, ante-historical, i. 121 seq.; and Thêbes, i. 127, iv. 253 (n. 4), viii.

Orchomenus, early historical, ii. 218; capitulation of, B.C. 418, v. 475; revolt of, from Thêbes to Sparta, vii. 459; and the Pan-Arcadian union, viii. 197; destruction of, viii. 296.

Oreithyia, i. 184.

Orestês, i. 150, 154; and Agamemnôn transferred to Sparta, i. 154.

Orestês, bones of, ii. 359. Oreus, ix. 435, 438.

Orgies, post-Homeric, i. 24. Orætés, iii. 443, 458. Orontes, the Persian nobleman, vii. 205, 209 (n. 2).

Orontês, the Persian satrap, viii. 21. Orôpus, v. 299 (n. 2), vi. 255, viii. 273. Orphans in legendary and historical Greece, ii. 32.

Orpheotelestæ, ii. 459. Orpheus, i. 19 seq.

Orphic Theogony, i. 16 seq.; egg, i. 16; life, the, i. 21; brotherhood, i. 31. Orsines, x. 178.

Orthagoridæ, ii. 407 seq.

Orthros, i. 7. Ortygés, iii. 16.

Ortygia, iii. 176; fortification and occupation of, by Dionysius, viii. 440 seq.; Dionysius besieged in, viii. 444 seq.; blockade of, by Dion, ix. 93, 96, 112; sallies of Nypsius from, ix. 105, 107; Dion's entry into, ix. 115; surrender of, to Timoleon, ix. 148 seq.; advantage of to Timoleon, ix. 154; siege tage of, to Timoleon, ix. 133 3-7, atvantage of, to Timoleon, ix. 154; siege of, by Hiketas and Magon, ix. 154 seq.; Timoleon's demolition of the Dionysian works in, ix. 163; Timoleon erects courts of justice in, ix.

Oscan, Latin and Greek languages, iii. 167.

Oscans, iii. 166.

Ossa and Pelion, ii. 144.

Ostracism, similarity of, to Solon's con-demnation of nentrality in sedition, ii. 511 seq., v. 505 seq.; of Hyperbolus, iii. 368, v. 504; of Kimôn, iv. 450; of Thucydides, son of Melesias, iv. 505; projected contention of, between Nikias and Alkibiades, v. 504 seq.; at

Syracuse, v. 518. Otanês, iii. 438 seq., 462 seq., 488.

Othryadés, ii. 362 seq. Othrys, ii. 143 seq.

OTOS.

Otos and Ephialtês, i. 128.
Ovid at Tomi, x. 404 (n. 4).
Oxus crossed by Alexander, x. 145.
Oxylus, i. 141, 441, 446. Oxythemis Korônæus, ii. 253, 254.

P.

Pachés, at Mitylèné, v. 147, 158 seq.; at Notium, v. 163; pursues the fleet of Alkidas to Patmos, v. 162; sends Mitylenæan prisoners to Atheus, v. 164; crimes and death of, v. 178. Paconians, iii. 238; conquest of, by Megabazus, iii. 487; victory of Philip over, ix. 211. Pagasa, conquest of, by Philip, ix. 287;

importance of the Gulf of, to Philip, ix. 296.

Pagondas, v. 299 seq. Paktyas, the Lydian, iii. 415 seq. Palæmon and Inô, i. 117. Palæphatus, his treatment of mythes. i. 371 seq. Palamédês, i. 269, 270.

Paliké, foundation of, v. 520. Paliadium, capture of, i. 276. Pallakopas, x. 190. Pallas, i. 6, 7.

Pallas, son of Pandiôn, i. 188. Palus Mæotis, tribes east of, iii. 67. Pammenês, expedition of, to Megalopolis, viii. 342, ix. 252 seq., 292.
Pamphyli, Hylleis, and Dymanes, ii.

28ō.

Pamphylia, conquest of, by Alexander,

Panaktium, v. 429, 432 seq. Pan-Arcadian Ten Thousand, viii. 221,

Pan-Arcadian union, viii. 197 seg., 307

Pan-Arcadian union, VIII. 197 seq., 501 seq.
Pandiôn, i. 181 seq.
Pandiôn, son of Phineus, i. 183.
Pandiôn II., i. 187.
Pandiôn, i. 67, 72 seq.
Pan-Hellenic proceeding, the earliest approach to, iii. 277; feeling, growth of, between B.C. 776-560, iii. 277; character of the four great games, iii. 292; congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, iv. 156 seq.; patriotism of the Athenians on Xerxes' invasion, iv. 160; union under Sparta after the iv. 160; union under Sparta after the repulse of Xerxes, iv. 350; schemes and sentiment of Periklês, iv. 504; pretences of Alexander, x. 3.

Pan-Ionic festival and Amphiktyony in

Asia, iii. 6. Panoptês Argos, i. 80. Pantaleôn, ii. 347. Pantikapæum, x. 410 seq., 417. Pantités, story of, iv. 191 (n. 3).

PAUSANIAS.

Paphlagonia, submission of, to Alexander, x. 59. Paphlagonians, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 311. Paragraphé, vi. 517. Parali, at Samos, vi. 258 seq. Paralii, ii. 464.

Paralus, arrival of, at Athens from Samos, vi. 259.

Satios, vi. 259.

Paranomôn, Graphê, iv. 459 seq., vi. 264.

Parasang, length of, vii. 185 (n. 4).

Paris, i. 262 seq., 274, 278.

Parisades I., x. 412.

Parmenidês, vii. 24, 26 (n. 5).

Parmenidês, vii. 24, 26 (n. 5).
Parmenio, embassy of, from Philip to
Athens, ix. 376, 379, 382, 386; operations of, in Asia Minor against
Memnon, ix. 549; debate of, with
Alexander at Miletus, x. 41; captures
Damaskus, x. 76; at the battle of
Arbela, x. 104, 110, 111; invested
with the chief command at Ekbatana, x. 126; family of, x. 135;
alleged conspiracy and assassination
of, x. 141 sec.

of, x. 141 seq. Paropamisadæ, subjugation of, by Alex-

ander, x. 144.

Paros, Theramenês at, vi. 341.

Partheniæ, iii. 198.

Parthenon, iv. 506, 507; records of offerings in, ix. 244 (n. 1), 248 (n.).

Parthia, Darius pursued by Alexander into y 198 eeg.

into, x. 128 seq.

Partition of lands ascribed to Lykurgus, ii. 297, 309 seq., 316 seq.; proposed by Agis, ii. 316.

Parysatis, wife of Darius Nothus, vii. 229, 239.

Parysatis, daughter of Darius Nothus, x. 181.

Pasimėlus, vii. 496 seq. Pasion and Xenias, vii. 197 seq. Pasiphaë and the Minôtaur, i. 203. Pasippidas, banishment of, vi. 351. Patizeithés, conspiracy of, iii. 437 seq. Patrokleidés, amnesty proposed by, vi.

Patroklus, treatment of, in the Iliad, ii. 109.

Patronymic names of demes, ii. 436 (n. 2). Patrôus Apollo, i. 47.

Patrôus Apollo, i. 47.
Pattala, x. 176 (n. 1).
Pausanias the historian, on the Acheans,
i. 99; his view of mythes, i. 375 seq.;
his history of the Bœotians between
the siege of Troy and the Return of
the Hêrakleids, i. 452; his account
of the Messenian wars, ii. 337 seq.,
343 seq.; on Iphikratês at Corinth,
B.C. 369, viii. 226 (n.).
Pausanias, the Spartan regent, at the
Isthmus of Corinth, iv. 251; at
Platæa, iv. 256 seq., 264 seq.; mis-

PAUSANIAS.

conduct of, after the battle of Platea, iv. 343 seq.; conduct of, after losing the command of the Greeks, iv. 357; detection and death of, iv. 360 seq.; and Themistoklės, iv.

Pausanias, the Spartan king, and Lyaustinus, the spartan king, and Lysander, vi. 481; his expedition to Attica, vi. 493 seq.; his attack upon Peiræus, vi. 495; his pacification between the Ten at Athens and the exiles at Peiræus, vi. 497 seq.; in Boeotia, vii. 461 seq.; condemnation of, vii. 463 seq.; and the democratical leaders of Mantineis viii. 34 leaders of Mantineia, viii. 34.

Pausanias the Macedonian, viii. 238, ix.

497 seq.

Pedaritus, vi. 219 seq., 249. Pedieis, ii. 464.

Pedigrees, mythical, connect gentes, i.

Pegasus, i. 7.

Peirceum, Athenian victory near, vi. 201; defeat of the Athenian fleet near, vi. 212; capture of, by Agesi-laus, vii. 509 seq.; recovery of, by Iphikratês, vii. 517.

Peiræus, fortification of, by Themisto-klês, iv. 339 seq.; and Athens, Long Walls between, iv. 412 seq., vi. 450, 488 seq.; improvements at, under Periklês, iv. 505; departure of the armament for Sicily from, vi. 15; walls built at, by the Four Hundred, vi. 290; approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas to, vi. 293, 298; Thrasybulus at, vi. 487 seq.; king Pausanias' attack upon, vi. 495; attack of Teleutias on,

upon, vi. 495; attack of Teleutias on, vii. 539 seq.; attempt of Sphodrias to surprise, viii. 92 seq.; seizure of, by Nikanor, x. 281 seq.

Peisunder, and the mutilation of the Hermæ, vi. 34; and the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, vi. 239, 244 seq., 250 seq., 255 seq., 262 seq.; statements respecting, vi. 262 (n. 1); punishment of vi. 313

ment of, vi. 313.

Peisander, the Lacedamonian admiral, vii. 440, 447.

Peisistratids and Thucydidês, iii. 327 (n. 1); fall of the dynasty of, iii. 343; with Xerxes in Athens, iv. 212 seq.

Peisistratus, ii. 519 seq., iii. 322, 324 seq., 337 seq.

Peithias, the Korkyrwan, v. 186 seq. Pelasgi, ii. 187 seq.; in Italy, iii. 165; of Lemnos and Imbros, iii. 488.

Pelasgikon, oracle about the, v. 53 (n. 2).

Pelasgus, i. 160.

Péleus, i. 109, 171, 172, 174. Pelias, i. 103 seq., 108. Pelion and Ossa, ii. 144.

PELOPONNÊSUS.

Pella, embassies from Grecian states at, B.C. 346, ix. 392 seq.; under Philip, x. 16.

Pellênê, i. 285; and Phlius, viii. 258. Pelopidas, escape of, to Athens, viii. 58; conspiracy of, against the philo-Laconian rulers at Thébes, viii. 78 Lacoman rulers at Thebes, viii. 78 seq.; slaughter of Leontiadês by viii. 82; and Epameinondas, viii. 115; victory of, at Tegyra, viii. 126; in Thessaly, viii. 236, 250, 268 seq., 288, 292 seq.; and Philip, viii. 236 (n. 4), 251; and Alexander of Pheræ, viii. 258 seq.; death of viii. 292

268 seq.; death of, viii. 293. Pelopids, i. 148 seq.

Peloponnesian war, its injurious effects upon the Athenian empire, iv. 530; war, commencement of, v. 50-74; fleet, Phormio's victories over, v. neet, Phormio's victories over, v. 120 seq., 127 seq.; war, agreement of the Peloponnesian confederacy at the commencement of, v. 422 (n. 1); allies, synod of, at Corinth, B.C. 412, vi. 199; fleet, under Theramenês, vi. 217 seq.; fleet at Rhodes, vi. 229 seq., 319; fleet, return of, from Rhodes to 319; fleet, return of, from Rhodes to Milêtus, vi. 255; fleet, discontent in, at Milêtus, vi. 321, 323 seq.: fleet, capture of, at Kyzicus, vi. 344; fleet, pay of, by Cyrus, vi. 366; confederacy, assembly of, at Sparta, B.C. 404, vi. 448; confederacy, Athens at the head of, B.C. 371, viii. 191: allies of Sparta after the Peloponnesian war iv. 274 war, ix. 274.

war, ix. 274.

Peloponnesians, immigrant, ii. 227; conduct of, after the battle of Thermopylæ, iv. 203; and Mardonius' approach, iv. 246 seq.; and the fortification of Athens, iv. 333 seq., 336 seq.; five years' truce of, with Athens, iv. 421; position and views of, in commencing the Peloponnesian war, v. 19 seq., 35, 47 seq.; invasions of Attica by, under Archidamus, v. 50 seq., 76; slaughter of neutral prisoners by, v. slaughter of neutral prisoners by, v. 102; and Ambrakiots attack Akarnania, v. 113 seq.; application of revolted Mityleneans to, v. 147 seq.; and Ætolians attack Naupaktus, v. 218; and Tissaphernes, vi. 207, 224 seq., 235, 252 seq., 337 seq.; defeat of, at Kynossema, vi. 333 seq.; at Abydos, vi. 340; aid of Pharnabazus to, vi.

349; letters of Philip to, ix. 476.

Peloponnésus, eponym of, i. 142; invasion and division of, by the Herakleids, i. 441; mythical title of the Dorians to, i. 443; extension of Pindus through, ii. 143; distribution of, about B.C. 450, ii. 222 seq.; difference between the distribution, B.C. 450 and 776, ii. 225; population of, which was

PERSIA.

believed to be indigenous, ii. 226; southern, inhabitants of, before the Dorian invasion, ii. 256; events in, during the first twenty years of the Athenian hegemony, iv. 402 seq.; voyage of Tolmidês round, iv. 419; ravages of, by the Athenians, v. 58, 85; political relations in, B.C. 421, v. 426; expedition of Alkibiadês into the interior of, v. 464; expedition of Konôn and Pharnabazus to, vii. 486; circumnavigation of, hy Timotheus, viii. 124; proceedings in, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 188, 230; expeditions of Epameinondas to, viii. expeditions of Epameinondas to, viii. 206 seq., 242 seq., 253 seq., 314 seq.; state of, B.C. 362, viii. 298 seq.; visits of Dion to, ix. 59; disunion of, B.C. 360-359, ix. 196; affairs of, B.C. 354-352, ix. 283 seq.; war in, B.C. 352-351, ix. 292; intervention of Philip in, after B.C. 346, ix. 429; expedition of Philip to, ix. 493; Kassander and Polysperchon in, x. 295, 299; Kassander and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, in, x. 285. sperchon, in, x. 285. Pelops, i. 142 seq.

Pelusium, Alexander at, x. 93.
Penal procedure at Athens, iv. 52 (n. 1).
Penestæ, Thessalian, ii. 204 seq.
Pentakosiomedimni, ii. 486.

Pentapolis on the south-west coast of

rentapois on the south-west coast of the Euxine, x. 390, 403.

Pentekontérs, Spartan, ii. 371 seq.

Penthesiteia, ii. 192, 272.

Pentheus and Agavé, i. 240 seq.

Perdikkas I., iii. 244 seq.

Perdikkas I., relations and proceedings of towards Athens iv 551 seq. 555. of, towards Athens, iv. 551 seq., 555, Sitalkės, v. 133; application of, to Sparta, v. 285; and Brasidas, relations between, v. 285, 356 seq.; joins Sparta and Argos, v. 494; death of, viii. 42.

Perdikkas, brother of Philip, viii. 285 seq., 354, 364, ix. 203 seq. Perdikkas, Alexander's general, x. 195,

255, 269 seq., 272.

Pergamum, i. 262 (n. 5), 294 seq.

Pergamus, custom in the temple of

Asklêpius at, i. 276 (n. 1).
Pergamus in Mysia, the Ten Thousand

Greeks at, vii. 340 seq.

Periander, the Corinthian despot, power and character of, ii. 415 seq.

Periklés, difference hetween the demo-

cracy after, and the constitution of Kleisthenês, iii. 366; effect of, on constitutional morality, iii. 379; at the battle of Tanagra, iv. 415; expeditions of, to Sikyon and Akarnania,

iv. 419; policy of, B.C. 430, iv. 427; reconquest of Eubeea by, iv. 434; and Ephialtês, constitution of dikasteries by, iv. 441 seq.; and Kimôn, iv. 447 seq.; public life and character of; v. 447 seq.; and Ephialtês, judicial reform of, iv. 441 seq., 451 seq.; real nature of the constitutional changes effected by, iv. 452 seq.; commenceeffected by, iv. 452 seq.; commencement of the ascendency of, iv. 455; and Kimôn, compromise hetween, iv. 416, 455; his conception of the relation hetween Athens and her allies, iv. 490; and Athenian kleruchs by, iv. 495; and Thucydides, son of Melêsias, iv. 501 seq.; Panhellenic schemes and sentiment of, iv. 504 city improvements at Athens iv. 504; city improvements at Athens under, iv. 504 seq., 506 seq.; sculpture at Athens under, iv. 506; attempt of, to convene a Grecian congress at Athens, iv. 510; Sophoklés, &c., Athenian armament under, iv. 512 seq.; funeral orations of, iv. 516, v. 65 seq.; demand of the Spartans for his hanishment, v. 22, 29; indirect attacks of his political opponents upon, v. 22 seq.; his family relations, and connexion with Aspasia, v. 25; charge of peculation against, v. 27 seq.; stories of his having caused the Peloponnesian war, v. 28 (n. 2); speech of, before the Peloponnesian war, v. 31 seq.; and the ravages of Attica by Archidamus, v. 49 seq.; last speech of, v. 87 seq.; accusation and punishment of, v. 89 seq.; life and character of, v. 93 seq.; new class of politicians at convene a Grecian congress at Athens, 93 seq.; new class of politicians at

Athens after, v. 165 seq.; and Nikias compared, v. 204.

Periklymenos, i. 105 seq.

Perinthus, iii. 254; and Athens, vi. 350, ix. 445; siege of, by Philip, ix.

444 seq.

Periœki, ii. 281 seq., 287, 289 (n. 3);

Libyan, iii. 266, 267 seq., 270 seq.

Pêrô, Bias, and Melampus, i. 104 seq.

Perseid dynasty, i. 86. Persephoné, i. 10; mysteries of, iv. 299 (n. 1).

Persepolis, Alexander's march from Susa to, x. 117 seq.; Alexander at, x. 118, 177 seq.; Alexander's return from India to, x. 177.

Persés, i. 6. Perseus, exploits of, i. 86 seq.

Persia, application of Athens for alliance with, iii. 383; state of, on the formation of the confederacy of Dêlos, iv. 356; treatment of Themistoklês in, iv. 374 seq.; operations of Athens and the Delian confederacy

against, iv. 395 seq.; and Athens, treaty between, B.C. 450, iv. 422 seq.; Asiatic Greeks not tributary to, between B.C. 477 and 414, iv. 424 (n. 2); surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by Sparta to, vii. 373; and the peace of Antalkidas, vii. 548 seq., viii. 1 seq., 149; applications of Sparta and Athens to, viii. 5 seq.; hostility of, to Sparta, after the battle of Ægostotami viii. 7 Sparta, after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 7; unavailing efforts of, to reconquer Egypt, viii. 12; and Evagoras, viii. 19 seq.; Spartan project against, for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks, viii. 41; application of Thèbes to, viii. 263 seq.; embassy from Athens to, B.C. 366, viii. 279; state of, B.C. 362, viii. 344, 350; alarm at Athens about B.C. 354 iv. 278. at Athens about, B.C. 354, ix. 278; projected invasion of, by Philip, ix. 495 seq.; correspondence of Demosthenes with, ix. 523 seq.; accumulation of royal treasures in, x. 121

(n. 2); roads in, x. 127 (n. 5).

Persian version of the legend of Iô, i. 81; noblemen, conspiracy of, against the false Smerdis, iii. 438 seq.; empire, organization of, by Darius Hystaspês, iii. 447 seq.; envoys to Macedonia, iii. HI. 44/ seq.; elivoys to Maccetonia, III. 487; armament against Cyprus, iii. 504; force against Milètus, iii. 510; fleet at Ladê, iii. 515; fleet, and Asiatic Greeks, iii. 515; armament under Datis, iv. 18 seq., 40 seq.; fleet, before the battle of Salamis, iv. 179 seq. 194 seq. 208, 215, 219 (m. 1): seq., 194 seq., 208, 215, 219 (n. 1); army, march of, from Thermopylæ to army, march of, from Thermopyle to Attica, iv. 209 seq.; fleet at Salamis, iv. 224 seq.; fleet after the battle of Salamis, iv. 235, 242; army under Mardonius, iv. 248 seq.; fleet at Mykalê, iv. 284; army at Mykalê, iv. 288; army, after the defeat at Mykalê, iv. 289; war, effect of, upon Athenian political sentiment, iv. 364; kings, from Xexxês to Artaxerxês Mnêmon. v. 278 seq.; cavalry, and the retreating Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 254 seq.; empire, distribution of, into satrapies and subsatrapies, vii. 377; preparations for maritime preparations for maritime war against Sparta, B.C. 397, vii. 421, 435; king, Thebans obtain money from, ix. 294; forces in Phrygia on Alexander's landing, x. 24, 27; Gates, Alexander at, x. 117; fleet and armies, hopes raised in Greece by, B.C. 334-331, x. 214.

Persians, condition of, at the rise of Cyrus the Great, iii. 403; conquests of under Cyrus the Great, iii. 493

of, under Cyrus the Great, iii. 423, 431 seq.; the first who visited Greece, iii. 471 seq.; conquest of Thrace by, PHALÆKUS.

under Darius Hystaspês, iii. 485; under Darius Hystaspes, in. 485; successes of, against the revolted coast of Asia Minor, iii. 504; attempts of, to disunite the Ionians at Lade, iii. 511; narrow escape of Miltiades from, iii. 518; cruelties of, at Milêtus, iii. 518; attempted revolt of Thasos from, iv. 4; at Marathôn, iv. 22, 33 seq.; after the battle of Marathôn, iv. 39 seq.; change of Grecian feeling towards, after the Marathôn, iv. 39 seq.; change of Grecian feeling towards, after the battle of Marathôn, iv. 43; their religious conception of history, iv. 110; at Thermopylæ, iv. 181, 184 seq.; in Psyttaleia, iv. 224, 231; at Salamis, 226 seq.; at Platæa, iv. 260 seq.; at Mykalê, iv. 288; between Xerxês and Darius Codomannus, iv. 331; necessity of Grecian activity against after Danus Codomannus, IV. 331; necessity of Grecian activity against, after the battle of Platæa and Mykalê, iv. 385; mutilation inflicted by, vii. 181 (n. 2); heralds from, to the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 226; impotence and timidity of, vii. 242; imprudence of, in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont, x. 27; defeat of, at the Granikus, x. 31 seq.; defeat of, at Issus, x. 79 seq.; incorporation of, at Issus, x. 70 seq.; incorporation of, in the Macedonian phalanx, x. 190.

Persis, subjugation of, by Alexander, x. 123; Alexander's return from India to, x. 177.

Personages, quasi-human, in Grecian mythology, i. 311 seq.

Personal ascendency of the king in legendary Greece, ii. 6; feeling towards the gods, the king, or individuals in legendary Greece, ii. 21 seq.; sympathies the earliest form of social existence, ii. 27.

Personalities, great predominance of, in Grecian legend, ii. 17.

Personality of divine agents in mythes,

Personification, tendency of the ancient Greeks to, i. 310 seq.; of the heavenly bodies by Boiocalus, the German chief, i. 313 (n. 1).

Pestilence and suffering at Athens after the Kylonian massacre, ii. 456.

Petalism at Syracuse, iii. 379, v. 519.

Peuké, ix. 525, 527 (n. 1).

Peukestés, x. 175, 178.

Pezetæri, x. 10.

Phæax, expedition of, to Sicily, v. 538. Phalakus succeeds to the command of the Phokians, ix. 294; decline of the Phokians under, ix. 364, 405; opposition to, in Phokis, ix. 364; opposition of, to aid from Athens to Thermopylæ, ix. 365; position of, at Thermopylæ, ix. 364, 405 seq.; death of, ix. 420.

PHALANTHUS.

Phalanthus, ækist of Tarentum, iii. 198

Phalanx, Macedonian, ix. 484, x. 9 seq., 191.

Phalaris, iv. 65, 295. Phalérum, Xerxês at, iv. 215. Phalînus, vii. 220 seq.

Phanés and Zeus, i. 17.

Phanosthenês, vi. 382. Pharakidas, viii. 486 seq. Pharax, vii. 436, 437 (n. 3).

Pharax, the officer of Dionysius, ix. 113,

Pharis, conquest of, ii. 333.

harnabazus and Tissaphernės, embassy from, to Sparta, vi. 197; and Derkyllidas, vi. 320, vii. 377, 386, 422; and Athens, vi. 337, 350; Athenian victory over, vi. 353; convention of, about Chalkėdon, vi. 356; and Alkibiadės, vi. 356, 529 seq.; and Greek envoys, vi. 358, 360; after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 528; and Anaxibius, vii. 321, 331 seq.; and Lysander, vii. 372; and the subsatrapy of Æolis, vii. 377 seq.; and Agesilaus, vii. 427, 440 seq.; and Konôn, vii. 447, 483, 486 seq.; and Abydos, vii. 484; and the anti-Spartan allies at Corinth, vii. 487; and the Syracusans, viii. 369; anti-Macedonian efforts of, x. 75; capture of, with his force, at Pharnabazus and Tissaphernês, embassy x. 75; capture of, with his force, at Chios, x. 89.

Pharsalus, Polydamas of, viii. 129 seq.;

and Halus, ix. 398.

Phasélis, Alexander at, x. 48.

Phayllus, ix. 290 seq.
Pheidias, iv. 507, 508, v. 27.
Pheidias, iv. 507, 508, v. 26; claims and
Pheidon the Temenid, ii. 236; claims and Phetaon the Tenerad, 11. 200; chains and projects of, as representative of Hêraklês, ii. 238; and the Olympic games, ii. 238 seq.; coinage and scale of, ii. 240 seq., 245 seq.; various descriptions of, ii. 243. Phetaon, one of the Thirty, vi. 490, 511.

Phanicia, ante-Hellenic colonies from, to Greece not probable, ii. 192; situation and cities of, iii. 88 seq.; reconquest of, by Darius Nothus, ix. 423 seq., 426 (n. 3); Alexander in, x. 76 seq., 97. Phanician version of the legend of 18,

i. 81; colonies, iii. 92 seq.; fleet at Aspendus, vi. 325, 338; towns, sur-render of, to Alexander, x. 77 seq. Phænicians in Homeric times, ii. 41 seq.; historical, iii. 87, 108, 121, 127, 156 seq.; and Persians, subjugation of Cyprus by, iii. 504; and Persians at Milêtus, iii. 510 seq.; and Persians at milêtus, iii. 510 seq.; and Persians, reconquest of Asiatic Greeks by, iii. 518; and the cutting through Athos, iv. 122; and Greeks in Sicily, iv. 298; in Cyprus, viii. 15 seq.

PHILIP.

PHILIP.

Pheræ, Jason of, viii. 130 seq., 139 (n. 1), 144, 145, 180 seq., 186 seq.

Pheræ, Alexander of, viii. 237, ix. 200 seq.; despots of, ix. 200 seq.; Philip and the despots of, ix. 256, 285, 287 seq.; Philip takes the oath of alliance with Athens at, ix. 397; Alexander of, and Pelopidas, viii. 250, 268 seq., 283, 292 seq.; Alexander of, subdued by the Thebans, viii. 294 seq.; hostilities of Alexander of, against Athens, viii. 353. viii. 353.

Pherekydês, i. 350, iii. 164, iv. 75. Pheretimê, iii. 271 seq.

Philæus, eponym of an Attic dême, i.

Philaidæ, origin of, i. 176.
Philip of Macedon, detained as a hostage at Thèbes, viii. 236 (n. 4), 251, ix. 205 seq.; accession of, viii. 364, ix. 206 seq.; as subordinate governor in Macedonia, ix. 205, 206; position of, on the death of Perdikkas, ix. 206; capture of Amphipolis by, ix. 230 seg.; his alliance with Olynthus and hostilities against Athens, ix. 232 seq.; capture of Pydna and Potidæa by, ix. 232 seq.; increased power of, B. C. 358-356, ix. 234; marriage of, with Olympias, ix. 235; intrigue of, with Kersobleptês against Athens, ix. 253; his activity, and conquest of Methônê, ix. 254 seq.; and the despots of Pheræ, ix. 256, 285 seq.; development of Macedonian military force under, ix. 277 seq.; and Onomarchus, ix. 1x. 277 seq.; and Onomarchus, 1x. 285 seq.; conquest of Pheræ and Pagasæ by, ix. 287; checked at Thermopylæ by the Athenians, ix. 288; power and attitude of, B.C. 352-351, ix. 295; naval power and operations of, B.C. 351, ix. 298 seq.; in Thrace, B.C. 351, ix. 298; hostility of, to Olynthus, B.C. 351-350, ix. 311; flight, of his half-brothers to Olynthus, B.C. 351-350, ix. 311; flight of his half-brothers to Olynthus, ix. 313; intrigues of, in Olynthus, ix. 313; destruction of the Olynthian confederacy by, ix. 315, 317, 321, 340 seq., 354; Athenian expedition to seq., 354; Athenian expedition to Olynthus against, ix. 325; intrigues of, in Eubea, ix. 329; and Athens, overtures for peace between, B.C. 348, ix. 359 seq.; Thebans invoke the aid of, against the Phokians, ix. 365; and Thermopylæ, ix. 363, 395, 398, 404, 408, 411; embassies from Athens to, ix. 369 seq., 390 seq., 409; envoys to Athens from, ix. 376, 381, 386, 389; synod of allies at Athens about, ix. 377 seq.; peace and alliance between Athens and, ix. 379 seq., 403, 416 seq., 428, 431 seq.; fabrications 403, 416 seq., 428, 431 seq.; fabrications of Æschinês and Philokratês about,

Philistidés, ix. 435, 438.
Philistus, his treatment of mythes, i.

PHOKIAN.

367; banishment of, ix. 33; recal of, ix. 64; intrigues of, against Plato and Dion, ix. 74; tries to intercept Dion in the Gulf of Tarentum, ix. 87; at Leontini, ix. 97; defeat and

death of, ix. 97.

Philokrates, motion of, to allow Philip to send envoys to Athens, ix. 360; motion of, to send envoys to Philip, ix. 369; motions of, for peace and alliance with Philip, ix. 379 seq., 402; fabrications of, about Philip, ix. 386, 397, 399; impeachment and con-

demnation of, ix. 419. Philoktétés, i. 275, 284. Philolaus and Dioklês, ii. 220.

Philoméla, i. 181 seq.
Philomelus, ix. 240; seizes the temple at Delphi, ix. 243; and Archidamus, ix. 243; and the Pythia at Delphi, ix. 245; successful battles of, with the Lokrians, ix. 246; defeat and death of, ix. 249; takes part of the treasures in the temple at Delphi, ix. 248.

Philonomus and the Spartan Dorians,

ii. 248.

Philosophers, mythes allegorized by, i.

277 seq.
Philosophy, Homeric and Hesiodic, i. 331; Ionic, i. 337; ethical and social among the Greeks, iii. 314.

Philotas, alleged conspiracy, and execution of, x. 137 seq., 142 (n. 1).

Philoxenus and Dionysius, ix. 26. Phineus, i. 183, 216. Phlegyæ, the, i. 121.

Phlius, return of philo-Laconian exiles to, viii. 39; intervention of Sparta with, viii. 66; surrender of, to Agesilaus, viii. 68 seq.; application of, to Athens, viii. 223 seq.; fidelity of, to Sparta, viii. 243, 257; invasion of, by Euphron, viii. 257; and Pellênê, viii. 258; assistance of Charês to, viii. 258; and Thêbes, viii. 278 seq.

 $Phab\hat{e}$, i. 5, 6.

Phabidas, at Thêbes, viii. 55, 57, 60,

Phanissa of Phrynichus, iv. 233 (n. 1).

Phanix, i. 236. Phokaa, foundation of, iii. 5; surrender of, to Harpagus, iii. 418 seq.; Alki-

biadês at, vi. 376. Phokwan colonies at Alalia and Elea.

iii. 420 seq.

Phokwans, exploring voyages of, iii. 101; effects of their exploring voyages upon Grecian knowledge and fancy, iii. 102; emigration of, iii. 420 seq. Phokian defensive wall at Thermopylæ,

Philippus, Alexander's physician, x. 61.

Philiskus, viii. 248.

ix. 386, 394, 399, 400 seq.; in Thrace,

ix. 391, 392, 436 seq.; letter of, taken

by Æschinės to Athens, ix. 398, 404; surrender of Phokis to, ix. 408; declared symyathy of, with the declared sympathy of, with the Thebans, B.C. 346, ix. 408; visit of Æschinės to, in Phokis, ix. 410;

admitted into the Amphiktyonic assembly, ix. 412; ascendency of,

assembly, 1A. 412, ascendency of, B.C. 346, ix. 414 seq.; named president of the Pythian festival, ix. 414; position of, after the Sacred War, ix. 421; letter of Isokratês to, ix.

422; movements of, after B.C. 346, ix. 429 seq.; warnings of Demosthenes against, after B.C. 346, ix. 430; mission of Python from, to Athens, ix.

431; and Athens, dispute between,

about Halonnesus, ix. 433 seq.; and Kardia, ix. 436; and Athens,

disputes between, about the Bosphorus and Hellespont, ix. 436; at Perinthus and the Chersonese, ix. 440, 444 seq.; and Athens, declaration of war between, ix. 441 seq.; makes peace with Byzantium, Chios, and other islands, attacks the Scythians,

and is defeated by the Triballi, ix.

447; and the Amphissians, ix. 464 seq., 480; re-fortification of Elateia by, ix. 467, 469 seq.; application of, to Thèbes for aid in attacking the

Athenians, ix. 468 seq., 473; alliance of Athens and Thêbes against, ix. 474 seq., 475 seq.; letters of, to the Peloponnesians for aid, ix. 476 seq.; victory of, at Cheroneia, ix. 483 seq., 488; military organization of, ix. 484, x. 8 seq.; and the Athenians, peace of Demades between, ix. 490

seq.; honorary votes at Athens in favour of, ix. 492; expedition of, into Peloponnesus, ix. 493; at the con-gress at Corinth, ix. 494; prepara-tions of, for the invasion of Persia, ix. 495; repudiates Olympias, and marries Kleopatra, ix. 495; and

Alexander, dissensions between, ix. 496; assassination of, ix. 499 seq., 510 seq.; character of, ix. 501 seq.; discord in the family of, ix. 508; military condition of Macedonia before, x. 7.

Philip Arideus, x. 255, 270. Philippi, foundation of, ix. 234.

Philippies of Demosthenês, ix. 301 seq., 430, 437.

Philippizing factions in Megara and Eubœa, ix. 435. Philippus the Theban polemarch, viii. 76,

PHOKIANS.

ii. 207; townships, ravage of, by Xerxès' army, iv. 210.

Phokians, ii. 212; application of Leonidas to, iv. 173; at Leuktra, viii. 172; and the presidency of the temple at Delphi, ix. 241 seq.; Thebans strive to form a confederacy against, ix. 247; take the treasures in the temple at Delphi ix. 248 261 800 264; ravage of Delphi ix. at Delphi, ix. 248, 251, 290, 364; war of, with the Lokrians, Thebans, and Thessalians, ix. 249; under Onomarchus, ix. 256, 285; under Phayllus, ix. 290 seq.; under Phalækus, ix. 364, 405; Thebans invoke the aid of Dhiling against ix. 265; application Philip against, ix. 365; application of, to Athens, ix. 365; exclusion of, from the peace and alliance between Philip and Athens, ix. 386 seq., 399; envoys from, to Philip, ix. 392, 397; motion of Philokratės about, ix. 403; the Theorems in the Seq. 1804.

at Thermopylæ, ix. 405 seq.; treatment of, after their surrender to Philip, ix. 412 seq.; restoration of, by the Thebans and Athenians, ix. 477. Phokion, first exploits of, viii. 124; character and policy of, ix. 267 seq., 300, x. 216. 247 294 seq.; in Eubosa ix. x. 216, 247, 294 seq.; in Eubea, ix. 331 seq., 438; at Megara, ix. 435; in the Propontis, ix. 445; and Alexander's demand that the anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens should be donian leaders at Athens should be surrendered, ix. 545, 547; and Demades, embassy of, to Antipater, x. 258; at Athens, under Antipater, x. 265; and Nikanor, x. 281, 284 seq.; and Alexander, son of Polysperchon, x. 284; condemnation and death of, x. 289 seq.; altered sentiment of the Athenians towards, after his death,

x. 291. Phokis, acquisition of, by Athens, iv. 418; loss of, by Athens, iv. 434; invasion of, by the Thebans, B.C. 374, viii. 128; accusation of Thebes viii. 128; accusation of Thêbes against, before the Amphiktyonic assembly, ix. 239; resistance of, to the Amphiktyonic assembly, ix. 240

seq.; Philip in, ix. 407, 467, 476 seq. Phokus, i. 171.
Phokylidés, iii. 316.
Phorkys, and Kétô, progeny of, i. 7.
Phormio at Potidæa, iv. 557; at Amphilochian Argos, v. 44; at Naupaktus, v. 101; his rictories ever the Poles. v. 101; his victories over the Peloponnesian fleet, v. 120 seq., 127 seq.; in Akarnania, v. 128; his later history, v. 196 (n. 2).

Phormisius, disfranchising proposition of, vi. 512.

Phorôneus, i. 79.

Phragarts, iii 56

Phraortés, iii. 56.

Phratries, ii. 426 seq., 435; and gentes, non-members of, ii. 436.

PLATÆA.

Phrikônis, iii. 20. Phrygia, Persian forces in, on Alexander's landing, x. 27, 28; submission of, to Alexander, x. 38.

Phrygian influence on the religion of the Greeks, i. 21, 22, 23; music and worship, iii. 39 seq.

Phrygians and Trojans, i. 304; and Thracians, iii. 38, 39 seq.; ethnical affinities and early distribution of,

Phrynichus the tragedian, his capture of Milêtus, iii. 520 seq.; his Phænissæ, iv. 233 (n. 1).

Phrynichus the commander, at Milêtus, vi. 218; and Amorgès, vi. 218 (n. 2); and Alkibiadès, vi. 240 seq.; deposition of, vi. 245; and the Four Hundred, vi. 249, 290 seq.; assassination of, vi. 293, 310 (n. 2); decree respecting the memory of, vi. 310.

Phrynon, ix. 360.

Phrymon, IX. 500.
Phrymos and Hellê, i. 116 seq.
Phthiôtis and Deukalion, i. 93.
Φύσις, first use of, in the sense of nature, i. 332.
Phyl-Athênê, iii. 326.
Phylarch, Athenian, ii. 372.

Phylé, occupation of, by Thrasybulus,

Phyllidas and the conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy Thêbes, viii. 78 seq.

Physical astronomy thought impious by ancient Greeks, i. 314 (n. 1); science, commencement of, among the Greeks,

Phytalids, their tale of Dêmêtêr, i. 41. Phyton, ix. 18 seq. Pierians, original seat of, iii. 204.

Piété, Monts de, ii. 528.

Πίλοι of the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, v. 260 (n. 1).
Pinarus, Alexander and Darius on the,

x. 66 seq.

Pindar, his treatment of mythes, i. 340

Pindus, ii. 141 seq.
Piracy in early Greece, ii. 30, 49 seq.
Pisa and Elis, relations of, ii. 351 seq.
Pisatans and the Olympic games, ii. 239, 347, vii. 396; and Eleians, ii. 347, 351.

Pisatic sovereignty of Pelops, i. 144. Pisidia, conquest of, by Alexander, x.

Pissuthnés, iv. 511, vii. 175.

Pitané, iii. 19.

Pittakus, power and merit of, iii. 26 seq. Plague at Athens, v. 77 seq.; revival of,

Platæa and Thêbes, disputês between, iii, 384; and Athens, first connexion

PLATÆANS.

of, iii. 383; battle of, iv. 270 seq.; revelation of the victory of, at Mykalê velation of the victory of, at Mykaie the same day, iv. 288; night-surprise of, by the Thebans, v. 37 seq.; siege of, by Archidamus, v. 109 seq.; surrender of, to the Lacedæmonians, v. 179 seq.; restoration of, by Sparta, viii. 28 seq.; capture of, by Thebans, viii. 151 seq.

Plalæans at Marathôn, iv. 33.

Plato, his treatment of mythes, i. 394, 396 seq.; on the return of the Hêra-kleids, i. 443; on homicide, ii. 35 (n. 1); his Republic and the Lykur-(n. 1); his Republic and the Lykurgean institutions, ii. 307; and the Sophists, vii. 34-80; and Xenophôn, evidence of, about Sokratês, vii. 84, 123 (n.), 125 (n. 2); his extension and improvement of the formal logic founded by Sokratês, vii. 107; purfounded by Sokratês, vii. 107; purpose of his dialogues, vii. 129; incorrect assertions in the Menexenus of, vii. 523 (n. 2); the letters of, ix. 50 (n. 2); and Dionysius the Elder, ix. 37, 58; and Dion, ix. 37, 55 seq., 67, 82; and Dionysius the Younger, ix. 50, 67, 81; Dion and the Pythagoreans, ix. 55 seq.; statements and advise of on the condition of Syrraadvice of, on the condition of Syracuse, ix. 128 seq.; and the kings of Macedonia, ix. 203 seq.

Plausible fiction, i. 387, 486.

Pleistoanax, iv. 434 seq.

Plemmyrium, vi. 103, 125 seq. Plutarch and Lykurgus, ii. 259, 263, 317 seq.; on the ephor Epitadeus, ii. 321; and Herodotus, iii. 417 (n. 2), iv. 107 (n. 2); on Periklês, v. 96.

Plutarch of Eretria, ix. 331 seq.

Plyntêria, vi. 368.

Podaleirius and Machaôn, i. 166.

Podarkês, birth of, i. 105. Poems, lost epic, ii. 57 seq.; epic, recited in public, not read in private, ii. 71.

Poetry, Greek, transition of, from the mythical past to the positive present, i. 327; epic, ii. 54 seq.; epic, Homeric and Hesiodic, ii. 56 seq.; didactic and mystic hexameter, ii. 57; lyric and choric, intended for the ear, ii. 72; Greek, advances of, within a century and a half after Terpander, iii. 300.

Poels inspired by the Muse, i. 320; iambic, elegiac, and lyric, predominance of the present in, i. 328; and logographers, their treatment of mythes, i. 339 seq.; early, chronological evidence of, i. 480 seq.; epic, and their probable dates, ii. 59; cyclic, ii. 59 seq.; gnomic or moralizing,

iii. 314 seq. Polemarch, Athenian, ii. 446. Polemarchs, Spartan, ii. 371.

PRAXITAS.

Polemarchus, vi. 467, Political club at Athens, vi. 246. Politicians, new class of, at Athens, after Periklês, v. 165 seq. Pollis, defeat of, by Chabrias, viii. 122. Pollux and Castor, i. 156 seq. Polyarchus, ix. 153. Polybiadés, viii. 64.

Polybius, his transformation of mythes to history, i. 369; perplexing state-ment of, respecting the war between Sybaris and Krotôn, iv. 99; the Greece of, x. 324. Polycharês and Euæphnus, ii. 339.

Polydamas of Pharsalus, viii. 129 seq. Polydamas the Macedonian, x. 141. Polydamidas at Mendê, v. 353 seq. Polykratês of Samos, iii. 453 seq. Polykratês the Sophist, harangue of, on the accusation against Sokrates, vii.

147 (n. 2).

Polynikės, i. 247, 248 seq., 252, 256. Polyphron, viii. 236.

Polysperchon, appointed by Antipater as his successor, x. 275; plans of, x. 276; edict of, at Pella, x. 278 seq.; Phokion and Agnonidês heard before,

x. 286 seq.; and Kassander, x. 295, 306, 316; flight of, to Ætolia, x. 302. Polystralus, one of the Four Hundred, vi. 295 (n. 1), 296 (n. 2), 305, 313. Polyzena, death of, i. 278. Polyzelus and Hiero, iv. 314. Pompey in Kolchis, i. 223. Pontic Greeks, x. 390 seq. Pontic Herakleia, x. 391, 403.

Pontus and Gæa, children of, i. 7. Popular belief in aucient mythes, i. 380, 383.

Porus, x. 169 seq.
Poseidôn, i. 6, 10, 53; prominence of, in
Æolid legends, i. 103; Erechtheus, i.
177; and Athènè, i. 180; and Laomedôn, i. 261.
Positive evidence, iudispensable to historical proof, i. 283 seq.

torical proof, i. 383 seq

Positive tendencies of the Greek mind

in the time of Herodotus, iii. 393 seq. Post-Homeric poems on the Trojan war, i. 291 seq.

Polidara and Artabazus, iv. 243; relations of, with Corinth and Athens, iv. 550; designs of Perdikkas and the Corinthians upon, iv. 551; revolt of, from Athens, iv. 552 seq.; Athenian victory near, iv. 555; blockade of, by the Athenians, iv. 556, v. 64, 85, 104; Brasidas' attempt upon, v. 363; capture of, by Philip and the Olynthians, ix. 232.

Prasia, expedition of Pythodôrus to, vi. 119.

Praxitas, vii. 493 (n. 1), 498 seq.

PRIAM.

Priam, i. 263, 268 (n. 1), iv. 129. Priênê, iii. 6, 10, iv. 511. Priests, Egyptian, iii. 133 seq. Primitive and historical Greece, ii. 35-Private property, rights of, at Athens,

vi. 521 seq.

Probability alone not sufficient for historical proof, i. 383.

Pro-Bouleutic Senate, Solôn's, ii. 489.

Prôbůli, board of, vi. 193.

Prodikus, vii. 48, 57 seq.

Prætos and his daughters, i. 84 seq.

Proknê, i. 181 seq. Prokris, i. 183.

Prometheus, i. 6; and Zeus, i. 59, 70, 73 seq.; and Pandôra, i. 67; and Epimetheus, i. 70; Æschylus', i. 345 (n. 1). Property, rights of, at Athens, ii. 478,

485 seq.

Prophecies, Sibylliue, i. 307. Propontis, Phokiôn in, ix. 445. Propylæa, building of, iv. 506, 509 (n. 2). Protagoras, vii. 44, 48 seq., 59 seq., 61 (n, 1).

Protesilaus, i. 268; iv. 292. Prothoiis, viii. 166.

Proxenus of Tegea, viii. 199.

Prytaneium, Solôn's regulations about, ii. 509.

Prytanes, iii. 357. Prytanies, iii. 357. Prytanis, x. 415.

Psammenitus, iii. 435. Psammetichus I., iii. 141 seq. Psammetichus and Tamos, viii. 12.

Psanimis, iii. 150.

Psephism, Demophantus' democratical, vi. 306 seq.

Psephisms and laws, distinctions between, iv. 457. Psyttaleia, Persian troops in, iv. 223, 231.

Ptolemy of Alôrus, viii. 237; and Pelo-

pidas, viii. 250; assassination of, viii.

Ptolemy of Egypt, attack of Perdikkas on, x. 271; alliance of, with Kas-sander, Lysimachus, and Seleukus against Antigonus, x. 303, 305, 317, 320; proclamations of, to the Greeks, x. 303; Lysimachus, and Kassander, pacification of, with Antigonus, x. 305; in Greece, x. 307. Ptolemy, nephew of Antigonus, x. 305. Public speaking, its early origin and intellectual effects, ii. 19 seq.

Punjab, Alexander's conquests in the, x. 171 seq.

Purification for homicide, i. 23. Pydna, siege of, by Archestratus, iv. 553; siege of, by Archelaus, vi. 342; and Philip, ix. 232.

RHEGIANS.

Pylx, in Babylonia, vii. 205 (n. 2), 209 (n.2).

Pylagoræ, ii. 173. Pylians, i. 448 seq., ii. 255. Pylus, attack of Hêraklês on, i. 106; long independence of, ii. 253 (n. 1); occupation and fortification of, by the Athenians, v. 232 seq.; armistice concluded at, v. 241, 249; Kleòn's expedition to, v. 252 seq.; cession of, demanded by the Lacedæmonians, v. 432; helots brought back to, by the Athenians, v. 469; recapture of,

by the Lacedemonians, vi. \$54.

Pyramids, Egyptian, iii. 139.

Pyrrha and Deukaliôn, i. 92.

Pyrrha and Sokratês, vii. 165 (n. 1).

Pyrrhus, son of Achillês, i. 174.

Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and Antipater, son of Kassander, x. 322 seq.

Pythagoras the Philosopher, i. 331 seq., iv. 75, 93 seq., 99.

Pythagorean order, iv. 82, 87 seq., 99.

Pythagoreans, logical distinction of genera and species unknown to, vii. 106 (n. 3); Plato and Dion, ix. 55 seq. by the Lacedæmonians, vi. 354.

seq. Pytheas, x. 389.
Pythia, the, at Delphi, and Philomelus, ix. 245.

Pythian Apollo, i. 44.
Pythian Apollo, ii. 168 seq., iii. 284 seq., 289, viii. 129 (n.), 186, ix. 414.
Pythius the Phrygian, iv. 127.
Pythodôrus, v. 531, 536, vi. 119.
Python, mission of, to Athens, ix. 431.
Pythonius vi 12 seq. 33

Pythonikus, vi. 12 seq., 33.

Q.

Quadriremes, viii. 461. Quinqueremes, iv. 146 (n. 2), viii. 461.

\mathbf{R} .

Races of men in "Works and Days," i.

Religious ceremonies a source of mythes, i. 58, 406 seq.; views paramount in the Homeric age, i. 323; views, opposition of, to scientific, among the Greeks, i. 324, 336 seq.; festivals, Grecian, iii. 278, 292 seq., ix. 343; associations, effect of, on early Grecian ort. iii. 201 art, iii. 321

Reply to criticisms on the first two volumes of this history, i. 365 (n. 1). Rhadamanthus and Minôs, i. 201.

Rhapsodes, ii. 65, 74 seq.

Rhea, i. 5, 6.
Rhegians and Tarentines, expedition of, against the Iapygians, iv. 328.

RHEGIUM.

Rhegium, iii. 195; the chorus sent from Messênê to, iii. 279 (n. 1); and Athens, v. 526 (n. 1); the Athenian fleet near, B.C. 425, v. 531; progress of the Athenian armament for Sicily to, vi. 17; discouragement of the Athenians at, vi. 26; relations of, with Dionysius, B.C. 399, viii. 456 seq.; and Dionysius, ix. 4, 7, 11, 16 seq.; and Dionysius the Younger, ix. 131;

Timoleon at, ix. 142 seq. Rhetoric, iv. 482, vii. 22, 28 seq. Rhetors and sophists, iv. 482 seq. Rhetra, the primitive constitutional, ii. 265 (n. 2).

Rhetræ, the Three Lykurgean, ii. 275 (n. 2).

Rhianus and the second Messenian war, ii. 343. Rhium, Phormio in the Gulf at, v. 117

Rhodes, founder of, i. 465 seq.; dikasteries at, iv. 468 (n. 1); and the Olympic games, v. 454 (n. 1); the Peloponnesian fleet at, vi. 229, vii. 527, 532 seq., vi. 319; Dorieus at, vi. 339; revolt of, from Sparta, vii. 436; revolt of, from Athens, ix. 216 seq.; siege of, by Demetrius Poliorkêtês, x. 315.

Rhodians and the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 487.

Rhodôpis, iii. 154 (n. 2). Rhækus of Samos, iii. 320.

Rhæsakés, x. 34.

Rites, post-Homeric, i. 24; ecstatic, i. 27 seq.

Rivers, mythical personages identified with, i. 311 (n. 2); of Greece, ii.

Robbery, violent, how regarded in Greece and Europe, ii. 49 (n. 2).

Romances of chivalry, i. 426, ii. 89 (n.

Roman kings, authority of, ii. 11 (n. 3) Roman law of debtor and creditor, ii.

Romans, respect of, for Ilium, i. 299; belief of, with regard to earthquakes, i. 358 (n. 2); dislike of, to paid judicial pleading, vii. 35 (n. 1); embassy from, to Alexander, x. 158 (n. 2); Livy's opinion as to the chances of Alexander, if he had attacked the, x. 199.

Rome, reduction of the rate of interest at, ii. 481 (n. 1); debasement of coin at, ii. 483; new tables at, ii. 484 (n. 1); law of debtor and creditor at, ii. 525 seq.; political associations at, vi. 247 (n. 1); and Carthage, treaties between, viii. 375 (n. 1).

Roxana, x. 157, 254, 269, 300, 305.

SAMOS.

Sacred games, Solôn's rewards to victors at, ii. 508; objects, Greek view of material connexion with, iii. 291

(n. 2), 348.
Sacred War, the first, iii. 288 seq., iv.
431; the second, ix. 237 seq., 364 seq.; position of Philip after the second,

ix. 421; the third, ix. 452. Sacrifices, i. 59; human, in Greece, i. 120 seq.

Sacrilege, French legislation upon, vi. 47 (n. 1).

Sadyattés, iii. 76.

Saga, the Ampêre on, i. 322 (n. 1). Sage, a universal manifestation of the

human mind, i. 412.
Sagenpoesie, applied as a standard to the Iliad and Odyssey, ii. 95.

Sagra, date of the battle at, iv. 94 (n. 2). Saints, legends of, i. 420 seq. Sakadas, iii. 312.

Salathus, v. 157 seq.
Salamis, the serpent of, i. 172; war between Athens and Megara about, ii. 461 seq.; retreat of the Greek fleet from Artemisium to, iv. 198, 203; the battle of, iv. 228; Persian and Greek fleets after the battle of, iv. 239; migration of Athenians to, on Mardonius' approach, iv. 249; seizure of prisoners at, by the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, vi. 486.

Salamis in Cyprus, i. 172; viii. 13 seq. Salmoneus, i. 102.

Samian exiles, application of, to Sparta, iii. 456; attack of, on Siphnos, iii. 457; at Zanklê, iii. 516. Samians and Athenians, contrast be-

tween, iii. 460; slaughter of, by Otanés, iii. 463; at Ladé, iii. 515; migration of, to Sicily, iii. 516; transfer of the fund of the confederacy from Delegate Athena proposed by from Dêlos to Athens proposed by, iv. 428; application of, to Sparta for aid against Athens, iv. 515.

Samnites, ix. 8. Samos, foundation of, iii. 5; condition of, on the accession of Darius Hystaspês, iii. 453; Lacedæmonians and Polykratês at, iii. 456; Persian armament under Datis at, iv. 18; Persian de total accession float et al. sian fleet at, after the battle of Salamis, iv. 239, 284; Greek fleet Persians, iv. 283; 234; Greek facet moves to the rescue of, from the Persians, iv. 283; an autonomous ally of Athens, iv. 488; revolt of, from the Athenians, iv. 511 seq., 515; and Milêtus, dispute between, about Priênê, iv. 511; Athenian armament against, under Periklês, Sophoklês, &c., iv. 512 seq.; blockaded, iv. 513;

SAMOTHRACIANS.

government of, after its capture by Periklês, iv. 515; democratical revolution at, vi. 208 seq.; powerful Athenian fleet at, B.C. 412, vi. 220; oligarchical conspiracy at, vi. 237 seq.; 255 seq.; embassy from the Four Hundred to, vi. 273, 281 seq., 284; Athenian democracy reconstituted at, vi. 276 seq.; the Athenian democracy at, and Alkibiadês, vi. 278 seq.; eagerness of the Athenian democracy eagerness of the Athenian democracy at, to sail to Peiræus, vi. 282, 283; envoys from Argos to the Athenian Demos at, vi. 284; Athenian democracy at, contrasted with the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, vi. 316 seq.; Strombichidês' arrival at, from the Hellespont, vi. 321; Alkibiadês' return from Aspendus to, vi. 339; Alkibiadês sails from, to the Hellespont, vi. 353; Alkibiadês at B.C. 407 pont, vi. 353; Alkibiadês at, B.C. 407, vi. 353; Alkibiadês leaves Antiochus in command at, vi. 376; dissatisfaction of the armament at, with Alkibiadês, vi. 377; Konôn at, vi. 382; Lysander at, vi. 443, 457; conquest of, by Timotheus, viii. 280, 282 (n.

Samothracians, exploits of, at Salamis,

iv. 230.

Sangala, capture of, by Alexander, x.

Sapphô, i. 328, iii. 25 seq. Sardinia, proposition of Bios for a Pan-

Ionic emigration to, iii. 422

Sardis, iii. 46; capture of, by Cyrus, iii. 408; march of Aristagoras to, and burning of, iii. 501; march of Xerxês to, and collection of his forces at, iv. 114; march of Xerxês from, iv. 126; retirement of the Persian army to, after their defeat at Mykalê, iv. 289 Alkibiadês' imprisonment at, and escape from, vi. 343; forces of Cyrus the Younger collected at, vii. 182; march of Cyrus the Younger from, to march of Cyrus the Younger from, to Kunaxa, vii. 185 seq.; victory of Age-silaus near, vii. 433; surrender of, to Alexander, x. 38. Sarissa, x. 8, 50 seq. Sarmatians, iii. 66 seq. Sarpedon, i. 202. Sataspes, iii. 106, 108 (n. 1). Satrapies of Darius Hystaspes, iii. 449.

Satraps under Darius Hystaspês, discontents of, iii. 443 seq.; of Alexander,

x. 179 seq.

Satyrus of Herakleia, x. 395 seq. Satyrus I. of Bosporus, ix. 258 (n. 2),

x. 411 seq.

Satyrus the actor, ix. 264, 355. Satyrus II. of Bosporus, x. 414.

Saxo Grammaticus and Snorro Sturleson

SENATE.

contrasted with Pherekydês and Hellanikus, i. 418.

Scales, Æginæan and Euboic, ii. 241 seq., 245; A Attic, ii. 538. 245; Æginæan, Euboic, and

Scandinavian mythical genealogies, i. 416 (n. 2); and Teutonic epic, i. 427

Scardus, ii. 142.

Science, physical, commencement of, among the Greeks, i. 331.

Scientific views, opposition of, to religious, among the Greeks, i. 324-333

Scission between the superior men and the multitude among the Greeks, i. 338.

Sculpture at Athens, under Periklês, iv.

506.

Scurrility at festivals, iii. 304 (n. 2).

Scylla, i. 1, 203. Scythia, iii. 61; Darius' invasion of,

iii. 474 seq. Scythians, iii. 61 seq., x. 405; invasion of Asia Minor and Upper Asia by, iii. 70 seq.; strong impression produced by, upon Herodotus' imagination, iii. 478; attack of Philip on, ix. 447;

and Alexander, x. 148, 149, 156.
Secession of the mythical races of

Greece, i. 457. Seisachtheia, or debtor's relief-law of Solôn, ii. 469 seq.

Selênê, i. 6, 314 (n. 1).

Seleukus, alliance of, with Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy against Antigonus, x. 308, 305, 317, 320; Kassander, Lysimachus, and Ptole-my, pacification of, with Antigonus, x. 305; and the Pontic Hêrakleia, x. 400; death of, x. 402.

Selinuntines, defeat of, by the Egesteens and Carthaginians, viii. 386.
Selinus, iii. 177; and Egesta, v. 540, viii. 383; application of, to Syracuse, viii. 384; capture of, by Hannibal, viii. 389 seq.; abandonment of, by the rest of Sicily, viii. 390; Hermokratês

at, viii. 399. Selli, ii. 194. Selymbria, vi. 349, 356, ix. 441 (n. 1). Semelé, i. 238. Semi-historical, interpretation of ancient

mythes, i. 382.

legendary, paramount in historical Greece, ii. 18; Spartan, ii. 266, 277; of Areopagus, ii. 444; powers of, enlarged by Solôn, ii. 489; of Four Hundred, Solôn's, ii. 489; of Five Hundred, iii. 357; at Athens, expulsion of, by the Four Hundred, vi. 267. Senate and Agora subordinate in

Sentiment, mingled ethical and mythical, in "Work and Days," i. 64 seq. Sépias-Akté, Xerxês' fleet at, iv. 181 seq. Servitude, temporary, of the gods, i. $5\overline{4}$, 108 (n. 3).

Sestos, capture of, B.C. 476, iv. 293 seq.; escape of the Athenian squadron from, to Elæus, vi. 329; Derkyllidas at, vii. 486; capture of, by Kôtys, viii. 352; surrender of, to Athens, B.C. 358, viii. 361 (n. 3); conquest of, by Charês, ix. 253.

Seuthes and the Ten Thousand Greeks,

vii. 323, 335 seq. Seven chiefs against Thêbes, the, i. 250. Seven wise men of Greece, iii. 316 seq.

Sibyl, the Erythræan, i. 26. Sibylline prophecies, i. 26, 307. Sicilian Greeks and Phœnicians, iii. 97; Greeks, prosperity of, between B.C. 735 and 485, iii. 180 seq.; Greeks, peculiarity of their monetary and statical scale, iii. 182; comedy, iii. 185; Greeks, early governments of, iv. 297; cities, B.C. 431, v. 522, 525; and Italian Dorians, aid expected from, by Sparta, v. 527; cities, general peace between, B.C. 424, v. 535; aid to Syracuse, B.C. 413, vi. 129.

Sicily, Phoenicians and Greeks in, iii. 97: ante-Hellenic population of, iii. 97; ante-Hellenic population of, iii. 163, 175, 186; and Italy, early languages and history of, iii. 167 (n. 2); and Italy, date of earliest Grecian colony in, iii. 169; rapid multiplication of Grecian colonies in, after B.C. 735, iii. 173; the voyage from Greece to, iii. 174; spot where the Greeks first landed in, iii. 174; Megarian, iii. 177; sub-colonies from, iii. 179; Sikel or Sikan caverns in, iii. 180 (n. 1); mixed population of, iii. 182; difference between Greeks in, and those in Greece Proper, iii. 184; despots in, about B.C. 500, iv. 297; Carthaginian invasion of, B.C. 480, iv. 210; cavalleign of departs from iv. 310; expulsion of despots from, B.C. 465, iv. 320; after the expulsion of despots, B.C. 465, iv. 323, 326 seq., v. 516; return of Duketius to, v. 521; intellectual movement in, between B.C. 461-416, v. 524; relations of, to Athens and Sparta, altered by the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, v. 526; Dorians attack the Ionians in, about B.C. 427, v. 528; Ionic cities in, solicit aid from Athens, against the Dorians, B.C. 427, v. 529; Athenian expedition to, B.C. 427, v. 529; Athenian expedition

SIMONIDÊS.

to, B.C. 425, v. 530; Athenian expedition to, B.C. 422, v. 538; Athenian expedition to, B.C. 415, vi. 1 seq.; Athenian expedition to, B.C. 413, vi. 123 seq.; effect of the Athenian disaster in, npon all Greeks, vi. 195; intervention of Carthage in, B.C. 410, viii.384 seq.; invasion of, by Hannibal, B.C. 409, viii.386 seq.; abandonment of Selinus by the Hellenic cities of, B.C. 409, viii. 390; Hannibal's return from, 409, viii. 390; Hannibal's return from, B.C. 409, viii. 397; return of Hermokrates to, viii. 398; invasion of, by Hannibal and Imilkon, viii. 404 seq.; southern, depressed condition of, B.C. 405, viii. 439; expedition of Dionysius against the Carthaginians in, viii. 465 seq.; frequency of pestilence among the Carthaginians in, ix. 1; Dionysius' concusts in the interior Dionysius' conquests in the interior of, B.C. 394, ix. 4; condition of, B.C. 353-344, ix. 128; voyage of Timoleon to, ix. 142 seq.; invasion of, by the Carthaginians, B.C. 340, ix. 169; Timoleon ix. 142 seq.; invasion of, by the Carthaginians, B.C. 340, ix. 169; Timoleon ix. 170, 100; condition in 170, 100; condition in 170, 100; condition in 170, 100; condition in 170, 170, condition in 170, 170, condition in 170, 170, condition in 170, condition of, B.C. 353, 344, ix. 4; condition of, B.C. 353, 344, ix. 4; condition of, B.C. 353, 344, ix. 128; condition of, B.C. 354, ix. 142, condition of moleon in, ix. 170-193; expedition to, under Giskon, ix. 180; Agathoklès in, x. 371 seq.; ceases to be under Hellenic agency after Agathoklês, x.

Sidon, iii. 90; conquest of, by Ochus, ix. 425; surrender of, to Alexander.

Sidus, capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, vii. 500; recovery of, by Iphikra-tês, vii. 517. Siege of Troy, i. 262-278. Sigeium, Mitylenæans at, i. 308; and

Peisistratus, iii. 337.

Sikans, iii. 163, 165 (n. 3), 184. Sikel prince, Duketius, iii. 186. Sikels, iii. 163; in Italy, iii. 164, 188; migration of, from Italy to Sicily, iii. 167 (n. 1); in Sicily, iii. 182; viii. 475, ix. 4.

1x. 4.

Sikinnus, iv. 222, 235, 401 (n. 2).

Sikyôn, origin of, i. 255 seq.; early condition of, ii. 380; despots at, ii. 407 seq., 412; classes of people at, ii. 410; names of Dorian and non-Dorian names of Dorian and non-Dorian tribes at, ii. 406, 410; Corinth, and Megara, analogy of, ii. 420; Athenian attacks upon, iv. 419; Spartan and Argeian expedition against, v. 495; desertion of, from Sparta to Thêbes, viii. 244; intestine dissensions at, B.C. 267, 368, iii. 255 ed. Evplanda et. Fig. 367-366, viii. 255 seq.; Euphrôn at, viii.

255, 259 seq. Silphium, iii. 260, 261. Silver race, the, i. 62.

Simonidés of Keôs, epigram of, on the battle of Thermopylæ, iv. 201; medi-ation of, between Hiero and Thero, iv. 317.

SIMONIDÊS.

Simonides of Amorgus, poetry of, i. 327 seq., iii. 305, 314.

Sinon, i. 277.

Sinôpê, and the Amazons, i. 195 (n. 3); date of the foundation of, iii. 74 (n.); Periklês' expedition to, iv. 495; and the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 296 seq., 311; long independence of, x. 391; envoys from, with Darius, x. 391.

Siphnus, ii. 533; attack of Samian exiles on, iii. 457.

Sirens, the, i. 1. Siris, or Herakleia, iii. 196.

Sisygambis, x. 111, 117. Sisyphus, i. 113 seq.

Stialkės, v. 64, 133. Sithonia, iii. 251. Sittakė, the Ten Thousand Greeks at,

vii. 277. Skalds, Icelandic, songs of, ii. 84 (n. 2), 89 (n. 2).

Skedasus, viii. 169.

Skėpsis, Derkyllidas at, vii. 380. Skillus, Xenophôn at, vii. 344 seq. Skiônė, revolt of, from Athens to Brasidas, v. 348 seq.; dispute about, after the One Year's truce between Athens and Sparta, v. 351; blockade of, by the Athenians, B.C. 423, v. 355; cap-ture of, by the Athenians, B.C. 421,

v. 426.

Skiritæ, v. 446, viii. 22. Skylax, iii. 450, 494, viii. 217 (n. 1). Skyllêtium, iii. 196.

Skyros, conquest of, by Kimôn, iv. 392.

Skytalism at Argos, viii. 189 seq.
Skythini, and the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 276.
Slavery of debtors in Attica before Solon, ii. 466.

Slaves in legendary Greece, ii. 37 seq.

Smerdis, iii. 437 seq.

Sminthian Apollo, i. 47, 306. Smyrna, iii. 10, 16. Social War, ix. 216, 227. Socratic philosophers, their unjust condemnation of rhapsodes, ii. 74.

Socratici viri, vii. 84 (n. 1).
Sogdian rock, capture of, by Alexander, x. 156.

Sogdiana, Alexander in, x. 145 seq., 150

Sokrates, his treatment of the discrepancy between scientific and religious views, i. 334; treatment of, by the Athenians, i. 337 seq.; alleged impiety of, attack by Aristophanes, i. 358 (n. 2); and the sophists, iv. 484, v. 440 (n. 1), vii. 60 (n. 2), 82, 113 (n. 1); at the battle of Delium, v. 311; and Alkibiadês, v. 440 seq.; and Kritias, v. 441 seq.; at the Athenian

SPARTA.

Assembly, on the generals at Arginuse, vi. 420; and the Thirty, vi. 464, 477; and Parmenidês, vii. 26 (n. 3); dislike of, to teaching for pay, vii. 24; life, character, philosophy, teaching, and death of, vii. 81-174. Solemnities and games, i. 95. Soli in Cyprus, ii. 514.

Soltium, Athenian capture of, v. 58.
Soloeis, Cape, iii. 93 (n. 2).
Solôn and the Iliad, ii. 87 (n. 1); civil condition of Attica before, ii. 424; life, character, laws, and constitu-tion of, ii. 460, 522. Sophoklés, his Œdipus, i. 247; his treat-

ment of mythes, i. 341 seq., 345; Periklês, &c., Athenian armament under, against Samos, iv. 512 seq.; number of tragedies by, vii. 3 (n. 1); Æschylus and Euripidês, vii. 6; and Herodotus, vii. 7 (n. 2).
Sophoklês and Eurymedôn, expeditions

of, to Sicily and Korkyra, v. 231 seq.,

273 seq., 535 seq. Sôsis, ix. 101.

Sôsistratus, x. 327, 331 seq. Sparta and Mykênæ, i. 154 seq.; occupation of, by the Dorians, i. 445, ii. 234, 248 seq., 280; and the disunion of Greek towns, ii. 185; not strictly a city, ii. 187; inferior to Argos and neighbouring Dorians, B.C. 776, ii. 230; first historical view of, ii. 250; not the perfect Dorian type, ii. 262 pair of kings at, ii. 269; classification pair of kings at, ii. 269; classification of the population at, ii. 280 seq.; syssitia and public training at, ii. 298 seq.; partition of lands at, ascribed to Lykurgus, ii. 310-331; progressive increase of, ii. 334; and Lepreum, ii. 352; Argos, and Arcadia, relations of, ii. 355; and Mantineia, ii. 357; and Arcadia, ii. 358 seq.; bones of Orestês taken to, ii. 359; acquisitions of, towards Argos, ii. 358 seq.; bones of towards Argos, ii. 361 seq.; extensive possessions and power of, tensive possessions and power of, censive possessions and power of, B.C. 540, ii. 365 seq.; military institutious of, ii. 368 seq.; recognized superiority of, ii. 372; peculiar government of, ii. 382; alleged intervention of, with the Nemean and Isthmian games, iii. 291 (n. 2); exclusive character of her factively clusive character of her festivals, iii. 294; musical and poetical tendencies at, iii. 306 seq., 309 (n. 1); choric training at, iii. 309 seq.; first appearance of, as head of Peloponnesian allies, iii. 386, 390 seq.; preparations at, for attacking Athens, effect the follower of Elements iii. after the failure of Kleomenes, iii. 390 seq.; and Crœsus, iii. 407; and Asiatic Greeks, iii. 414, viii. 253, 257;

and Samian exiles, iii. 456; and Aristagoras, iii. 497 seq.; treatment of Darius' herald at, iv. 7; appeal of Athenians to, against the Medism of Ægina, iv. 8; war of, against Argos, B.C. 496-495, iv. 10 seq.; no heralds sent from Xerxês to, iv. 155; Pan-hellenic congress convened by, at the Isthmus of Corinth, iv. 156
seq.; leaves Athens undefended
against Mardonius, iv. 247 seq.; headship of the allied Greeks transferred Athens, first open separation between, iv. 348, 350 seq., 379; secret promise of, to the Thasians, to invade Attica, iv. 399; restores the supremacy of Thêbes in Bœotia, iv. 402, 414; and the rest of Peloponnêsus, between B.C. 477-457, iv. 402; earthquake and revolt of Helots at, B.C. 464, iv. 403 seq.; Athenian anxiliaries to, against the Helots, iv. 404 seq.; Athenians renounce the alliance of, B.C. 464, iv. 407; and Athens, five years' truce between, iv. 421; and Delphi, B.C. 452-447, iv. 431; and Athens thirty years' truce 431; and Athens, thirty years' truce between, iv. 435; application of Samians to, iv. 515; imperial, com-pared with imperial Athens, iv. 523, vii. 358 seq.; and her subject-allies, iv. 523; and Athens, confederacies of, iv. 533; promise of, to the Potidæans, to invade Attica, iv. 552; application of the Lesbians to, v. 1; assembly at, before the Peloponnesian war, v. 5 seg.; relations of, with her allies, v. 4; congress of allies at, B.C. 432, v. 17 seg.; requisitions addressed to Athens by, B.C. 421, v. 98 seg. 90 sec.; of the seg. to 431, v. 22 seq., 29 seq.; efforts of, to raise a naval force on commencing the Peloponnesian war, v. 48; and the Mitylenæans, v. 143 seq.; despatches from Artaxerxès to, v. 26-seq.; and Athens, one year's truce between, B.C. 423, v. 346 seq., 362, 362, seq.; and the Peace of Nikias, v. 405, 407; and Argos, uncertain relations between, B.C. 421, v. 407; and Athens, alliance, between B.C. 421, v. 407 alliance between, B.C. 421, v. 408; revolt of Elis from, v. 421 seq.; congress at, B.C. 421, v. 427; and Beeotia, alliance between, B.C. 420, v. 429; and Argos, fifty years' peace between, v. 431 seq.; embassy of Nikias to, v. 450; and Athens, relations between, B.C. 419, v. 469; and the battle of Mantineia, B.C. 418, v. 487; and Argos, peace and alliance between, B.C. 418, v. 491 seq.; submission of Mantineia to, v. 493; and Athens, relaSPARTA.

tions between, B.C. 416, v. 500; and Sicily, relations of, altered by the cours, relations of, aftered by the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, v. 526; aid expected from the Sicilian Dorians by, B.C. 431, v. 527; embassy from Syracuse and Corinth to, B.C. 415, vi. 68 seq.; Alkibiadês at, vi. 68 seq., 232; and Athens, violation of the peace between, B.C. 414 vi. 117; resolution of the fartify. 414, vi. 117; resolution of, to fortify Packeleia and send a force to Syracuse, B.C. 414, vi. 119; application from Chios to, vi. 196; embassy from Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus to, vi. 197; embassy from the Four Hundred to, vi. 286, 290; proposals of peace from, to Athens, B.C. 410, vi. 245, e.g.; alleged proposals of peace 345 seq.; alleged proposals of peace from, to Athens, after the battle of Arginuse, vi. 431; first proposals of Athens to, after the battle of Ægospotami, vi. 446; embassies of Theramenês to, vi. 447, 448; assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy at, B.C. 404, vi. 448; terms of peace granted to Athens by, B.C. 404, vi. 449; triumphant return of Lysander to, vi. 457; and her allies, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, vi. 478; oppressive dominion of, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, vi. 480; opposition to Lysander at, vi. 481; pacification by, between the Ten at Athens and the exiles at Peiræus, vi. 497; empire of, contrasted with her promises of liberty, vii. 358 seq.; change in the language and plans of, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, vii. 362; and the Thirty at Athens, vii. 365; op-portunity lost by, for organizing a stable confederacy throughout Greece, vii. 369 seq.; alienation of the allies of, after the battle of Ægospotami, vii. 389 seq.; and Elis, war between, vii. 391 seq.; refuses to restore the Olympic presidency to the Pisatans, vii. 396; expels the Messenjans from Polympics viii. Messeniaus from Peloponnêsus, vii. 396; introduction of gold and silver to, by Lysander, vii. 397 seq.; in B.c. 432 and after B.c. 404, contrast between, vii. 399; position of kings at, vii. 404 seq.; conspiracy of Kinadon at, vii. 414 seq.; Persian preparations for mariseq.; Persian preparations for maritime war against, B.c. 397, vii. 421, 435; revolt of Rhodes from, vii. 436; relations of, with her neighbours and allies, after the accession of Agesilaus, vii. 450; and Hêrakleia Trachynia, vii. 451, 468; and Timokratês, vii. 452 seq.; and Thêbes, war between, B.C. 395, vii. 455 seq.;

alliance of Thêbes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos against, vii. 467; proceedings of, against Thêbes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos, vii. 469, 470 seq.; consequences of the battles of Corinth, Knidus, and Korôneia to, vii. 482 seq.; hostility of, to partial land confederacies in Greece, vii. 524; congress at, on the peace of Antalkidas, vii. 548; and the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 1 seq., 7 seq., 26; applications of, for Persian aid, viii. applications of, for Persian aid, viii. 5 seq.; and Persia after the battle of Ægospotami, viii. 7,; and Grecian autonomy, viii. 10 seq., 26; miso-Theban proceedings of, after the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 28 seq.; restores Platæa, viii. 28 seq.; oppressive conduct of, towards Mantineia, p.c. 386, viii. 33 seq.; mischievous influence of, after the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 37 seq.; naval competition of Athens with, after the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 39 seq.; and the tion of Athens with, after the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 39 seq.; and the Olynthian confederacy, viii. 49 seq., 54, 61 seq.; and the surprise of Thèbes by Phœbidas, viii. 58 seq.; and Phlius, viii. 67; ascendency and unpopularity of, B.C. 379, viii. 69 seq.; Xenophôn on the conduct of, between B.C. 387-379, viii. 74; effect of the revolution at Thêbes, B.C. 379, on, viii. 89; trial of Sphodrias at, viii. 95 seq.; war declared by Athens against, B.C. 378, viii. 96; separate peace of Athens with, B.C. 374, viii. 128, 133; and Polydamas, viii, 130 seq.; decline of the power of, between B.C. 382-374, viii. 132; discouragement of, by her defeat at Korkyra and by earthquakes, B.C. 372, viii. 148; disposition of Athens to peace with, B.C. 372, viii. 149, 155; general peace settled at, B.C. 371, viii. $155 \ seq.$, 161, 188; effect of the news of the defeat at Leuktra on, viii. 175; and Athens, difference between, in passive endurance and active energy, viii. 178; reinforce-ments from, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 178; treatment of Leuktra, viii. 178; treatment of defeated citizens on their return from Leuktra, viii. 182 seq.; and Thêbes, alleged arbitration of the Achæans between, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 189 (n. 1); position of, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 190; and the Amphiktyonic assembly, viii. 192 seq., ix. 239; feeling against Agesilaus at, B.c. 371, viii. 197; hostile approaches of Epameinondas to, viii. 207 seq., 314 seq.; abstraction of Western Laconia from, viii. 216 seq.; application of, to Athens for

SPARTANS.

aid against Thôbes, B.C. 369, viii. 223 seq.; and Athens, alliance between, B.C. 369, viii. 240; reinforcement from Syracuse in aid of, viii. 245; peace of her allies with Thôbes, viii. 277 seq.; alliance of Elis and Achaia with, B.C. 366, viii. 298; and Dionysius, viii. 440, 490, ix. 22; degradation of, B.C. 360-359, ix. 195 seq.; countenance of the Phokians by, B.C. 353, ix. 256; plans of, against Megalopolis and Messênê, B.C. 353, ix. 256, 283; decline in military readiness among the Peloponnesian allies of, after the Peloponnesian war, ix. 274; ineffectual campaign of, against Megalopolis, ix. 292 seq.; envoys from, vith Darius, x. 133; anti-Macedonian policy of, after Alexander's death, x. 219 seq.;

policy of, after Alexander's death, x. 219 seq.

Spartan kings, i. 448, ii. 18, 269 seq.; senate, assembly, and ephors, ii. 266 seq.; popular assembly, ii. 276; constitution, ii. 278 seq.; government, secrecy of, ii. 294, 295; discipline, ii. 298 seq.; women, ii. 300 seq.; law and practice of succession, erroneous suppositions about, ii. 325 seq.; arbitration of the dispute between Athens and Megara about Salamis, ii. 463; expeditions against Hippias, iii. 342; empire, commencement of, vii. 349, 352 seq., 357 seq.; empire, Theopompus on, vii. 363 (n. 1); allies at the battle of Leuktra, viii. 173.

Spartans, and Pheidôn, ii. 240; and Mesceniers can't precedirers.

at the battle of Leuktra, viii. 173. Spartans, and Pheidôn, ii. 240; and Messenians, early proceedings of, ii. 252; local distinctions among, ii. 281; the class of, ii. 282 seq.; and Helots, ii. 291 seq.; marriage among, ii. 300; their ignorance of letters, ii. 307 (n. 2); musical susceptibilities of, ii. 346; and the second Messenian war, ii. 347, 350; careful training of, when other states had none, ii. 367; and the battle of Marathôn, iv. 30, 48; unwillingness of, to postpone or neglect festivals, iv. 175; at Platæa, iv. 256; and the continental Ionians after the battle of Mykalê, iv. 290; favourable answer of the oracle at Delphi to, on war with Athens, B.C. 432, v. 17; final answer of the Athenians to, before the Peloponnesian war, v. 35; their desire for peace, to regain the captives from Sphakteria, v. 268 seq.; and Thebans, at the battle of Korôneia, vii. 479; project of, for the rescue of the Asiatic Greeks, viii. 41; miso-Theban impulse of, B.C. 371, viii. 165; confidence and defeat of, at Leuktra, viii. 170 seq.;

SPARTI.

retirement of, from Bosotia after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 180; refusal of, to acknowledge the independence of Messênê, viii. 277, 334; and Dion, ix. 60.

Sparti, i. 238, 239. Spartokidæ, x. 409 seq. Speaking, public, its early origin and intellectual effects, ii. 19 seq.

Sperthiës and Bulis, v. 104 (n. 1). Speusippus, indictment of, by Leogoras,

vi. 41 (n. 4).

Sphakteria, locality of, v. 222; occupa-tion of, by the Lacedæmonians, v. 237, 257; blockade of Lacedæmonians in, v. 241, 250 seq.; Lacedæmonian embassy to Athens for the release of the prisoners in, v. 242 seq.; Demosthenes' application for reinforce-ments to attack, v. 250 seq.; condition of, on the attack by Demosthenes and Kleôn, v. 257; victory of Demosthenês and Kleôn over Lacedæmonians in, v. 258 seq.; surrender of Lacedemonians in, v. 262 seq.; arrival of prisoners from, at Athens, v. 267; restoration of prisoners taken at, v. 409 seq.; disfranchisement of restored prisoners from, v. 425.

Sphendaleis, Attic deme of, iv. 252 and n.

Sphinx, the, i. 7, 244.

Sphodrias, attempt of, to surprise Peiræus, viii. 92 seq.

Spitamenes, x. 145, 149. Spithridates and the Lacedremonians, vii. 427, 440 seq.

Stable, the Augean, i. 130.

Stageira, iii. 252. Standard of historical evidence raised with regard to England, but not with regard to Greece, i. 433.

Statira, x. 72, 100 (n. 2), 181.
Statira, x. 72, 100 (n. 2), 181.
Statues, Greek, identified with the beings they represented, i. 410. Stenyklerus, Dorians of, ii. 248 seq.

Steropés, i. 5.

Stesichorus, the lyric poet, and Hellen, i. 279 seq.; dialect of, iii. 310 seq. Stesiklės, viii. 136, 139 (n. 1). Sthenelaidas, the ephor, v. 15 seq. Story of striking off the overtopping ears of corn, ii. 399 (n. 2).

Strabo on the Amazons, i. 197; his version of the Argonautic expedition, i. 234; on Old and New Ilium, i. 300 seg.; his transformation of mythes to history, i. 369

Strangers, supplication of, ii. 21 (n. 1); reception of, in legendary Greece, ii.

Strategi, Kleisthenean, iii. 355; enlarged

SYRACUSAN.

functions of Athenian, after the Persian war, iv. 365. Stratolas, viii. 304 seq

Stratus, attack of Peloponnesians, Ambrakiots, and Epirots upon, B.C. 429, v. 114.

Strelitzes, suppression of the revolt of, by Peter the Great, iii. 446 (n. 3)

Strombichides, pursuit of Chalkideus and Alkibiades by, vi. 202; expedi-tion of, to Chios, vi. 205, 220; removal of, from Chios to the Hellespont, vi. 320; arrival of, at Samos, from the Hellespont, vi. 321; and other Athe-nian democrats, imprisonment of, vi. 454; trial and execution of, vi. 459

Strophé, introduction of, iii. 312.

Struthas, victory of, over Thimbron, vii. 526.

Strymôn, Greek settlements east of, in Thrace, iii. 252; Xerxês' bridges across the, iv. 125.

Styx, i. 7.

Styx, rocks near, ii. 225 (n. 1).

Subterranean course of rivers in Greece,

Succession, Solôn's laws of, ii. 505. Suli, iii. 228.

Suppliants, reception of, in legendary Greece, ii. 26.

Supplication of strangers, ii. 21 (n. 1). Susa, sum found by Alexander the Great at, iii. 449 (n. 3); Pharnabazus conveys Greek escorts towards, vi. 358; Alexander at, x. 115, 179; Alexander's march from, to Persepolis, x.

116 seq. Susia, x. 134.

Susian Gates, Alexander at, x. 117. Syagrus, reply of, to Gelôn, i. 154.

Sybaris, foundation, territory, and colonies of, iii. 189 seq.; fall of, iii. 209, iv. 95 seq.; maximum power of, iii. 205 seq.; aud Krotôn, war between, iv. 95.

Sybarites, character of, iii. 206 seq.; defeat of, by the Krotoniates, iv. 96; descendants of, at Thurii, iv. 500. "Sybaritic tales," iii. 205.

Syennesis of Kilikia, and Cyrus the

Younger, vii. 191. Sylosôn, iii. 461 seq. Symmories at Athens, viii. 110 seq.; speech of Demosthenes on the, ix. 278 seq.

Symplégades, the, i. 217.

Syntagma, Macedonian, x. 11.

Syracusan assembly, on the approaching Athenian expedition, B.C. 415, vi. 18 seq.; ships, improvements in, to suit the narrow harbour, vi. 131; squadron under Hermokratês against

Athens in the Ægean, viii. 368 seq.; generals at Agrigentum, complaints against, viii. 409, 413; generals at Agrigentum, speech of Dionysius against, viii. 415 seq.; horsemen, mutiny of, against Dionysius, viii. 433 seq.; soldiers, mutiny of, against Dionysius, viii. 443.

Syracusans, confidence and proceedings of, after the capture of Plemmyrium, B.C. 413. vi. 127 seq.; and Athenians.

B.C. 413, vi. 127 seq.; and Athenians, conflicts between, in the Great Harbour, vi. 127, 132 seq., 144 seq., 156 seq.; defeat of the Athenian night-attack upon Epipolæ by, vi. 139 seq.; their blockade of the Athenians in the harbour, vi. 151; captured by Thrasyllus, vi. 353; delay of, in aiding Selinus, B.C. 409, viii. 387, 390; improvement in Dionysius' behaviour towards, B.C. 399, viii. 455; victory of, over the Carthaginians in the Great Harbour, viii. 482; prostingtions of Harbour, viii. 482; negotiations of Dionysius the Younger with Dion and the, ix. 94; defeat of Dionysius the Younger by Dion and the, ix. 95 seq.; application from, to Dion at Leontini, ix. 106; gratitude of, to Dion, ix. 110; opposition of, to Dion as dictator, ix. 116 seq.; application of, to Hiketas and Corinth, B.C. 344, ix. 132 seq.; and Timpleon applica-

ix. 133 seq.; and Timoleon, application of, to Corinth, ix. 164.

Syracuse, foundation of, iii. 176; petalism or ostracism at, iii. 380; inferior to Agrigentum and Gela, before B.C. to Agrigentum and Gela, before B.C. 500, iv. 295; in B.C. 500, iv. 296; increased population and power of, under Gelo, iv. 306 seq.; prisoners awarded to, after the battle of Himera, iv. 314; topography of, B.C. 465, iv. 322 (n. 1); fall of the Gelonian dynasty at, iv. 323 seq.; Gelonian citizens of, iv. 324 seq.; reaction against despotism at after the fall of against despotism at, after the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, iv. 326; political dissensions and failure of ostracism at, v. 518; foreign exploits of, B.O. 452, v. 519; Duketius at, v. 520; and Agrigentum, hostilities between, B.O. 446, v. 522; conquests and ambitious schemes of, B.C. 440, v. 522; incredulity and contempt at, as to the Athenian armament for Sicily, B.C. 415, vi. 18; quiescence of the democracy at, vi. 20 (n. 1); preparations at, on the approach of the Athenian armament, B.C. 415, vi. 26; empty display of the Athenian armament at, B.C. 415, vi. 29; increased confidence at, through Nikias' inaction, B.C. 415, vi. 52; landing of Nikias and his forces in the Great

SYRACUSE.

Harbour of, B.C. 415, vi. 53; defensive measures of, after the battle near the Olympicion, vi. 61; embassy from, to Corinth and Sparta, B.C. 415, vi. 68; local condition and fortifications of, in the spring of B.C. 414, vi. 78; localities outside the walls of, vi. 78; possibilities of the siege of, B.C. 415, and 414, vi. 79; siege of, B.C. 414, vi. 82 seq.; battle near, B.C. 414, vi. 88 seq.; entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbour at, B.C. 414, vi. 60; corrected of Cellistant et into the corrected et into the corrected of Cellistant et into the corrected et into the correct vi. 90; approach of Gylippus to, vi. 95 seq.; arrival of Gylippus and Gongylus at, vi. 98 seq.; expedition to, under Demosthenes, e.c. 413, vi. 123; Athenian victory in the harbour of, Robert All Victory in the harbour of, B.C. 413, vi. 125; defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement to, B.C. 413, vi. 129; disadvantages of the Athenian fleet in the harbour of, vi. 130; arrival of Demosthenes at, vi. 134, 135; philo-Athenians at, during the siege, vi. 445 (x. 1); increase of force and confi 145 (n. 1); increase of force and confidence in, after the night attack upon Epipolæ, vi. 147; postponement of the Athenians' retreat from, by an eclipse of the moon, vi. 147; number and variety of forces engaged at, vi. 152; postponement of the Athenians' retreat from, by Hermokratês, vi. 163; retreat of the Athenians from, vi. 165 seq.; number and treatment of Athenian prisoners at, vi. 176 seq.; topography of, and the operations during the Athenian siege, vi. 534 seq.; rally of Athens during the year after the disaster at, vi. 232; reinforcement from, in aid of Sparta, B.C. 368, viii. 245; after the destruction of 368, viii. 245; after the destruction of the Athenian armament, viii. 366, 370 seq.; and the quarrel between Selinus and Egesta, B.C. 410, viii. 383 seq.; embassy from, to Hannibal, at Selinus, viii. 390; aid from, to Himera, against Hannibal, viii. 392, 393; attempts of Hermokratês to re-enter, viii. 398 seq.; first appearance of Dionysius at, viii. 403; discord at, B.C. 407, viii. 403; reinforcement from, to Agrigentum, viii. 408; movement of Dionysius to power, viii. 414; Dionysius one of the generals at, viii. 415 seq.; return of the Hermokratean exiles to, viii. 419; return of Dionysius one of the thermokratean exiles to, viii. 419; return of Dionysius form Cole to, re. 406; viii. 421. sius from Gela to, B.C. 405, viii. 421; establishment of Dionysius as despot at, viii. 425 seq., 436; redistribution of property at, by Dionysius, viii. 441 seq.; locality of, viii. 451; additional fortifications at, by Dionysius, viii. 453 seq.; plunder of Carthaginians at,

SYRIANS.

by permission of Dionysius, viii. 464; provisions of Dionysius for the defence of, against the Carthaginians, B.C. 396, viii. 476; retreat of Dionysius from, to Katana, B.C. 305, viii. 478; siege of, by Imilkon, viii. 480 seq.; Carthaginians before, viii. 480 seq., 488 seq.; exultation at, over the burning of the Carthaginian fleet at Daskon, viii. 491; new constructions and improvements by Dionysius at, ix. 38: feeling at, towards Dionysius the Younger and Dion, B.C. 357, ix. 83; Dion's march from Herakleia to, ix. 88; Timokratês, governor of, ix. 89 seq.; Dion's entries into, B.C. 357 and B.C. 356, ix. 90 seq., 108; flight of Dionysius the Younger from, to Lokri, ix. 102; rescue of, by Dion, ix. 108 seq.; condition of, B.C. 353-344, ix. 128 seq.; return of Dionysius the 128 seq.; return of Dionysius the Younger to, ix. 130; first arrival of Timoleon at, ix. 147; return of Timoleon from Adranum to, ix. 156; flight of Magon from, ix. 157 seq.; Timoleon's temptations and conduct on becoming master of, ix. 161 seq.; Timoleon's recal of exiles to, ix. 164; desolate condition of, on coming into desolate condition of, on coming into the hands of Timoleon, ix. 164; efforts of Corinth to reconstitute, ix. 165; influx of colonists to, on the invitation of Corinth and Timoleon, ix. 167; Timoleou marches from, against the Carthaginians, ix. 170 seq.; Timoleon lays down his power at, ix. 182; great influence of Timoleon at, after his resignation, ix. 183, 190; residence of Timoleon at, ix. 187; Timoleon in the public assembly of, ix. 188 seq.: the constitution established 188 seq.; the constitution established by Timoleon at, exchanged for a democracy, x. 327; expedition from, to Krotôn, about B.C. 320, x. 330; re-volutions at, about B.C. 320, x. 332, 333; massacre at, by Agathoklês, in collusion with Hamilkar, x. 334 seq.; Agathoklês constituted despot of, x. 335; Hamilkar's unsuccessful attempt to take, x. 355 seq.; barbarities of Agathoklês at, after his African expedition, x. 377.

Syrians not distinguished from Assyrians in Greek authors, iii. 112 (n.).

Syrphax, x. 39.

Syssitia, or public mess at Sparta, ii. 298.

T.

Tachos, viii. 345 seq. Tagus, Thessalian, ii. 206. Talôs, i. 221.

TELEUTIAS.

Tamos, viii, 12,

Tamyna, Phokion's victory at, ix. 332; Demosthenes reproached for his absence from the battle of, ix. 334; Tanagra, battle of, iv. 415; reconcilia-tion of leaders and parties at Athens,

after the battle of, iv. 417.

Tantalus, i. 144.

Taochi, and the Ten Thousand Greeks,

vii. 275 seq.

Taphians in Homer's time, ii. 41.

Taranto, fishery at, iii. 201 (n. 1).

Tarentines and Rhegians, expedition of, against the Iapygians, iv. 328; and Messapians, x. 329.

Tarentum, foundation of cities in the Gulf of, i. 210; Greek settlements on the Gulf of, iii. 196; foundation and position of, iii. 198 seq.

Tarsus, origin of, i. 81 (n. 1), iii. 98; Cyrus the Younger at, vii. 192 seq.;

Alexander at, x. 61.

Tartarus, i. 4, 8, 9.
Tartássus, iii. 96; not visited by Greeks before B.C. 630, iii. 98; Kôlæus' voyage to, iii. 99, 257.

Tauri in the Crimea, iii. 69.

Tauromenium, iii. 174 seq.; commencement of, viii. 475; repulse of Dionysius at, ix. 5; capture of, by Dionysius, ix. 8; Timoleon at, ix. 145.

Taurus, x. 127 (n. 5).

Taurus, Mount, Alexander at, x. 60.

Taxiarch, ii. 371.

Taxila, Alexander at, x. 169.

Tearless Battle, the, viii. 252 seq.
Tegea and Mantineia, ii. 356, v. 364 seq.,
414; and Sparta, ii. 358 seq.; bones of
Orestês taken from, ii. 359; refusal
of, to join Argos, B.C. 421, v. 423;
plans of the Argeian allies against, plans of the Argenan allies against, B.C. 418, v. 475; march of Agis to the relief of, B.C. 418, v. 476; revolution at, B.C. 370, viii. 199; seizure of Arcadians at, by the Theban harmost, viii. 309 seq.; Epameinondas at, B.C. 362, viii. 314, 317, 320 seq.; march of Epameinondas from, B.C. 362, viii. 322 323.

Tegyra, victory of Pelopidas at, viii. ĭž6.

Teian inscriptions, iii. 14 (n. 1).

Telamôn, i. 172 seq. Telegonus, i. 287.

Téleklus, conquests of, ii. 333; death of, ii. 339.

Teleontes, iii. 427.

Télephus, i. 165, 267.

Teleutias and Agesilaus, capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, and of Lecheum by, vii. 503 seq.; expedition of, to Rhodes, vii. 527, 531; at Ægina, vii. 536, 539; attack of, on the Pei-

TÊLINÊS.

ræus, vii. 540 seq.; at Olynthus, viii.

Tests, vi. 54 seq., to C., and S., of 1 seq.

Télinés, iii. 326 (n.); iv. 299 seq.

Télys of Sybaris, iv. 95 seq.

Temenion and Solygeius, ii. 231.

Témenus, Kresphontés, and Aristodêmus, i. 440 seq.; and Kresphontés, family of, lowest in the series of subject for heroic drama.

subjects for heroic drama, i. 447.

Témnos, situation of, iii. 19 (n. 2).
Tempé, remarks of Herodotus on the legend of, i. 358; Delphian procession to, ii. 201 (n. 1); Grecian army sent to defend, against Xerxès, iv. 165; abandonment of the defence of, against Xerxês, iv. 166 seq.

Temple of Eleusis, built by order of Dê-

mêtêr, i. 37

Tenedos, continental settlements of, iii. 23; recovery of, by Macedonian admirals, x. 89.

Ten, appointment of the, at Athens, vi. 490; measures of the, at Athens, vi. 491; peace between the, at Athens, and Thrasybulus, vi. 497 seq.; treatment of the, at Athens, B.C. 403, vi.

Ten generals appointed to succeed Alki-

biadês, vi. 382

Tennes, the Sidonian prince, ix. 425. Ten Thousand Greeks, position and circumstances of, vii. 224; commencement of their retreat, vii. 225; Persian heralds to, on commencing their retreat, vii. 226; negotiations and convention of Tissaphernes with, vii. 228 seq.; quarrel of, with Ariæus, vii. 230; retreating march of, under Tissaphernês, vii. 231 seq.; at the Tigris, vii. 232 seq.; at the Greater Zab, vii. 236; summoned by Ariæus to surrender, vii. 243; distress of, after the seizure of the generals, vii. 243; new generals appointed by, vii. 246; great ascendency of Xenophon over, vii. 250 seq.; crossing of the Great Zab by, vii. 254; harassing attacks of the Persian cavalry on, vii. 256 seq.; retreat of, along the Tigris, vii. 257 seq.; and the Karduchians, vii. 261 seq.; at the Kentritês, vii. 266 seq.; in Armenia, vii. 269 seq.; and the Chalybes, vii. 273 seq.; and the Taochi, vii. 273 seq.; and the Skythini, vii. 276; first sight of the Euxine by, vii. 277; and the Makrônes, vii. 278; and the Kolchiaus, vii. 279, 294; at Tra-pezus, vii. 280, 294 seq.; geography of the retreat of, vii. 281 seq.; feel-ings of the Greeks on the Euxine towards, vii. 290 seq.; leave Trapezus, vii. 294; at Kerasus, vii. 294; march of, to Kotyôra, vii. 295; at Kotyôra,

THASOS.

vii. 296 seq.; and the Paphlagonians, vii. 211; sail to Sinôpê, vii. 311; at vii. 311; sail to Sinope, vii. 311; at Herakleia, vii. 313; at Kalpė, vii. 315; and Kheander, vii. 316 seq., 331; and Anaxibius, vii. 321 seq., 334; and Seuthès, vii. 321, 334 seq.; after leaving Byzantium, vii. 331 seq.; and Aristarchus, vii. 333 seq.; under the Lacedæmonians, vii. 337, 342, 375, 381; in Mysia, vii. 340 seq.; Xenophôn's farewell of, vii. 342; effects of their retreat on the Greek mind vii their retreat on the Greek mind, vii.

Ten Thousand, the Pan-Arcadian, viii.

220.

Teôs, foundation of, iii. 13; inscriptions of, iii. 14 (n. 1); emigration from, on the conquest of Harpagus, iii. 418; loss of, to Athens, E.C. 412, vi. 205; capture of, by the Lacedæmonians, vi. 377.

Tereus, i. 181. Terpander, ii. 77; musical improvements of, iii. 299.

Téthys, i. 5, 6.
Teukrians, the, i. 305; and Mysians, ethnical affinities and migrations of, iii. 36 seq.

Teukrus, i. 175.

Teukrus the Metic, vi. 32, 40 (n. 2).

Teuthrania mistaken by the Greeks for

Troy, i. 267. Teutonic and Scandinavian epic, its analogy with the Grecian, i. 427 seq.; points of distinction between the Grecian and, i. 429.

Thais and the burning of the palace of

Persepolis, x. 122 (n. 3).

Thatês, Xenophanês, and Pythagoras, i. 331 seq.; predictions ascribed to, ii. 53; alleged prediction of an eclipse of the sun by, iii. 57; suggestion of, respecting the twelve Ionic cities in Asia, iii. 82; philosophy and celebrity of, iv. 66 seq.

Thalitas, iii. 306, 309.

Thamyris, analogy between the story of,

and that of Marsyas, iii. 40.

Thanatos, i. 7.

Thapsokus, Cyrus the Younger and his forces at, vii. 201 seq.; Alexander crosses the Euphratés at, x. 97.

Thasos, island of, iii. 253; attempted revolt of, from the Persians, iv. 4; contribution levied by Xerxês on, iv. 140; revolt of, from the confederacy of Dėlos, iv. 397; blockade and con-quest of, B.C. 464-463, iv. 399; appli-cation of, to Sparta, for aid against Athens, iv. 399; expulsion of the Lacedemonians from, vi. 351; reduction of, by Thrasyllus, vi. 367; slaughter at, by Lysander, vi. 443.

Thaumas, i. 7.

Theagenés of Rhegium, the first to allegorize mythical narratives, i. 374. Theagenés, despot of Megara, ii. 418.

Theagenes of Thasus, statue of, iv. 117 (n. 2).

Theatre, Athenian, accessibility of, to the poorest citizens, vii. 4. Thébaid of Autimachus, i. 245.

Thébais, the Cyclic, i. 245; ascribed to

Homer, ii. 65.

Theban contingent of Leonidas, doubts about, iv. 189, 192; leaders put to death after the battle of Platæa, iv. 279; prisoners in the night-surprise at Platea, slaughter of, v. 42 seq.; military column, depth of, v. 301, 304; band of Three Hundred, v. 301; exiles

at Athens, viii. 57, 77 seq. Thebans and Æginetans, i. 172; against the seven chiefs, i. 250; application of, to Ægina for assistance against Athens, iii. 388; and Xerxês' invasion, iv. 174; defeated by the Athenians at Platæa, iv. 272; night-surprise of Platæa by, B.C. 431, v. 37 seq.; capture of, in the night-surprise of Platea, v. 39 seq.; captured in the night-surprise of Platea, slaughter of, v. 42 seq.; opposition of, to peace with Athens, B.C. 404, vi. 449 (n. 1); humiliation of Agesilaus by, vii. 424; application of, to Athens for aid against Sparta, B.C. 395, vii. 457 seq.; at the battle of Corinth, vii. 472(n. 1); and Spartans at the battle of Korôand Spartans at the battle of Korôneia, vii. 479; and the peace of Antalkidas, vii. 548; expulsion of the Lacedæmonians from Bœotia by, B.C. 374, viii. 127; invasion of Phokis by, B.C. 374, viii. 128; discouragement and victory of, at Leuktra, viii. 171 seq.; and allies, invasion of Laconia by, B.C. 370, viii. 205 seq.; displeasure of, with Epameinondas, B.C. 367, viii. 254; expeditions of, to Thessaly, to rescue Pelopidas, viii. 269, 288 seq.; destruction of Orchomenus by. viii. destruction of Orchomenus by, viii. 296; under Pammenės, expedition of, to Megalopolis, viii. 342; extinction of free cities in Bœotia by, ix. 199; exertions of, to raise a confederacy against the Phokians, B.C. 356, ix. 247; Lokrians and Thessalians, war of, against the Phokians, B.C. 355, ix. 249; assistance under Pammenės sent by, to Artabazus, ix. 252, 292; assistance of, to Megalopolis against Sparta, B.C. 352-351, ix. 292 seq.; obtain money from the Persian king, B.C. 350-349, ix. 294; invoke the aid of Philip to put down the Phokians, ix. 365; Philip deTHÊBES.

clares his sympathy with, B.C. 346, ix. 408; invited by Philip to assist in an attack upon Attica, B.C. 339, ix. 468 seq.; and Athenians, war of, against Philip in Phokis, ix. 477, 478 seq.; revolt of, against Alexander, ix. 531 seg

Thêbê, ix. 202 seq.

Thebes and Orchomenos, i. 127; legends of, i. 235 seq.; how founded by Kadmus, i. 237; five principal families at, i. 238; foundation of, by Amphiôn, i. 241; poems on the sieges of, i. 245 seq.; sieges of, i. 246 seq.; the seven chiefs against, i. 250 seq.; results of the seven chiefs against, i. 250 seq.; results of the seven chiefs against, i. 250 seq.; results of the seven chiefs against. pulse of the seven chiefs against, i. 251 seq.; the seven chiefs against, i. death of all but Adrastus, i. 251; the seven chiefs against, burial of the fallen, i. 253; second siege of, i. 254 seq.; early legislation of, ii. 219; and Platæa, disputes between, iii. 384; summoned to give up its leaders after summoned to give up its leaders after the battle of Platæa, iv. 279; dis-credit of, for its Medism, iv. 401; supremacy of, in Bœotia restored by Sparta, iv. 402, 414; mastery of Athens over, B.C. 456, iv. 418; re-inforcements from, in support of the night-surprise at Platæa, v. 41 seq.; hard treatment of Thespiæ by, B.c. 423, v. 365; altered feeling of, after the capture of Athens by Lysander, vi. 476, 483, 495; and Sparta, war between, B.c. 395, vii. 455 seq.; revolt of Orchomenus from, to Sparta, vii. 459; alliance of, with Athens, Corinth, and Argos, against Sparta, vii. 467; increased importance of, B.C. 395, vii. 467; alarm at, and proposals of peace from, on the Lacedemonian capture of the Long Walls at Corinth, vii. 505; envoys from, to Agesilaus, vii. 510, 516; and the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 2; proceedings of Sparta against, after the peace of Antalkidas, viii. 37 809.; seizure of the Kadmeia at, by Phoebidas, viii. 56 seq.; government of, B.c. 382, viii. 56 (n. 1); under Leontiades and other philo-Laconian oligarchy, viii. 75 seq.; conspiracy against the philo-Laconian oligarchy at, viii. 77 seq.; alliance of, with Athens, B.C. 378, viii. 97; state of, with the philosupple of the philosu after the revolution of, B.C. 379, viii. 112; the Sacred Band at, viii. 112; expeditions of Agesilaus against, B.C. 378 and 377, viii. 119 seq.; displeasure of Athens against, B.C. 474, viii. 126, 149; dealings of, with Platæa and Thespiæ, B.C. 372, viii. 150, 152 seq.; exclusion of, from the peace of B.C. 371 viii. 151 371, viii. 161 seq.; increased power

THÉBES.

of, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 184; and Sparta, alleged arbitration of the Achæans between, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 189 (n. 1); influence of, in Thessaly, B.c. 369, viii. 236; alienation of the Arcadians from, B.c. 368, viii. 248 seq.; assassination of Euphron at, viii. 260 seq.; application of, to Persia, B.c. 367, viii. 263 seq.; Persian rescript in favour of, viii. 264 seq.; protest of the Arcadians against the headship of, viii. 266; peace of Corinth, Epidaurus, and Phlius with, B.c. 366, viii. 277 seq.; opposition of the Mantineians and other Arcadians to, B.c. 362. viii. 307 seq.; power of, B.c. 360battle of Leuktra, viii. 189 (n. 1); tineians and other Arcadians to, B.C. 362, viii. 307 seq.; power of, B.C. 360. 359, ix. 198 seq.; Philip at, ix. 204 seq.; Eubœa rescued from, by Athens, B.C. 358, ix. 213 seq.; accusation of, against Sparta before the Amphiktyonic assembly, ix. 238; accusation of, against Phokis before the Amphiktyonic assembly, ix. 239; the Phokians countenanced by Athens and Sparta as rivals of, ix. 256; envoys to Philip from, B.C. 346, ix. 392; and Athens, unfriendly relations between, B.C. 339, ix. 468; mission of Demosthenes to, B.C. 339, ix. 471 seq.; and Athens, alliance of, against Philip, B.C. 339, ix. 474 seq.; severity of Philip towards, after the battle of Cheroneia, ix. 488; march of Alex-Chæroneia, ix. 488; march of Alexander from Thrace to, ix. 537; capture and destruction of, by Alexander, ix. 539 seq.; restored by Kassander, x. 302.

Thêbes in Egypt, iii. 131. Theft, laws of, at Athens, ii. 508.

Theia, i. 5, 6.

Themis, i. 5, 10.
Themistoklés, character of, iv. 25 seq.; and Aristoidès, rivalry between, iv. 149, 362; change of Athens from a land-power to a sea-power proposed by, iv. 150; long-sighted views of, in creating a navy at Athens, iv. 151; 382 (n. 2); and the Laurian mines, iv. 153; his explanation of the answer of the Delphian oracle on Xerxês' invasion, iv. 159; prevails upon the Greeks to stay and fight at Artemisium, iv. 194 seq.; inscribed invitations of, to the Ionians under Xerxès, iv. 199; activity and resource of, on Xerxès' approach, iv. 207; opposes the removal of the Greek fleet from Salamis to the isthmus of Corinth, iv. 218 seq.; and Eurybiades at Salamis, iv. 219 (n. 1); and Adeimantus of Corinth, at Salamis, iv. 219; his message to Xerxes before the

THERAMENÊS.

battle of Salamis, iv. 222; his message to Xerxês after the battle of Salamis, iv. 235; levies fines on the Cyclades, iv. 236; honours rendered to, after the battle of Salamis, iv. 240; alleged proposal of, to burn all the Grecian ships except the Athenian, iv. 294 (n. 2); stratagem of, respecting the fortification of Athens, iv. 336 seq.; plans of, for the naval aggrandizement of Athens, iv. 339 seq.; persuades the Athenians to build twenty new triremes annually, iv. 342; and Pausanias, iv. 362; opponents and corruption of, after the Persian war, iv. 367 seq.; and Timokreon, iv. 368; first accusation of treason against, iv. 369; two accusations of treason against, iv. 369 (n. 1); ostracism of, iv. 370, 371 (n. 1); second accusation of treason against, iv. 371; flight and adventures of, on the second charge of Medism, iv. 371 seq.; and Admetus, iv. 372; and Artaxerxês Longimanus, iv. 375

and Areaxerses honginamis, iv. 573 seq.; in Persia, iv. 373 seq.; rewards and death of, iv. 377 seq.

Theodôrus of Samos, iii. 320 (n. 1).

Theodôrus the Syraeusan, speech of, against Dionysius, viii. 484 seq.

Theogony of the Greek not a cosmogony, i. 3, of Maria i. 4. Ombio.

i. 2; of Hesiod, i. 4; Orphic, i. 16 seq.; Hesiodic and Orphic, compared, i. 19; Hesiodic legend of Pandorain,

Theokles, the founder of Naxos in Sicily, iii. 174; expels the Sikels from Leon-

tini and Katana, iii. 177. Theology, triple, of the pagan world, i.

Theophrastus, the phytologist, i. 325 (n.

Theopompus the Spartan king, ii. 339 (nn.). Theopompus the historian, his treatment of mythes, i. 366; on the Spartan empire, vii. 363 (n. 1.) Theôric Board at Athens, creation of,

vii. 542.

Theôric Fund, allusions of Demosthenês to, ix. 325, 329; motion of Apollodorus about, ix. 337; not appro-priated to war purposes till just before the battle of Chæroneia, ix. 342; true character of, ix. 343 seq.; attempt of the Athenian propertyclasses to evade direct taxation by recourse to, ix. 346; application of,

to military purposes, ix. 475.

Theôrikon, vii. 5.

Theôrs, ii. 168.

Thèra, i. 462; foundation of Kyrênê from, iii. 257 seq.

Theramenés, Peloponnesian fleet under,

THERAMENÊS.

vi. 217; statement of, respecting the Four Hundred, vi. 244 (n. 2); expedition of, to the Hellespont, vi. 341; accusation of the generals at Arginusæ by, vi. 403 seq.; probable conduct of, at Arginusæ, vi. 407, 409 seq.; first embassy of, to Sparta, vi. 447; second embassy of, to Sparta, vi. 447; second embassy of, to Sparta, vi. 448; and the executions by the Thirty, vi. 460, 461, 464; and Kritias, dissentient views of, vi. 461 seq., 468 seq.; exasperation of the majority of the Thirty coniect. against, vi. 468; denunciation of, by Kritias in the senate, vi. 469; reply of, to Kritias' denunciation in the senate, vi. 470; condemnation and death of, vi. 472 seq.

Theramenes the Athenian, vi. 249; his opposition to the Four Hundred, vi.

286 seq.; his impeachment of the embassy of the Four Hundred in Sparta, vi. 309 seq.

Therimachus, vii. 530.
Therma, Xerxês' movements from, to Thermopylæ, iv. 180; capture of, by Archestratus, iv. 544.

Thermaic Gulf, original occupants on,

Thermopylæ, Greeks north of, iu the first two centuries, ii. 199; Phokian defensive wall at, ii. 207; resolution of Greeks to defend, against Xerxês, iv. 169; the pass of, iv. 170 seq.; path over Mount (Eta avoiding, iv. 176; movements of Xerxês from Therma to, iv. 180; impressions of Xerxês about the defenders at, iv. 184; repeated Persian attacks upon, repulsed, iv. 185; debate among the defenders of, when the Persians approached their rear, iv. 187; maneuvres ascribed to Xerxês respecting the dead at, iv. 200; numbers slain at, on both sides, iv. 200; inscriptions commemorative of the battle at, iv. 200 seq.; effect of the battle of, on the Greeks and Xerxês, iv. 202 seq.; conduct of the Peloponnesians after the battle of, iv. 203; hopeless situation of the Athenians after the battle of, iv. 204: Onomarchus at, ix. 251; Philip checked at, by the Athonians, ix. 288; position of Phalækus at, B.C. 347-346, ix. 364, 405; application of the Phokians to Athens for aid against Philip at, B.C. 347, ix. 365; importance of, to Philip and Athens, B.C. 347, ix. 367; march of Philip to, B.C. 346, ix. 395 seq.; plans of Philip against, B.C. 346, ix. 398; letters of Philip inviting the Athenians to join him at, ix. 404; Phokians at, B.C. 347-346, ix. 404 seq.; surrender of, to

THESSALV

Philip, ix. 408; professions of Philip after his conquest of, ix. 411; special meeting of the Amphiktyons at, B.C. 339, ix. 464

Thermus, ii. 214.
Thêro of Agrigentum and Gelo, iv. 306 seq.; and Hiero, iv. 317; severe treatment of Himeræans by, iv. 317; death of, iv. 320.

Thersander, the Orchomenian, at the Theban banquet to Mardonius, iv.

Thersités, i. 273, ii. 13.

Theseium at Athens, iv. 394.

Theseus, i. 156, 189 seq.; and the Minotaur, i. 204; obtains burial for the fallen chiefs against Thêbes, i. 253; the political reforms of, i. 457; and Menesthens, i. 458; restoration of the sons of, to his kingdom, i. 459; consolidation of Attica by, ii. 440; bones of, conveyed to Athens, iv. 393.

Thesmoi, ii. 446.

Thesmophoria, festival of, i. 41.

Thesmothetæ, ii. 446.

Thespice, hard treatment of, by Thêbes, B.C. 423, v. 365; severity of Thêbes towards, B.C. 372, viii. 152.
Thespian contingent of Leonidas, iv.

188.

Thespians, distress of, caused by Xerxês' invasion, iv. 188 (n. 4); at the battle of Leuktra, viii. 171; expulsion of, from Bœotia, after the battle of Leuktra, viii. 185. Thespis and Solôn, story of, ii. 512 seq. Thesprotians, iii. 223 seq.

Thessalian cities, disorderly confederacy of, ii. 204; and Athenian cavalry, skirmishes of, with Archidamus, v. 57; cavalry sent home by Alexander, x. 127.

Thessalians, migration of, from Thesprôtis to Thessaly, i. 451; non-Hellenic character of, i. 451; and their dependents in the first two centuries, ii. 200 seq.; character and condition of, ii. 202 seq.; and Xerxès' invasion, iv. 165, 167; alliance of, with Athens and Argos, about B.C. 461, iv. 408; Thebaus and Lokrians, war of, with the Phokians. B.C. 355, ix. 248 seq.

Thessalus, son of Kimôn, impeachment of Alkibiadės by, vi. 45.
Thessaly, affinities of, with Beeotia, i. 452; quadruple division of, ii. 205; power of, when united, ii. 207; Athenian march against, B.C. 454, iv. 419; Brasidas' march through, to Thrace, v. 312 seq.; Lacedæmonian reinforcements to Brasidas prevented

THÊTES.

from passing through, v. 362; state of, B.C. 370, viii. 235; influence of Thébes in, B.C. 369, viii. 236; expedition of Pelopidas to, B.C. 368, viii. 250; expedition of Pelopidas to, B.C. 366, viii. 251 (n. 2); mission of Pelopidas to, B.C. 366, viii. 269; expedition of Pelopidas to, B.C. 363, viii. 288 292 sea : despots of, ix 200 sea : 288, 292 seq.; despots of, ix. 200 seq.; first expedition of Philip into, against the despots of Pheræ, ix. 256, 285, 286 (n. 1); second expedition of Philip into, against the despots of Pheræ, ix. 286 seq.; victory of Leosthenes over Antipater in, x. 251.

Thêtes, in legendary Greece, ii. 39; in Attica immediately before Solones legislation; if 25 seq. in the solones of the solones of

legislation, ii. 465 seq.; mutiny of,

Thetis and Pêleus, i. 173. Thimbron, expedition of, to Asia, vii. 375; defeat and death of, vii. 526, x. 363 seq.

Thirlwall's opinion on the partition of land ascribed to Lykurgus, ii. 318 seq.,

322 seq., 325 seq. Thirty at Athens, nomination of, vi. 455; proceedings of, vi. 458 seq.; executions by, vi. 459 seq., 461 seq., 467 seq.; discord among, vi. 461; three thousand hoplites nominated by, vi. 464; disarming of hoplites by, vi. 465; murders and spoliations by, vi. 466, 476; tyranny of, after the death of Theramenes, vi. 474; intellectual teaching forbidden by, intellectual teaching forbidden by, vi. 476; and Sokratès, vi. 477; growing insecurity of, vi. 477; disgust in Greece at the enormities of, vi. 481; repulse and defeat of, by Thrasybulus at Phylè, vi. 484; seizure and execution of prisoners at Eleusis and Salamis by, vi. 485; defeat of, by Thrasybulus at Peiræus, vi. 487 seq.; deposition of vi. 490; reaction deposition of, vi. 490; reaction against, on the arrival of King Pausanias, vi. 494; flight of the survivors of the, vi. 499; treatment of, B.C. 403, vi. 511; oppression and suffering of Athens under the, vii. 350; Athens rescued from the, vii. 351; the knights or horsemen supporters of the, vii. 351; Athens under the, a specimen of the Spartan empire, vii. 352; compared with the Lysandrian Dekarchies, vii. 355; and Kallibius, vii. 356; put down by the Athenians themselves, vii. 365.

Thorax and Xenophôn, vii. 301 seq. Thrace, Chalkidic colonies in, iii. 249
seq.; Greek settlements east of the
Strymôn in, iii. 252; conquest of, by
the Persians under Darius, iii. 485;

THRASYLLUS.

and Macedonia, march of Mardonins into, iv. 3; contributions levied by Xerxès on towns in, iv. 140; Brasi-das' expedition to, v. 286, 312 seq.; war continued in, during the one war continued in, during the one year's truce between Athens and Sparta, v. 348; Alkibiadês and Thrasybulus in, B.C. 407, vi. 367; Iphikratês in, between B.C. 387·378, viii. 101 seq.; Iphikratês in, B.C. 368·365, viii. 238 seq.; Philip in, B.C. 351, ix. 30; and B.C. 346, ix. 390, 392; and B.C. 342·341, ix. 436 seq.; Alexander's expedition into, ix. 524 seq.; march of Alexander from, to Thêbes, ix. 537. 537.

Thracian influence upon Greece, i. 29; race in the North of Asia Minor, iii. 34; Chersonèsus, iii. 254; subject-allies of Athens not oppressed by her, v. 314 seq.; mercenaries under Ditrephès, vi. 188 seq.

Thracians, in the time of Herodotus and Thucydidès, ii. 29; and Phrygians, affinities between, iii. 35 seq., 40; affinities and migrations of, iii. 35 seq.; numbers and abode of, iii. 247; general character of, iii. 247 seq.; Asiatic characteristics of, iii. 240; venality of v. 132 (n. 1) 249; venality of, v. 132 (n. 1).

Thrasius, ix. 171, 178.
Thrasybulus of Syracuse, iv. 321 seq. Thrasybulus the Athenian, speech of, at Samos, vi. 276; efforts of, at Samos, in favour of Alkibiadês, vi. 278; in Thrace, vi. 367; accusation of the generals at Arginusæ by, vi. 404 seq.; flight of, from Attica, vi. 462; occupation of Phylê, and repulse and defeat of the Thirty by, vi. 484; occupation of Peiræus by, vi. 487; victory of, over the Thirty at Peiræus. vi. 487 seq.; increasing strength of, at Peiræns, vi. 491; straitened condition of, in Peiræus, vi. 493; at Peiræus, king Pansanias' attack upon, vi. 495; and the Ten at Athens, peace between, vi. 497; and the extles, restoration of, to Athens, vi. 497; assistance of, to Evander and others, vi. 523(n.1); honorary reward to, vi. 528; aid to the Thebans by, vii. 461; acquisition of, in the Hellespont and Bosphorns, vii. 529; victory of, in Lesbos, vii. 530; death and character of, vii. 530.

Thrasydaus, iv. 317; cruel government, defeat, and death of, iv. 320, vii. 391,

Thrasyklês and Strombichidês, expedi-

tion of, to Chios, vi. 205.
Thrasyllus, v. 473, 474; at Samos, B.C.
411, vi. 276; at Lesbos, vi. 325;

THRASYLOCHUS.

eluded by Mindarus, vi. 327; at Elæus, vi. 333; repulse of Agis by, vi. 352; expedition of, to Ionia, vi. 351; and Alkibiadês, at the Hellespont, vi. 353.

Thrasylochus and Demosthenês, ix. 263

(n. 4).

Thrasymachus, rhetorical precepts of, vii. 47; doctrine of, in Plato's Republic, vii. 71 seq.

Three thousand, nominated by the

Thirty at Athens, vi. 464.

Thucydidés, altered intellectual and ethical standard in the age of, i. 330; his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 351, 361 seq.; his version of the Trojan war, i. 361 seq.; on the dwellings of the earliest Greeks, ii. 47; his date for the return of the Herakleids, i. 452; silence of, on the treaty between Athens and Persia, iv. 423; descent of, iv. 498 (n. 2); various persons named, iv. 513 (n. 3); his division of the year, v. 466 (n. 1); his aivision of the year, v. 400 (n. 1); ins judgment respecting Periklés, v. 94, 97; first mention of Kleôn by, v. 165, 167; reflections of, on the Korkyræan massacre, B.C. 427, v. 197 seq.; structure of his history, v. 226 (n. 2); judgment of, on Kleôn's success at Pylus, v. 264 (n. 2); in the breve seq. ment of, on Kleon's success at Pylus, v. 264 seq.; on Kythêra, v. 281 (n. 1); and the capitulation of Amphipolis to Brasidas, v. 325 seq.; banishment of, v. 328 seq.; on Kleôn's views and motives in desiring war, B.C. 422, v. 368 seq.; passages of, on the battle of Amphipolis, v. 377 seq. (nn.); feelings of, towards Brasidas and Kleôn, v. 390: treatment of Kleôn by v. 391 390; treatment of Kleon by, v. 391, 394 seq.; dialogue set forth by, between the Athenian envoys and Executive Council of Mêlos, v. 508 seq., 514 seq.; his favourable judgment of the Athenians at the restoration of the democracy, B.C. 411, vi. 315 seq; study of, by Demosthenes, ix. 263.

Thucydides, son of Melesias, iv. 427; rivalry of, with Perikles, iv. 502 seq.; ostracized, iv. 505; history of, after his ostracism, iv. 513 (n. 3).

Thurians, defeat of, by the Lucanians,

Thurii, foundation of, iv. 499 seq.; few Athenian settlers at, iv. 500; revolution at, B.C. 413, ix. 368.

Thyamia, surprise of, by the Phliasians and Charês, viii. 258.

Thyestêan banquet, the, i. 149. Thyestês, i. 147 seq.

Thymochares, defeat of, near Eretria, vi. 299 seq.

Thymodés, x. 65, 73.

TIMOLEON.

Thynians, iii. 34.

Thyrea, conquest of, ii. 362; capture of, by Nikias, B.C. 424, v. 282; stipulation about, between Sparta and Argos, B.C. 420, v. 431.

Thyssagetæ, iii. 68.

Tigris, the Ten Thousand Greeks at the,

vii. 232 seq.; retreat of the Ten Thousand along the, vii. 257 seq.; forded by Alexander, x. 98; voyage of Nearchus from the mouth of the Indus to that of the, x. 176; Alexander's voyage np the, to Opis, x. 183.

Tilphusios Apollo, origin of the name,

i. 44 seq.

Timeus' treatment of mythes, i. 367. Timagoras, his mission to Persia, and execution, viii. 264, 266, and n. 2.

Timandra, i. 155.

Timarchus, decree of, ix. 358, 359 (n. 1). Timasion and Xenophôn, vii. 301 seq. Time, Grecian computation of, ii. 52 (n.

Timégenidas, death of, iv. 279. Timocraey of Solôn, ii. 488 seq. Timokratés the Rhodian, vii. 452 seq. Timokratés of Syracuse, ix. 88 seq. Timokreon and Themistoklês, iv. 368. Timolaus, speech of, vii. 470.

Timoleon, appointment of, to aid Syracuse, ix. 134, 139; life and character of, before B.C. 344, ix. 134 seq.; and Timophanės, ix. 135 seq.; preparations of, for his expedition to Syracuse, ix. 141; voyage of, from Corinth to Sicily, ix. 141 seq.; message from Hiketas to, ix. 142; at Rhegium, ix. 142 seq.; at Tanromenium, ix. 145; at Adranum, ix. 146, 154; first arrival of, at Syracuse, ix. 147; surrender of Ortygia to, ix. 148 seq.; reinforcement from Corinth to, ix. 151, 154, 156; admiration excited by the successes of, ix. 151, 159; advantage of Ortygia to, ix. 154; return of, from Adranum to Syracuse, ix. 156; Messênê declares in favour of, ix. 156; capture of Epi-polæ by, ix. 158; favour of the gods towards, ix. 160, 176; ascribes his successes to the gods, ix. 161; temptations and conduct of, on becoming master of Syracuse, ix. 161 seq.; demolition of the Dionysian stronghold in Ortygia by, ix. 163; erection of courts of justice at Syracuse by, ix. 164; recal of exiles to Syracuse by, x. 164; capitulation of Hiketas with, at Leontini, ix. 168; puts down the despots in Sicily, ix. 168, 182 seq.; march of, from Syracuse against the Carthaginians, ix. 170 seq.; and Thrasius, ix. 170; victory of, over the Carthaginians at the Krimėsus, ix.

173 seq.; and Mamerkus, ix. 178 seq.; partial defeat of his troops, ix. 179 victory of, over Hiketas at the Damurias, ix. 179; surrender of Leontini and Hiketas to, ix. 179; peace of, with the Carthaginians, ix. 180; capture of Messênê and Hippon by, ix. 181; lays down his power at Syracuse, ix. 182; great influence of, after his resignation at Syracuse, ix. 183, 188; and the immigration of new Greek settlers into Sicily, ix. 184 seq.; residence of, at Syracuse, ix. 187; in the public assembly at Syracuse, ix. 189 seq.; uncorrupted moderation and public spirit of, ix. 190; freedom and prosperity in Sicily, introduced by, ix. 191; death and obsequies of, ix. 192; and Dion, contrast between, ix. 193 seq.; the constitution established at Syracuse by, exchanged for an oli-

garchy, x. 327.
Timonachus in the Hellespont, viii. 356.

Timonachus in the Hellespont, viii. 366.
Timophanés and Timoleon, ix. 135 seq.
Timotheus, son of Konôn, viii. 103; circumnavigation of Peloponnésus by, viii. 124; at Zakynthus, viii. 133; appointment of, to aid Korkyra, B.C. 373, viii. 136; delay of, in aiding Korkyra, viii. 138 seq., 139 (n. 1); and Iphikratês, viii. 140, 284, and n. 3; trial and acquittal of, viii. 144 seq., 145 (n. 1); expedition of, to Asia Minor, B.C. 366, viii. 279 seq.; and Charidêmus, viii. 284, 286; successes of, in Macedonia and Chalkidikê, B.C. of, in Macedonia and Chalkidikê, B.C. 365-364, viii. 285; failure of, at Amphipolis, B.C. 364, viii. 286; and Kôtys, viii. 286; in the Chersonese, B.C. 363, viii. 352; in the Hellespont, B.C. 357, ix. 221; accusation of, by Chares, ix. 222 seq., 224 (n. 4); arrogance and unpopularity of, ix. 223; exile and death of, ix. 225.

Timotheus, of the Pontic Herakleia, x. 396. Tiribazus, and the TenThousand Greeks, vii. 266, 269; embassy of Antalkidas, Konôn, and others to, vii. 522 seq.; and Antalkidas at Susa, vii. 546; and the peace of Antalkidas, vii. 548; and Orontês, viii. 21.

Tisamenus, son of Orestes, i. 441, 444, 465 (n. 1).

Tisamenus the Athenian, decree of, vi.

Tisiphonus, despot of Pheræ, ix. 202. Tissaphernés and Pharnabazus, embassy from, to Sparta, B.C. 413, vi. 197; and Chalkideus, treaty between, vi. 207; first treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, vi. 207; payment of the Peloponnesian fleet by, vi. 219; and Astyochus, treaty between, vi. 224

seq.; second treaty of, with the Peloseq.; second treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, vi. 224 seq.; and Lichas, at Milètus, vi. 228; double dealing and intrigues of, with the Peloponnesian fleet, vi. 228, 229 seq.; escape and advice of Alkibiadês to, vi. 233 seq.; and the Greeks, Alkibiadês acts as interpreter between, vi. 235; reduction of pay to the Peloponnesian fleet by, vi. 236; third treaty of with fleet by, vi. 236; third treaty of, with the Peloponnesians, vi. 253 seq.; envoy from, to Sparta, B.C. 411, vi. 323; false promises of, to Mindarus, vi. 324; and the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, vi. 325, 338; and the Peloponnesians at the Hellespont, vi. 338 seq.; Alkibiadês arrested by, vi. 343; charge of, against Cyrus the Younger, vii. 180; negotiations and convention of, with the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 227 seq.; retreating march of the Ten Thousand under, vii. 221 seq.; treachery of, towards Klearchus and other Greeks, vii. 239 seq.; plan of, against the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 242; attack of, on the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 257; and the Asiatic Greeks, vii. 374; and Derkyllidas, vii. 376, 387 seq.; and Agesilaus, vii. 427, 433; death of, vii. 434.

Titanides, the, i. 4. Titans, the, i. 4, 6; the Orphic, i. 16. Τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα, meaning of, v. 38 (n. 4), 272 (n. 2), 289 (n. 1), 300 (n. 1), 302 (n, 2).

Tithraustês supersedes Tissaphernês. and opens negotiations with Agesilaus, vii. 434; sends an envoy to Greece against Sparta, vii. 452 seq.; victory of Charês and Artabazus over, ix. 226.

Tolmidés, voyage of, round Peloponnêsus, iv. 419; defeat and death of, iv. 432 seq.

Tomi, legendary origin of the name, i.

219 (n. 5), x. 404. Topographical impossibilities in the legend of Troy no obstacles to its re-ception, i. 301; criticisms inappli-cable to the legend of Troy, i. 302.

Torgium, victory of Agathoklês over Deinokratês at, x. 378. Torônê, surprise and capture of, by Brasidas, v. 336; capture of, by Kleôn, v. 374 seq.

Torrhêbia, iii. 50.

Torture, use of, to elicit truth, vi. 36 (n.). Town-occupations, encouragement to, at Athens, ii. 503 seq.

Towns, fortification of, in early Greece,

ii. 46 seq. Trades, Grecian deities of, i. 312.

Tradition, Greek, matter of, uncertified,

TRAGEDIES.

i. 385; fictitious matter in, does not imply fraud, i. 386.

Tragedies, lost, of Promêtheus, i. 74 (n.

Tragedy, Athenian, growth of, vii. 2; Athenian, abundant production of, vii. 3; Athenian effect of, on the public mind, vii. 6; ethical senti-

ment in, vii. 9.

Trapezus, legendary origin of, i. 160;
date of the foundation of, iii. 74 (n.); the Ten Thousand at, vii. 279, 290 seq.; departure of the Ten Thousand

from, vii. 294. Trench of Artaxerxes, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media, vii. 209, 211 (n. 1).

Triballi, defeat of Philip by, ix. 447;

victory of Alexander over, ix. 525.

Tribes and demes of Kleisthenes, iii. 347.

Tribute of the subject-allies of Athens, iv. 491 (n. 1), 492 (n. 3). Trinakia, town of, v. 523. Triphylia, Minyæ in, i. 463; and Elis,

ii. 352, viii. 249, 299.

Triphylians, ii. 227 Triple theology of the pagan world, i. 391; partition of past time by Varro, i. 436.

Tripolis, iii. 90.

Trireme, equipment of a, v. 119 (n. 1). Tritantæchmês, exclamation of, on the Greeks and the Olympic games, iv. 210.

Tritôn and the Argonauts, i. 220.
Tritônis, Lake, iii. 261 (n. 4); prophecies about, iii. 265.

Trittyes, ii. 426, 442 (n. 1). Trôad, the, i. 305.

Trôas Alexandreia, i. 296.

Trôas, historical, and the Teukrians, i.

Træzen, removal of Athenians to, on Xerxès' approach, iv. 204.

Trojan war, Thucydidês' version of, i. 361 seq.; the date of, i. 472, 491.

Trojans, allies of, i. 258; new allies of, i. 273; and Phrygians, i. 304.
Trophonius and Agamêdês, i. 122.

Trôs, i. 261.

Troy, legend of, i. 260 seq. Tunés, capture of, by Agathoklês, x. 348; mutiny in the army of Agathoklês at, x. 358; Archagathus blocked up by the Carthaginians at, x. 371, 374; victory of the Carthaginians over Agathoklês near, x. 374; nocturnal panic in the Carthaginian camp near, x. 374; Agathoklês deserts his army at, and they capitulate, x. 375.

Turpin, chronicle of, i. 424. Tyché, near Syracuse, vi. 78.

WORKS.

Tydeus, i. 140, 250. Tyndareus and Lêda, i. 155 seq.

Tyndarion, v. 518. Tyndaris, foundation of, ix. 4.

Types, manifold, of the Homeric gods, i. 316.

Typhaôn and Echidna, offspring of, i. 7.

Typhōeus, i. 9.
Tyre, iii. 89 seq.; siege and subjugation
of, by Nebuchadnezzar, iii. 149; and Carthage, amicable relations between, iii. 161; siege and capture of, by Alexander, x. 80 seq.

Tyrô, different accounts of, i. 103.

Tyrrhenians, O. Müller's view of the origin of, iii. 8.

Tyrtæus and the first Messenian war, ii. 336, 337, 338, 341; efficiency of, in the second Messenian war, ii. 344 seq.; poetry of, iii. 305 seq.; age and metres of, iii. 301.

U.

Uranos, i. 5. Usury, and the Jewish law, ii. 480 (n. 1). Utica, iii. 92; capture of, by Agathoklês, x. 368, 369.

Uxii, conquest of, by Alexander, x. 116 seq.

V.

Varro's triple division of pagan theology, i. 391; his triple partition of past time, i. 436. Veneti, the, i. 290.

Villagers regarded as inferiors by Hellens, ii. 185, 187.

Villages numerous in early Greece, ii.

Volsunga Saga, i. 427, 428 (n. 1).

W.

War, the first sacred, iii. 288 seq., iv. 431; the social, ix. 216, 227; the second sacred, ix. 237 seq., 364 seq.; the third sacred, ix. 452.

Wise men of Greece, seven, iii. 316 seq. Wolf's Prolegomena to Homer, ii. 77 his theory on the composition of the Iliad and Odyssey, ii. 84 seq. Women, Solon's laws respecting, ii. 506.

Wooden horse of Troy, the, i. 276 seq., 282. "Works and Days," races of men in, i. 61 seq.; differs from the Theogony and Homer, i. 63; mingled ethical and mythical sentiment in, i. 64; the earliest didactic poem, i. 66; personal feeling pervading, i. 68; probable age of, i. 68; legend of Pandora in, i. 72; general feeling of the poet in, i. 73; on women; i. 74. on women, i. 74.

WRITING.

Writing, unknown to Homeric and Hesiodic Greeks, ii. 54; few traces of, long after the Homeric age, ii. 78; among the Greeks, iii. 319.

X.

Xanthippus and Miltiadês, iv. 45, 52, Xanthippus, son of Perikles, v. 25.

Xenarés and Kleobûlns, the anti-Athenian ephors, v. 427 seq.

Xenias and Pasion, desertion of Cyrus by, vii. 197. Xenodokus, x. 357, 371, 373.

Xenokratés, embassy of, to Antipater, x. 259, 267.

Xenophanes, his condemnation of an-

Xenophanés, his condemnation of ancient legends, i. 331; Thalés and Pythagoras, i. 332 seq.; his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 374; philosophy and school of, iv. 73 seq.

Xenophôn, his treatment of ancient mythes, i. 367; on Spartan women, ii. 301, 303 (n. 1); his Cyropædia, iii. 55 (n. 3), 400; his version of Cyrns' capture of Babylon, iii. 426 (n. 1); on the dikasteries, iv. 526, 530 (n. 1); and Plato, evidence of, about Sokratês, vii. 84 seq., 123 (n. 1); the preceptorial and positive exhortation of Sokratês exhibited by, vii. 123; remarks of, on exhibited by, vii. 123; remarks of, on the accusation against Sokratês, vii. 149; on the condemnation of Sokra-tês, vii. 158; and his joining of the Cyreian army, vii. 184; length of the parasang in, vii. 185 (n. 4); dream of, after the seizure of the generals, vii. 244; address of, to the captains of the Ten Thousand, after the seizure of the generals, vii. 246; chosen a general of the Ten Thousand, vii. 246; first speech of, to the Ten Thousand, vii. sand, after being chosen a general, vii.247 seq.; great ascendency acquired by, over the Ten Thousand, vii. 250 seq.; and Cheirisophus, vii. 260, 264, 273; prowess of, against the Persians, vii. 259 seq.; in the monntains of the Karduchians, vii. 261 seq.; at the Kentritês, vii. 266 seq.; propositions of, to the Ten Thousand at Trapezus, vii. 292; his idea of founding a new city on the Euxine, vii. 299 seq.; charges against, and speeches of, at Kotyora, vii. 301 seq.; offered the sole command of the Ten Thousand, vii. 312; at Herakleia and Kalpê, vii. 312 seq.; and Kleander, vii.316 seq.; at Byzantinm, vii. 321; and Anaxibius, vii. 330, 331 seq.; takes leave of the Ten Thousand, vii. 330; rejoins the Ten Thousand, vii. 334; and Aristarchus, vii. 333; and Seuthês, vii. 334, 335 seq.; his poverty and

XERXÊS.

sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios, vii. 338 seq.; at Pergamus in Mysia, vii. 340 seq.; takes his second farewell of the Ten Thousand, vii. 342; and the Cyreian army under the Lacedemonians. reian army under the Lacedemonians, vii. 342, 376 (n. 3), 474, 479; banishment of, by the Athenians, vii. 343 and n. 1; at Skillus, vii. 344 seq.; later life of, vii. 345; and Deinarchus, vii. 346 (n. 2); on the conduct of Sparta between B.C. 387-379, viii. 74; partiality of, to Sparta, in his Hellenica, viii. 219 (n. 1); on the results of the battle of Mantineia, viii 334.

Mantineia, viii. 334.

Xerxés, chosen as successor to Darius, iv. 103; instigated to the invasion of Greece, iv. 104; resolves to invade Greece, iv. 105; deliberation and dreams of, respecting the invasion of Greece, iv. 109 seq.; vast preparations of, for the invasion of Greece, iv. 112 seq.; march of, to Sardis, and collection of his forces there, iv. 114; throws two bridges across the Hellespont, iv. 115; wrath of, on the destruction of his bridges across the Hellespont, iv. 115; pnnishment of the Hellespont by, iv. 116 seq.; second bridges of, over the Hellespont, iv. 118 seq.; ship-canal of, across the isthmus of Mount Athos, iv. 122 seq.; bridges of, across the Strymon, iv. 125; demands of sent to Greece before his invasion, iv. 125, 155; and the mare which brought forth a hare, iv. 125 (n. 1); march of, from Sardis, iv. 126; and Pythius, the Phrygian, iv. 127; march of, to Abydos, iv. 129; respect shown to Ilium by, iv. 129; crossing of the Hellespont by, iv. 131 seq.; march of, to Doriskus, iv. 131; review and muster of the forces of, at Doriskus, iv. 132; numbering of the army of, at Doriskus, iv. 132; number of the army of, iv. 134 seq.; conversa-tions of, with Demaratns, iv. 139, 184, 193; march of, from Doriskus along Thrace, iv. 140 seq.; crosses the Stry-mon and marches to Akanthus, iv. 141; march of, to Therma, iv. 142; favourable prospects of, on reaching the boundary of Hellas, iv. 143; pre-parations of, known beforehand in Greece, iv. 155; heralds of, obtain submission from many Grecian cities, iv. 155; alarm and mistrust in Greece on the invasion of, iv. 157; unwillingness or inability of northern Greeks to resist, iv. 162; inability of Gelon to join in resisting the invasion of, iv. 164; the Thessalians and the invasion of, iv. 164; Grecian army sent to defend Tempê against, iv. 165; abandon-

10-32*

XERXÊS.

ment of the defence of Tempê against, iv. 166 seq.; submission of northern Greeks to, after the retreat from Tempê, iv. 167; engagement of confederate Greeks against such as joined, iv. 169; first encounter of the fleet of, with that of the Greeks, iv. 178; movements of, from Therma to Thermopylæ, iv. 180; movements of the fleet of, from Therma to Thermopylæ, iv. 180 (n. 3); destruction of the fleet of, by storm at Magnesia, iv. 181 seq.; delay of, with his land force near Trachis, iv. 183 seq.; impressions of, about the defenders at Thermopýlæ, iv. 184 ; at Thermopylæ, doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to, iv. 184; the mountain-path avoiding Thermopylæ revealed to, iv. 186; impressions of, after the combat with Leonidas, iv. 193; Demeratus' advice to, after the death of Leonidas, iv. 193; manœuvres ascribed to, respecting the dead at Thermopylæ, iv. 200; losses of, repaired after the 1V. 200; losses of, repared above the battle of Thermopyle, iv. 202; abandonment of Attica on the approach of, iv. 205 seq.; occupation of Attica and Athens by, iv. 209; conversation of, with Arcadians, on the Olympic games, iv. 209; detachment of, against Delphi, iv. 211; capture of the Acropolis at Athens by, iv. 212 seq.; number of the fleet of, at Salamis, iv. 215 (n. 1); reviews his fleet at Phalerum, and calls a council of war, iv. 215; resolution of, to fight at Salamis, iv. 216; Themistokles' message to, before the battle of Salamis, iv. 222; surrounds the Greeks at Salamis, iv. 224 seq; and the fleets at Salamis, position of, iv. 227; story of three nephews of, at Salamis, iv. 227 (n.3); fears of, after the battle of Salamis, iv. 232; resolves to go back to Asia after the battle of Salamis, iv. 233 seq.; sends his fleet to Asia after the battle of Salamis, iv. 232; Mardonius' proposal to, after the battle of Salamis, iv. 233; Themistoklês' message to, after the battle of Salamis, iv. 235; retreating march of, to

ZOPYRUS.

the Hellespont, iv. 238 seq.; and Artayktês, iv. 292; causes of the repulse of, from Greece, iv. 330; comparison between the invasion of, and that of Alexander, iv. 331; death of, vii. 174.

Xuthus, i. 95 seq., 99; and Kreusa, i. 183.

Z.

Zab, the Great, the Ten Thousand Greeks at, vii. 236 seq.; crossed by the Ten Thousand Greeks, vii. 254.

Zagreus, i. 18 (n. 1).
Zakynthus, iii. 220; Timotheus at, viii.
133; forces of Dion mustered at, ix.
82, 85; Dion's voyage from, to Herakleia, ix. 86.

Zaleukús, iii. 194. Zalmoxis, i. 400.

Zanklê, iii. 178; fate of, iv. 301 seq. Zariaspa, Alexander at, x. 149.

Zêlos, i. 7. Zeno of Elea, vii. 23, 25.

Zephyrus, i. 6. Zêtês and Kalais, i. 183.

Zethus and Amphiôn, Homeric legend

of, i. 235, 241 seq.

Zeugitæ, ii. 486; Boeckh's opinion on the pecuniary qualification of, ii. 487


Zeus, i. 2, 6, 7, 8, 12; Homeric, i. 12; account of, in the Orphic Theogony, i. 17, 18; mythical character, names, and functions, i. 57 seq.; origin of the numerous mythes of, i. 58; and Prometheus, i. 59, 71; and Danaê, i. 85; and Alkmênê, i. 85; and Ægina, i. 170; and Eurôpa, i. 227; and Ganymêdês, i. 261; in the fourth book of the Iliad different from Zeus in the first and aighth; ii. 150; functioning first and eighth, ii. 120; fluctuation of Greek opinion on the supremacy of, iii. 412 (n. 2).

Zeus Ammon, Alexander's visit to the oracle of, x. 95.


Zeus Laphystios, i. 118. Zeus Lykæus, i. 160.

Zeus Meilichios, Xenophôn's sacrifice to, vii. 338 seq. Zopyrus, iii. 445.

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